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Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election . . . *Converse, Campbell, Miller and Stokes* . . . . . . . . . . 269

*Studies in Comparative Politics*

Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes . *Robert C. Tucker* . . . . . . 281

Comment on Tucker's "Movement-Regimes" . . . . . . *Peter Wiles* . . . . . . . . . . . . 290

Single-Party Systems in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *Ruth Schachter* . . . . . . . . 294

The Political Development of Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . *Martin C. Needler* . . . . . . 308

Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *W. Howard Wriggins* . . . . 313

Patterns of Group Development in a New Nation: Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *Douglas E. Ashford* . . . . . 321

*Studies in Congressional Organization*

Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate . . . . . . . . . . *Ralph K. Huitt* . . . . . . . . 333

House Committee Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *Nicholas A. Masters* . . . . . 345

Representation in Congress: The Case of the House Agriculture Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *Charles O. Jones* . . . . . . . 358

*Seminar Exercise*

The Chairman's Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *Bertrand de Jouvenel* . . . 368

*Communications to the Editor* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373

*Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *Thomas H. Eliot (ed.)* . . . 377

*News and Notes* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *Ralph A. Straetz* . . . . . . . . 459

*(For list of book reviews, see page 377)*

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# STABILITY AND CHANGE IN 1960: A REINSTATING ELECTION

Philip E. Converse, Angus Campbell, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes
*University of Michigan*

John F. Kennedy's narrow popular vote margin in 1960 has already insured this presidential election a classic position in the roll call of close American elections. Whatever more substantial judgments historical perspective may bring, we can be sure that the 1960 election will do heavy duty in demonstrations to a reluctant public that after all is said and done, every vote does count. And the margin translated into "votes per precinct" will become standard fare in exhortations to party workers that no stone be left unturned.

The 1960 election is a classic as well in the license it allows for "explanations" of the final outcome. Any event or campaign strategem that might plausibly have changed the thinnest sprinkling of votes across the nation may, more persuasively than is usual, be called "critical." Viewed in this manner, the 1960 presidential election hung on such a manifold of factors that reasonable men might despair of cataloguing them.

Nevertheless, it is possible to put together an account of the election in terms of the broadest currents influencing the American electorate in 1960. We speak of the gross lines of motivation which gave the election its unique shape, motivations involving millions rather than thousands of votes. Analysis of these broad currents is not intended to explain the hairline differences in popular vote, state by state, which edged the balance in favor of Kennedy rather than Nixon. But it can indicate quite clearly the broad forces which reduced the popular vote to a virtual stalemate, rather than any of the other reasonable outcomes between a 60-40 or a 40–60 vote division. And it can thereby help us to understand in parsimonious terms why a last feather thrown on the scales in November, 1960, could have spelled victory or defeat for either candidate.

## I. SURFACE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ELECTION

Any account of the election should not only be consistent with its obvious characteristics as they filtered clear from raw vote tallies in the days after the election, but should organize them into a coherent pattern of meaning as well. These characteristics are, of course, the ones that have nourished post-election speculation. In addition to the close partisan division of the popular vote, the following items deserve mention:

(1) *The remarkably high level of turnout.* About 62.7 percent of estimated adults over 21 voted in the 1952 election, a figure which had stood as the high-water mark of vote turnout in recent presidential elections. The comparable turnout proportion for the 1960 presidential election appears to have been 64.3 per cent.[1]

(2) *Upswing in turnout in the South.*[2] The South

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[1] Estimates of turnout lack much meaning except as raw vote totals are stated as a proportion of the potential electorate. Whereas the number of adults over 21 in the nation is known with reasonable precision, the number of adult citizens over 21 who are "eligible" according to any of several possible definitions depends on cruder estimates, which can be quite diverse. For the 1952 figure we employ here Table No. 446 for the "Civilian Population 21 Years and Older," *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1958 edition). The 1960 figure rests on an estimated 107 million adults over 21.

[2] The South is defined throughout this article to include 15 border and deep Southern States. Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kentucky, West Virginia and Maryland (but not Delaware) are included and form the western and northern boundaries of the region.

appears to have contributed disproportionately to the high level in turnout. Outside the South, the increase in total presidential votes cast in 1960 relative to the 1956 election was about 7 percent, a figure scarcely exceeding estimated population growth in this period. In the South, however, presidential ballots in 1960 increased by more than 25 per cent relative to 1956, an increase far outstripping population growth in this region.[3]

(3) *Stronger Republican voting at the presidential level.* On balance across the nation Nixon led Republican tickets, while Kennedy trailed behind many other Democratic candidates, especially outside of the Northeast. These discrepancies in the partisanship of presidential voting and ballots at other levels were not, of course, as striking as those in 1956. Nevertheless, their political significance has an obvious bearing on the future expectations of the two youthful candidates, and therefore occasions special interest.

(4) *The stamp of the religious factor in 1960 voting patterns.* While the Kennedy victory was initially taken as proof that religion had not been important in the election, all serious students of election statistics have since been impressed by the religious axis visible in the returns. Fenton, Scammon, Bean, Harris and others have commented upon the substantial correlation between aggregate voting patterns and the relative concentration of Catholics and Protestants from district to district.

Of these surface characteristics, probably the last has drawn most attention. Once it became clear that religion had not only played some part but, as these things go, a rather impressive part in presidential voting across the nation, discussions came to hinge on the nature of its role. It could safely be assumed that Kennedy as a Catholic had attracted some unusual Catholic votes, and had lost some normally Democratic Protestant votes. A clear question remained, however, as to the *net* effect. The *New York Times*, summarizing the discussion late in November, spoke of a "narrow consensus" among the experts that Kennedy had won more than he lost as a result of his Catholicism.[4] These are questions, however, which aggregate vote statistics can but dimly illuminate, as the disputed history of Al Smith's 1928 defeat makes clear. Fortunately in 1960 the election was studied extensively by sample surveys, permitting more exact inferences to be drawn.

The national sample survey conducted by the Survey Research Center of The University of Michigan in the fall of 1960 had features which give an unparalleled opportunity to comment on the recent evolution of the American electorate. The fall surveys were part of a long-term "panel" study, in which respondents first interviewed at the time of the 1956 presidential election were reinterviewed.[5] In the fall of 1956 a sample of 1763 adults, chosen by strict probability methods from all the adults living in private households in the United States, had been questioned just before and just after the presidential election. This initial sample was constituted as a panel of respondents and was interviewed again in 1958 and twice in connection with the 1960 presidential election.[6] These materials permit the linking of

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[3] Population growth in areas such as Texas and Florida includes the immigration of American citizens from outside the South who are more accustomed to voting in every election than are Southerners. It seems almost certain, however, that there was a real increase in motivation among long-term Southern residents as well. The factor of population change was quite insufficient to account for the 1960 increase in Southern turnout.

[4] *New York Times*, November 20, 1960, Section 4, p. E5.

[5] Results of the 1956 survey, considered as a simple cross-section sample of the nation, are reported in Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960). There are natural difficulties in any attempt to retain contact with a farflung national sample over periods of two and four years, especially in a population as geographically mobile as that of the current United States. Of the original 1763 respondents interviewed twice in 1956, nearly 100 had died before the 1960 interview. Others had been effectively removed from the electorate by advanced senility or institutionalization. Of the remaining possible interviews, numbering somewhat over 1600 people, more than 1100 were successfully reinterviewed in the fall of 1960. The 1956 social, economic and political characteristics of the 1960 survivors show almost no sign of deviation from the characteristics of the larger pool of original 1956 respondents. Therefore, although attrition may seem substantial, there is no evidence of alarming bias.

[6] The sequence of interviews in 1956, 1958 and 1960 was carried out under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation. The 1960 sample design provided not only contact with the 1956 panel which, due to aging, no longer gave an adequate representation of the 1960 electorate, but also a set of additional interviews filling out an up-to-

1960 and 1956 voting behavior with unusual reliability.[7]

## II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ELECTORATE, 1956–1960

The difference in presidential election outcome between 1956 and 1960 might depend upon either or both of two broad types of change in the electorate. The first includes shifts in the physical composition of the electorate over time due to non-political factors, *i.e.*, vital processes. Some adult citizens who voted in 1956 were no longer part of the eligible electorate in 1960, primarily because of death or institutionalization. On the other hand, a new cohort of voters who had been too young to vote in 1956 were eligible to participate in the 1960 election. Even in a four-year period, vital processes alone could account for shifts in the vote. In addition, changes in the electoral vote, though not in the nationwide popular vote margin, might result from voters changing their residences without changing their minds.

Secondly, there are obviously genuine changes in the political choice of individuals eligible to vote in both elections. Such citizens may enter or leave the active electorate by choice, or may decide to change the partisanship of their presidential vote.

The contribution of these two types of change to the shift in votes from a 1956 Eisenhower landslide to a narrow 1960 Kennedy margin—a net shift toward the Democrats of almost 8 percent—may be analyzed. Somewhat less than 10 percent of the eligible 1956 electorate had become effectively ineligible by 1960, with death as the principal cause.[8] Older people naturally bulk large in this category. The felt party affiliation or "party identification" expressed in 1956 by these "departing" respondents was somewhat Republican relative to the remainder of the sample.[9] Nonetheless, these people cast a vote for president which was about 48 percent Democratic, or 6 percent *more Democratic* than the vote of the 1956 electorate as a whole. Although this appears to be a contradiction, it is actually nothing more than a logical consequence of existing theory. The high Republican vote in 1956 depended on a massive defection to Eisenhower by many people identified with the Democratic party. Since the strength of party attachments increases as a function of age, and since defections are inversely related to strength of party identification, it follows that 1956 defection rates were much higher among younger citizens than among older.[10] The data make it clear that the group of older people voting for the last time in 1956 had cast a much straighter "party vote" than their juniors. Only about 5 percent of these older Democrats had defected to Eisenhower, as opposed to about a quarter of all Democrats in the electorate as a whole. So both things are true: this departing cohort was more Republican than average in party identification but had voted more Democratic than average in 1956. If we remove them from the 1956 electorate, then, we arrive at a presidential vote of about 60 percent for Eisenhower among those voters who were to have the option of voting again in 1960. Hence the elimination of this older group from consideration increases the amount of partisan change to be accounted for between 1956 and 1960, rather than decreasing it.

Comparable isolation of the new cohort of young voters in 1960 does very little to change the picture. Little more than one half of this new group of voters normally votes in the first election of eligibility;[11] furthermore, in 1960

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date cross-section sample of all adult citizens living in private households in 1960. Analysis of the additional interview material is being carried out under a grant from the Social Science Research Council. Both the panel and cross-section bodies of data contribute, where appropriate, to materials in this article.

[7] The longitudinal analysis of political change permitted by a panel design can only be poorly approximated in simple cross-section surveys, where deductions must rest on the respondent's recollection of his behavior in time past. Most analysts have justly felt uncomfortable with recall materials of this sort, since it has been clear that the accuracy of a vote report declines rapidly as time passes. In both 1958 and 1960, we asked our respondents to recall their 1956 vote. The results, as compared with actual reports collected just after the 1956 election, demonstrate forcefully the inaccuracies which accumulate with time.

[8] Throughout this article, the "eligible electorate" is taken to consist of those non-institutionalized citizens over 21. Negroes disqualified in many parts of the South, for example, are included in this bounding of the electorate, as well as those who had moved too recently to have established new voting residences in 1960.

[9] The concept of party identification is treated in detail, Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 120 ff.

[10] Our theoretical understanding of this net of relationships is suggested *ibid.*, pp. 161–167.

[11] Participation rates by age in 1960 follow rather nicely the rates indicated *ibid.*, Fig. 17-1, p. 494.

its two-party vote division differed only negligibly from that of the nation as a whole. As a result, its analytic removal leaves the vote among the remainder of the electorate nearly unchanged. By way of summary, then, differences in the 1956 and 1960 electorates arising from vital processes do not explain the 1956–1960 vote change; if anything, they extend the amount of change to be otherwise explained.

We may further narrow our focus by considering those people eligible in both 1956 and 1960, who failed to join the active electorate in 1960. A very large majority of these 1960 non-voters had not voted in 1956, and represent Negroes in the South as well as persistent non-voters of other types. Among those who *had* voted in 1956, however, the vote had been rather evenly divided between Eisenhower and Stevenson. As with the older voters, removal of this group leaves an active 1956–1960 electorate whose vote for Eisenhower now surpasses 60 percent, broadening again the discrepancy between the two-party divisions in the 1956 and 1960 votes. The final fringe group which we may set aside analytically is constituted of those citizens eligible to have voted in 1956 who did not then participate, yet who joined the electorate in 1960. The fact that young voters often "sit out" their first presidential election or two indicates part of the composition of such a group. Once again, however, these newly active citizens divided their ballots in 1960 almost equally between the two major candidates, and the residual portion of the 1960 electorate changes little with their removal.

By this point we have eliminated all the fringe groupings whose entry or departure from the active electorate might have contributed to change in the national vote division between 1956 and 1960. We come to focus directly, then, on the individuals who cast a vote for Kennedy or Nixon in 1960 *and had voted for president in 1956* (Table I). As we see, paring away the fringe groupings has had the total effect of increasing the net shift in the vote division between the two years from 8 percent to 11 percent. If we can explain this shift it will be clear that we have dealt with those broad currents in the electorate which brought the 1960 election to a virtual stalemate.

Naturally, the most interesting features of Table I are the cells involving vote changers. In a sequence of elections such as the 1956–1960 series it is a temptation to assume that about 8 percent of the Eisenhower voters of 1956 shifted to Kennedy in 1960, since this was the net observable change between the two years. Much analysis of aggregate election statistics is forced to proceed on this assumption within any given voting unit. However, we see that the net shift of 11 percent in the vote of the active 1956–1960 electorate in fact derived from a gross shift of 23 percent, over half of which was rendered invisible in the national totals because counter-movements cancelled themselves out.

TABLE I. 1956–1960 VOTE CHANGE WITHIN THE ACTIVE CORE OF THE ELECTORATE

| 1960 Vote for ↓ | 1956 Vote for Stevenson % | 1956 Vote for Eisenhower % | Total % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kennedy | 33 | 17 | 50 |
| Nixon | 6 | 44 | 50 |
| | 39 | 61 | 100 |

Note: Since we usually think of vote shifts in terms of proportions of the total electorate, percentages in this table use the total vote as a base, rather than row or column totals.

A traditional analysis of these vote changers would specify their membership in various population groupings such as age and occupation category, union membership, race and the like. However, results of this sort in 1960 are so uniform across most of these population groupings that they seem to reflect little more than national trends, and change seems at best loosely connected with location in various of these specific categories. If we took the fact in isolation, for example, we might be struck to note that union members voted almost 8 percent more Democratic in 1960 than in 1956. However, such a figure loses much of its interest when we remind ourselves that people who are not labor union members also shifted their votes in the same direction and in about the same degree between 1956 and 1960. Such uniform changes characterize most of the standard sociological categories.

There is, of course, one dramatic exception. Vote change between 1956 and 1960 follows religious lines very closely. Within the 6 percent of the active 1956–1960 electorate who followed a Stevenson-Nixon path (Table I), 90 percent are Protestant and only 8 percent are Catholic. Among the larger group of Eisenhower-Kennedy changers, however, only 40 percent are Protestant and close to 60 percent are Catholic. In the total vote in 1956 and 1960, Protestants show almost no net partisan change. Eisenhower had won 64 percent of the "Protestant vote" in 1956; Nixon won 63 percent. Meanwhile, the Democratic proportion of the two-party vote among Catholics across the nation skyrocketed from a rough 50 percent in the two Eisenhower elections to a vote of 80 percent for Kennedy. These gross totals appear to substantiate the early claims of Kennedy backers that a Catholic candidate would draw back to the Democratic party sufficient Catholics to carry the 1960 election. Furthermore, it appears that Kennedy must have gained more votes than he lost by virtue of his religious affiliation, for relative to Stevenson in 1956, he lost no Protestant votes and attracted a very substantial bloc of Catholic votes.

The question of net gains or losses as a result of the Catholic issue is not, however, so simply laid to rest. The data cited above make a very strong case, as have the aggregate national statistics, that religion played a powerful role in the 1960 outcome. The vote polarized along religious lines in a degree which we have not seen in the course of previous sample survey studies. Moreover, the few interesting deviations in the 1960 vote of other population groupings, to the degree that they are visible at all, seem with minor exceptions to reflect the central religious polarization. That is, where a group exceeded or fell below the magnitude of the national shift to the Democrats, it is usually true that the group is incidentally a more or less Catholic group. The central phenomenon therefore was religious; the question as to its net effect favoring or disfavoring Kennedy remains open.

In a strict sense, of course, the answers to this question can only be estimated. We know how the election came out, with Kennedy a Catholic. We cannot, without major additional assumptions, know what the election returns might have been if Kennedy were a Protestant and all other conditions remained unchanged. We can make an estimate, however, if we can assume some baseline, some vote that would have occurred under "normal" circumstances. A number of such baselines suggest themselves. We might work from the 1956 presidential vote, as we have done above (42 percent Democratic); or from the more recent Congressional vote in 1958 (56 percent Democratic); or from some general average of recent nation-wide votes. But it is obvious that the simple choice of baseline will go a long way toward determining the answer we propose to the question of net religious effect. If we choose the 1958 vote as a baseline, it is hard to argue that Kennedy could have made any net gains from his religion; if we choose the 1956 presidential vote, it is equally hard to argue that he lost ground on balance.

Indeed, the most cogent arguments documenting a net gain for Kennedy—those accounts which appear to express the majority opinion of election observers—use the 1956 presidential vote quite explicitly as a baseline. Yet the second Eisenhower vote seems the most bizarre choice for a baseline of any which might be suggested. The vote Eisenhower achieved in 1956 stands out as the most disproportionately Republican vote in the total series of nation-wide presidential and Congressional elections stretching back to 1928. In what sense, then, is this extreme Republican swing plausible as a "normal vote?" Its sole claim seems to lie in the fact that it is the most recent presidential election. Yet other recent elections attest dramatically to the extreme abnormality of the 1956 Eisenhower vote. In the 1954 Congressional elections the nation's Democrats, although they turned out less well than Republicans in minor elections, still fashioned a solid majority of votes cast. The fall of 1958 witnessed a Democratic landslide. Even in 1956, "underneath" Eisenhower's towering personal margin, a Democratic popular vote majority exceeding that which Kennedy won in 1960 appeared at other levels of the ticket. Finally, if 1956 is taken as a normal baseline and if it is true that Kennedy did score some relative personal success in 1960, how can we possibly explain the fact that other diverse Democrats on state tickets around the nation tended to win a greater proportion of popular votes than he attracted?

It seems more reasonable to suggest that Kennedy did not in any sense *exceed* the "normal" vote expectations of the generalized and anonymous Democratic candidate; rather, he fell visibly below these expectations, although nowhere nearly as far below them as Adlai Stevenson had fallen. This proposition is congruent not only with the general contours of election returns in the recent period, but with the great mass of sample survey data collected in the past decade as well. With this proposition we can draw into a coherent pattern the several surface characteristics which seemed intriguing from the simple 1960 vote totals. With it, we can locate the 1960 election more generally in the stream of American political history.

## III. THE BASIC VOTING STRENGTH OF THE TWO PARTIES

We have found it of great explanatory value to think of election results as reflecting the interplay of two sets of forces: stable, long-term partisan dispositions and short-term forces specific to the immediate election situation. The long-term partisan dispositions are very adequately represented by our measures of party identification. The stability of these dispositions over time is a matter of empirical record.[12] Their partisan division over any period, as it may favor one party or the other, provides the point from which one must start to understand any specific election. This underlying division of loyalties lends itself admirably to the goal of indicating what a "normal" vote would be, aside from specific forces associated with the immediate election.

In these terms, the basic Democratic majority in the nation is scarcely subject to dispute. Year in and year out since 1952, national samples of the American electorate have indicated a preference for the Democratic party by a margin approaching 60–40. However, since no election in recent years has shown a Democratic margin of this magnitude, it would be as absurd to take a 60–40 Democratic majority for a baseline as it would be to work from the 1956 presidential vote. Actually there is little temptation to do so. Over the years large amounts of information have been accumulated on the behavior of people identifying with the two major parties, and it is clear that the realistic voting strength of the Democrats—and this is the sort of baseline which interests us—falls well short of a 60–40 majority. The fact that heavy Democratic majorities in the South are concealed by low voting turnout is but one factor which reduces realistic Democratic strength. Outside the South, as well, Democrats under the same conditions of short-term stimulation are less likely to vote than Republicans.

It is possible to manipulate the data in such a fashion as to take into account all of the significant discrepancies between nominal party identification and realistic voting strength. We thereby arrive at a picture of the vote division which could be expected in the normal presidential election, if short-term forces associated with the election favored neither party in particular, but stood at an equilibrium. In such circumstances, we would expect a Democratic proportion of the two-party popular vote to fall in the vicinity of 53–54 percent.[13] Outside of the South, such a vote would fall short of a 50–50 split with the Republicans; within the South there would be a strong Democratic majority exceeding a 2-to-1 division.

Short-term forces associated with a specific election may, according to their net partisan strength, send the actual vote in that election deviating to one side or the other of the equilibrium point. In 1952 and 1956 the popularity of Eisenhower constituted one such force, and this force was strongly pro-Republican. The distortions produced in the behaviors of party identifiers of different types have now become familiar. If the net partisan force is strong, as in 1956, identifiers of the favored party vote almost *en bloc*, without defection. The small group of "independents" who do not commit themselves to either party divide very disproportionately in favor of the advantaged party, instead of dividing their vote equally as in the equilibrium case. And members of the disfavored party defect in relatively large numbers, as Democrats did in 1956. A useful description of any specific election, then is an account of the short-term forces which have introduced these strains across the distribution of party identification.

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[12] The absence of any significant change in the distribution of party loyalties throughout the Eisenhower period is best illustrated by Table 6-1, *ibid.*, p. 124. Distributions drawn in 1959 and 1960 continue the same pattern. Furthermore, there is no evidence that this surface stability of party identification is concealing a great flux of compensating changes beneath the surface. There have indeed been one or two slow, modest evolutions since 1952 which do involve compensating changes and hence are not visible in simple distributions. Nevertheless, our panel data show strikingly that among all the political orientations which we measure, partisan identification is by far the most stable for individuals over the periods which our data cover.

[13] This figure should be taken to indicate a rough range. It would vary upward or downward slightly according to the assumptions made concerning the overall proportion of the electorate turning out. While the computations underlying this estimate are tedious, their rationale is entirely straightforward. Turnout rates and the two-party vote division within each of seven categories of party identifiers have shown remarkable regularities over the range of elections which we have studied. These rates are not constant from election to election, but do vary for each type of identifier quite dependably as a function of the net balance of short-term partisan forces characterizing the specific election. While we have observed no election which registered a perfect equilibrium of these forces, we have observed situations in which net forces were Democratic (e.g., 1958) as well as Republican (e.g., 1952 or 1956). It is therefore possible to compute the turnout rate and two-party vote division which could be expected for each type of party identifier in the intermediate case in which short-term forces are balanced. The estimate employed above derives from a summation of these computations across categories of identifiers, weighted in a fashion appropriate to represent the entire electorate.

In such a description, the existing division of deeper party loyalties is taken for granted. Its current character is not to be explained by the immediate political situation. The point is made most clearly by the 1960 election. The fact that the Democrats enjoyed a standing majority was in no way a consequence of the personal duel between Kennedy and Nixon, for it was a majority created long before either candidate became salient as a national political figure, and long before most of the campaign "issues" of 1960 had taken shape. In this perspective, then, we can consider some of the forces which drew the 1960 vote away from its equilibrium state.

### IV. SHORT-TERM FORCES IN THE 1960 ELECTION

Popular vote tallies show that Kennedy received 49.8 percent of the two-party vote outside of the South, and 51.2 percent of the popular vote cast in the South. The vote outside the South is almost 1 percent more Democratic than our equilibrium estimates for this part of the nation. In the South, however, the Democratic deficit relative to the same baseline approaches 17 percent. Naturally, some short-term forces may balance out so that no net advantage accrues to either party. But the comparisons between our baselines and the 1960 vote suggest that we should find some short-term forces which gave a very slight net advantage to Kennedy outside of the South, and yet which penalized him heavily within the South.

As in all elections that attract a wide degree of public attention, a number of short-term forces were certainly at work in 1960. A comprehensive assessment of these forces must await further analysis. However, there can be little doubt that the religious issue was the strongest single factor overlaid on basic partisan loyalities in the 1960 election, and we have focused most of our initial analyses in this area. Fortunately we know a great deal about the "normal" voting behavior within different religious categories, and can use this knowledge to provide baselines which aid in estimating the net effect of Kennedy's Catholicism upon his candidacy.

*The Catholic Vote.* As we have observed, the vote division among Catholics soared from a 50–50 split in the two Eisenhower contests to an 80–20 majority in the 1960 presidential vote. However, it is hard to attribute all of this increment simply to the Kennedy candidacy. In the 1958 election, when there were mild short-term economic forces favoring the Democratic party, the vote among Catholics went well over 70 percent in that direction. Ever since our measurements of party indentification began in 1952, only a small minority—less than 20 percent—of Catholics in the nation have considered themselves as Republicans, although a fair portion have typically styled themselves as "Independents." Most of what attracted attention as a Republican trend among Catholics during the 1950's finds little support in our data, at least as a trend peculiar to Catholics. To be sure, many Democratic Catholics defected to vote for Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. So did many Democratic Protestants. As a matter of fact, the defection rate among Democratic Catholics in 1952 was very slightly less than among Democratic Protestants, and in 1956 was very slightly more. In neither case do the differences exceed sampling error. There is some long-term evidence of a faint and slow erosion in the Catholic Democratic vote; but this has been proceeding at such a glacial pace that the 1956–1960 vote trends which we are treating here dwarf it completely. There is no reason to believe that the short-term personal "pull" exerted on Democrats generally by Eisenhower had a different strength for Catholics than for Protestants. The myths that have arisen to this effect seem to be primarily illusions stemming from the large proportion of Democrats who are Catholics. Their loss was painful in the two Eisenhower votes. But they were at the outset, and remained up to the first glimmer of the Kennedy candidacy, a strongly Democratic group.

We may specify this "normal" Democratic strength among Catholics by applying the same operations for Catholics alone that we have employed for the electorate as a whole. In the equilibrium case, it turns out that one would expect at least a 63 percent Democratic margin among Catholics. The difference between 63 percent and the 80 percent which Kennedy achieved can provisionally be taken as an estimate of the increment in Democratic votes among Catholics above that which the normal, Protestant Democratic presidential candidate could have expected.

We can readily translate this 17 percent vote gain into proportions of the total 1960 vote, taking into account levels of Catholic turnout and the like. On such grounds, it appears that Kennedy won a vote bonus from Catholics amounting to about 4 percent of the national two-party popular vote. This increment is, of course, very unequally divided between the South and the rest of the nation, owing simply to the sparse Catholic population in the South. Within the 1960 non-Southern electorate, Kennedy's net gain from the Catholic increment amounts to better than 5 percent of the two-party vote. The same rate of gain represents less than 1 percent of the Southern popular vote.

*The Anti-Catholic Vote.* Respondents talked to our interviewers with remarkable freedom about the Catholic factor during the fall of 1960. This is not to say that all respondents referred to it as a problem. There were even signs that some Protestant respondents were struggling to avoid mention of it although it was a matter of concern. Nonetheless, nearly 40 percent of the sample voluntarily introduced the subject before any direct probing on our part in the early stages of the pre-election questionnaire. Since this figure certainly understates the proportion of the population for whom religion was a salient concern in 1960, it testifies rather eloquently to the importance of the factor in conscious political motivations during the fall campaign.

These discussions of the Catholic question, volunteered by our respondents, will, in time, provide more incisive descriptions of the short-term anti-Catholic forces important in the election. Our interest here, however, is to estimate the magnitude of anti-Catholic voting in terms of otherwise Democratic votes which Kennedy lost. In such an enterprise, our material on the political backgrounds of our respondents is most useful.

We focus, therefore, upon the simple rates of defection to Nixon among Protestants who were identified in 1960 with the Democratic party. As Figure 1 shows, this defection rate is strongly correlated with regularity of attendance at a Protestant church. Protestant Democrats who, by self-description, never attend church, and hence are not likely to have much identification with it, defected to Nixon only at a rate of 6 percent. This rate, incidentally, is just about the "normal" defection rate which we would predict for both parties in the equilibrium case: it represents the scattered defections which occur for entirely idiosyncratic reasons in any election. Therefore, for Democrats who were nominal Protestants but outside the psychological orbit of their church, the short-term religious force set up by a Catholic candidacy had no visible impact. However, as soon as there is some evidence of identification with a Protestant church, the defection rate rises rapidly.

Although Protestant Independents are not included in Figure 1, they show the same gradient at a different level of the two-party vote division. The few Protestant Independents not attending church split close to the theoretically-expected 50–50 point. Then the Nixon vote rises to 61 percent in the "seldom" category; to 72 percent for the "often" category; and to 83 percent for the Protestant Independents attending church regularly. This increment of Republican votes above the "normal" 50-50 division for Independents matches remarkably the increment of Republican votes above the "normal" figure of 6 percent in the case of the Democrats.

We customarily find in our data certain substantial correlations between church attendance and political behavior. The correlation between church attendance and vote among Protestant Democrats and Independents is not, however, one of these.[14] The strong associations seem linked in an obvious way to the 1960 election. We need not assume, of course, that each defection pictured here represents a sermon from the pulpit and an obedient member of the congregation. Social science theory assures us that whether through sermons, informal communication or a private sense of reserve toward Catholicism, the faithful Protestant would react more negatively to the presidential candidacy of a Catholic than would more indifferent Protestants.[15] It remains notable, however, that Democrats who were at the same time regular Protestants defected to Nixon at rates far exceeding those which Eisenhower had attracted in 1952 or 1956.

We may use Figure 1, then, as a tool to estimate the magnitude of the anti-Catholic vote. It is easily argued that the area below the dotted line in Figure 1 represents "normal" defections within each category of church attendance, and that the votes represented by the triangle above the dotted line are votes which Kennedy lost on religious grounds. It is then a simple mechanical matter to convert this triangle into proportions of the popular vote for South and non-South.

On the surface, Figure 1 seems to say that the impact of the religious factor was very nearly the same, North and South, for the Southern gradient of defections is only slightly higher than the non-Southern gradient. If we think of the impact of short-term forces *on*

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[14] Re-examination of earlier data shows a faint residual relationship between Republican voting and church attendance among Democratic Protestants which is not statistically significant. In 1956, the rank-order correlations involved were about .05 both within and outside the South. On the other hand, the comparable coefficient for Independents in 1956 was negative, −.04. The text ignores these variations as probably inconsequential.

[15] This is simply a special case of propositions concerning group identifications more generally, discussed in Campbell *et al., op cit.*, ch. 12.



FIGURE 1. Defections to Nixon among Protestant Democrats as a Function of Church Attendance.

* The number of Protestant Democrats who "never" attend church in the South is too small for inclusion.

*individuals* as a function of their party and religious loyalties, this conclusion is proper. Indeed, as we consider in later analyses the impact by different types of Protestantism, it may well be that the character of the impact will show no remaining regional difference whatever. However, to construe Figure 1 as suggesting that the *magnitude* of the anti-Catholic effect was about the same in votes cast in North and South, is quite improper. The differences between the regions turn out to be substantial.

We must consider first that less than two-thirds of the active non-Southern electorate is Protestant, whereas within the South the electorate is almost completely (95 percent) Protestant. Secondly, Protestants are more faithful church-goers in the South than outside it. Quite specifically, we find that over half of the Southern presidential vote is cast by Protestants who go to church regularly, whereas less than 20 percent of the vote outside the South comes from regular, church-going Protestants. Finally, of the minority outside the South who are Protestant and attend church regularly, only a small proportion are Democratic identifiers: Republicans clearly predominate in this category. In the South, the situation is reversed, with regular Protestants being far more often than not Democratic identifiers.

This conjunction of regional differences means that the defecting votes represented in Figure 1 are of vastly different sizes, South and non-South. It turns out that outside the South regular, church-going Protestants who are Democrats cast only about 5 percent of the total non-Southern vote. Within the South, however, regular church-going Protestants who are Democrats contributed over 35 percent of the total Southern vote. Thus it is that the anti-Catholic impact in the South turns out to involve a much larger share of the votes than elsewhere. The anti-Catholic vote in the South fulfills our search for a short-term force of strong net Republican strength in that region.

Summing up these apparent anti-Catholic votes as proportions of the total vote in the

TABLE II. OFFSETTING EFFECTS OF THE CATHOLIC ISSUE, 1960 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL VOTE

| Area | % of 2-party vote in area |
|---|---|
| *Outside the South,* Kennedy's "unexpected" . . . | |
| Gains from Catholics | 5.2% |
| Losses from Protestant Democrats and Independents | −3.6 |
| NET | +1.6% |
| *Inside the South,* Kennedy's "unexpected" . . . | |
| Gains from Catholics | 0.7% |
| Losses from Protestant Democrats and Independents | −17.2 |
| NET | −16.5% |
| For the *nation as a whole,* Kennedy's "unexpected" . . . | |
| Gains from Catholics | 4.3% |
| Losses from Protestant Democrats and Independents | −6.5 |
| NET | −2.2% |

South, the non-South, and the nation as a whole, we can compare them with our estimations of the bonuses received by Kennedy from Catholics. Table II shows the balance sheet.

There is every reason to believe that these preliminary estimates under-estimate the importance of religion in the 1960 vote and, in particular, under-estimate the magnitude of the anti-Catholic vote. We have at no point taken account, for example, of the possibility that certain Republican identifiers, exposed to short-term forces which would normally have produced defections to the Democrats, may have been inhibited from such defection by Kennedy's Catholicism. In the midwest there were signs of a "farm revolt" favoring the Democrats which failed to materialize in the presidential balloting. At lower levels on farm belt tickets one finds that major Democratic candidates consistently surpassed "normal" Democratic expectations. Yet Kennedy seems to have been peculiarly insulated from any of this profit-taking: in these areas he lagged behind other major Democrats by a rather consistent 5 percent. It is difficult not to believe that at lower levels of office net short-term forces were favoring the Democrats, and Republican identifiers were defecting at unusual rates. Analyses may show that religion was a primary force inhibiting such defections at the presidential level.

Other early glimpses of our data also suggest the estimates of anti-Catholicism in Table II are conservative. It is likely that a number of non-religious short-term forces generated by the campaign itself were favorable to Kennedy on balance. As a number of other surveys reported, Nixon held a substantial lead over Kennedy in the early stages. At the outset, Kennedy was little known to the public: he stood primarily as the Democratic candidate and a Catholic. As the campaign went on, other and non-religious aspects of the Kennedy image filled in, and the public impression was usually positive. In this crucial shift in sentiment during the campaign, the television debates probably played an important role. Although there were Democrats who reacted warmly to Nixon's performance, our materials show quite strikingly that the net response to the debates favored Kennedy, as has been commonly supposed. In case studies, a reading of interviews has already turned up numerous Protestants of varying partisanship who were much more impressed by Kennedy as a candidate than by Nixon, yet who could not bring themselves to vote for a Catholic. In the measure that Kennedy's attractiveness as a candidate exceeded Nixon's and other short-term forces apart from religion were favoring the Democrats, the total popular vote should have been drawn to the Democratic side of the equilibrium point. The fact that it stayed instead on the Republican side may represent further damaging effects of religion for Kennedy.[16]

Refined analyses at a later date will permit us to estimate more adequately the role which all the major motivational factors, including religion, played in the 1960 outcome. For the moment, however, it is impressive the degree to which the surface characteristics of the 1960 election become intelligible even when viewed simply as the result of an "ancient" and enduring division of partisan loyalties overlaid by a short-term cross-current of religious motivation.

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[16] Two other motivational patterns associated with religion in 1960 deserve note. There were undoubtedly broad-minded Protestants who were drawn to a Kennedy vote out of a desire to see the religious precedent broken and hence buried; and there were undoubtedly Catholics who were drawn away from a Kennedy vote out of fear that the fact of a Catholic president would keep the religious issue uncomfortably prominent. It is hard to find instances of these viewpoints in our sample, however, and it is to be assumed that their incidence was slight.

Normally we would expect a national vote falling as close to its equilibrium point as the 1960 case to be a relatively low-turnout election. That is, a vote near the equilibrium point suggests either weak short-term forces or else a balance of stronger forces creating conflict in individuals and thereby lowering their motivation to vote. It is rare that forces strong enough to compel indifferent citizens to come out and vote do not also favor one party over the other quite categorically.

In 1960, however, the motivational picture underlying the vote was somewhat different, and can best be understood by separating the Protestant South from the rest of the nation. In the South, of course, a strong and unidirectional short-term force was reflected in a sharp departure from equilibrium and a surge in turnout, as fits normal expectations. What is abnormal is that this strong Republican short-term force raised motivation in a Democratic preserve, rather than diluting it through conflict. It is likely that conflict *was* created, especially where Democratic partisanship was strong. "Strong" Democrats in our sample made virtually no contribution to the 1960 rise in Southern turnout. The increase came from weaker Democrats, whose participation increased so radically over 1952 and 1956 that their turnout even surpassed that of strong Democrats in very exceptional fashion. For these voters, it seems likely that such forces as anti-Catholic feelings rapidly overcame relatively weak party loyalties and left strong motivation to turn out.

While turnout elsewhere did not show the same remarkable surge which appeared in the South, it remained at the fairly high level characteristic of the 1952 and 1956 elections, despite a partisan division of the vote near the regional equilibrium point. Strong balancing forces appear to have been in operation which did not create much conflict within individuals. The reason is clear: to the degree that religious motivations were engaged, forces were conflicting between groups rather than within individuals. Non-Southern Catholics, predominantly Democratic, were exposed to strong unidirectional short-term forces motivating them to get out and vote for Kennedy. Non-Southern Protestants, predominantly Republican, were exposed to contrary forces, at least where Protestant religious fidelity was strong. Thus the vote fell near the equilibrium point, but there was rather high turnout as well.

The other surface characteristics of the election are equally intelligible in these terms. Despite his position as majority candidate, Kennedy very nearly lost and tended to run behind his ticket. In the northeast, where concentrations of Catholics are greatest, his relation to the rest of the ticket was not generally unfavorable. The penalty he suffered becomes visible and consistent in the Midwest, where Catholics are fewer and Protestant church attendance is more regular. In the South, and for the same reasons, the differences between the Kennedy vote and that of other Democrats become large indeed. Everywhere, if one compares 1956 vote statistics with 1960 statistics, the course of political change is closely associated with the religious composition of voting units.

There was some relief even outside the more committed Democratic circles when the Kennedy victory, slight though it was, demonstrated that a Catholic was not in practice barred from the White House. Yet it would be naive to suppose that a Catholic candidate no longer suffers any initial disadvantage before the American electorate as a result of his creed. Not only did Kennedy possess a type of personal appeal which the television debates permitted him to exploit in unusual measure, but he was also the candidate of a party enjoying a fundamental majority in the land. Even the combination of these circumstances was barely sufficient to give him a popular vote victory. Lacking such a strong underlying majority, which Al Smith most certainly lacked in 1928, it is doubtful that the most attractive of Catholic presidential candidates in 1960 would have had much chance of success. It remains to be seen how far the experience of a Catholic president may diminish the disadvantage another time.

## V. THE 1960 ELECTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In a publication which appeared a few months prior to the 1960 elections[17] we posed the question of "how long a party can hope to hold the White House if it does not have a majority of the party-identified electorate." We had identified the two Eisenhower victories as "deviating elections," in which short-term forces had brought about the defeat of the majority party. We had not found any evidence in our 1952 or 1956 studies that these short-term forces were producing any significant realignment in the basic partisan commitments of the electorate. We felt that unless such a realignment did occur, "the minority party [could] not hope to continue its tenure in office over a very extended period."

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[17] Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, ch. 19.

We now know that the eight-year Eisenhower period ended with no basic change in the proportions of the public who identify themselves as Republican, Democrat, or Independent. If there had been an opportunity in 1952 for the Republican party to rewin the majority status it had held prior to 1932, it failed to capitalize on it. The Democratic party remained the majority party and the 1960 election returned it to the presidency. It was, to extend the nomenclature of our earlier publication, a "reinstating" election, one in which the party enjoying a majority of party identifiers returns to power. The 1960 election was remarkable not in the fact that the majority party was reinstated but that its return to power was accomplished by such a narrow margin. We had recognized the possibility that "the unfolding of national and international events and the appearance of new political figures" might swing the vote away from its natural equilibrium. We now see that such a deflection did occur and that it very nearly cost the majority party the election.

It may be argued that the deficit the Democratic presidential candidate suffered from his normal expectation did not derive from damaging circumstances which were specific to the 1960 election but from a progressive weakening in the willingness of some Democratic partisans to support their ticket at the presidential level. It has been suggested that some voters who consider themselves to be Democrats and customarily favor Democratic candidates at the lower levels of office may have come during the Eisenhower period to have a perverse interest in favoring Republican candidates for president, either because of notions of party balance in government, because of local considerations in their states, or simply out of admiration for Eisenhower.

Important differences no doubt exist between voting at the presidential level and voting for a congressman. Our studies have shown, for example, that the popular vote for lesser offices is a more party-determined vote than the vote for president and varies around the normal equilibrium vote figure within a much narrower range than does the presidential vote.[18] However, the supposition that Kennedy failed to win a normal Democratic majority because of a cadre of Democrats who are covertly Republican in their presidential voting is not supported by our data.

Table I has already demonstrated that the overall shift in partisanship of the vote between 1956 and 1960 cannot be explained as a simple unilateral movement of erstwhile Eisenhower Democrats. The election did not depend, as was often supposed, upon the number of Eisenhower Democrats whom Nixon could retain as "covert Republicans." Our panel materials show that if Nixon had been forced to depend only upon the Eisenhower Democrats whom he retained, he would have suffered a convincing 54–46 defeat, assuming that other Democrats had continued to vote for Kennedy. He did not suffer such a defeat because he drew a new stream of Democratic defections nearly sufficient to put him in the White House.

The patterns of short-term forces in the 1960 election were independent of those shaping the 1956 election, then, in the sense that they affected a new set of people, on new grounds. There were Democrats susceptible to Eisenhower in 1956; there were Democrats sensitive to religion in 1960: the two sets of people do not intersect much more than one would expect by chance. In short, there is little evidence that the two Eisenhower elections had created a set of Democrats peculiarly disposed to vote for a Republican presidential candidate.

Analysis of our 1960 data is not sufficiently complete to enable us to describe the entire pattern of forces to which the electorate was reacting on Election Day. We do not know, for example, what the partisan impact of international affairs, which had favored the Republican candidate so strongly in the preceding two elections, was in the 1960 election. We do not know the effect of the Negro discrimination issues. We do not know in detail as yet how the personal attributes of the major candidates, other than their religious affiliations, were evaluated by the public. We feel confident, however, that we will not find any short-term force which moved as large a fraction of the 1960 electorate as did the issue of a Catholic president. This was the major cause of the net departure of the vote totals from the division which the comparative underlying strength of the two parties in 1960 would have led us to expect. After two consecutive "deviating" elections won at a presidential level by the minority party, the 1960 election reinstated the Democratic party. But short-term forces generated by the immediate 1960 situation once again favored the Republicans on balance, and the difference in votes which separated this "reinstating election" from a third "deviating election" was slight indeed.

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[18] Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (Fall 1960), pp. 397–418.

# TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF MOVEMENT-REGIMES[1]

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Those who specialize in the study of Soviet government and politics are beginning to feel and acknowledge the need for a more effective theoretical apparatus. The post-war years of expanded research in this field have been fruitful in empirical studies of Soviet political history and institutions, but the theoretical development has not kept pace; and now the lag is beginning to inhibit the further fruitful progress of empirical research itself. Instead of a gradually developing body of theory, we still have a mélange of "ten theories in search of reality," as Daniel Bell has summed it up in the title of a recent article.[2]

The purpose of the present paper is not to propound an eleventh theory. It is only an exploratory effort, a consideration of a somewhat different approach to the problem than has been customary in the field of Soviet studies. In presenting it, I shall try to shed the blinkers of a Russian specialist and take a look at the whole political galaxy in which Russia is only the biggest star and probably no longer the brightest one.

## I

The best way out of the theoretical difficulty may lie in making the study of Soviet government and politics more comparative than it has generally been so far, thus bringing it into much closer working relations with political science as a whole and particularly with the slowly growing body of theory in comparative politics.[3] As this statement implies, our work on Soviet government and politics has been characterized by a certain theoretical isolationism. The underlying assumption of a great deal of it is that Soviet politics constitutes a unique subject-matter, a politcal world apart that can only be understood in terms of its own queer if not inimitable laws or motivations. Among the ten approaches surveyed by Bell we encounter, for example, "diaperology," or the view that Soviet politics is what it is largely because the leading participants may have been swaddled in babyhood. Another illustration is the theory of Nathan Leites, who finds at the bottom of Bolshevism and all its works "a reaction-formation to fears of death and latent homosexual impulses."[4]

It would not be accurate, however, to say that no one has studied the Soviet political system in a comparative political way. Indeed, much of the work done on this subject in the past fifteen years or so has been built around a kind of comparative concept—"totalitarianism." This term, it may be noted, was not originated by political scientists, but by totalitarians. It appears to have been put into currency by Mussolini or members of his circle.[5] Beginning in the late 1930s, however, Western students of dictatorship began to make use of it. The phenomenon of the totalitarian or all-embracing state was conceived as a distinctively new, twentieth-century development in the theory and practice of despotism. The Soviet Russian state, as reshaped under Stalin in the 1930s, was coupled with the nazi-fascist type of system under the general heading of "totalitarianism." They represented respectively the totalitarianism of the "left" and the totalitarianism of the "right"—two different species of one and the same new political genus. Though the political symbolisms differed, in all essentials the two types of system were identical. They shared the *Fuehrerprinzip*, the mass party brooking no opposition and extending its tentacles into all other organizations, the aggressive ideology and dynamism of external expansion, the use of the mass communications media to keep the controlled population always keyed up, the development of terror by concentration camp into a system of power, the penetration of the total state into every pore of the "atomized" society, and so on.[6]

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[1] This is a revised version of a paper read at the 1960 annual meeting of The American Political Science Association.

[2] "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior in the Social Sciences," *World Politics* (April 1958). The article is reprinted in A. Dallin, ed., *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs*, and will be quoted from this source.

[3] Gordon Skilling has advocated this view in his very useful article "Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (1960). Skilling is primarily interested in the comparative politics of different communist political systems, whereas I shall be concerned here with the comparative politics of communist and non-communist systems.

[4] *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs*, pp. 3, 5.

[5] Mussolini wrote the following in his article on the doctrine of fascism in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* in 1932: "The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values may exist, much less have any value. Thus understood, Fascism is totalitarian and the Fascist State, as a synthesis and a unit which includes all values, interprets, develops and lends additional power to the whole life of a people."

There was an obvious basis for this trend of thought. The fact is that Stalinism was essentially identical with Hitlerism and the other expressions of fascism. Unfortunately, however, the concept of the twin totalitarianisms of the left and the right did not clearly fix and delimit this fact. The theory of totalitarianism has tended to equate not Stalinism and fascism but communism and fascism, and this is a mistake. The two phenomena have a great deal in common, but they also differ significantly. The difference is visible and traceable within the political history of the Soviet Union itself. That is, communism differs from fascism as Leninism (or Bolshevism) differs from Stalinism. And a clear recognition of this is an essential prerequisite for the advancement of theory in comparative politics as it affects Russia and numerous other countries.

It must be said, too, that the theorists of totalitarianism are conscious of this difference. They show it by suggesting in various ways that Soviet totalitarianism is preeminently a phenomenon of the Stalin era. According to Wolfe, "the Soviet government had been established for more than a decade before Stalin, late in the twenties and into the early thirties, began to impose totalitarian controls upon it."[7] Arendt writes in the same general vein that: "To change Lenin's revolutionary dictatorship into full totalitarian rule, Stalin had first to create artificially that atomized society which had been prepared for the Nazis in Germany by historical circumstances."[8] Friedrich and Brzezinski observe, for their part, that the emergence of totalitarian government in the Soviet Union "is marked by Stalin's liquidation of his erstwhile colleagues in the USSR's leadership and more particularly by his epochal struggle with Trotsky."[9]

The implication of these statements is that something in the nature of a change of political configuration, a transformation of regime, occurred in Soviet Russia between Lenin's time and Stalin's, and this is quite true. Lenin's system—a "revolutionary dictatorship"—was revolutionized by Stalin in a process that involved, among other things, the repression of Lenin's Bolshevik Party, and was supplanted by a Stalinist totalitarian autocracy. This process of transformation is accurately describable as a political revolution, although Stalin, for psychological and political reasons of his own, never admitted that fact. He never permitted his own new political order to be officially described as "Stalinism," and maintained to the end the myth of complete continuity between the regime created in the October Revolution and the new regime created in and through his own political revolution from above.[10]

The theorists of totalitarianism, as has been indicated, recognize that a virtual change of regime occurred, but their theory does not. In effect, it says that the communist political system, established by Lenin and the Bolshevik Party, *is what it became* after Stalin revolutionized it and transformed it into a Stalinist political system. This is a questionable procedure from an analytical point of view. That Lenin's revolutionary dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party paved the way for Stalinism, and that the later system had much in common with the one it supplanted, is true. But if, on this account, we ignore the significant differences between them and view Stalinism as the effective reality of communism, we deprive ourselves of the theoretical basis for a comparative politics of the Soviet Union over time as well as a comparative politics of communism and fascism as two significantly different species of one genus.

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[6] The outstanding and most influential book written from this point of view is Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951). A notable attempt to develop the approach systematically has been made by Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski in *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (1956). Another effective proponent of the view is Bertram D. Wolfe, who calls totalitarianism "a total-power system" under which the state "strives to be *coextensive* with society." "The Durability of Soviet Despotism," *Commentary*, August, 1957, reprinted in A. Dallin, *op. cit.*

[7] Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism* (1954), pp. 335–336.

[8] *Origins of Totalitarianism*, p. 312.

[9] *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, p. 295.

[10] This analysis has been presented at greater length in the writer's paper on "The Politics of Soviet De-Stalinization," in *World Politics* (July 1957).

A good comparative concept should perform a dual discriminating function: it should direct attention to the ways in which similar phenomena differ, and simultaneously to the ways in which differing phenomena resemble each other. I have suggested that the concept of totalitarianism is deficient in the former respect since it fails to direct attention to significant differences between the closely resembling political phenomena of communism and fascism. I must now extend the argument by suggesting that it also fails to direct attention to significant resemblances between *both* these phenomena and a further class of phenomena belonging to the same genus: single-party systems of the nationalist species.[11]

This century has seen the rise of a large and still growing number of revolutionary nationalist regimes under single-party auspices. Turkey under Kemal-Ataturk, Nationalist China under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, Tunisia under Bourguiba, Egypt under Nasser and Ghana under Nkrumah are some among the many examples that might be cited. If we disregard all considerations of international relations and look at these regimes simply as regimes, we see a political phenomenon that calls for comparison with communist and fascist regimes. We see the need for a comparative-political framework within which communist, fascist and nationalist single-party regimes may be analyzed in terms of their significant similarities as well as their significant differences, or as three species of a single political genus.

The definition of the political genus presents obvious difficulties. Ideally this definition should fix upon (1) that which is common to all phenomena of the class and specific to no one of the three postulated sub-classes, and (2) that which differentiates this whole class of phenomena from others that may be more or less closely related to it. As a rough attempt I would propose the following formula: *the revolutionary mass-movement regime under single-party auspices.* For brevity I shall refer to it as the "movement-regime."

In advocating this category as a tool of comparative analysis, it is not my object to suggest that the notion of totalitarianism is useless or ought to be discarded from political science. The frequency with which we employ it in political discourse strongly indicates that it answers to a genuine need of intellectual communication. My thesis is simply that the concept of totalitarianism has not adequately stimulated the progress of research in the comparative study of the novel forms of authoritarianism that have arisen in profusion in this century, and that it will have its scientific uses *within* a comparative politics of movement-regimes. Otherwise expressing it, the totalitarian dictatorship as such is not the novel political phenomenon of the present century, but at most one of the forms that this phenomenon takes. The distinctively new type of political formation that needs to be studied as a general form and in its specific varieties is the revolutionary mass-movement regime under single-party auspices.

## II

The first element of the formula—"revolutionary"—establishes that we are dealing with regimes born in revolutionary struggle and that once in being they strive to maintain revolutionary momentum. The movement to displace the preexisting system of order then becomes a revolutionary movement for national renovation, or a movement to carry the revolution beyond the national borders, or both. In the case of the nationalist movement-regimes, especially in more recent times, the original revolutionary struggle is typically directed against a foreign colonial regime or regime of foreign dependency. With communist and fascist regimes, the typical—though not necessary or invariable—pattern is one of revolutionary struggle against an indigenous order that is treated *as though* it were foreign. So Lenin in 1902 conceived the Russian revolutionary movement as a nation-wide resistance movement against an essentially alien Tsarist monarchy and its supporters, and for Hitler the Weimar Republic was an un-German phenomenon. Stalin's was a marginal case in which the revolution against the pre-existing (Bolshevik) system of order was conducted from above. It is notable, however, that the purged old Bolshevik leadership was condemned as a treasonable, anti-national element.

The reader may have wondered why "ideology" was not included as an independent element of the formula. It might have been, but for simplicity's sake it seems preferable to consider this extremely important factor under the "revolutionary" heading. The ideology is, in its core, a philosophy of the revolution and program of the revolutionary struggle. As such it not only provides political orientation but serves as a powerful organizing instrument in the hands of the leadership. As Lenin said, "Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."[12] Every movement-regime is associated with an ideology. As will be suggested later in this paper, comparative analysis of the ideologies may be useful in differentiating communist, fascist and nationalist forms of the movement-regime.

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[11] It must be said to the credit of Arendt that she stresses the relationship between the nineteenth-century "pan-movements" of nationalism and the totalitarian movements of the present century. Unfortunately, however, she considers the nationalist movements as simply historical forerunners of totalitarianism, and non-European nationalisms are more or less left out of the picture.

Revolutionary regimes are not at all new in history, but the revolutionary *mass-movement* regime is a relatively novel phenomenon. The idea is traceable at least as far back as Mazzini, and earlier intimations of it are to be found in eighteenth-century France.[13] Thus, Mazzini's contemplated revolution of national liberation and unification of Italy was to bring into being a third and greater Rome, "the Rome of the People," which in turn would provide leadership for all of Europe in creating a Europe of the people. The revolution was to be accomplished, moreover, with the active participation of masses of the people under the guidance and energetic leadership of an elite organization, Young Italy.

The history of politics in the twentieth century could be written in terms of the realization of the dreams of the nineteenth—and the discrepancy between dream and reality. The contemporary world contains a multitude of regimes, born in revolution, that rest upon and represent—or claim to—mass movements of a national or trans-national scope. In the typical case the mass movement is organized during the revolutionary struggle for power and as a means of waging this struggle. Once the regime is in being, the mass movement is enlarged and given new tasks of various kinds in the continuing revolution of national renewal. In some instances (present-day Egypt, for example) the development of the mass movement occurs after the conquest of power. In some instances too, it remains largely a political artifact or pretence of a mass movement. Some of the Soviet satellite regimes might be cases in point.

The third common element is the militant centralized revolutionary party, or "vanguard" party as we may call it, which takes power in the name of the movement and the nation and then assumes the new function of governing the country single-handedly. Mazzini's phrase "party of action" foreshadowed the nature of this new type of party. Its character is largely determined by the circumstances of its origin. Since it arises outside of, and in opposition to, an existing system of law and order, electioneering is not its *métier*. Though it may take part in a given election for tactical purposes, it exists to overthrow a political order rather than to come to power within it. In the typical case it develops as a disciplined elite connected with a mass following through party "cells" in the enemy-order, and usually has a single dominating personality as its top leader and organizer. It is in essence a political warfare organization, and as such tends toward conspiratorial habits and a quasi-military, authoritarian concept of its internal organization and relation to the mass following. Since its revolutionary ends transcend the destruction of the old order, the latter event is simply a new beginning. The party becomes the staff headquarters of the new revolutionary movement-regime, the territorial committees and cells become units of rule, and the single-party state is born.

The concept of the revolutionary vanguard party, with its "cellular structure" penetrating the pores of the old society, was rather well developed already in the nineteenth century, particularly among the Russian Populists. But it found its most influential exponent early in the twentieth century in Lenin. Unlike Marx, who tended to think that history itself would make the revolution, Lenin based all his thinking on the premise that revolutions have to be organized. His theory and practice of revolutionary "party construction" not only shaped the organization of communist movements everywhere; it also radiated far and wide into nationalist and fascist movements. A well known instance of this diffusion occurred in the early 1920s, when Sun Yat-sen decided to remodel the Chinese national revolutionary party (Kuomintang) in accordance with the Leninist concept, and the Russian Bolshevik Mikhail Borodin was sent to supervise the overhauling. A little later Chiang Kai-shek gave the Russians a lesson in what might be called "anti-Communist communism" by turning the assimilated Bolshevik-type organizational forms against the Chinese Bolsheviks and their Muscovite mentors. The lesson was not lost on Stalin, who in the 1930s made use of Bolshevik organizational forms in destroying the *Russian* Bolsheviks, save for those whom he permitted to survive as Stalinists.

An instructive present-day example of a nationalist movement-regime with a ruling party shaped in the Leninist image may be found in Tunisia. President Bourguiba's Liberal Constitutional (Neo-Destour) party "has covered the whole country with a network of a thousand cells" which "replace the 'infrastructure' of the modern state." "The party members who are organized in cells form the party Congress, which elects an executive, the Political Bureau. The Political Bureau is the main instrument of government. . . . The Political Bureau exercises tight control over the party machine, in which it has established a kind of 'democratic centralism'. . . . The Liberal Constitutional party has established a large network of organizations which embrace practically the whole population."[14] The exquisite irony of the situation is that the Communist Party of Tunisia is the sole opponent of President Bourguiba's regime.

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[12] *What Is To Be Done?*, in *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1946), Vol. I, p. 165.

[13] J. A. Talmond discusses the eighteenth-century background in his *Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (1952).

One further generalization may be offered regarding the movement-regimes as a class. Since the militant centralized revolutionary party becomes the new foundation of political authority, and its cellular structure the "infrastructure" of the new state, the movement-regime takes on the authoritarian character of the founding organization. In certain instances (about which more later) it subsequently grows much more authoritarian, and the adjective "totalitarian" may become applicable. However, the leadership of the authoritarian movement-regime insists that it is also democratic in a "new way" (*i.e.*, not the liberal Western way). This mode of thought, in which the dichotomy of "dictatorship—democracy" is rejected, is an outgrowth of the original concept of the revolutionary struggle as a mass movement for national or supra-national objectives under guidance of a disciplined political elite organization. The result is one or another version of the doctrine of "guided democracy," of which, again, Lenin was the preeminent exponent.

The notion should not be dismissed as simple hypocrisy, although it may be that in any given instance. If "democracy" here loses the connotation of effective popular control over the regime (which is, by self-definition, the group that knows best what is in the interests of the people), it simultaneously acquires the connotation of mass popular participation in the continuing revolution of national renewal. In practice this means the enlisting of masses of people in the activities of trade unions, youth, professional and other organizations that are formally non-party in character but are operated under party guidance and supervision via directorates from top to bottom in which disciplined party members predominate (the so-called "transmission belts" of Leninist theory). A large proportion of the population is thus drawn into the whirlpool of guided public life, and many may derive an experience of political participation that was denied them under the old regime. In Russia the foremost non-party organs of controlled participation are the soviets or local councils, which arose before the October Revolution and independently of communism but were later reshaped into components of the Bolshevik movement-regime. Today they form a pyramidal network of thousands of party-guided bodies at village, town, district and province level, with deliberative and administrative functions in which several millions of deputies and sub-committee members take part. Very many of these people have no direct Communist party affiliation.

This brings us again to the principle of transferability of organizational forms among movement-regimes of different types. Recently, for example, a pyramidal system of "councils," quite comparable in concept if not in all details to the one just described, has been introduced under the auspices of President Nasser's National Union regime in Egypt, and President Mohammed Ayub Khan's new regime in Pakistan is now introducing a similar setup there under the heading of "basic democracy." A close associate of President Nasser's has explained to a Western journalist that the purpose of the Egyptian councils is to enlist mass participation at the village level in the revolution of national renewal: "The real revolution must come in the villages. . . . Every village has elected a council, replacing the old appointed Mayor. The council constitutes itself a cooperative and works with the Government's agricultural experts." The journalist reports that Nasser aides are not insulted if this system is described as "guided democracy," and he quotes the close associate further as saying: "We have a concept of democracy, it differs from yours. . . . We need something more dynamic, more realistic. . . . If we use your system the Communists will succeed, because they can speak to the masses."[15] Thus, there can be anti-Soviet sovietism in the field of "guided democracy," as well as the previously mentioned phenomenon of anti-Communist communism in the field of party organization.[16]

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[14] Hans E. Tutsch, "Bourguiba's Tunisia—I," *The New Leader*, February 29, 1960, p. 7.

[15] "New Mood Found in Nasser's Egypt," by Dana Adams Schmidt, *New York Times*, December 29, 1959, p. 2. The Pakistani experiment is reported by Paul Grimes in "Pakistanis Study Government by Practice on Local Problems," *ibid.*, June 29, 1960, p. 14.

A final observation about the movement-regime is that it has no restricted habitat in the world. A comparative politics of movement-regimes is not a regional affair, and defies the classifications of political systems according to geographic zone.[17] There is a rough correlation between antecedent colonialism and the rise of nationalist movement-regimes, or alternatively of communist movement-regimes that ride to power on a wave of nationalist revolution. There is a related and still rougher correlation between the movement-regime and the conditions of economic and cultural backwardness, feudalism, stagnation, etc., that lend a special cogency to the revolutionary call for renovation of the nation. All this might suggest the thought that the specific habitat of the movement-regime is the "East" or, more broadly, the "under-developed areas." Yet such regimes, in one form or another, have appeared not only in Russia, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe, but also in parts of Western Europe (Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal); and Hitler's Germany was hardly an under-developed area. Moreover, movements bearing within themselves the germs of potential movement-regimes have arisen in many other countries, including Great Britain and the United States. The movement-regime is a political phenomenon to which no nation and no part of the world is completely immune.

## III

The differentiation of the species of movement-regime presents a much more difficult and complex problem than the definition of the genus. There are many avenues of approach to it, variously emphasizing social, economic, historical, religious and psychological factors, etc. The most that can be attempted here is to present a few notes on the problem.

First, it must be said that we are dealing with classes of phenomena that may be distinguishable but are not fully distinct. Thus, elements of nationalism are to be found in both communist and fascist movement-regimes, and any formulae for the latter that excluded this fact would be useless. It therefore appears inadvisable to segregate the species under conceptually pure "ideal types." Allowance must be made for complexity of character and even for the possibility of genuine hybrids. In short, nationalist, fascist and communist movement-regimes are best differentiated according to their characteristic *prevailing tendencies.*

What has been said above about the transferability of organizational forms among movement-regimes of different types argues against any attempt to differentiate the types primarily in organizational terms. A more promising basis of differentiation, it seems to me, lies in the motivation of revolutionary politics, or what is often called the "revolutionary dynamism." All the movement-regimes originally have a revolutionary dynamism. They come into being by the revolutionary displacement of a pre-existing order, and seek to maintain revolutionary momentum after they come to power. They may, of course, fail to do so. They may lose revolutionary momentum eventually. When this happens they become what I shall call "extinct" movement-regimes. Like a star that has ceased to give off light, an extinct movement-regime may go on existing for a long while without a revolutionary *raison d'etre.* We may say of such a regime what Herzen in 1853 said of the contemporary Russian monarchy, that it "exercises power in order to exercise power."

The revolutionary dynamism of the nationalist movement-regime is relatively restricted in scope and easy to define. Here the goal of the revolutionary movement is, first, national independence, the creation of a sovereign nation-state. Second, the revolutionary movement is aimed at the modernization of the newly independent state, and this typically involves many elements of an internal social revolution. Old class relations in society, old patterns of land tenure, old customs, old traditions of thought and generally old ways of conducting the business of life are assailed in an internal revolution of national renewal. However, purely nationalist revolutionary movement-regimes show a definite tendency to spend their revolutionary force rather early.

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[16] In this connection it may be worth noting that a group of anti-Soviet Russian emigres has recently put forward, under the heading of "Kronstadt Thesis," a program whose slogan is: "Down with the party, all power to free soviets!" The program takes its name from the Kronstadt rising of 1921, when sailors and workers called for soviets without Bolsheviki. A partial text appears in *Novy Zhurnal,* No. 59, 1960.

[17] Gabriel Almond, for example, has recently proposed a classificatory scheme that turns on the notion of "political culture," which is defined in part according to area. The result is a fourfold classification of political systems under the Anglo-American, Continental European, pre-industrial and totalitarian categories. See his "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 18 (1956).

In some cases this happens soon after the achievement of the original revolutionary goals and prior to the completion of the revolutionizing of the old society. In other words, the nationalist movement-regime is peculiarly the prey of the phenomenon of "extinction."

In the best of cases, of which the Kemalist movement in Turkey might be an example, the revolution of national renewal is carried through far enough under the auspices of the movement-regime to make possible an orderly further development in a new and more democratic direction. More typical, however, may be the case of the Chinese Kuomintang, where the early subsiding of revolutionary dynamism paved the way for the displacement of the nationalist movement-regime by a communist movement-regime that came to power under the slogan of carrying through the "betrayed" revolution of national renewal. In general, communist movement-regimes, where not installed by direct action of a foreign power (as in most of Eastern Europe, North Korea, etc., after World War II), tend to arise as the penalty for either the absence of an effective national revolutionary movement where conditions call for it, or the inability of nationalist movement-regimes, once in being, to maintain their initial revolutionary momentum.

The relatively low revolutionary dynamism of the nationalist movement-regime is correlated with a relatively restricted revolutionary "constituency." The ideology of the national revolution is itself national. The sovereign independence and renovation of the nation are the objectives. Once installed in power, the nationalist movement-regime may develop an active foreign policy within what is likely to be a neutralist orientation in world affairs. But this will not be a policy of active export of the revolution to other lands. Such revolutionary expansionism is, on the other hand, a distinctive characteristic of *both* communist and fascist movement-regimes. Here the sphere of outlet for revolutionary energy is not confined to the national homeland. The politics of revolution embrace not only the revolutionary capture of power and subsequent internal revolution, but also, in varying manner and degree, the turning of the revolutionary dynamism out upon the world. Thus when a new movement-regime embarks upon a course of active export of the revolution to other countries, this may be taken as a fairly strong indication that it belongs not to the nationalist species but to one of the other two. The Castro regime in Cuba would be a case in point.

Communism and fascism are often contrasted on the ground that the one has an international "class appeal" while the other has a "national appeal" and is nationalist in essence. There is something in this idea, but it is also quite misleading. The dichotomy of communist internationalism *versus* fascist nationalism overlooks the fact that national and international elements commingle in both phenomena. On the one hand, the communist movement-regime is committed to a form of the national revolution as well as to the goal of world communism. It appropriates not only the appeals of the revolution of national renewal but also the task of carrying it through (in its own special way) when the movement comes to power.

On the other hand, the fascist revolutionary dynamism shares with the communist a supra-national scope. Both give ideological expression to this by proclaiming a supra-national revolutionary constituency and also an international *enemy* of the revolution. In the classic Bolshevik conception, the revolutionary constituency begins with the working classes of the revolutionary homeland and embraces the working classes of all countries, and the international bourgeoisie (or "international imperialism") is the enemy. Fascist regimes differ in their ideologies, but these regularly show a dualism that is comparable in kind if less comprehensive in scope. They take the *nation* as the nucleus of a larger whole, a supra-national revolutionary constituency or sphere of revolution. Thus, for Hitler the German *Volk* was the nucleus of the "Nordic race," and international Jewry or international imperialism was the enemy of the national-socialist revolution. For Mussolini "Romanism" was the key word, and the larger sphere of revolution was reflected in the slogan: "Italy today, tomorrow the Roman Empire!" Examples could be multiplied. The dual symbolism of President Nasser's movement-regime, which views Egypt or the U.A.R. as the nucleus of a vast "Arab nation" embracing all the separate Arabic nations and Arabs wherever they are, belongs to the pattern in question. Taken in conjunction with Nasserist activity in the export of the revolution to neighboring countries, this suggests that it would be a mistake to construe Nasserism as nationalist in essence although it does display various features of a nationalist revolutionary movement.[18]

In certain instances, typically occurring in smaller countries, we see the phenomenon of "national communism" or, alternatively, "national fascism" (of which present-day Francoist Spain might be a good example). This development may be, and in the latter case no doubt is, indicative of a general loss of revolutionary momentum and the tendency to grow "extinct." On the other hand, it may, as in the case of Titoist Yugoslavia, be accompanied by something in the nature of an internal political "reformation" in which the movement develops with new vigor but in different directions.

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[18] For a discussion of various considerations relevant to a judgment on this question, see the forthcoming book of P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Indiana University Press), ch. 7.

One further consideration should be noted in connection with the fascist form of movement-regime. Although its sphere of revolution is not confined to the national homeland, it does typically indulge in strident national self-glorification. It proclaims its nation to be supreme in all the recognized national virtues, and declares that the good of the nation is the highest goal of the regime. This has led some scholars to see in fascism "an inflammation of nationalism."[19] It seems, however, that this inflamed nationalism is essentially a pseudo-nationalism, and that fascists must be distinguished from authentic nationalists as being, at best, the pharisees of nationalism. Thus, when Hitler saw that all was lost, he desired the destruction of the German nation as punishment for its unworthiness. Germany had not been worthy of its *Fuehrer*. Obviously, the supreme value was not the German nation but the Hitlerite self, and the official glorification of the nation had been a cover and vehicle of the leader's self-glorification.

I take this to be indicative of a critically important general fact about the fascist type of movement-regime, viz., that here the psychology or more accurately the psychopathology of the leader becomes the driving force of the political mechanism. The regime is shaped into a highly complicated instrumentality for acting out the needs of the paranoid leader-personality, whose psychodynamics are politicalized, *i.e.*, expressed in political action. Thus, the Nazi regime started the second World War in 1939 at a time when it was militarily not yet prepared and to the chagrin of many of its highest officials, military and civilian. It was propelled into this action not by a cold calculation of relative forces and risks, but by the compulsive need of Hitler for revenge against his enemies. When his advisers warned him against it on the ground of the enemies' strength, he replied: "Then I will build U-boats! U-boats! U-boats! . . . I will build airplanes! airplanes! airplanes!—*and I will exterminate my enemies.*"[20] Comparable in character (though not in consequence) was the statement reportedly made by Stalin on the eve of his public assault on Tito in 1948: "I will shake my little finger—and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."[21]

In order to shape the regime into a means of expression of his personal needs, the leader must reduce the ruling party to the role of an important cog in the apparatus of the state. It was pointed out earlier that movement-regimes tend to be headed by a dominating individual personality. This, however, does not imply that they are absolute autocracies. In fact, the broad tendency is oligarchical rule by the top leadership of the ruling party under the overall direction of the dominant personality. The fascist movement-regimes deviate from this pattern and show a pronounced tendency to absolute autocracy, which involves the subordination of the party to the state as embodied in the leader. He emancipates himself from the control of the party oligarchy, and relies heavily upon the secret police and permanent pervasive terror through this organization to ensure unquestioning compliance with his least wishes on the part of everyone from the lowliest man in the street to the highest dignitaries of the regime. Consequently, fascist regimes tend to become highly *statist* in orientation, and the state as personified in the leader displaces the party as the supreme symbol and object of official adoration. For these reasons the most accurate general term for the various fascist movement-regimes would be "fuehrerism," and the most accurate title in each individual instance would be the one formed from the leader's name (*e.g.*, "Hitlerism" rather than "Nazism").

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[19] Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (1955), p. 79.

[20] G. M. Gilbert, *The Psychology of Dictatorship, Based on an Examination of the Leaders of Nazi Germany* (1950), p. 301. Gilbert concludes: "Our study of Hitler's lieutenants strongly suggested that if any one of them had replaced Hitler before 1939 (even aggressive Hermann Goering, the heir apparent), or if a slight change in circumstances (such as a little less appeasement) had replaced the Nazis with leaders more responsive to the will of the people, then there probably would have been no World War II and there certainly would have been no systematic 'extermination of my enemies' " (*Ibid.*, pp. 302–303).

[21] The statement was quoted by Khrushchev in his secret report to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, and appears in *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (1956), p. 62.

It was said above that movement-regimes may undergo "extinction" when the revolutionary dynamism subsides. Another possible process is "metamorphosis" as a result of the *alteration* of the dynamism. A movement-regime of one species turns into one of another species as a consequence of a qualitative change in the motivation of revolutionary politics. Such a change is determined in its turn by a change or changes in the leadership situation within the regime. For various reasons it may not be possible for the leadership of the metamorphosed movement-regime to admit (even to itself) that the metamorphosis has occurred. The evidence of it must therefore be sought not in the regime's official self-definition but rather in changes in the observable complex of ideological and behavioral patterns.

In conclusion I suggest that the political history of Soviet Russia probably offers the best laboratory for the study of the phenomenon of metamorphosis of movement-regimes. From the standpoint of a comparative politics of movement-regimes, this history is one of different *movements* and of different Soviet *regimes* within a framework of continuity of certain (transferable) organizational forms and official nomenclature. The rise of Stalinism between 1928 and 1938 involved a process of change far more deep and pervasive than is generally realized. It was the metamorphosis of the original communist or Bolshevik movement-regime into a new movement-regime of the fuehrerist type. As indicated at the outset of this paper, the metamorphosis was not accompanied by any change in the regime's official self-definition (although it is significant that Stalin in 1952 banned the word "Bolshevik" from the name of the party and from all Soviet official usage). It was, however, reflected in a whole system of changes in the political process, the ideological pattern, the organization of supreme power, and official patterns of behavior. Partly because of the inadequacy of our theoretical apparatus, and partly too because of the unduly large influence of the Soviet regime's self-image upon our conceptions, Western thinking has not, on the whole, assessed the full significance of the change from the Bolshevik to the Stalinist political system. A basic continuity of the Bolshevik movement-regime has been postulated, as is implicit, for example, in the following statement by Bertram Wolfe: "When Stalin died in 1953, Bolshevism was fifty years old."[22]

Very real and important issues affecting the understanding and interpretation of the political changes in Russia since Stalin's death are involved in what may seem to be a problem of merely historical interest. On the postulate of continuity of the Bolshevik movement-regime from 1917 to 1953, "significant change" will logically mean change *away* from Bolshevism or communism. This assumption results in a tendency to deprecate the significance of the post-Stalinist changes in Soviet political processes and policies. If, on the other hand, we operate on the premise that Stalin's political revolution from above transformed the original Bolshevik movement-regime into a new one that was fuehrerist in its inner dynamism and political tendency, we shall reason that when Stalin died in 1953 Bolshevism had been moribund in Russia for fifteen years, and that the main issue was whether it would revive and if so to what extent. This opens the way to a recognition that a whole complex of quite significant political changes have occurred in post-Stalinist Russia within the broad framework of a conscious movement under the aegis of Khrushchev to reconstitute the political system of Bolshevism.

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[22] *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs*, p. 268.

# COMMENT ON TUCKER'S "MOVEMENT-REGIMES"

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> . . . Then he [Krivitsky] asked in German (the only language that we ever spoke): "*Ist die Sowjetregierung eine faschistische Regierung?* —Is the Soviet government a fascist government?"
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> Communists dearly love to begin a conversation with a key question the answer to which will also answer everything else of importance about the answerer. I recognized that this was one of those questions. On the political side, I had broken with the Communist Party in large part because I had become convinced that the Soviet Government was fascist. Yet when I had to give that answer out loud, instead of in the unspoken quiet of my own mind, all the emotions that had ever bound me to communism rose in a final spasm to stop my mouth. I sat silent for some moments. Then I said: "*Ja, die Sowjetregierung ist eine faschistische Regierung*—the Soviet Government is a fascist government." Later on that night, Krivitsky told me that if I had answered yes at once, he would have distrusted me. Because I hesitated, and he felt the force of my struggle, he was convinced that I was sincere.
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> Whittaker Chambers, *Witness* (New York, 1952), p. 499.

Professor Tucker's paper has done a great service and a not inconsiderable disservice to our understanding of Communism. Let us take the constructive side first. He has brought the species under its genus, as a good entomologist classifies a new moth, by showing how it fits, not into a sterile and purely abstract conceptual framework, but into a historically explicative framework, whereby its evolutionary essence is laid bare. Thus the evolutionary essence of a moth is not that it has wings, for so do birds and bats; but that it is an insect. Similarly, the essence of Communism is not that it is, say, socialistic but that it is, in Tucker's words, "a revolutionary mass-movement regime under single-party auspices." There is a single pattern of political behavior, characteristic of the twentieth century, that embraces Bourguiba, Sekou Touré, Atatürk, Hitler and Mussolini. This pattern also embraces Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Tito and Khruschchev.

It is a pity that this great positive achievement is marred by an inadequate definition of totalitarianism: by what seems to be an attempt to reject old truth instead of reconciling it with new. What follows was written in criticism of Tucker's original version. I have left it to stand in all its sharpness of phrasing because in the version now before us the language is muted, but the essential thought is wholly untouched.

On page 282 it is astoundingly stated that Lenin's regime was not totalitarian; on that page we learn too that because Stalin's was, it was Fascist, not Communist; and that the USSR is now reverting to Communism. These are controversial statements indeed.

Let us concentrate, then, on totalitarianism, not the movement-regime Tucker has handled so well. Let us take a very simple and flatfooted definition of totalitarianism: it is a type of regime under which the state governs the whole life of each of its individual subjects in all respects. I choose, that is to say, not some lengthy and subtle definition, for that may turn out to be a concealed description of a particular, empirically occurring, syndrome of totalitarianism with something else; but rather the essence of the thing, the reason why its subjects hate it and outsiders fear it. Moreover this is Mussolini's own definition (Tucker, p. 281). Fascism and—pace Tucker—Leninism are both totalitarian. Could a non-"movement-regime" also be? I think it is possible. Any Caesaro-Papist set-up, such as that of Tsar Nicholas I or perhaps of the Papal States, or of an efficient Islamic ruler, can be—and above all can try to be—totalitarian in the sense meant. If the confessional, the pulpit, the courts, the police and the newspapers are all used towards the same end by the same power, you have totalitarianism in Mussolini's definition, word for word. It is of course traditionalist; it is there, in other words, to prevent, not to mold, the future. It will certainly dispense with a youth movement and it will indeed demand passive conformity, not active participation, of all its citizens. But it will still control every aspect of their lives, and treat the tradition as a compulsory ideology. The "Oriental Despotisms" of Karl Wittfogel[1] all conform to this pattern.

We may even imagine a Trujillo, enjoying not even the support of the Church, operating a similar regime with policemen and electronic devices alone. It would not be very effective, since a Trujillo has no ideology, not even a traditionalist one, and thus has nothing in particular with which to fill his subjects' minds. Moreover his hold over his police is purely financial, and that too is unsatisfactory. But we must not underestimate the power of modern technology. If it has not significantly improved the art of torture, it has those of persuasion, espionage, data-processing and communication. Nor have we any guarantee against new drugs that would induce, say, docility in the population and that could be fed to it via the water supply. In these ways we can legitimately imagine a totalitarian regime based neither on a mass-movement nor on a traditional Caesaro-Papism, but simply on technology.

So here is another genus with species. Totalitarianism has its mass-movement species, its Caesaro-Papist species, and perhaps other too. True, the various kinds of totalitarianism have not arisen at one time or in one set of circumstances; but then mass-movement regimes are also of diverse origin—compare those of Hitler, Bourguiba and Lenin, not to mention Nasser's *ex post facto* imitation. The *effects* of totalitarianism are the same, down to many little details, however it arose, and whether it is "trad." or "modern."[2] In particular, at the overlap we subdivide the totalitarian mass-movement species into varieties: the products of lower middle-class radicalism (Fascism), and of working-class radicalism (Communism). This subdivision has been studied long and well by politicians and sociologists;[3] and I see no reason to reject or even modify their results in view of Tucker's findings. Here, in fact, is already a successful comparative study of political institutions that embraces Communism, and I do not understand why, simply because it points to similarities, it can be accused of obliterating distinctions. Surely, on the contrary, *all* analogies provoke the discovery of distinctions.

Moreover, it also throws light on the evolutionary essence of Communism. The political scientist studies a more complicated field than the entomologist: he may be forced to derive a phenomenon in two ways not one, and refer it to two or indeed more conceptual frameworks, equally explicative. Communism owes its totalitarian nature not to being a mass-movement but precisely to the country of its birth, to Russian Caesaro-Papism, *i.e.*, to a traditional type of totalitarianism. This was by no means complete in theory or practice, any more than Mussolini's Fascism was complete. But there was enough of it to operate on Lenin and Stalin both by example—they could understand no other system of government; and by crude necessity—their party itself had to be totalitarian to beat the Okhrana. And more than that: they were totalitarians because of their *utopian vision*. Any vision, held with enough fanaticism, and incompatible with human reality, forces the dictator who holds it into totalitarianism. Hence the extreme importance for our discussion here of Marx, whose name only by accident occurs in Tucker's paper. A utopian vision is, as we have seen, not essential for a Caesaro-Papist, though some Tsarists certainly had one in Moscow, the "Third Rome." But for mass-movement totalitarianism it does seem indispensable. Its presence was enough to make the NSDAP totalitarian, on the very different background of Weimar Germany. Its absence casts doubt on the viability and even the genuineness of Mussolini's own totalitarianism,[4] and *a fortiori* on that of the modern colonial mass-movements. The "extinct nationalist mass-movement regime," in Tucker's brilliant phrase, arises precisely because nationalism is not a utopian vision but a goal that can be reached.

The relation between mass-movements and totalitarianism is thus very complex. Historiography hitherto has kept it too close. We are all familiar with the sequence: Rousseau, Robespierre, Babeuf, Buonarroti, the Carbonari, the Decembrists, Ogarev,[5] Zemlya i Volya, Narodnaya Volya, Lenin. But look at the links in the chain between Buonarroti and Lenin. Practically none of these people consciously wanted a totalitarian form of government *after* their revolution, nor were they fanatics holding to a utopian vision that would have in practice brought it about. Many, notably the Narodnaya Volya, were elitists, Blanquists, who didn't even want a mass movement! These distinctions are very important, and if we keep to them we shall avoid much loose thinking. Blanquism is not totalitarianism for all, but the voluntary self-sacrifice of a few to that way of life. It breeds, to be sure, totalitarian personalities, and Chernishevsky's *What Is To Be Done* gives a very fine description of such a personality. But the aims and doctrines, as opposed to the methods, of the conspiratorial élite may be extremely moderate and realistic, and this is especially true of the Narodniks. If all we want to do is blow up the Tsar and redistribute the land, human freedom will survive our success.

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[1] *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, 1957).

[2] Compare the Marquis de Custine's *A Journey for Our Time* (New York 1951; a translation of his *La Russie en 1839*, Brussels 1843), which reveals to the modern reader amazingly many detailed similarities between the regimes of Nicholas I and Stalin.

[3] Notably S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York 1960).

[4] *Cf.* Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 258, 303–4. Miss Arendt's doubtless extreme position is countered by D. L. Germino, *The Italian Fascist Party in Power* (Minneapolis 1959), pp. 133–9. Germino's claims for the importance of Fascist ideology seem to this reader also rather unconvincing. Mussolini's great *Enciclopedia Italiana* article of 1932 says Fascism is expressly against Utopias and teleological notions of future happiness, and solves problems empirically, as they arise.

These links give us neither the derivation of Lenin's totalitarianism nor of his mass-movement, but of his revolutionary tradition. After the imaginings of Buonarroti,[6] the concept of a utopian revolutionary élite, manipulating the mass, went underground so far as I am aware. Nineteenth century mass movements were democratic both in their internal structure (on the whole) and still more in their aims. Some of them were mass pressure-groups for particular causes, such as the Irish Land League and the Anti-Corn Law League, some were movements embracing a man's whole life but still democratic not totalitarian, like the German Social Democrats or—in Mazzini's intention—the *Giovine Italia*. The idea of a revolutionary élite, and the again quite separate drive for a totalitarian society after the revolution, remained divorced.[7] It was Lenin's genius to rejoin all three. It was no accident that he did so in Russia, where the regime itself was totalitarian; and on a Marxist base, for Marxism is impregnated with a utopian vision.

Tucker is of course bound to believe Lenin was no totalitarian if he is to maintain his thesis: Communism and Fascism are *merely* types of mass movement; and all totalitarianism is of the Fascist kind, so Stalin was a Fascist. This is not just an extremely inconvenient choice of vocabulary but a genuine misunderstanding of facts. Lenin was of course no Fascist: he believed neither in anti-Semitism nor in nationalism nor in the *Führerprinzip.* As to the latter he was in theory but *primus inter pares;* in contrast to the mystical totalitarianisms of the Right, the rationalistic ones of the Left all pay lip-service to elections and committee rule. If in fact Lenin was, so to say, *primissimus inter pares,* so are Nkrumah and Nehru. So indeed is the leader of the British Conservative Party at any moment,[8] and so was Robespierre. Strong men are common, indeed inevitable, under systems that have no overt *Führerprinzip.* The need for a single, strong political leader extends far beyond totalitarianism and mass-movements. It is much more securely institutionalized, for instance, in the United States Constitution than in the statutes of any Communist Party. Stable, genuine committee rule is rare in the world. In an extremist atmosphere that tendency runs to extremes, and we call it *Führerprinzip;* in a moderate atmosphere we call it leadership. If it is a formalized principle in Fascism and Nazism, so it is in presidential democracies. If it is informal in Communism, so it is in parliamentary democracies. I think here especially of Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung and Tito: does the cult of personality around these three men make them Fascists too?

In defining totalitarianism we must, to repeat, hew closely to Mussolini's definition. Putting aside the factual power over the situation that differing historical circumstances gave them, who made the most far-reaching *claims* to interfere with the citizen's private life, Lenin or Stalin? The family? Lenin tried to destroy it and Stalin built it up again. Religion? Lenin tried to destroy it, Stalin was content to use it. Economic motivation? Lenin wanted perfect equality, Stalin capitulated to the facts of human nature. Only in matters of the peasantry, of inner-party democracy and of intellectual and artistic life, was Stalin the more totalitarian. These are not more important aspects of life than the others. The real difference is simply that Stalin was *more* totalitarian: that he was much more thorough and unscrupulous, that he was able to use and perfect instruments Lenin had forged, and that he was a criminal and a murderer. None of this subtracts much from Lenin's totalitarianism. Lenin and Stalin were both totalitarians. For For this purpose Lenin used the technique of the revolutionary mass-movement, and then Stalin grafted on to this the technique of Russian Caesaro-Papism. It is of course easier to confuse Stalin than Lenin with a Fascist, since Russian Caesaro-Papism is no stranger to *Führerprinzip* and anti-Semitism. But both men were in fact Marxists, and that is another thing again, compatible indeed also with parliamentary democracy.

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[5] Who must be inserted here, as is shown by S. V. Utechin in the *Twentieth Century* (London), July 1960.

[6] Set out, for instance, in J. L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (Boston 1952), III/4, 6.

[7] Though Mazzini and Ogarev combined the ideas of an elite and a mass movement.

[8] R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties,* New York 1955.

Tucker quotes in defense from Hannah Arendt: I find this passage of hers (pp. 312–3) a caricature of Lenin's deeds and intentions. Again he quotes Bertram Wolfe: who was, if I mistake not, personally a Bukharinite in 1927–8 and therefore very likely to claim for Lenin his own leader's deviant liberalism. And finally he quotes Friedrich and Brzezinski; to this I can only reply that they operate with a much more restricted definition of totalitarianism than I, and that even so the six characteristics listed on their pages 9–10 were all possessed in high degree by Lenin. What they mean on their p. 312 is merely that Lenin had not *succeeded* in establishing totalitatian rule.

Moreover, I fail to understand how Mao Tse-tung fits into Tucker's scheme of Communist totalitarianism. Here we have a man who has violated family and religion more utterly than Lenin, the peasantry and intellectual life more utterly than Stalin, and all on a not too absurd or forced interpretation of the words of Marx. So I want to call him a Communist totalitarian, in extension of the Marx-Lenin-Stalin line. To call him a Fascist is to strain language well beyond its breaking point.

# SINGLE-PARTY SYSTEMS IN WEST AFRICA

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In this paper I propose to examine the tendency towards single-party systems in West Africa, particularly in relation to the social structure and the historical circumstances in which the parties emerged.[1] I shall therefore point up the distinction between "mass" and "patron" parties, and then consider the new single-party governments, most of them based on mass parties, in relation to the prospects of of democracy in West Africa. My argument is that mass parties are created by African leaders out of the very liberating and egalitarian forces we in this country generally associate with democracy. Some of the mass parties encourage the growth of forces and institutions which may ultimately make possible the machinery of democratic systems familiar to us: as, for instance, competition for every citizen's vote by more than one organized team of candidates. At this stage of West African party history, it seems to me, the number of parties is far too simple a criterion upon which to decide whether or not a system is democratic.

General statements about parties in the new West African states can be made only tentatively. Significant rights to vote and organize parties came to West Africa only after the Second World War. Since then formal institutional change has taken place at a rapid pace. The constitutional framework in which the parties grew changed continuously. The franchise expanded until it became universal, the powers of African elected representatives grew by stages from consultative to legislative and eventually to executive, and the locus of political power shifted from London or Paris to Africa. Even so basic a feature of a political system as its territorial and international frontiers occasionally altered. For example, Upper Volta was reconstituted as a separate territory in 1947; and some eleven years later the federation of French West Africa was dissolved and Ghana had absorbed British Togoland. The Mali Federation, born in 1959, dissolved before it was two years old. The general points evident from an examination of party history over less than twenty years may turn out to be of minor importance in a later perspective.

All these are reasons for caution. Nevertheless, the parties are among the oldest national political institutions in West Africa, wholly Africanized long before the governments or the civil services (which still are not). Hence parties give better guidelines to African politics than those formal institutions of government which were set up by French and British colonizers at least in part as a condition for their recent political withdrawal, and are being changed by Africans after independence.

The majority of the new West African sovereign nations are based on single parties, likely to dominate for some time whether or not opposition parties are allowed to exist alongside. Most of their governments are founded on mass parties: Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali (formerly Soudan), Senegal, Togo and—with qualifications—the Eastern and Western Regions in the Federation of Nigeria. Without the pressure these mass parties exerted on the French or British colonial authorities, it is doubtful whether the colonial era in West Africa would have ended quite so soon. Perhaps, indeed, the nationalist drive of these particular mass movements, linked with the rapid decline of European power, carried along towards independence in 1960 even those states in which mass parties have not yet emerged: the Northern Region of Nigeria, the Islamic Republic of Mauretania, and (with qualifications) Niger and Upper Volta, which are also single party systems, but based on parties of the "patron," "cadre," or "personality" types.[2] In Dahomey, however, government rests on an unstable alliance of parties, both of the mass and patron types, still regional and not territorial in scale.

Successive post-war electoral results in West Africa make obvious another clear trend: the only sharp changes in party majorities took place prior to independence, and were from patron to mass party majority; never the reverse. An apparent exception was Ivory Coast, where the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) rode to power in 1946, immediately after Africans were able to organize parties legally. Between 1949 and 1952 it lost a series of elections and by-elections, but only because the French administration had tampered with the ballot. Officially, then, some candidates of the allied patron parties of Ivory Coast won, but the PDCI resumed its monopoly of offices as soon as the voters could register their choice freely once more.

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[1] Evidence for this paper was gathered during field trips to West Africa, and is to be published in my *Parties of French-Speaking West Africa.* I am most grateful to Jeffrey Butler, Thomas Hodgkin, Richard Sklar and Immanuel Wallerstein for their valuable comments, and to Newell Stultz for his assistance.

[2] "Patron" parties and "parties of personalities" are terms employed by Thomas Hodgkin, author of *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (London, Muller, 1956). 'Cadre' party is used by Maurice Duverger in his *Political Parties* (London, Methuen, 1954).

### I. MASS AND PATRON PARTIES

The main distinction between mass and patron parties lies not in the social origins of aspiring national leaders, and not in the scale of party organizations. It lies rather in the reply to the questions: How are the national leaders related to the rest of the population, and on what groups and with what ideas and structures did they build their parties? The distinction is perhaps best seen first at the local branch level.

Mass parties generally sought the adherence of every single individual. They wanted to enroll each man, woman, and even child, and so they had to establish local branches with headquarters, regular meetings and elections for branch leaders. Examples are the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* or the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (PDG) of Guinea. The patron parties usually terminated their structure simply with the adherence of influential notables or patrons; these were mostly the officially recognized "chiefs" or their direct representatives. Examples are the *Union Nigérienne des Indépendants et Sympathisants* (UNIS)*[3] of Niger, the *Parti Progressiste Soudanais** (PSP *sic*), the *Bloc Africain de Guinée** (BAG) or with qualifications, the *Northern People's Congress* (NPC) of Nigeria. Most patron parties did little to reach every individual in the community, and relied upon the "patrons" for their local influence. A defection from the local branch of a mass party rarely led to the disintegration of the branch. But the defection of a local notable from the patron party seriously weakened it in the locality.

Mass parties, such as the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* of Guinea, the *Union Soudanaise* (US) of Mali, the *Convention People's Party* (CPP) of Ghana, the *Action Group of Nigeria*, the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise* (UPS) of Senegal, *the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons* (NCNC), the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* of Ivory Coast, and the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* (CUT) of Togo counted their numbers in the hundreds of thousands. First organized around an anti-colonial platform, they claimed to "represent 'all the people'; to embody the national will . . . "[4]

Several structural concepts elaborated by Duverger and applied to Moroccan parties by Rézette[5] can be usefully employed in connection with the tropical African parties. At least for a time, most mass parties were strongly articulated, relatively disciplined and called forth considerable direct participation from members, in varying degrees roughly indicated, in descending order, by the sequence of their listing above. The leaders of these parties emphasized organization partly because they opposed the established authorities and could not use established institutions. They usually created parallel women's and youth organizations. They published newspapers, set up central and regional headquarters, hired permanent staff, distributed membership cards, charged dues, and especially before independence, synchronized activities and shared personnel with African trade unions. The more effective their organization, the more mass party leaders were in a position to implement their decisions. *Union Soudanaise* and *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* leaders, for example, regarded their mass parties as "weapons"[6] designed to achieve independence and economic development with the greatest speed possible.

In contrast, most patron parties—*Parti Progressiste Soudanais**, for instance, and *Union Nigérienne des Indépendants et Sympathisants** —were weakly articulated, comparatively undisciplined, with little if any direct membership participation. This difference in structure between mass and patron parties is one of several reasons why, though mass parties took the place of patron parties with a regularity suggesting a definite pattern, so far no mass party has ever been replaced by a rival in free election.

Closely related to structure was the pattern of authority within the party. Not all but some of the mass parties had both institutionalized and collective leadership, such as the *Union*

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[3] Parties indicated with an * have gone out of existence.

[4] Hodgkin, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

[5] R. Rézette, *Les Partis politiques marocains* (Paris, Colin, 1955).

[6] David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg, "Nationalism and Models of Political Change in Africa," *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, Symposia Studies Series #1, The National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, George Washington University, 1959, p. 8.

*Progressiste Sénégalaise*, the *Action Group of Nigeria*, the *Union Soudanaise* and the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée*. Elections were fairly regular; officers gave some account of their stewardship to the members; discipline was given serious attention; a predetermined procedure was followed when important decisions were to be made. Patron parties, and a mass party such as the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* after 1950, had essentially personal leadership; leaders, either as individuals or as a group, made decisions and reconciled conflicts in ways unfettered by pre-arranged rules. The parties with institutionalized leadership could deal far more smoothly with the problems posed by renewal and succession.

For an understanding of the authority pattern within the parties a modified notion of charisma is sometimes useful,[7] provided it is not understood simply as "the polar opposite of formal and traditional bonds,"[8] or taken to mean the total "absence of any defined hierarchy."[9] Thus some, but not all, mass party top-level leaders—Sékou Touré of the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and Mamadou Konaté (d. 1956) of the *Union Soudanaise*—enjoyed a type of charisma which was limited both by the constitutional procedure they themselves insisted upon within their mass parties, and by the power exercized to a greater or lesser extent by other groups and individuals within the party. Other leaders, particularly of patron parties—such as Fily Dabo Sissoko of the *Parti Progressiste Soudanais** and Sourou Migan Apithy of the *Parti Républicain du Dahomey** (PRD)—used their charisma comparatively unchecked by procedure, though limited by the power and influence of the "patrons." This was also true for some mass party leaders, such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*. Still other leaders, like Lamine Kaba of the Kankan region of Guinea, enjoyed charisma only within a locality considerably smaller than a territory. Their gift, usually recognized by only one ethnic group, came to be regarded as a threat to national party discipline. The notion of charisma, denoting extraordinary qualities ascribed to an individual, is a useful starting point for further investigation. But it is only a starting point; perhaps sharper than the idea Carlyle expressed with "Find in a country the Ablest Man . . . raise him to the supreme place . . . what he tells us to do must be precisely the wisest, fittest . . . "[10]

The distinction between mass and patron parties has implications beyond those already discussed—local branch organization, size of membership, patterns of authority, and structure. It illuminates also variations in social composition, methods and function. Before turning to these, however, we must look somewhat more closely at the total society in which West African parties sought support.

### II. MODERN AND TRADITIONAL ELEMENTS

The West African societies in which ten new sovereign states emerged between 1957 and 1960 were at an earlier stage of economic and social history than the retiring colonial powers. The specific figures are less reliable than the generalizations they are designed to illustrate. As a result of the reforms extended after the Second World War, the vote became universal in a society where—on very rough average—fifteen per cent could read or write, perhaps three per cent were regular wage earners, and another three per cent were employed away from their villages. Considerably more than half the people's efforts still went into subsistence activity outside the exchange economy.[11] In Europe, by contrast, the vote became general only after almost everyone was deeply involved in the market economy. Indeed, not even the middle classes could vote until after the emergence of the "commercial civilization from the feudal, the society based on contract from the society based on status."[12] Not so in West Africa. Although there is an educated elite—mainly clerks, teachers, nurses, doctors, lawyers, and low-level technicians—only Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and southern Nigeria have a growing minority of literate Africans self-employed in trade, transport, and farming for export.

Several hundred different ethnic groups make up the approximately sixty million inhabitants of the new West African nations. The educated minority is almost alone in seeing a clear interest in maintaining the present territorial frontiers, or in enlarging them, and in preventing tribal separatism from fragmenting the new nations. With a few exceptions, the existence of this elite, its size and even its distribution according to ethnic and geographic origins, were due to the forces of economic and social change accompanying the arrival of the Europeans in West Africa. Much more economic activity took place in the coastal and forest belt of West Africa, and the proportion of people educated from that region is far greater than from the savannah and *sahel* belts. This caused trouble both for parties and for nations. Northern Nigerians, Ghanaians, and Ivory Coasters, for example, resent having too many party organizers, too many civil servants, and too many government leaders come from the southern regions of their countries. Some seeds of the 1958 riots against Dahomeans in the Ivory Coast were planted before the war, when the French West African educational system trained an unusually high proportion of them.

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[7] David Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955).

[8] Max Weber, "The Sociology of Charismatic Authority," *From Max Weber*, H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds. (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), p. 250.

[9] Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound* (London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1957), p. 271.

[10] Thomas Carlyle, "The Hero as King," *On Heroes and Hero Worship* (London, Ward & Lock, 1900), p. 262.

[11] See Elliot Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (June 1960), esp. Table I on p. 393.

[12] Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London, Macmillan, 1951), p. 567.

The political facts of colonial rule, and then the democratic reforms extending over some two decades, sped up the process whereby the modern layer of African society acquired the lead politically, even though it was still so small a minority. The European powers enlarged the scale of West African political units from the many tribal to the present territorial ones. Together with their new technology they introduced or reinforced secular values such as equality and merit, weakened traditional religious sanctions, and overthrew kinship as the main determinant of rank. Although the British believed in indirect rule and the French in direct rule, in varying degrees they both undermined the secular authority of the pre-European authorities.

There were few areas in which the presence of the Europeans did not add yet another dimension to the already thorny issue of succession. Pre-war "native authorities," or members of the *commandement indigène*—the official "chiefs"—did not necessarily also have a traditional claim to high rank. These categories seem to have overlapped most in the savannah region of the western Sudan, where such historic pre-European empires as Mali and Ghana existed, and where in the nineteenth century the Europeans could not install their administrations until they had defeated the warrior-kings, Samory Touré and the sons of Hajj Umar Tall. The official "chiefs" were no regular mobile civil servants recruited by standards of merit; few were literate; they were for the most part stationed among their kinsmen. In time, these official "chiefs" constituted a new stratum of the population in the countryside, with a sense of corporate identity transcending the limits of their different ethnic groups. They were aware that the postwar reforms affected the "prestige of the chiefs, precedence, deportment, decoration, housing, salaries."[13]

This awareness developed farthest in northern Nigeria, in Mali, Niger, and the plateau and savannah regions of Guinea. It became the basis for the more successful "patron" parties, including those now behind the single-party governments of Northern Nigeria, Niger, and Mauretania. In Mali and Guinea also, the patron parties which won in the postwar elections until defeated, in 1956, by the *Union Soudanaise* and the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* mass parties respectively, were based on these "chiefs." It was therefore in these territories particularly that the struggle against the colonial power barely masked another struggle, most acute in the countryside, between traditionalists and modernizers. In Mali and Guinea the mass party leaders, as soon as they were in a position to do so, consolidated their electoral victory by doing away altogether with the official "chiefs" and replacing them with regular civil servants, assisted by elected village councils. In Niger and Northern Nigeria, however, the challenge to the "chiefs," though already offered by the respective opposition parties—*Sawaba* and the *Northern Elements Progressive Union* (NEPU)—has not yet been successful.

Even before the war educated Africans rather than traditional or official "chiefs" were increasingly sought out by their kinsmen to help them settle controversies with the Europeans and their laws. After the war, by the order in which they came as well as by their content, the reforms in West Africa helped the educated elite to assume the political initiative. (The recent history of the Congo illustrates, by contrast, the importance of this by-product of a reform phase preceding total independence.) In West Africa, most people took it for granted that Africans elected to postwar representative posts would know how to read and write in English or French—if only to talk to the Europeans who had promulgated the reforms. Moreover, in most territories the franchise was initially weighted in favor of those who were able to identify themselves in the records kept by the colonial power—which meant the literate and those earning money, mainly the people in the regular civil service, and only to a lesser degree those recognized as candidates for official "chief." The reforms gave the educated Africans legal channels for organizing the expulsion of the colonial power. They had reason to want to. Most of them lived in towns, saw Europeans often and were directly affected by the discrimination—racial, cultural, social and professional—which characterized the prewar colonial system.

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[13] From the electoral manifesto of September 5, 1945, issued by the *Parti Progressiste Soudanais* leader, Fily Dabo Sissoko.

The postwar reforms strengthened the position of the educated elite further by synchronizing political developments in areas of unequal political pressure, and by forcing even those traditional leaders who could still count upon the following of their ethnic groups, as in Mauretania or Northern Nigeria, to select educated "front men" for the new elective offices. Moreover, because the reforms extended over approximately two decades before full independence came, aspiring leaders had time to build records as nationalists, to champion opposition causes in the countryside, to build parties, and so anchor their authority to some degree. Nationalism gave the educated elite a powerful theme: to make all Africans once again masters in their own land. With a few exceptions this educated elite, rather than the traditional aristocrats or official "chiefs," got the credit for expelling the European colonizers.

Major or minor parties, mass or patron, these educated men staffed them. They provided the candidates for the new government offices after the war, they took the seats in legislative assemblies, in cabinets, and public corporations; they filled the senior civil service posts. A majority of them were of the first generation in their families to read or write a language other than Arabic. They had been trained in schools designed to produce only subordinates for Europeans in that phase of colonial history when all senior posts were reserved for Europeans. Many were only primary school graduates; a minority—significantly larger in southern Ghana and Nigeria, which were richer, than in French-speaking Africa—went to secondary school. Only a tiny number graduated from universities.

Since most university places only opened up to West Africans after the war, few graduates were available to take the first offices. Nearly all of these had to content themselves with second-level posts, usually in the civil service. Some, indeed, were in the peculiar position of working under African ministers who were contemporaries, but who had failed the secondary school or college entrance examinations—which had left them free to take part in the crucial first years of postwar political activity, and so to become "founding fathers." The mass franchise, in effect, added yet another reason why, for the modern elite, the standards of success in the schools of the Europeans were often the reverse of the standards of success in African elections. Under the prewar conditions of total European control, the most educated generally acquired the highest of the subordinate offices open to Africans. But after the war, when the villagers acquired the vote and so became arbiters in the competition for power among members of the elite, those with only a primary school education often spoke the language of the people and exhibited talents which appealed to the villagers.

While the state schools helped weaken ethnic and historic antagonisms, they also created new cleavages among the educated elite, which in some territories acquired some political significance. For example, in postwar Guinea most of those who had been prewar students in the dominant French West African secondary school, the École Normale William-Ponty, wanted to keep the only paying jobs open to them. These were invariably in the civil service and so they had little alternative, prior to 1956, but to go into "administrative" parties. Most of them joined one of the officially preferred regional patron parties. The mass party in Guinea, the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée*, was led by products of the lower state schools, who accused Ponty graduates of "betraying the masses," and called them "valets of the administration." In Gold Coast (now Ghana) also, political and educational cleavages were to some degree superimposed when the "Standard VII boys" joined a radical breakaway from the more highly educated leaders of the *United Gold Coast Convention** (UGCC) and built the *Convention People's Party*. In Ivory Coast, by contrast, Ponty graduates took the lead both in the regional "patron" parties, and in the mass party—the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*. There Ponty graduates found alternatives to administrative employment in cocoa and coffee farming. Consequently in Ivory Coast political cleavages did not relate closely to differences in the diplomas achieved by members of the elite.

Apart from levels of education, differences of generation also made for cleavages among the elite, such as those which divided the Senegalese leaders of the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais** (BDS)[14] from the leaders of the Senegalese federation of the *Section Française de l'Intérnationale Ouvrière** (SFIO);[15] or the young organizers of the *Convention People's Party* from the older leaders of the *United Gold Coast Convention.** There are differences in ideology too: Marxist-inspired for the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and the *Union Soudanaise;* a blend of Catholic and socialist politiical doctrine for many leaders of the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise.* These differences are sharpest in the minor parties organized by university trained graduates: dissident-marxist for some leaders of the *Parti du Régroupement Africain* (PRA)—*Sénégal;* close to orthodox Communism for the leaders of the Senegalese *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance* (PAI); an Africanized version of Emmanuel Mounier's French Catholic social doctrine for those participating in the *Mouvement Africain de Libération Nationale* (MLN). There were also differences in status, distinguishing in Senegal, for example, the prewar privileged "citizens" in the SFIO* from the "subjects" in the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais;** the former had earlier access to education, more wealth often from the peanut trade, and higher jobs in the civil service.[16]

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[14] Forerunner of the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise*.

[15] In 1958 both groups merged into the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise*.

These differences within the modern elite were balanced, however, by a certain common outlook. They conceived of themselves as Africans rather than Malinke, for example. Their common experiences in schools, jobs, and in the money economy, in prewar town associations, and with colonial administration gave them a homogeneity. But no such common outlook linked all the elite to the mass of the population. Instead, a separation gradually developed, most marked among people several generations or several decades removed from the village, *e.g.*, the "citizens" of Senegal or many of the French- or British-trained university graduates. Africans building parties to bridge this gulf after the war had to work with peoples mostly ignorant of French or English. Yet these were the languages expressing the modern constitutional decisions, including the decisions to introduce the universal franchise. Few had ever been to a large town and most had never lived in one; almost all handled money rarely and lived far from roads or railroads. The African organizer who came into a village to solicit votes was at the same time a transmitter of news of a modern world. This world was symbolized by the airport located perhaps fifty miles from the village, if the distance is reckoned in physical mileage; but several hundred years away if the distance is plotted against the timetable of European economic and social history.

Grass roots politics are different from national politics in most parts of the world, and particularly great in Africa. The educated elite are few in number and disproportionately distributed over even the most important of the many ethnic groups and regions of various types. The gap is large between the traditions which inspired the formal governments of the new nations and the pre-European institutions. To some extent most people continue to relate themselves to political parties through a "screen of kinship," a fact which made it necessary for all successful parties—mass or patron—to develop skill in "ethnic arithmetic" when selecting leaders and candidates. This skill is at the core of the new African parties' methods of approaching the important work of social integration.

### III. THE INTEGRATING FUNCTION

In illuminating the functions of the parties, the mass-patron distinction again has meaning. Patron parties fulfilled only the minimum tasks assigned to parties by the formal institutions; they integrated only the patrons. With the possible exception of the *Northern People's Congress*, these parties were interested in an individual only insofar as he happened to be included in the franchise; they provided candidates for election and the minimum machinery for bringing the voter to the polls. They paid little attention to the function of political education, and barely explained the context of the postwar reforms to the population.

By contrast, the functions of mass parties were far more complex and varied. On occasion, before they acquired government responsibilities, mass parties disregarded—indeed replaced—the existing legal institutions. To the extent that for a time they substituted, or proposed to substitute, their structure for that of the state—that they developed their own ways of administering justice or of keeping order—these parties filled a revolutionary function. (Though in West Africa, unlike Cameroun or Algeria, none waged guerrilla war.) For some time the population considered them, far more than the legal institutions conceived in London or in Paris, to be legitimate. By agreeing to work at least partly within the postwar representative institutions, therefore, these parties legitimized the formal structure, rather than *vice versa.* Coincidentally, these parties acted as national "melting pots," educating people as Africans. Insofar as they provided a new social framework for people no longer firmly rooted in a stable ethnic tradition, they can be termed "parties of social integration."[17] They and their cultural affiliates were interested in everything from the cradle to the grave—in birth, initiation, religion, marriage, divorce, dancing, song, plays, feuds, debts, land, migration, death, public order—and not only in electoral success.

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[16] For further details, see Kenneth E. Robinson's excellent chapter "Senegal" in *Five Elections in Africa,* edited by him and W. J. M. Mackenzie (Oxford, 1960).

An analysis of the modern and traditional status and ethnic origins of national and local leaders shows how the mass parties performed this integrating function. This analysis is particularly important, since the achievement of independence in West Africa allowed shifts in the distribution of power not only between Europeans and Africans, but also within African society—between the modern and traditional elites, within each of these groups, and in the links connecting them with the mass of the population.

Perhaps the best approach is the relatively simple question—what group or sub-group predominated in the major parties? Trade unionists predominated within the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and were of great significance in the *Union Soudanaise* and the (outlawed) *Sawaba* mass party of Niger. African planters formed the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire,* and people associated with the cocoa export trade were influential in the *Action Group of Nigeria.* The educated former "subjects" constructed the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais** to challenge, in effect, the "citizen"-led socialists. All these dominant groups were in the modern categories of the population, a feature all mass parties had in common and shared with only those few "patron" parties that were based on a prewar town elite.

Who predominated in those patron parties resting on important village personalities? The distinction between mass and patron parties, in relation to local party structure, was less neat in fact than in definition. When first organizing, aspiring mass party leaders did not disdain to accept the backing of an important local personage—an official chief, a traditional aristocrat, a Muslim *marabout* or an animist sage. But partly because most mass parties were born after the war either as or out of anticolonial "congresses,"[18] locally important persons in West Africa connected with the colonial establishment usually held aloof until the mass party was itself becoming the establishment. Then many "shifted their rifles from one shoulder to the other."[19] Most important local personages without modern education who became identified with the mass parties during the height of the independence struggle—*la lutte anti-impérialiste*—had special reasons for lining up against the colonial administration, usually connected with a local quarrel over chieftaincy, prestige or property. Many rivals to the official "chiefs," at the village or regional level, joined the mass parties at an early stage. However, when such a personality became included locally within the mass party, the methods of the mass party worked to control his local influence, to make of him but one among many. There were, of course, variations in degree, related to mass party structure and to the type of tribal political organization.

Where there was an educated urban middle class, also identified both for cultural and economic reasons with the colonial power, its members hesitated too before becoming associated with the radical, anti-colonial mass parties, usually initiated by younger, less educated men, less acceptable to the Europeans. The clearest examples of this were in Senegal and in Gold Coast (Ghana). The prewar "subjects," shortly after they acquired the vote in 1945, broke from the "citizen"-dominated SFIO* of Senegal to organize their *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais**. Similarly in Gold Coast the younger, more radical men broke from the *United Gold Coast Convention** to organize the *Convention People's Party.*

Thus in some areas, in spite of their many differences, a prewar town elite holding the highest positions permitted to Africans in the colonial system, and the official "chiefs" already conscious that the presence of the Europeans stabilized their position, made common cause in partron parties against mass party leaders. The lineup of "haves" against their "have not" challengers was evident in the epithets exchanged at election time. Urban patron party leaders called mass party leaders "vagrants" (Guinea), "veranda boys" (Ghana); in the countryside patrons underlined that their rivals were "slaves" or "strangers." Mass party leaders, for their part hurled labels like "union of featherbedders" at the patron party leaders.

In varying degrees, the nationalist struggle helped stir up "loyalty" issues, national and local, frequently with the result of providing yet another cause for disintegration in an already fragile society. For where they could, those lower on the traditional or modern social scale used the issue of nationalism to strengthen their own position through the mass parties. And those with privileges to lose, as in Niger or Nigeria, showed signs of preferring rule by the Europeans to rule by the *talakawa* (commoners in Hausa). Especially in the countryside, showing loyalty to the mass party when it was under pressure from the colonial power, was one way to compensate for a weak claim to belonging to the local ethnic group—for the immigrant *dioula* ("strangers") in Ivory Coast to show they were as loyal, for example, as the *originaires* who first came to the area.

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[17] Sigmund Neumann, *Modern Political Parties* (University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 404.

[18] Hodgkin, *op. cit.,* p. 144.

[19] Madeira Keïta, "Le Parti unique en Afrique," *Présence Africaine,* février-mars, 1960, pp. 19–20.

With so few in the educated elite, and a subtle network of kinship connecting leaders and followers, it was logical that leaders of both mass and patron parties organized on a territorial scale should have gone through the first and simplest stage of "ethnic arithmetic": they kept a rough correspondence between the ethnic origins of leaders and followers. This correspondence is at least as important in Africa as in Boston or New York City politics. Defeating a patron party which has not been through this first stage was relatively easy for mass party leaders—as when, the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais** used "favorite sons" in the Casamance region of Senegal, to defeat the SFIO* which was locally (as well as territorially) dominated by Wolof and Lébou from Dakar or Saint-Louis. Leaders who tried to build national parties failed when they did not have among their ranks representatives of the most important ethnic groups. The Socialist party of Guinea was in this category. It grew from the Fulani club at the Ecole Normale William-Ponty and never really succeeded in broadening its ethnic base, even though it underwent several important changes, from an ethnic to a nationalist ideology. Too many of one ethnic group, too few of another, caused jealousies and difficulties for any party. The *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* had relatively little trouble with ethnic separatism from the Baule, while the *Convention People's Party* had considerable difficulty with the Ashanti. These two ethnic groups, traditionally related, occupy similar historic and geographic positions in their respective states, produce most of the coffee and cocoa and so have the most wealth. The PDCI from the beginning had Baule associated with them through the person of their leader, Félix Houphouët-Boigny; while in Ghana the CPP started, and except in the revolutionary years 1949–1950 remained, without similar support among the Ashanti. They are conscious of losing power to southerners, and "young men" "on occasion lament with their more conservative elders the present absolute reversal of Ashanti fortunes."[20]

While patron parties' leaders, once through this first simple phase of "ethnic arithmetic," generally stopped their calculations there, the leaders of mass parties had taken that as a point of departure. They tried to use their party organizations in order to awaken a wider, national sense of community. They appealed to particular categories existing within or cutting across ethnic groups—a technique suitable to recruiting in a mobile, changing society. Youth and women were of course two such categories which mass parties emphasized heavily. As already noted, in many villages mass party organizers went to rivals of official "chiefs"; from these they discovered local grievances. They often appealed to rural underprivileged groups. For example, the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* first gained a following in the Fouta Djallon plateau not among the Fulani majority, but rather among the "captives" living in the ancillary villages (*roundé*). They appealed to rural scribes, whose modern skills set them apart, and to those who had travelled, often "strangers" who were among the most recent immigrants to a flourishing agricultural area. In some areas they went to veterans—in Ghana, for example, and in Senegal. They sought out religious dissidents—Harrists in the Ivory Coast, Hamallists in Mali. In some areas they found Muslim proselytizers opposed by the "chief"—either because he was animist, or because though Muslim he nevertheless felt his secular position under attack. They found camel drivers, chauffeurs, transporters, and peddlers—such as the *dioula* traders of Western Upper Volta, Mali, Guinea, and Ivory Coast, or some "Hausa" traders of Ghana and Nigeria. (Many of these in fact came from families with a tradition as middlemen in the trans-Saharan trade before it declined under trans-Atlantic competition.) Finally, they appealed to those who earned money income for growing coffee, cocoa, peanuts or bananas, and had become restless with tradition; to young men who no longer listened to the old; and to women who made money trading in the marketplace. People responded to the mass party organizers' appeals against established authorities.

People in these non-ethnic social categories were still in a minority, to be sure; most of them had some roots in a tribal community and they too wanted party leaders of roughly similar origins to their own. Mass party leaders were well aware they needed associates who were kinsmen of those they sought as followers, even while many rejected the principle that ethnic considerations should enter into the selection of party office holders. Indeed, conflicts among ethnic groups were often sharper in mass than in patron parties, since mass parties made a continuous attempt to propagate modern values and diminish the weight of ethnic exclusiveness. For example, after their 1956 victories, both *Union Soudanaise* and *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* leaders developed the habit of deliberately scrambling the ethnic origins of party propagandists and their audiences. Men from the Guinea coast campaigned in the forest and Fouta Djallon; men from Upper Guinea in the forest. All these tactics had the purpose of encouraging people to relate themselves directly to the party.

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[20] Dennis Austin and William Tordoff, "Voting in an African Town," *Political Studies* (Oxford), June 1960, p. 131.

Conflicts between modern and traditional leaders were also often sharper in mass than patron parties since most mass parties were egalitarian by policy. The traditional upper-class standing of Sékou Touré or Modibo Keïta, for example, was important because of the high popular esteem given to them. The *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* began to make headway among the Fulani after Diallo Sayfoulaye, the son of an important Fulani chief, "like La Fayette . . . left his privileges to join the democratic cause."[21] Félix Houphouët-Boigny, in the militant years of the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* before 1952, used his prestige as official chief, and not only as a doctor and wealthy planter, in order to entrench the PDCI in the countryside. On the whole, they used their nobility to preach equality.

The majority of the national and regional leadership in patron parties is of traditional upper-class status, while the majority of the mass party national and regional leadership is of commoner origin. But mass parties have a surprisingly large number of people with high traditional status as the top national party leaders. And patron parties have an exceptionally large number of prime ministers, or officials holding the first post in the modern institutions, with low traditional status. (Is this a method of chiefly control, reminiscent of their habit, at the turn of the century, of sending not their own but sons of slaves to the schools of the Europeans?) Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Northern Nigerian designated by the *Northern People's Congress* to become Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria, is of low traditional status. So is Joseph Conombo, who until 1956 was deputy to the French National Assembly from Upper Volta, elected through a patron party based on the Mossi chiefs. So was Yacine Diallo (d. 1954), Guinea deputy to the French National Assembly representing the then dominant patron party alliance, and more specifically the Fulani chiefs. So is Hubert Maga, Prime Minister of Dahomey, who represented a regional patron party strong in Northern Dahomey. It is as if "princes" fear least the competition of "captives"; while villagers, first hearing equality preached, learn fastest from "princes."

Thus within mass parties, not only ethnic origins but also ethnic status continue to count, often causing more conflict precisely because mass party ideology usually ignores or challenges these differences. Yet men with high modern but low traditional qualifications—Ponty graduates of *griot*[22] descent, for example, lawyers descended of "captives"—were rarely put forward by local mass party branch members as candidates for elective office. In varying degrees, mass party national leaders usually maintained a continuous pressure in favor of such nominations, as of West Indians and other ,'strangers," to prove they believed in equality. (Precisely so as to be able to maintain this pressure, mass party leaders often preferred multi-member to single-member constituencies in legislative assembly elections. Where ten seats were to be filled, local branch members were more inclined to accept some candidates that national headquarters designated, than where only one seat was involved.) Though they tried much harder than patron party leaders, mass party leaders did not always succeed in avoiding institutionalizing ethnic differences. So in the long run, friction among ethnic groups in Ivory Coast may have been intensified by the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*'s decision to organize local branches on an ethnic, rather than a neighborhood principle. This distinguished the PDCI local structure from that of most other mass parties. The *Union Soudanaise*, the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée*, and the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise*, for example, made strenuous efforts to mix ethnic groups at the local level—and did so at least to the extent that neighborhoods did. The PDCI decision was a recognition of the way people actually communicated in Ivory Coast, a concession to reality, unwillingly made by many educated leaders because they knew they might need to assemble their followers rapidly. It was challenged by a PDCI Congress resolution in 1959, as yet not implemented.[23]

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[21] *La Liberté*, PDG newspaper, December 22, 1955.

[22] Traditional caste resembling medieval troubadours.

The various methods used by mass and patron parties further illustrate the differences between them. Patron parties adopted methods respectful of established authority. They rarely called mass meetings and until 1957 generally avoided the techniques of protest, offered few if any personal services to supporters, and were little concerned with party symbols. The mass parties, prior to achieving government majorities, employed techniques related to their revolutionary, legitimizing, educational and social integration functions. Demonstrations, strikes, boycotts and occasional violence were revolutionary techniques. The parties paid considerable attention to the creation of new national symbols: insignias, colors, slogans, party cloth for women to wear. The *Action Group of Nigeria* even hired American public relations advisers. Mass party choices of symbols and slogans were based on sound insight into popular responses, and repetition is at the heart of African oratory, as of drumming and dance.[24] "Vote the elephant; he is wise and never forgets." The *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* painted the elephant on walls and roofs and streets and cars. In the savannah, however, the *Union Soudanaise* never made much of the fact that the elephant was its symbol also; for there *Union Soudanaise* opponents said with effect, "the elephant eats your crops and leaves you destitute." The *Action Group of Nigeria* adopted the palm tree as its symbol of the "life more abundant." Elaborating on the meaning of the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais** party colors, Léopold Senghor of Senegal wrote "Green is for the Muslim majority, the color of the Prophet's flag; green is for the Christian minority, the color of hope; green is for the animists, the symbol of youth and the irrepressible force of Black Africa."[25] And using the elimination of forced labor to their ends, aspiring mass party *Union Démocratique Nigérienne**[26] leaders of Niger whose ballot carried the picture of a camel, warned people not to vote for the patron *Union Nigérienne des Indépendants et Sympathisants** party which had a yellow ballot bearing the picture of a stick and a basket. "Vote for the camel, and you will be as free as he," they said, well acquainted with that ornery beast. And they added, "The yellow ballot is a stick and a basket; if you vote for it forced labor will come back." The *Northern People's Congress* made *salama*—"peace"—its slogan. Prayers were often connected with party ceremonies, and so a libation was poured in connection with *Convention People's Party* and *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* meetings, or the Fatiha (opening *sura* of the Koran) was intoned prior to some *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* meetings.

Personal oratory was one of the most effective educational techniques. Campaigning against the Guinea regional patron parties during 1954–6, Sékou Touré explained, "I am Diallo the shepherd from the Fouta, I am Mamba the planter from Nzerekore, Keïta the rice grower from Siguiri, Soumah the fisherman from the coast, I am African, I am every man." Both because they believed it, and because the "important people" in the countryside opposed them, most mass party organizers preached equality. "Vincent Auriol and Lamine both die if they go hungry." Or, "three men want to go to Bamako. The governor goes by plane, Mamba by bicycle, Yacine on foot. Who arrives first?" "The governor," shouts the crowd. "Next?" "Mamba." "Then?" "Yacine." In such dialogues leaders communicated the idea that the environment accounts for most human differences.

The identification of the mass party with the community before independence was emphasized not only by party sponsorship of dances, festivals, songs, receptions, by party organization of weddings or funerals, but also by the existence of an informal party social security system which resulted in support for indigent partisans, legal advice for imprisoned militants, payment of medical bills for the sick, food and housing for families of party widows or grass widows, as well as automatic hospitality for party-sponsored travellers. On occasion the mass party could count on free labor even for the construction of bridges, roads and schools—on popular good will that the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and *Union Soudanaise* leaders termed human investment—*investissement humain*—and included in their inventory of economic resources.

## IV. DEMOCRACY AND THE SINGLE PARTY SYSTEM

The nationalist struggle strengthens the position of the educated elite in largely traditional societies and encourages the elite to knit into mass parties the forces for change and dissent, both traditional and modern. There is not yet evidence to show that the trend from patron to mass party majority continues after independence. The distinctions between and among mass and patron parties turn on differences in degree, and some parties fall between the two categories. Is the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire,* for example, losing its mass party characteristics and becoming a patron type? The efficiency of its organization has declined, as has its interest in social equality; there have been many signs of rising discontent; it has been increasingly unable to cope with ethnic separatist pressures. The *Northern People's Congress,* on the other hand, because of its growing emphasis on mass recruitment, may be moving towards the mass party type. Despite these transitional cases the distinction between types is useful.

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[23] *Abidjan-Matin*, June 18, 1959. See A. R. Zolberg, "Effets de la structure d'un parti politique sur l'intégration nationale," *Cahiers d'études africaines*, October 3, 1960, p. 140 f.

[24] Unless otherwise indicated, I recorded the citations in Africa.

[25] *Condition Humaine, Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais** newspaper, November 30, 1948.

[26] The forerunner of *Sawaba.*

It is useful in considering the now popular question: how far are the West African single-party systems democratic? I use "democratic" to mean, roughly, that decisions are made with general consent, according to established procedures, in harmony with such values as social equality, and under conditions in which opposition can be expressed. It is difficult to argue that West African single-party systems resting on patron parties are or are becoming democratic, notwithstanding variations in degree. Northern Nigeria has been mentioned. Least in Mauretania, somewhat more in Niger and Upper Volta, can significant evidence be found of general consent, of social equality as a value, or of opportunity to express opposition in the dominant party. The main opposition groups are outlawed. Of the single patron-party states it is easier to argue they are moving towards military dictatorship.

In the present phase of West African party history, there is more evidence that the single-party systems based on mass parties are moving towards democracy. There is, first, the element of widespread consent. During at least a brief period the territorial and party communities were indistinguishable; the mass party reflected the "general will." This was usually just prior to taking over responsibility for governing, but after using to advantage the fact of being in opposition. Discontent was the common denominator. Typical of the instructions national mass party leaders gave to local leaders were, "Go and talk to the peasants in the field." "Tell Abdoulaye his daughter cannot be forced to marry the old chief." "Tell the peasants not to sell their crops at that ruinous price." "Defend Pango's palm trees against destruction by the administrator." "Speak up for Binta's right to cultivate the land the chief claims." While not all the questions were settled, villagers found a national platform in the mass party which they had never known. Mass party organizers sought out grievances, expressed them in the marketplace, coordinated them. They blamed European rule for forced labor, taxes, abuses of official "chiefs," racial discrimination, poverty. Out of these grievances they welded their massive demonstrations against colonial rule. Most patron party leaders were too linked with the established authorities to play this muckraking role.

Muckraking paid. Mass party membership was open to all, and practically all sought to acquire it. This characteristic of recruitment distinguished West African states based on mass parties from states based on single parties confining their membership—as most fascist or Communist parties do—to a selected group. The widespread influence and number of followers of the mass parties at their peak, their national character long before the institutions of government were controlled by Africans, their success in acquiring the credit for the national revolution—all these bore out the mass party claim to represent the entire population. This helps explain why many West African mass party leaders saw little contradiction between claiming to be democratic and insisting on the existence of only a single, mass-based party. It is the African version of that "sole and central power which governs the whole community, by its direct influence,"[27] which de Tocqueville observed in the nineteenth-century American idea of the state.

The prospect of democracy in West African mass party states is enhanced, second, by party organization and procedure. Mass parties, at their best, have developed the organization which can publicize and encourage the mass discussion of important issues. Local branches involve the many rather than honor the few, and mass party leaders try to use traditional organizations in order to reach individuals. They are often more effective than the civil service. Leaders are chosen by voting. In the thoroughly organized mass parties, institutionalized leadership was also collective. Set procedures were followed for the making of decisions and leaders were expected to report back. Thus the mass parties reenforced the African version of responsibility.

Mass parties strengthened democratic forces, in the third place, to the extent that they encouraged social equality. The modern elite, themselves in favor of such values as merit rather than birth as the determinant of rank, were in a stronger position in the mass party states. Moreover, most mass party leaders rose from lower positions both in the modern and the traditional social scale, and used their new power in favor of social equality. Though they had to employ both ethnic and status "arithmetic" to bridge the gap between the educated and the mass of the population, mass party leaders, unlike patron party leaders, did so in a manner to blur ethnic differences and weaken status differences.

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[27] *Democracy in America* (London, 1952), pp. 550–51.

The fourth contribution of mass parties to the prospects of democracy is setting conditions in which opposition is possible. Among the elite, there is enough consensus about the rules of the political game to make it possible for them to disagree without coming, too often, to blows. After all, in prewar Senegal, as in nineteenth-century Britain or present Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the vote, and controversies among the several parties, remained confined to a few who spoke the same language and fought for similar interests. In the long run in Africa, restricting the franchise to a privileged few is a greater threat to democracy than the existence of but a single party. At the present stage of African social history, the mass party organization makes it possible for people to disagree within it, without necessarily triggering incidents endangering the rule of the elite and the stability of the state. Confining disagreements to the issues at hand is difficult in a society where only the members of an educated elite born of different ethnic groups are able to speak directly to each other in French or English. Even where the organization of a mass party is a "spider's web"[28] villagers often have different ideas than national leaders. Sékou Touré spoke of this to the Fifth Congress of the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* in September 1959:

> . . . democracy, within our Party, is not a democracy of clan or family, but a basic democracy to which the entire population contributes directly and freely . . . the old forms of social democracy anchored in the villages often influence the party militants, who believe themselves authorized to violate the new individual forms prescribed within the PDG. Therefore at each new election for officers, dissensions arise within the Movement. This occurs because we have not yet accomplished our work.[29]

As long as kinship is an important link between the educated and their rural constituents, divisions among the elite on such constitutional matters as federalism, independence, or the position of "chiefs," is often taken by their kinsmen as a signal for settling entirely unrelated traditional issues over land, women or water. This was one of the dynamic factors behind the Kumasi riots which accompanied the *Convention People's Party-National Liberation Movement** (NLM)[30] controversy about constitutional matters after 1956. A similar dynamic helped to explain the Ivory Coast incidents of 1949–51. In the relatively integrated societies of North America or Western Europe, pluralism is quite rightly counted among the democratic virtues. In Africa today, it is rather a vice.

These four points back up the argument that West African states based on dominant mass parties are moving towards democracy. West Africans justify their insistence on a single party on yet other grounds—that a national emergency exists. The struggle for independence is "not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are virtually involved in the contest. . . . "[31] These words of Tom Paine's reflect the African sense of history.[32] Africans argue the plural "party system under imperialist domination is synonymous with a sterile division that profits only those who want to see to it that their privileges continue."[33] This is the logic of a community at war, considering an *administratif* to be like a "quisling." Most Africans carry their sense of urgency into the post-independence era, and consider unity necessary in order rapidly to "install the apparatus of the State, at the service of economic development, of social and cultural development."[34]

While there is good evidence for the argument that West African states based on dominant mass parties are moving towards democracy, there is also evidence of forces moving against. How does a mass party continue to reflect the "general will" after independence? The full responsibilities of government have already brought out centrifugal forces—opposition within the mass parties from its youth, labor and traditionalist affiliates. Some officials have used their public office for personal gain. There have been signs of ethnic separatism, particularly on international frontiers. Rural friction intensified between "strangers" or *dioula* and the original owners of tribal lands. It appears, as Thomas Hodgkin claims, that the logical consequence of self-determination is anarchy. Yet perhaps even a greater threat to democracy is the fear of anarchy, making new African governments as quick to pass Preventive Detention Acts as the United States was to adopt the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798.

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[28] The term is frequently used by the *Union Soudanaise* secretary general, Modibo Keïta.

[29] *Official Report* (Conakry, 1959), pp. 43–4.

[30] After 1957 the United Party.

[31] "Common Sense" in *The Political Writings*, Vol. 1, Investigator Office (Boston, 1856), p. 33.

[32] For a most interesting discussion of the new history of West Africa, see Immanuel Wallerstein's paper delivered to the 1960 meeting of the American Sociological Association, "The Search for National Identity," mimeographed.

[33] Alexander Adandé, "In the Phase of National Reconstruction the Fusion of Parties Becomes a Categorical Imperative," address at the Congress for Cultural Freedom Conference, Ibadan, March 1959, mimeographed, F/413, p. 3.

[34] Madeira Keïta, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

What opportunity is there in the mass party states to express disagreement? This varies. *Within* the mass parties the greatest opportunity appears to exist in the best organized ones. So far discussion is widespread and frank —within the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and the *Union Soudanaise*, for example—and leaders have on many occasions been outvoted on important issues. Not only individual disagreement is possible under the party umbrella, but also organized disagreements by *tendances* —such as trade union, youth, student and cultural organizations, even the civil service. In the less highly organized mass party states, such as Ivory Coast, the Eastern Region of Nigeria, Senegal and Togo, these modern associations tend to be foci of opposition outside of the mass party, though not necessarily calling themselves parties.

The opportunity to express opposition through rival political parties also varies. In no West African mass party state is *all* organized opposition to the dominant party directly excluded by law, though specified parties or types of parties are outlawed in most states. It is excluded in effect, however, where it is a matter of doctrine to insist on the single party, the *parti unique*, and on its identity with both the popular will and with the state. It is less excluded where leaders justify the single party for empirical reasons as a *parti unifié*, making common cause in the present national emergency. Where single-party states are based on patron parties, opposition groups exist which are already or potentially mass parties; at least in Niger, Northern Nigeria, and to less extent Upper Volta these have considerable momentum behind them. But in mass party states, from among what groups has organized opposition come? There are "one-man shows" such as the *Union Démocratique et Sociale Africaine** of Guinea or the *Front de Libération Noire** of Ivory Coast; rump groups left over from mergers or reorganizations, like the post-war *Parti Socialiste Sénégalais** and the "expatriate" groups such as the *Parti de la Libération de la Côte d'Ivoire* in Guinea; these have simply curiosity value and generally exist only for a short time. Limited staying power also characterizes parties like the *Parti de Solidarité Sénégalaise*, built by disaffected "clan leaders" and other rural personalities. Numerous ethnic minor parties exist in the countryside, such as the *Union Dogon** of Mali, or the Socialists among the Bété of Ivory Coast. When ethnic parties are based on urban areas, their supporters usually belonged to the tribes which originally owned the land—the *Rassemblement Démocratique Sénégalais* among the Lébou of Dakar, for example.

Standing alone these ethnic parties have little potential on the national scene. But they might have in inter-state politics if, for example, Guinea leaders used as an instrument of pressure the loyalty to the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* of ethnic groups living on the frontiers of Liberia or Sierra Leone. Or there might be a future in federal politics if well organized teams of educated leaders synchronized the discontent among minority groups—as the *Action Group of Nigeria* has done in the North and the *National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons* has done in the West of the Federation. The political history both of Nigeria and the former French West African federation suggests that federalism adds to the prospects for organized opposition groups. Partly this is because the desire to control the federation offers mass party leaders dominant in one region incentives to seek support in another. Furthermore the desire to work together in a federation is a reason why leaders of the dominant party in one region may at least hesitate before repressing opponents having political support in another region.

Most significant are opposition groups among "young Turks," mainly town-dwellers differently educated or younger than the men leading the dominant parties: JUVENTO in Togo, *An Nahda al Watenia al Mauritania* (Party of the National Renaissance of Mauretania), *Parti du Regroupement Africain-Sénégal*, and the *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance* of Senegal. With the possible exception of the PAI, these avant-garde groups had no conscious elitist theory governing recruitment, but in practice their audience is still confined to the modern elite, to youth and student and trade union groups. Particularly when the party in power is of a mass type, most of these groups alternate between opposing it, and joining it in order to constitute a "party within a party." These "young Turks" are nationalists and modernizers. They have little appetite for ethnic, separatist opposition of the type loosely allied in the *United Party* of Ghana.

The "young Turks" constitute the actual or potential national, not ethnic, opposition. They might be joined, eventually, by breakaway groups from among the "founding fathers."[35] As long as the elite is small, the civil service is likely to absorb the most newly educated strata of the elite—and dominant parties will brook no partisan opposition from within the civil services. On economic development depends the growth of the modern strata of African society in large enough numbers, and spread evenly enough across ethnic groups, to permit opposition party leaders to calculate in ethnic and status "arithmetic." The chance of opposition groups eventually displacing in elections the dominant mass parties in the single-party states, may increase as the "national emergency" ends. Independence is mostly acquired. Now in West Africa, unity for economic development is the order of the day.

There are, in the mass party states of West Africa, obstacles to the growth of democracy, as in most other parts of the world. But on balance, to a much greater extent than the colonial governments which they succeeded, the mass party states rest on popular consent, strengthen procedures and institutions on a scale essential for accomplishing the tasks of the modern democratic state, reflect egalitarian values and leave room for the expression of opposition. So far, the mass party states have used to good effect the emphasis on

> union, a word like friendship, goodness, an abstract thing having no face, raising no concrete image in the mind. It goes into all sauces; it accommodates itself to irreconcilables.[36]

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[35] Julius Nyerere suggested this in "Africa's Place in the World," *Symposium on Africa* (Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., 1960), pp. 162–3.

[36] *La Liberté*, November 23, 1954.

# THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICO

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Mexico's political experience over the last fifty years—since the Revolution of 1910—is highly significant, not only for the rest of Latin America, but for much of the rest of the world. For Mexico has accomplished the exceedingly difficult feat of breaking out of the vicious circle of dictatorship, misery, and revolution, and finding a way to a regime that is at once increasingly democratic, stable, and progressive. Despite a relative lack of many of the social, economic, and cultural characteristics which are often treated as prerequisites of stable democracy, Mexico seems to have solved the problem of assuring peaceful succession to leadership positions, while at the same time permitting wide participation in policy formation and allowing full civil freedom.

This type of end-result is almost always the conscious goal of political leaders throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia. While the Mexican road is hardly likely to be followed exactly elsewhere, other countries, to reach the same goal, will have to find equivalents for the solutions that Mexico has devised, for the obstacles in their paths are much the same. A study of the difficulties which Mexico has faced and how they were overcome may therefore have a generic interest, as being suggestive of some broader hypotheses about political development.

Much has been written about the seeming paradox that Mexico is clearly a democracy and yet has a one-party system; and parallels with putative one-party democracies in Africa and Asia are often drawn. I will not deal here with the question, compounded of definition and fact, whether the full complement of characteristics usually attributed to democracies can ever exist in a one-party system. It is enough for present purposes that Mexico, with her special brand of political institutions, has been more democratic and more stable, either than she was before, or than most Latin American countries have been, under more common arrangements, during the same period. Her system deserves to be judged in this relative light, rather than by absolute standards.

## I

The changes that have taken place in Mexico over the last fifty years need to be set in a general context. We may begin with the reminder that the realm of politics is the realm of clashing interests and aspirations. The so-called "style" of a country's politics is determined by the methods it usually uses for settling such conflicts. The most common of these methods can be arranged along a scale, from force to bargaining to administration and law-enforcement. The degree of the internal stability of a political order may then be gauged from the proportion of its disputes that are solved by means which are nearer the "administration and law-enforcement" end of the scale rather than towards the "force" end.

Where disputes are solved only by resort to force, clearly no consensus need exist between the contending parties. In a bargaining relationship the parties are at least committed to arriving at a resolution of their differences by peaceful means, and to expectations that agreement will ordinarily be honored. Where a problem can be resolved by administrative techniques, the parties are in addition agreed, at least implicitly, on a set of norms which can be applied to the resolution of the dispute by a third party.

The shift towards the use of methods of political settlement normal for a more stable, higher-consensus society has been marked in Mexico. If we look, for example, at the succession of Presidents that Mexico has had since the Revolution, a clear change has taken place in their characteristic skills.

The Presidents of the early years of the Revolutionary regime were, of course, military leaders—Carranza, Obregón, Calles. At the end of Calles' term, the Revolutionary leadership had planned another term of office for Obregón, but he was assassinated between the election and the inauguration. At this juncture, Calles tried—abortively, as it proved—to make the transition from "personalist" to "institutionalist" politics, as he put it. In other words, he proposed to pass to a system in which the President would not need himself to be the strongest military leader in the country, but could simply represent the Revolutionary leadership, which would be institutionalized as a political party. As Calles explained to a conference of army leaders, the new President would of course "seek orientation among the representative members of the revolutionary family."[1] The Provisional President chosen, Emilio Portes Gil, was an able lawyer-politician, who performed very creditably during his brief tenure of office. The President elected to succeed him for the still unexpired remainder of Obregón's term, however—Pascual Ortiz Rubio, an engineer-administrator—proved ineffectual and inconsistent. He was, in effect, "fired" by Calles, and the experiment in transition was called off. Mexico returned to being ruled by leading generals for the next three Presidential terms, with Generals Rodríguez, Cárdenas, and Ávila Camacho.

By the end of Ávila Camacho's term, after Mexico had experienced, during Cárdenas' "New Deal" and the Second World War, both considerable economic growth and a heightened consciousness of national unity, the time again seemed ripe to make the transition to a civilian President. Ávila Camacho chose as his successor another astute lawyer-politician, Miguel Alemán, who might thus be regarded as the functional—though certainly not the moral—equivalent of Portes Gil. Alemán, in turn, was succeeded by one who was primarily an administrator, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. The present President, Adolfo López Mateos, also a career administrator, is the first representative of the post-Revolutionary generation to wear the presidential sash. This progression in the characteristic skills of the men who have become presidents is symbolic of the progress Mexico has made to a politics of stability.

A like transition in political skills has been found characteristic of other revolutions, widely disparate in other respects, which have lived to become institutionalized. For example, according to Feliks Gross, "The American Revolution kept its leaders during the period of consolidation, and the shift was away from military leaders and political philosophers to law-makers and administrators."[2]

Barrington Moore, Jr., has observed a similar phenomenon, albeit modified by the obvious differences, take place in the Soviet Union: "The Party man has had to change from agitator to political administrator and give ground to both the engineer-administrator and the policeman."[3]

The Mexican type of development in dominant political skills appears, then, as might have been expected *a priori*, to be a general phenomenon in the stabilization of a post-revolutionary situation.

## II

I have suggested that the principal mode of settlement of disputes in Mexico today is by "administration." What, then, is the nature of the consensus on the basis of which it is possible for the solutions of conflicts to be "administered"?

Put very briefly, it is this: the organized interests of the country, major and minor (with the exception of large-scale employers of labor) are integrated into the structure of the "official" government party, the Party of Revolutionary Institutions (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, or PRI). These interest groups are currently organized into three "sectors" of the party—labor, agrarian, and "popular," the last a catch-all category.[4] PRI nominations to elective posts, which are normally equivalent to election, are allotted to the sector strongest in the constituency to be represented. So far as is known to the outsider, major lines of party policy on public questions are, similarly, subject to a process of bargaining and compromise among sector leaders.

From the point of view of the evolution of the Mexican political style, there are several things to be said about this sector organization of the party, and of intraparty bargaining. First, it originated in the epoch in which the use of force was an ever-present possibility. For this reason, the three original sectors of the "official" party, when it was first constituted as the National Revolutionary Party, were those of the military, labor, and the agrarians (*i.e.*, members of the cooperative farming settlements, the *ejidos*); *for these three elements had "earned" their places by virtue of their capabilities as fighting forces.* Given the possibility of violence, successful peaceful decision-making required the participation of those groups able to use violence effectively.

Both organized labor and the organized collective farmers, the *ejidatarios*, had demonstrated their fighting effectiveness in enabling

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[1] See the account of this conference in Froylan C. Manjárrez, *La Jornada Institucional* (Mexico, D.F., 1930), p. 68.

[2] *The Seizure of Political Power*, Philosophical Library (New York, 1958), p. 51.

[3] *Terror and Progress, USSR* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 31.

[4] Perhaps the best account of the organization of the PRI is in Leon Vincent Padgett's unpublished Ph.D. thesis *Popular Participation in the Mexican "One-Party" System.* (Northwestern University, 1955); *cf.* his "Mexico's One-Party System: Re-evaluation," in this Review, Vol. 51 (December, 1957), pp. 995. Party structure is also discussed in Robert E. Scott's recent *Mexican Government in Transition*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1959.

the government to survive revolts backed by major segments of the Army during the 'twenties.

Perhaps the most important of these—certainly the one which came closest to success—was led by Generals Sanchez and Estrada in 1923, in behalf of the Presidential aspirations of Adolfo de la Huerta. Disappointed by Obregón's choice of Calles to succeed him as President, these three major revolutionary figures gathered the greater part of the army to their cause, which seemed certain to be victorious. In fact, Calles entrained for the United States border (he later returned with some troops, and the story was given out that he had gone north for reinforcements.) But then unusual things began to happen; organized *ejidatarios* cut Estrada's communication lines, sabotaged his supplies, and even formed diminutive armies which attacked his rear. It soon became clear that Estrada's army was not going to be able to "hold" rural areas at all; then President Obregón marshalled a new army out of a few detachments of troops that had remained loyal, volunteers from the *ejidos*, and "labor battalions" of Mexico City union members, took to the field, and defeated Estrada, who by then had virtually to fight on two fronts, against Obregón, and against the *ejidatarios* harassing his rear. This marked the beginning of the atrophy of revolution as a Mexican institution. For this result, Mexico had to thank the labor battalions and especially the organized peasants. So labor and the *ejidatarios* gave substance to their claim for an equal voice with the military in the councils of the Revolution.

Much has been written about the Mexican land reform, *i.e.*, the transfer of land from private or state ownership to *ejidos*, in which individuals have a right to farm a small plot of land without being able to alienate it; and a plausible case can be made for the view that other forms of agricultural ownership would be more productive—either outright collective farms, state farms, or straightforward individual ownership of units larger than the average small *ejido* plot. The fact that postwar governments have kept the amount of land constituted into *ejidos* constant at about half a million hectares a year, while opening up increasingly more newly irrigated land to private ownership, suggests that this view, that *ejidos* are relatively less productive, is the one now dominant in government circles.

But if the *ejido* system is not economically warranted, it is surely justifiable on political grounds. For the granting of land to the *campesino* was the one act which could secure his loyalty to the Revolution and assure that, in future revolts, he would support the government, and not, as had almost invariably been the case in pre-Revolutionary Mexico, the insurgents.

## III

The second significant aspect of the sectoral organization of the Revolutionary party, for present purposes, relates to the political function of bribery, and "corruption" generally. For much of the period since the Revolution, and especially from about the mid-'twenties to the mid-'forties, leaders and subleaders of the three great structures of power and interest within the Party—labor, collective agriculture, and the army—have been so situated as to control the distribution of offices and their perquisites, licit and illicit. Operating under, at most, nominal control by those whose interests they are supposed to represent, sectoral leaders have been in the classic position of those who wield power without corresponding responsibility. As a result, purely personal benefits became counters in intra-party negotiations and the whole of Mexican politics bore a tinge of immorality and cynicism, much as American municipal politics did within living memory. In 1947, for example, Stephen S. Goodspeed noted the curious circumstance that "Army officers are associated with almost every governmental venture involving the spending of money."[5] On the labor leaders, Bertram Wolfe wrote:

> The writer has seen a list of his [the reference is to Lombardo Toledano, leader of the CTM, the Mexican Confederation of Labor] chief lieutenants, inherited from the past, with a price next to the name of each of them. The list is provided by the Chamber of Commerce of Mexico to trustworthy members to let them know how much it costs to settle a labor dispute.[6]

The distinguished scholar, Jesús Silva Herzog, summed up the situation in *La Revolución Mexicana en Crisis;*

> There are big, medium and small politicians, giant and dwarf, and they are found everywhere . . . in the ejido he exploits the ejidatarios, in the labor unions he exploits the workers and employees, and in the schools he deceives his companions.[7]

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[5] *The Role of the Chief Executive in Mexico,* Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1947, p. 476.

[6] Bertram Wolfe and Diego Rivera, *Portrait of Mexico* (New York, 1937), p. 199.

[7] Quoted in Nathan L. Whetten, *Rural Mexico* (University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 544–545.

Thus the clashing gears of interest were lubricated by the heavy oil of graft; and though one can hardly condone the betrayal of his trust by an interest group representative, it should not be overlooked that in some ways the prevalence of graft-taking facilitated the transition to a more stable and orderly politics. Bribery has been known to perform similar functions, after all, in the eighteenth-century England of Fox and North; indeed, in the early United States of Alexander Hamilton.

We noted above that the *ejidatario* became a supporter of the *status quo* after he had acquired a material stake in it. In a comparable way, the trouble-making potentialities of the revolutionary general could be inhibited by allowing him to engage in profitable if not altogether legal "business" activities. Those who benefit by the *status quo* are hardly likely to seek to overthrow it.

## IV

The era of periodic revolts is over in Mexican politics; and the prevalence of graft has been reduced markedly (though it has certainly not been eliminated entirely) since the inauguration of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines as President in 1952.

In 1942, President Manuel Ávila Camacho abolished the military sector of the Party as a separate entity. His successor, Miguel Alemán, pushed forward the development of the party sector into which the military was incorporated, the "popular" sector, which includes syndicates of groups of people as disparate as small agricultural proprietors and lottery ticket vendors, civil servants and itinerant minstrels. With the atrophy of the military influence in Mexican politics,[8] the standard of importance in accordance with which public office is distributed has become numbers. For example, the legislative seat in a district is assigned to the sector of the party with greatest strength in the district.

This principle has had two relevant consequences. In the first place, it has given an incentive to the sector organizations to conduct recruiting drives, since the more members the organization has, the greater will be its bargaining power within the party. This has led to a marked expansion in the proportion of the population represented when decisions are made. In the second place, representation by sector enrolment has meant that the popular sector can claim to represent virtually the entire population except for collective farmers and organized workers. It is therefore most frequently the majority sector in any one election district, and so has come to dominate the party. The seats assigned the popular sector are most frequently taken by lawyers, who constitute, in Mexico as in most other countries, a group whose occupational skills make them especially adapted to success in politics. This development has reinforced the tendency to moderation that has been growing within the party concomitant with Mexico's great economic growth of recent years—a tendency reflected in the moderate position of the present President, López Mateos, and of his predecessor, Ruiz Cortines. This development within the official party complements the trend outside it[9] for opposition groups to gain an increasingly large share of the votes, especially the Party of National Action (PAN), which represents in large part growing "bourgeois" elements.

## V

In sum, the style of Mexican politics over the last half-century has been undergoing steady modification. The emergence of a preponderance of force on the side of the Revolutionary *status quo* and the subsequent atrophy of violence were of crucial importance; graft and bribery had a role to perform; and the political effects of the land reform and of economic growth were significant.

The role of the official party has been, throughout the period of transition so far traversed, to contain dispute, to minimize the friction of change. The one-party system has striking achievements to its credit, which North Americans, trying to impose normative patterns familiar to themselves, generally overlook. Put briefly, the one-party system in Mexico has assured peaceful succession to power while allowing for civil freedoms. In itself, this is a dual achievement worthy of note in Latin America. In addition, the system has permitted—indeed, has fostered—economic and political development.

Yet one must be wary of going to the other extreme, and of seeing the virtues of the system without acknowledging its faults. Mexico under the PRI is full of bossism, opportunism, favoritism, and careerism, Candidates are all too often imposed on the local party organization against its will. Too often major political figures are mere sycophants of the President.

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[8] Virginia Prewitt discusses the techniques used in deemphasizing the military in "The Mexican Army Today," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1941.

[9] See Robert E. Scott's *Mexican Government in Transition* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 195.

With all its advantages—by comparison with what went before in Mexico, with what would probably have occurred in Mexico without it, with what has taken place elsewhere in Latin America—the one-party system, admirably suited though it has been to the politics of this transitional period in Mexican life, is most likely itself a transitional form. The old arguments for a system of effective party competition, where a society can support it, are still good ones. And the models which ascribe properties of equilibrium to systems of two- or multi-party competition, but not of one-party dominance,[10] are still accurate. It is unlikely, to put it another way, that in a democratic and "developed" society a one-party system can persist. By its success in contributing to Mexico's development, the one-party system may have made itself obsolete there. But it can hardly be denied that it performed its historical role well.

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[10] For example, Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York, 1957); or E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942).

# IMPEDIMENTS TO UNITY IN NEW NATIONS: THE CASE OF CEYLON*

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In their search for nationhood since World War II, many peoples of Asia and Africa have discovered that independence from western rule is only the first and perhaps the easiest step. Once the foreigner has gone, the larger problem looms of creating a viable political society. Divisions and competitive strivings held in check when outsiders controlled affairs are suddenly released. Ethnic, religious and regional differences, that seemed less important so long as colonial administrators ruled, boil up after independence and more often than not come to dominate the loyalties and inspire the ambitions that move men in politics. To their dismay, responsible leaders find themselves heading not the homogeneous, modern nation state they dreamed of before independence, but a congeries of separate groups. The simple, unifying purpose of the independence struggle fades away, leaving a host of contradictions and cleavages.

Indonesia is wracked by repeated resistance to Jakarta. Burma has been beset by periodic insurrection, supported in part by regional and ethnic hostility to Rangoon. The nightmare of India's Nehru is the growth of regional and linguistic differences. Imminent disintegration of the ex-Belgan Congo dramatizes the extreme case.

Are the difficulties impeding national consolidation mainly the fruit of irresponsible political leadership, as ex-colonial administrators are tempted to allege? Are ill-considered linguistic and educational reforms to blame, reforms that wiser statesmanship could have avoided? What other social and political developments sharpen antagonisms and impede the building of a viable nation state? Would more rapid economic development solve the problems of marked diversity, as the proponents of take-off aid programs often assert?

## I. THE PRICE OF UNION

No doubt repeated appeals to regional, ethnic or traditional differences stunt the growth of a sense of common nationhood. Yet political leaders usually have substantial reasons for stressing their attachment to such divisions in the body politic. Unlike the colonial administrator who preceded him, the elected politician must elicit support; he cannot impose allegiance. So long as the bulk of citizens are moved by appeals to local or traditional ties, there is no surer way of winning political backing than by demonstrating attachment to parochial loyalties. It remains an essential part of political campaigning in Scotland or Wales, as it does in Louisiana or in Maine. In Great Britain and the United States, to be sure, tacit understandings by now set bounds beyond which regional or certain other special interests cannot profitably be pressed at the expense of an overriding national interest. In new countries, the pressures for asserting regional, ethnic or traditional values are many times greater, tacit understandings of the proper limits are not yet agreed upon, and people are little aware of a public interest that must take priority if the national community is to solve its problems effectively and survive.

In India, as Selig Harrison reminds us, many members of the Congress Party—and even the Communist Party—draw their strength mainly from regional or traditional interests so insistent that an over-arching identity with policies of concern to all of India in many instances is not possible. In Indonesia, many politicians and administrators feel impelled to insist upon regional interest, reenforced by traditional attachments and religious differences. Not even Sukarno can count any more upon a freely given nationwide support; he has had to reach adjustment with the army to help him hold the nation's multiplicity together. In Pakistan, differences between Urdu-speaking, moghul-influenced West Pakistan and Bengali-speaking, Hindu-influenced East Pakistan are profound. Any political man from East Pakistan who does not speak out for his region's peculiar interests is likely to lose indispensable political support at home. However understandable these political imperatives may be, it often appears that spokesmen for parochial interests press their claims excessively, disregarding the likely disruptive consequences to the whole of what they seek to achieve for the part.

In nearly all the countries of South and Southeast Asia, linguistic legislation and educa-

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* This discussion develops ideas originally presented in a more detailed empirical context in the author's *Ceylon, Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton University Press, 1960).

tional reform have had high priority. Yet governments and legislators on the side of the largest language group have persistently and seriously underestimated the strength of linguistic loyalties among minorities. In India, for example, legislation provides that Hindi shall replace English as the official language, at a pace defined by an official time-table. At the same time, the efforts to promote Hindi have sharpened minority anxieties about the larger ambitions of the Hindi-speaking segments of the population, and consolidated their loyalties to their own languages. In Malaya, Chinese are antagonized by Malay efforts to strengthen the position of Malay. In Ceylon, Tamils have bitterly opposed efforts of the Sinhalese majority to raise the status of Sinhalese. Each such measure may promote national consolidation in the long run, but it usually favors immediately one group more than another, and changes the terms on which groups compete for opportunity, wealth and power. Those who promote the reforms find it hard to imagine why the minorities should feel so bitter, a lack of empathy that impedes taking steps to assuage minority anxieties, or otherwise to ease what may be an unavoidable transition.

Educational reforms adopted on grounds of excellent principles—the right to universal education, for example, or the right to have children taught in the language of their parents—may have disruptive side effects which can be foreseen but are not taken seriously. A rapidly expanded school system without appropriate changes in the curriculum produces large numbers of educated citizens who are ambitious for status but for whom there are no proper jobs. Teaching children only in the vernaculars segregates them into ethnic groups from the outset and weakens communication between communities. A leadership which transcends the traditional differences such as developed, with all its inequities, under the British and to a more limited extent, under the French colonial systems is no longer produced. Neither by-product is examined with care, and sufficient counter-measures are not taken, with the result that communal awareness is heightened and competition for all-too-scarce opportunities is sharpened.

Economic development providing new opportunities and greater hope for the future would be likely to mitigate this competition in the long run, but in the politically crucial short run it does not eliminate the attachment to old divisions. At the outset, development is likely to favor those most adaptable and ready to seize new opportunities, who are often ethnic and linguistic minorities such as the Marwaris in India or aliens, like the Chinese, in Indonesia. If this process is allowed to run its course, divisions and antagonisms are aggravated. If it is interrupted by political intervention in favor of the majority, resentments among these minorities are heightened. Improved means of communication may at first arouse more perception of group differences and sharpen conflicting ambitions.

Modernization may provoke its own reaction, as traditionalist groups organize to oppose innovation and to weaken the power of those who are responsible for it. Thus, in the short run, at least, modernization may increase group tensions. However much urbanization and industrialization may eventually free men from their traditional loyalties and make a new basis for integration possible, the transition is more likely to be immediately disruptive than to ease group relations.

The struggle for independence provokes the turning back to prewestern cultural roots. But as the early history of each country is explored, it is discovered that the ancestors of those presently engaged in common opposition to the European fought one another in bloody wars or gradual incursions upon one another's territory. When independence is finally achieved, these historical struggles take on a new urgency as groups compete for opportunity and status in the new country.

Hence, the task of national consolidation, however urgent it may be, poses very difficult problems. A close look at Ceylon's experience with relations between its majority and minority populations will illustrate these observations. The country's small size permits clearer analysis of interacting social, political, and economic factors than is possible in massive India or less organized Burma or Indonesia. Of all the new Asian countries, Ceylon seemed to have the best chance of making a successful transition to modern statehood. It began its independence most auspiciously with seasoned leadership drawn from nearly all important ethnic groups. The population was sixty percent literate at independence. It had longer experience with nationwide elections on the basis of a universal franchise to represent single-member, territorial constituencies than any other country. Per capita GNP was higher than in any other country in the area apart from Japan. Its recent experience of relative harmony among classes and racial groups was such that there had been no insurrection, no partition, no sharp class struggle. Yet in 1956 and 1958, unprecedented riots left deep antagonisms that will be hard to soften in the future; the hitherto orderly processes of representative government were interrupted by emergency governor's rule, and the Prime Minister was assassinated.

A detailed examination of this deterioration where high hopes were entertained may shed some light on what other countries have in store. For despite their many differences, virtually all the former colonial countries on the edge of Asia share certain fundamental characteristics that complicate their search for national consolidation. First, there are fissures in the indigenous social order, often regionally defined, that separate ethnic, linguistic and religious groups from one another. In most there are also important minorities who have come to the country within the past century, brought by European enterprisers or drawn by economic opportunities during the colonial period. Indian Tamils in Ceylon, Bengalis in Burma, Chinese in Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia are the legacy that must be dealt with. Both of these impediments to national unity are usually identified as "communal" differences, creating a "plural" or "mosaic" society. Second, the horizontal stratifications are no less important, dividing socio-economic classes sharply from one another. By education, language and culture, the leading elements are in many respects alien to the masses they must lead. The nearest analogues to this stratification in the contemporary West are perhaps to be found in Latin America, Spain or southern Italy.

## II. IMPEDIMENTS TO UNITY IN CEYLON

*The Social Structure.* The social structure of Asian countries provides an underlying element of disunity; the plural society in Ceylon is simpler than most others in the area. The majority Sinhalese community comprises nearly 70 percent of the total population. There are two Tamil-speaking minorities: approximately 12 percent of the population have lived on the island for many centuries; another 10 percent are relative newcomers who arrived during the colonial period to man the tea and rubber estates and develop wholesale businesses. A Muslim minority of some 5 percent and a Burgher community descended from mixed European and Ceylonese marriages form the balance.

The Sinhalese are largely Buddhists and speak Sinhalese, an Aryan language related to Bengali; the Tamils are Hindus who speak the Dravidian language Tamil. The Muslims, descendants of Arab traders, speak Sinhalese or Tamil and perhaps English as well, depending upon where they live. The Burghers claim English as their mother-tongue, though many speak Sinhalese too. Perhaps 8 percent of the population are Christians, divided between Sinhalese and Tamils, though nearly all the Burghers are Christians. There are also caste groupings, less strict than in India, which need not detain us. These are the gross contours of the plural society in Ceylon.

Members of the Sinhalese and Tamil communities speak different languages, lead different lives, and follow differing family customs. Although many individuals in both communities are fully accepted within the other, the two groups hold unflattering views of each other. Their attitudes show clearly differentiated and mutually critical stereotypes. Sinhalese and Tamils consider themselves to be markedly different. Each sees in the other traits it does not admire. Group distrust lies not far beneath the surface. Each community tends to form a network of mutual confidence and assistance when a member is faced with harm from those outside his own community. Some, though by no means all, trade unions, the Christian churches, larger business enterprises and the public service have provided opportunities for mingling and common activity. The army, though drawing on all communities, remains small and professionalized, playing only a minor role in national integration. The communities are therefore brought together by few institutions.

Other divisions in the society complicate the fundamental Sinhalese-Tamil difference. In many ways as profound is the fissure that separates the mass of the population from the English-speaking, western-educated elite who represent roughly 8 percent of the total. An exact appraisal of this social distance is difficult, since the man who appears most at home in the western offices or salons of the capital may quickly shed his western ways when he returns to the family village. There are, of course, gradations in the degree of westernization, from the Oxford graduate raised in an English-speaking Ceylonese family, at one extreme, to the graduate of grammar school who has learned his English after primary school, on the other. Yet the division between the trousered men who command English and the rest is a visible, striking reality, and one profoundly felt by the millions who are not part of that elite. It is significant because the distribution of wealth, opportunity and power no longer depends alone upon family ties and family relations to the land, as in the traditional society.

This is still important. But today, and for several generations already, real influence on the national stage and often wealth have depended in addition upon the acquired skills of English education and western social ways.

Regardless of whether they were Sinhalese, Tamils, or Burghers in origin, the English-educated formed a stratum that lay across the ethnic and linguistic differences. These Tamils and Sinhalese had many close friendships that ignored communal lines. The English-educated articulated the desire for independence. Their vision usually encompassed all communities living in some degree of mutual acceptance in a gradually modernizing, unifying Ceylonese nationhood. As elsewhere in Asia, they inherited political power when the colonial rulers withdrew, in 1948.

But they were not politically homogeneous. Indeed, they competed among themselves for the opportunities of office. They were divided on political-ideological as well as religious grounds, and divisions were accentuated as their leading position in the society became less sure.

*Growing Awareness of Differences.* Awareness of mutual differences has increased rather than diminished since independence. First, a cultural revival came to Ceylon only after independence, expressing the need to assert a cultural idiom distinct from western ways. As Sinhalese and Tamils each explored their own pasts, they recalled battles won from the other; they gained a sense of inferiority or superiority toward each other. In their search, they found no common Ceylonese tradition, only separate Sinhalese and Tamil pasts. The state-wide alien rule no longer formed a common opponent uniting the different groups.

Second, an expanded educational system carried schooling to ever higher grades in the vernacular languages. More and more young people graduated from upper levels of the school system, reared entirely within one or the other vernacular culture without the unifying experience of English education.

Third, mutual understanding between the ethnic communities seemed to diminish. The vernacular press, for example, gained importance as literacy increased and as the wider masses became more actively concerned with public issues. This enhanced the distance between the Sinhalese and Tamils, since each vernacular paper tended to stress those aspects of public issues and cultural traditions which editors believed would appeal to their differentiated audiences. The press thus tended to provide contrasting and often contradictory interpretations of public problems to the different ethnic communities, hardening differences and sharpening distrust.

Fourth, with independence the Sinhalese majority expected that the Tamil and other minorities would assimilate to the Sinhalese way of life. But a sense of cultural superiority among the Tamils led them to resist the majority's effort to realize this expectation. Tamils feel a part of the capacious Indian tradition; they believe they have a culture rich in art, literature and religious insight. Becoming part of the Sinhalese cultural world is taken to mean abandoning this great tradition. Conversely, a sense of Sinhalese cultural inferiority has made many in the majority community unusually sensitive. There are only 8 million Sinhalese in all the world. In Ceylon itself reside 2 million Tamil-speaking people; across in India there are some 28 million more. The Sinhalese are often fearful of being overwhelmed by their Tamil neighbors; the Ceylon Tamils fear being swamped by the island's majority Sinhalese. Ironically, both groups are beset with something akin to minority feelings, each oversensitive to the other's criticisms and fearful of the other's ambitions.

These differences set the stage for invidious communal comparisons. Moreover, modernization has not gone so far that an individual's professional or financial achievement is seen as his personal accomplishment. On the contrary, an individual's achievement still reflects more upon the position of his communal group. When communal differences become projected into politics, every act of members of one community is looked at for its political significance—to see, that is, whether it enhances or diminishes the relative political influence of his own community. Past political contests between communities are disinterred and over-elaborate political strategies and tactics are attributed to moves made by members of the other community that often had no political intention behind them.

Fifth, a growing awareness among the masses concerning the privileged position of the westernized elite and a clearer cultural consciousness led to an increasing resentment against that elite. Articulate leaders of the independence movement from among the westernized talked of welfare, of democracy and of majority rule. But positions of control in the society were still filled by men of high birth or those fortunate enough to have been able to learn English. In a period of growing cultural self-awareness, this was not the democracy that had been preached by the leadership for many decades. The country still seemed to be ruled by an oligarchy of men alienated from indigenous traditions and cultures.

Moreover, their efforts to modernize their country, though cautious, provoked anxiety and resentment in important groups in the countryside who were among the intermediaries between the urban politicians and the rural masses. Practitioners of traditional *ayurvedic* medicine resented the resources invested in modern, western-type medical services; Buddhist monks, keepers of the Sinhalese tradition, opposed the growing emphasis on materialistic values; vernacular teachers protested against their second-class professional status by comparison with the higher pay and respect accorded to English-speaking teachers; local officials opposed the growing influence and size of the capital's bureaucracy.

*Economic competition.* Awareness of economic competition increased as the population grew. The expanding school system turned out more liberal arts graduates who aspired to enter the coveted public service than the service could absorb. After an initial expansion to replace colonial officials and provide new economic and social service functions, public service hiring fell off just as more graduates began to enter the job market.

The students who could not find work form an articulate group, with time on their hands and an acute sense of grievance. They possess the skills necessary for political activity. Had there been other job opportunities, their frustrated ambitions for public service careers would not have mattered so desperately. But economic development that produced white collar jobs was disappointingly slow. The jobs they sought were not to be found in the government or elsewhere, and their liberal arts education had not fitted them for much else.

This increased the potentiality for tension between communities in part because the communal structure of Ceylon is relatively simple and readily lends itself to statistical comparisons. It was possible to argue, for example, that although the Sinhalese represented some 70 percent of the population, they held only 60–65 percent of the public service jobs, while the Ceylon Tamils, representing only 12 percent of the population, held some 20 percent of the jobs. In a time of growing unemployment in lower jobs as well, a politician could prove his devotion to the majority community by pointing the finger at the Tamils who had "usurped" more than their fair share of the best jobs.

Clearing and irrigating jungle land to be settled by peasants from the overcrowded Sinhalese and Tamil areas became a bitter apple of discord between the two communities. The land had lain under the rule of malaria, empty and desolate, until DDT made its reconquest possible. Tamils consider these new lands to be areas they have traditionally inhabited. The Sinhalese see much historical evidence to prove that Buddhist civilization once flourished before the jungle and malaria made their conquest. Both argue that settlement of peasants from the other community represents encroachment. And since political representation goes according to territorial constituencies, a significant change in the population structure of such areas would alter the balance of communal representation in the House of Representatives. Hence, even land development has sharpened group conflict.

*Political Imperatives.* The background of political leaders and their electoral imperatives provided other potentialities for social tension.

The principal political figures have come from the westernized elite. Broadly speaking, national electoral politics has been a struggle for office between men of this socio-economic class. Each has sought those relationships and issues that would carry influence and "project his image" across the social and linguistic gulf that separated him from the mass of voters. A convenient way of identifying himself with the voters was to demonstrate that he was more closely attached to the cultural and religious values of his constituents than his opponent, who could usually be charged with being too much like the former colonial rulers in style of life and language.

After independence, Ceylon was ruled by a coalition of moderately conservative men from the English-educated, land-owing, professional families in both Sinhalese and Tamil communities. Their support in the country-side was reenforced by the semi-feudal fact that the rural masses tended to vote the way the rural notable, landowner or employer wished. But as new men from lesser origins entered the westernized elite, as cultural revival accented indigenous virtues often flouted by the more modern, westernized man, as democratic ideology penetrated the countryside, the westernized could not assume that their ruling position would continue. Their right to control affairs was bound to be tested. More direct appeals to mass sentiments often seemed the way to ensure continued political success.

Until 1956 the opposition parties were splintered, as in India, and the majority party could not be effectively challenged on the floor of the House of Representatives or at the hustings.

The urban population was relatively small and underrepresented in a House designed to give greater representation to backward rural areas. Only if the opposition could undercut the government party in the countryside could it hope to displace the men who had ruled since independence.

In rural areas, between the notables and landowners who dominated national politics and the peasant and town masses, is a rural middle class of men who are prominent in their towns and villages. Buddhist monks, elected village officials, teachers skilled in the vernacular languages, practitioners of traditional *ayurvedic* medicine are such men. Opposition agitation in 1956 drew them into political activity that contributed decisively to the opposition's electoral victory that year. This agitation precipitated the elements of potential disunity into communal discord and violent conflict. The particular issue of import to them all concerned the matter of language.

### III. LANGUAGE AND POLITICS

*The "language question."* It is difficult in the United States, where one language predominates, to appreciate the intensity of emotions that the "language question" can arouse. In a plural society, language distinguishes one man from his neighbor, gives him access to his own cultural tradition, is the canonical representation of his religion and the instrument for communicating about it. English had been the colonial ruler's language. Language differences had much to do with the distribution of opportunity, wealth and political power. Widespread resentment against the airs and privileges of the English-educated, the power and aloofness of the English-speaking public service, the cultural snobbishness of the westernized city man, made the demotion of English virtually inevitable.

As independence neared, two vexed questions of government policy toward the country's languages had to be answered. In what language should the children be taught and what should be the country's official language (or languages) of government?

After sharp and protracted debates, it was decided that Sinhalese and Tamil children should learn in their own language, while English would be taught as a second language. The policy solution was obvious enough, but the debates on the matter added to communal sensitivities. Each year they were renewed as the Opposition accused the government of not pressing ahead rapidly enough with the necessary language changeover in the higher grades of the schools. As a by-product of this decision—and significant for the long run—there would no longer be produced an island-wide elite from all communities who had passed together through the same educational experience.

*Electoral politics.* Intense feelings were provoked over the issue of the language or languages to be designated as official languages of state. Seeking to undercut the ruling coalition, the political opposition found the language question an unusually effective means for mobilizing the rural middle class in the majority community—the teachers, native physicians, the *bhikkhus* and local elected officials. Each one, for different reasons, experienced some sense of threat from westernizing, modernizing changes or some resentment against the westernized elite. Each rallied behind traditional communal symbols. They all believed that if Sinhalese were made the sole official language, their cultural and religious tradition would receive greater attention and their opportunities and status would be commensurately improved.

All who opposed making Sinhalese the sole official language were held to be standing in the way of legitimate—and national—aspirations. The Tamils opposed such a change and were therefore considered opponents. In the excitement of platform polemics, which were remarkably colorful and keyed to traditional allusions and indigenous fancy, many politicians made no distinction between Tamil invaders of 1,000 years ago and contemporary Ceylon Tamils. Ancient antagonisms were thus revived and combined with contemporary competition for scarce opportunity and uncertain status.

Many among the western-educated Sinhalese were generally opposed to the changes. But their will and power were sapped by two circumstances. In the first place, they feared that speaking out on behalf of moderation and a gradual transition to Sinhalese as the official language would turn the wrath of ardent Sinhalese against them, leading to the accusation that they were allies of the Tamils in a cause which they felt was all but lost already. Secondly, many experienced a growing sense of guilt that they had allowed themselves to become so alienated from their own tradition. In the name of their community's tradition, which they now sensed they had neglected, they were prepared to acquiesce in the changes even though these would seriously undermine their hitherto privileged position and risk bringing on dramatic communal difficulties.

As the Tamils saw it, to make Sinhalese the sole official language put Tamil in an inferior position and would no doubt give the Sinhalese-speaking people a competitive advantage as entrants to the public service, to teaching, university and other desirable careers. Pride in their culture was hurt; even their status as accepted inhabitants of Ceylon seemed brought in doubt.

In the 1956 election, the Sinhalese opposition, skilfully led by Bandaranaike, was successful in displacing the formerly ruling United National Party by a landslide vote. The ruling party had been vulnerable on other counts as well, but it was primarily linguistic politics that brought it down.

*Electoral by-products.* As a by-product of the campaign, communal antagonisms were at a new high for the country. The successful Prime Minister—like his defeated opponents—had assumed that communal antagonism could be turned up for tactical purposes and then turned down when the political need was gone. But new pressure groups organized among extremist Sinhalese and a vigorous minority of the clergy were not prepared to allow the new Prime Minister to moderate these antagonisms until their full aspirations were met. The Tamils, frightened by the upsurge of anti-Tamil sentiment, became more rigid.

Riots in 1956 followed close on the heels of the election and the debate in the House of Representatives over a language bill designed to give Sinhalese sole official standing. In the face of dramatic activities by the newly organized pressure groups, all provisions designed to safeguard Tamil interests were removed from the bill before it was submitted to debate. Starting in Colombo, vicious riots spread rapidly and over 100 were killed.

If bold political leadership, putting extremists on both sides in their place, might have cut through the fear and tension of communal intransigence, none appeared.

In 1958 more serious riots occurred. The police had become demoralized as a result of politically inspired transfers and because of restraining orders pressed upon the Prime Minister by his Marxist cabinet colleagues with political trade union interests to promote. The police were unable to restore order as rioting, looting, and burning spread. Several hundreds were killed—some say as many as 2,000. In the end, 10,000 Tamils and 2,000 Sinhalese sought refuge in army-managed refugee camps. When the army was finally called out, order was quickly restored. But a deeper gulf of fear now separated the minority Ceylon Tamil community from the majority Sinhalese.

As a tragic climax to these events, the Prime Minister was assassinated on his own verandah in September 1959 by a monk, a student of *ayurvedic* medicine. The case is under adjudication and there may be obscure political or even economic foundations for what at first appeared to be an act of a religious and cultural enthusiast who found the Prime Minister unable to carry out the promises he had made in the heat of political campaigning.

## IV. CONCLUSIONS

Apart from the tragedy of the hundreds killed during the riots and the assassination of the Prime Minister himself, the two rounds of communal riots left the country divided as it had not been for centuries. What conclusions can be drawn from these unhappy events?

(1) The social structure of the plural society remains a stubborn social and political fact. Modernizing currents have not yet undermined the primary loyalty of the mass voters to traditional linguistic communities. A sense of Ceylonese nationhood is not yet clear.

(2) Efforts to assert cultural independence from the West lead to explorations of the country's tradition. But this reaffirms diverse traditions and a past of local conflict which enlivens communal awareness and antagonisms. These differences increase after independence is achieved when the common opponent, the western ruler, no longer provides a focus for unifying antagonism.

(3) Important rural middle class figures feel sufficiently threatened by modern, secular influences to be particularly susceptible to traditional appeals that have, as their by-products, profound communal implications. These men are potential intermediaries between the westernized political leaders and opposition and the rural voters. They can therefore play an important role in politics when they are drawn into political activity, and they are by no means always carriers of modernization to the rural masses.

(4) The earlier equation between education and opportunity has been disrupted and ever-higher levels of education are conducted in the vernaculars. Economic diversification and growth have not kept pace with expanding educational opportunities, resulting in a middle-class unemployment. This contributes particularly and directly to communal competition. Since the newly educated middle classes are largely trained in the vernacular languages, they identify only with their own parochial community. They do not comprehend a wider loyalty to the country as a whole, and they see their job futures in terms of their language community only.

(5) Unavoidable decisions have to be made regarding the language or languages to replace

English in the schools and in the government. These are bound to cause communal discord unless handled with great finesse.

(6) Where a ruling elite is at a notable linguistic and cultural distance from the masses in a representative political system, those who seek to replace elected representatives may easily evoke communal and ethnic enthusiasms as a means of enlisting mass political support.

(7) As one side effect of such electoral politics, communal anxieties may be greatly increased and new pressure groups develop to further press communal and religious claims. This stiffens the inflexibility of minority leaders and leaves a new government relatively little room for maneuver as it seeks an adjustment of contradictory claims.

(8) A new government that is indecisive in domestic affairs and allows the vigor of the police to deteriorate unwittingly encourages extremists in both camps. Outbreaks of mob violence create further anxiety and antagonism for the future.

(9) Rapid economic growth providing new opportunities to the most frustrated probably would mitigate such conflicts. In itself, however, it would not be sufficient to prevent them, and in the short run, at least, it may provide additional grounds for group antagonism.

In sum, those forces which divide, which separate one group from another grow in strength after independence—in school, in political activity and sometimes in economic life. Cultural revival enlivens the recollection of historic divisions and group conflicts; steps toward modernization arouse resistance from traditionalists who, feeling threatened, fall back on vernacular cultural values as protection. Rapidly expanding the liberal arts school system in the vernaculars at a time when the colonial administrator's *lingua franca* must be replaced produces educated unemployed, stops the creation of a nation-wide elite, and provokes minority anxieties about their own future opportunities. Simultaneously, a westernized elite at a cultural distance from the masses and not having solved important public problems, is an easy target of criticism and scorn for those who would use ethnic enthusiasm as a means of replacing the leaders who gained power at independence. As a result of such political developments, new pressure groups form around divisive, parochial purposes while new leadership may only encourage extremists if it is indecisive.

In the Ceylon setting, the westernized elite no longer can be as self-assured as it used to be. Consolidation of ethnic communities into one nation is farther away today than it was ten years ago. The task of mending the social fabric will tax the skill and statesmanship of the new governement of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, widow of the former Prime Minister, whose electoral coalition won handsomely in June 1960. In other new countries, too, national consolidation remains one of the crucial problems of the future, demanding quite as much courage and foresight as the more familiar problems of economic development.

# PATTERNS OF GROUP DEVELOPMENT IN A NEW NATION: MOROCCO

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The study of political groups has been characterized by large areas of general agreement and a relatively small output of precise application. Political scientists seem convinced that groups larger than the family and smaller than a nation are necessary in the analysis of more advanced political systems. But what variables of group behavior in this intermediate range may be most useful in studying development in new nations is a question little explored. Systematically assembled data have only recently been brought to bear on the study of political groups in the United States; and still more recently a survey of pressure groups outside the United States has appeared.[1] The purpose of this article is to examine the importance of several widely accepted and frequently used variables of group behavior in the light of survey data collected in a new nation, Morocco. Pursuing the suggestion of Professor Blanksten,[2] data collected in Morocco in late 1958 will be used to see how a particular way of analyzing group data may contribute to the study of less developed countries.

One important distinction employed here needs to be noted at the outset. Political scientists have generally used groups to study administrative decision-making or more formal, institutional aspects of government.[3] This essay will argue that a group focus is of more value in the study of new nations[4] where group activity can be correlated with levels of social development. Once this is done, the way is open for comparative analysis of the kind and number of nationally organized groups in relation to various levels of societal development. Ultimately it may be possible to estimate what group characteristics are prerequisite to various kinds of more specialized political behavior. In short, groups are treated here as aspects of societies or in relation to a societal variable, not of political systems, although groups may serve as an important indicator or possibly even a crucial factor in determining certain kinds of political behavior in a developing nation. More detailed elaborations of group theory of that sort might be especially useful in the study of political behavior, but are possible only with continued field research.

## I. SCOPE AND METHOD

The following inquiry is addressed in particular to one of the basic tenets of group theory, namely, that important political characteristics are regularly associated with the number of nationally active groups. I have divided Morocco into three regions, based on their levels of societal development and previous involvements in national politics. Then I attempted to measure the progress made by each of seven nationally important groups in each region. In an effort to extend the usefulness of group theory, I looked finally into the degree of group development in relation to indicators of nationalist and governmental activity. The data for the final section are less complete than might be desired, but still yield more precise information on the political impact of increased group activity in developing nations than has heretofore been available.

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[1] David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1950), and Henry W. Ehrmann, *Interest Groups on Four Continents* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958). Also see particularly Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 33–38. The groups to be used in this study would fall largely in the category of "associational" groups in the Almond-Coleman terminology, *ibid.*, p. 34.

[2] "Political Groups in Latin America," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (March 1959), p. 121. Although the author is essentially in agreement with Blanksten's observations, it is important to realize that the major reason why group analysis has not come to grips with "macro-problems" as suggested, *ibid.*, p. 123, is simply that the large universe *is* hard to define in a way that leads to significant discovery. This is true of large universes when analyzed in other ways than those opened by various applications of group analysis.

[3] An example of this type of analysis is Joseph LaPalombara's article, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (February 1960), pp. 29–49. His study of an Italian interest group casts doubt on the usefulness of group studies outside the United States but does not establish that group-based studies might not be useful in analyzing broader social and political change, or even in the study of the "political process," *ibid.*, pp. 34 and 36, given different formulations of how group data might be related to political problems.

[4] The phrases "new nation," "less developed nation," "emergent nation," etc. are used interchangeably here. Although the societal differentiations used here are based largely on firsthand observation, the author is reasonably certain that parts of France, Italy and possibly the United States would fall within the Moroccan "advanced rural" category. Indeed, we may even have some areas that are as "underdeveloped" as Morocco's more remote provinces.

My use of the word "group" will become clear from the questionnaire I employed, but two limiting features of my operational definition need emphasis. First, the article deals with "formal" groups, each of which has its own well established organization throughout most of Morocco. Second, my data cover only groups organized on a national basis. Some modifications would be needed before applying the conclusions to what are called in the Almond-Coleman terminology "non-associational" groups, *e.g.*, linguistic groups or regional associations. This limitation is, in part, dictated by the method of collecting the data, and in part by my views of the best strategy for developing more useful general theory for the study of underdeveloped countries.[5] The difficulties of collecting information in quantity about informal groups in advanced societies suggest that even greater obstacles would be encountered in less advanced societies.

Through a written questionnaire circulated to the local secretaries of the Moroccan nationalist party, the Istiqlal, data were collected on the activity of seven politically significant and nationally organized groups.[6] Some limitations of the returns are evident. From a total of approximately 1200 party secretaries, 337 completed questionnaires were returned. To reduce the "no response" factor to nearly 10 percent or below for each group in each of the three societal categories defined below, questionnaires were rejected from respondents returning four or more blank answers to the questions dealing with the presence of the seven groups. This reduced the total sample to 304. Since the data were collected through the party organization, some bias may have resulted from disparities in the organization itself and from the secretaries' attitudes concerning the groups listed. The latter factor is impossible to control under the circumstances of the survey, but the relation of the party's organization to the total population has been previously analyzed.[7] The sample used here actually corresponds very closely to the overall population distribution in Morocco, although conclusions will be based largely on the group characteristics of the separate societal categories and the aggregate level of group activity.

The societal categories have been established on the basis of broad, geographically derived differentiations in Morocco.[8] The country is divided by the Atlas Mountains into a western coastal strip, which contains the large cities and is chiefly occupied with modern agricultural establishments. In this area tribal differentiations have nearly disappeared. East of the Atlas agricultural techniques are often primitive and tribal social structure is much more important. Agitation by the nationalists was not widespread in this area until independence, and the colonial regime took measures to isolate the region. In this retarded rural region are grouped the responses from the provinces of Marrakech (50), Ouarzazate (36), Midelt (33), and the south of Rabat (17): a total of 136 returns. The more advanced rural region includes Meknes (38), Oudja (46), north of Rabat (23), Fes (10), Agadir (8), and Tangier (2): a total of 127 returns. The third societal category is represented by all those questionnaires (41) from cities of over 20,000 population: Marrakech (6), Casablanca (19), Oujda (5), Rabat (6), and Meknes (2) and others (3).[9]

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[5] Roughly the same point is made by Blanksten, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–122. A different and thought-provoking viewpoint is put forward by Fred W. Riggs in his forthcoming *Public Administration in America, Thailand and the Philippines: Some Observations on Methodology and Significance* (New Delhi, Indian Institute of Public Administration).

[6] The questionnaire was originally prepared in English. Two independent translations were made into Arabic, which were then merged with the help of a committee appointed for this purpose by Istiqlal headquarters. Then a third and separate translation was made into English. The regional party inspectors distributed one questionnaire, an envelope and a letter from party headquarters to each local secretary. The letter explained the purpose of the survey as an attempt to improve the party and to serve the nation better. The secretary was assured that his responses would be kept anonymous and that the sealed envelope would be opened only at party headquarters, thereby keeping his immediate supervisor, the inspector, from seeing his replies.

[7] Douglas E. Ashford, "Transitional Politics in Morocco and Tunisia," *Current Problems in North Africa*, Princeton, Princeton Conference Series, Number 20, p. 34.

[8] Background data are now available in Nevill Barbour, *A Survey of North West Africa (The Maghrib)* (London, R.I.I.A., 1959), pp. 75–172, which provide ample support for the broad differentiations made here.

The groups selected for analysis are generally agreed to be politically important in present-day Morocco. In this respect Morocco constitutes an unusually fortunate case for the student interested in the effects of rapid national political development, for no nationally organized group of the colonial or protectorate period, with the possible exception of the Istiqlal, managed to transform itself successfully into an accepted group in independent Morocco. Historically all seven groups have existed freely only since late 1955, though some have roots in earlier clandestine activity.

### II. GROUP TYPES AND THEIR FREQUENCY

Some elaboration of the kinds of groups under study may help in the subsequent analysis.[10] The resistance and Liberation Army groups have existed since open hostilities between Moroccan nationalists and the French began in late 1953. Neither group was organized on a large scale until late 1954 and their clandestine life up to 1956 restricted contacts among the members severely. Their activity is still closely guarded, although they are known to hold meetings of national committees and have offices in some provinces. No data of this detail could be secured except through an Istiqlal-sponsored questionnaire. At the time my questionnaire was administered all resistance organizations were at least nominally working with the Istiqlal although serious schisms have appeared since in both the resistance and the Istiqlal. Since their members are now widely scattered and many may have lost contact with the groups as now preserved, the Istiqlal party secretaries were asked to indicate the existence of the resistance and Liberation Army groups on the basis of their representation on the local party committee. Many resistance members undoubtedly returned to their peacetime activities unchanged, but their group activity has been stimulated by governmental programs to provide resistance veterans with employment and financial assistance.[11]

The feminist, youth and illiteracy groups have been more directly under Istiqlal auspices than the others covered here. Their inclusion is justified largely on the basis of their very specific functions and their independent organizations. The illiteracy program was given its first stimulus by the party, but is now also supported by the government and by individual community efforts. Youth groups are extremely popular and are organized into a variety of specialized youth activities, each with its own representation on national committees, summer activities, publications, etc. In Morocco as in other young nations, "youth" frequently includes persons up to 30 years of age and politically is of crucial importance. The feminists are of particular interest due to their important role in the social advancement of their sex; this very likely comprises much of their familiarization with national politics.

The labor unions and the opposition parties have peculiar characteristics in Morocco, although both are important avenues of group development in a new nation. The labor union organization, the UMT (*L'Union Marocaine du Travail*), was established several months before independence and has been a center of progressive political opinion in the new country. Despite profound differences with party leadership it too maintained representation at Istiqlal headquarters while building its own national organization. The UMT's position in the national group structure of Morocco is especially interesting in view of its great influence in national decision-making.[12] The unions have extremely effective leadership, which ostensibly worked in liaison with the Istiqlal at

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[9] Those familiar with Morocco may question three of the allocations of questionnaires. Although Marrakech province lies partly to the west of the Atlas ranges it was effectively isolated by the Glaoui-French empire to keep its inhabitants considerably in arrears of those nearer the coast. Both Oujda and Agadir provinces might be classified as belonging in the retarded rural category. However, the returned questionnaires came from the more intensely cultivated and irrigated regions of the Triffia plain of Oujda and the Sous valley of Agadir, and, therefore, more properly fit with the advanced category.

[10] A more detailed description and historical background of the groups analyzed will be found in the author's forthcoming *Political Change in Morocco*, Princeton University Press, 1961, chs. 6, 10 and 12.

[11] See the author's "Politics and Violence in Morocco," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 13 (Winter 1959), pp. 17–31.

[12] This touches an interesting point raised by LaPalombara, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–44. Since he saw little evidence that his interest group, *Confindustria*, has "visible" representation in the formal decision-making apparatus he concludes that we should reconsider the generally held view that it is an influential group. But the occupation of formal, widely recognized "positions of influence" alone is often an extremely misleading indicator.

TABLE I. GROUP STRUCTURE IN MOROCCO, BY SOCIAL CATEGORY*

| Group | Urban (41) | | | | Advanced Rural (127) | | | | Retarded Rural (136) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | % Yes | Yes | No | NR | % Yes | Yes | No | NR | % Yes | Yes | No | NR |
| Opposition Party | 95 | 38 | 2 | 1 | 82 | 95 | 21 | 11 | 73 | 94 | 35 | 7 |
| Illiteracy Group | 87 | 34 | 5 | 2 | 80 | 92 | 23 | 2 | 82 | 98 | 22 | 6 |
| Resistance | 80 | 33 | 8 | — | 50 | 61 | 61 | 5 | 61 | 70 | 45 | 21 |
| Youth | 81 | 31 | 7 | 3 | 47 | 58 | 66 | 3 | 45 | 50 | 62 | 14 |
| Feminists | 87 | 34 | 5 | 2 | 44 | 43 | 55 | 18 | 29 | 31 | 74 | 31 |
| Liberation Army | 33 | 13 | 26 | 2 | 48 | 59 | 64 | 4 | 27 | 30 | 80 | 27 |
| Labor Unions | 52 | 20 | 18 | 3 | 45 | 54 | 67 | 6 | 24 | 29 | 93 | 14 |

* In one instance under advanced rural and three instances under retarded rural the "no response" rate exceeds 10%. At this preliminary stage it was judged better to incur this hazard than to reduce the sample further. Unpublished analyses of the total sample strongly suggest that respondents in the retarded areas, where illiteracy factors and other response obstacles are greater, tended to use the "no response" as an alternative to circling "no."

the time the questionnaire was administered. Since 1958 the UMT has become the force behind a new opposition party, the UNFP (*L'Union Nationale des Forces Populaires*). Including opposition parties as evidence of group development may be disputed; they could easily be removed without disrupting the subsequent analysis. In 1958 three parties actively opposed the Istiqlal, and at least two of them had considerable and widespread support. They have been included to broaden our knowledge of how opposition groups behave in a political system dominated by a strong nationalist party, and also to clarify the relationship between groups and parties: under the circumstances prevailing in new nations it may well be more appropriate to consider the formal opposition as groups, rather than parties.[13]

Using the societal distinctions described above, the number of groups active in each category is summarized in Table I, where group occurrence has been ranked on the basis of the order of urban group development. The overall finding confirms what is no doubt the "inner truth" of group analysis: There is indisputably a higher level of group development in the more advanced social settings. Table I enables us to refine this broad conclusion somewhat.

For all but two of the groups the percentage of occurrence in the urban setting is 80 or higher. In fact, it appears likely that group activity in the larger Moroccan cities is very similar to that in more advanced societies as a whole, where national-group affiliations are so numerous that collecting full information about them would be most difficult. In the advanced rural category only two groups are found in as many as 80 per cent of the cases, but the other five groups all occur at about the same frequency, near 50 per cent. The degree of group development in the retarded rural category displays more differences. The two groups most highly developed in the advanced (as also in the urban) environment remain so in the retarded setting; but three of the five groups of intermediate development in the advanced category occur much less frequently in the retarded setting.

These differences throw some light on the possibilities of political development in Morocco. First, it is remarkable that opposition party activity consistently ranks first or second. It is preceded only by literacy group development, which is understandably most widespread and requisite to more effective and widespread group participation. Second, the same two groups, labor unions and Liberation Army, consistently occupy low positions, although unions are much more highly developed in the cities than the Liberation Army. It may indeed be surprising that unions have equalled the performance of other groups in the advanced rural setting and have managed to gain a foothold in so many retarded rural settings. The shifts of position in the advanced and retarded rural settings are also noteworthy. While the feminists appear to lose strength in more retarded areas,[14] the resistance groups

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[13] Sigmund Neuman makes this suggestion in Ehrmann (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[14] The rank order for the feminist group seems questionable. A good deal of the author's less systematically collected information suggests that the feminists are more influential in the retarded rural areas than many other groups. If this is correct, then the simple fact of occurrence is an unreliable indicator of position in a power or influence structure.

TABLE II. RANKINGS OF GROUPS BY SOCIAL SETTING AND LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, BY PERCENTAGES OF OCCURRENCE*

| Group | Urban (40) |  |  |  | Group | Advanced (127) |  |  |  | Group | Retarded (136) |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | No. of Groups |  |  |  |  | No. of Groups |  |  |  |  | No. of Groups |  |  |  |
|  | 0–4 |  | 5–7 |  |  | 0–4 |  | 5–7 |  |  | 0–4 |  | 5–7 |  |
|  | Rank | % | Rank | % |  | Rank | % | Rank | % |  | Rank | % | Rank | % |
| Parties | 1 | 91 | 1 | 96 | Parties | 1 | 82 | 5 | 83 | Illit. | 1 | 79 | 1 | 100 |
| Illit. | 2 | 82 | 4 | 89 | Illit. | 2 | 74 | 1 | 98 | Parties | 2 | 69 | 3 | 78 |
| Resist. | 3 | 64 | 5 | 87 | Resist. | 3 | 52 | 2 | 92 | Resist. | 3 | 35 | 4 | 75 |
| Femin. | 4 | 64 | 2 | 96 | Lib. A. | 4 | 37 | 7 | 67 | Youth | 4 | 32 | 2 | 88 |
| Youth | 5 | 44 | 3 | 93 | Femin. | 5 | 28 | 4 | 83 | Lib. A. | 5 | 21 | 7 | 50 |
| Unions | 6 | 25 | 6 | 47 | Unions | 6 | 26 | 6 | 75 | Femin. | 6 | 17 | 5 | 74 |
| Lib. A. | 7 | 9 | 7 | 43 | Youth | 7 | 20 | 3 | 91 | Unions | 7 | 6 | 6 | 56 |

* The transfer to percentages for ease of ranking blurs the absolute differences that can be seen in Table I. Thus, only about a fourth of the urban group structure fell into the 0–4 range, while about two-thirds of the advanced rural and three-fifths of the retarded rural are in that range. The percentages were calculated without allowing for the "no responses."

tend to become stronger there, and the youth groups nearly hold their own. This may be explained in part by the tendency of young people to dominate nationally organized activity in the more retarded areas and in part by the extent to which the cadre for the more distant group development came from youth trained in the resistance.

### III. ANALYSIS OF GROUP DEVELOPMENT

Before venturing more general statements about Morocco's political characteristics it may be advisable to push the group analysis further. The high and low marks of group occurrence can be easily identified for each response. The frequencies of group activity in each social setting can therefore be distributed and ranked within two ranges, using 4 out of the possible 7 as the cutoff boundary to distinguish the upper from the lower range of group occurence, as summarized in Table II. In this way we can trace variations in group occurrence in each of the three types of environment, and look for similarities in the patterns where low levels are found as well as for trends where higher levels are reached.

The breaking point between four and five groups[15] was chosen after some preliminary analysis. The average number of groups per response in the urban category is 4.9, in the advanced rural 3.9 and in the retarded rural 3.1. The breaking point I used consequently falls just above the average for the intermediate category. This choice also makes some allowance for the fact that three of the groups have indirect lines to the nationalist party. A high response therefore required the recognition of at least two groups organized entirely independently of the Istiqlal.

Table II can be interpreted in three ways. First, we can look at the differences between high and low levels of development for each social setting. For example, party groups occur in 90 per cent or more of the cases in the urban environment for both the 0–4 and 5–7 level of development. Second, the low levels or the high levels of each setting can be compared separately. For example, party groups predominate at high levels of group development in all social settings except the advanced rural. Third, the direction of change of rank order can be analyzed in each setting. For example, the feminists steadily lose rank at both high and low levels of group development as the social setting becomes increasingly retarded. The first two considerations reveal a great deal about the characteristics of group structure in new nations and will be elaborated first. The last consideration gives the table additional predictive value and provides a more suggestive base for launching into analysis of the political system than the simpler formulation given in Table I.

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[15] If we wanted to examine only the level of group development, we might better have taken the average number of groups in each setting for the breaking point in each. For simplicity and conservation of space, the single breakdown is used here in two ways, *i.e.*, both to study the kinds of group development in different settings that are at the same level, and also the direction of development in the three settings when development passes the given point. Analysis of the original data shows that little change in trends or rank orders would result from making separate tables for each inquiry. The total distribution shows that in the urban setting three-fourths of the cases had five or six groups. In the advanced rural settings nine secretaries reported no groups or only one, six reported the maximum of seven, while the intermediate numbers of groups ranged from 19 to 28 in no particular order. In the retarded setting a peak was rapidly reached at two and three groups, reported by over half the secretaries.

Opposition parties and illiteracy groups have distinguished themselves throughout the table. Party activity remains very high (90 per cent or better) at both levels of group development in the urban setting and is still strong (80 per cent or better) at both levels of group development in the advanced rural setting. These two settings clearly are prepared for fairly intensive and specialized political activity. The illiteracy groups are consistently strong at both levels of group development (80 to 90 per cent). The close association of parties and illiteracy groups is also additional testimony to the importance of educational reform in enlarging the scope of political activity in new countries.

What the table adds to our knowledge of the general importance of parties is the way they appear to attain high levels of development *before* other national groups are organized. That there can be several parties in existence at early stages of group development certainly justifies hope that some form of popular participation in government will be feasible. It also raises a question that needs additional inquiry: what kind of party development and political participation is encouraged where there is a strong tendency for parties to be both national groups and also ground-breaking organizations in extending group participation? Only two other groups (Illiteracy and Resistance) begin to parallel party development at the low level of group development in all societal categories. Furthermore, the closely following groups in both cases are the militarily oriented Resistance and Liberation Army, with Youth groups also generally predominating at higher levels of group development. This contrasts sharply with the structure of high level development in the urban setting, where five groups are widely organized (90 per cent or better) and the other two quite strong.

The relatively high position held by the Resistance during the low level phase of group development in all social settings (about 60, 50, and 35 per cent, respectively) clearly establishes the importance of revolutionary groups in the country's political future. There has been no way of estimating their influence, although it may be significant that their importance appears to decrease slightly in the urban setting at higher levels of group development. There, where the group structure becomes more complex, the Resistance appears to do slightly better than hold its own while it declines slightly in the retarded rural setting. The other military group, the Liberation Army, appears to be confined to the areas of its original organization in more advanced rural provinces. It has little strength in initial phases of group development in either the urban or retarded rural setting. Although the Army tends to extend its organization as groups are multiplied in the higher level of development in all settings, its relative position remains low. With the possible exception of the advanced rural setting, it appears very likely that the Liberation Army groups are organized as other group developments stimulate an interest and awareness of bygone associations.

The role of the feminists, youth and labor unions is possibly of greatest interest since their activity is most closely associated with social change. Even at a low level of urban group development the feminists and youth are important (64 and 44 per cent respectively), and both increase in importance as the group structure reaches a higher level of development. This is also the case in the advanced rural category. Although they rank low initially, they make remarkable progress as more group behavior becomes more widespread (28 to 83 per cent for feminists, 20 to 91 per cent for youth). The same trend is demonstrated in the retarded rural setting, but the shortage of local leaders may well hold back the feminists. They do not make as good a showing as the youth, who can more easily acquire both the skills and the leisure to expand their organization in the remote areas.

The labor unions do not reach a high ranking position in any of the social settings, which is probably a function of the generally low level of industrialization in Morocco. Nevertheless, the low performance even in the urban sector causes some curiosity since the U.M.T. has approximately half a million members. Since the union has created its own auxiliary organizations with considerable success in the cities, it may well be that a more detailed survey would be needed to reveal its position in the urban group structure. As displayed in Table I, however, the labor unions have made inroads in both the less advanced social settings, especially as higher levels of group development are attained (75 per cent advanced rural and 56 per cent retarded rural). The fact that labor unions have been able to organize to the extent shown is surprising, although the non-urban development is no doubt largely among miners, farm laborers and the civil service.

Table II does not clearly reveal what similarity there may be in group development in the various social settings. If group analysis is to make an important contribution to the study of comparative politics, it is desirable that the significance of one or several variables that concern groups in particular should be demonstrated. A simple method to compare the trends of group development between the high and low level is to subtract a group's ranking in the low group development analysis (0–4) from its ranking in the high level group analysis (5–7). Then a group that is holding its own in relation to the other groups in both circumstances will have a 0 score, one that is becoming *relatively* less numerous will have a negative score, and one that is becoming relatively more numerous will have a plus score. The results are summarized in Table III.

TABLE III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEEN HIGH AND LOW DEVELOPMENT RANKINGS, BY GROUP AND SOCIAL SETTING

| Group | Rank Differences | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Urban | Advanced | Retarded |
| Opposition Parties | 0 | −4 | −1 |
| Illiteracy Groups | −2 | +1 | 0 |
| Resistance | −2 | +1 | −1 |
| Feminists | +2 | +1 | +1 |
| Youth | +2 | +4 | +2 |
| Unions | 0 | 0 | +1 |
| Liberation Army | 0 | −3 | −2 |

Although the results of high level group development cannot be said to be the same regardless of the social setting, certain consistencies appear, at least for the collection of groups for which data are available. Political parties do not tend to increase their level of occurrence, but on the contrary, decrease in relative frequency as more groups are formed. This is at least partial evidence that the parties tend to act more as large, impersonal organizations and have less important societal roles as more complex group development begins. Literacy groups have a less regular pattern of scores, although they tend to become less active as more groups are formed in the urban setting, as might be expected. One of the requisites for high level group development is normally taken to be a more skilled, literate populace, which tends to specialize and proliferate group affiliations. The Resistance scores also exhibit an unexpected increase in the advanced rural setting, although their loss in the other two settings seems reasonable. In this case as with the Liberation Army, which loses heavily in both rural settings, some difficulty in sustaining the organizations' goals might be anticipated as groups having more appealing and immediately relevant goals are developed. The expected beneficiaries of higher group development are consistently more successful in all three social settings. The feminists consistently make small gains, and youth groups appear to prosper, as the group structure becomes increasingly complex.

## IV. INDICATORS OF ISTIQLAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

The appearance and growth of more groups, offering goals often more specifically and immediately useful than the nationalist party's in the post-independence period, might be expected to constitute a threat to that party and so lead to defensive action. The Istiqlal response, for example, might be made in areas of its own strength, in areas where other groups were weak, or possibly might not be forthcoming at all. Using the societal categories and group patterns given in Tables I and II, data concerning Istiqlal activity can be used to test these suppositions.

Five organizational indicators have been used, followed by three indicators concerning the party's communication system, although the "no response" rate does not permit generalization by conventional statistical standards even to the sample used in some cases. The Istiqlal has two layers of organization between its cells and its regional inspectors, namely sub-sections and sections.[16] Rural sub-sections are mostly found in villages. An analysis of the sub-sections, therefore, should give an indication of the kinds of group activity taking place where the party is less influential, *i.e.*, in less important centers of party organization. In the urban category nearly all sub-section secretaries indicated a complex group structure. In the advanced rural category, however, sub-sections appear to coincide with areas of relatively less group activity, having an average of slightly less than three groups. By contrast, the average for all sections is just under four. The most interesting finding is in the retarded rural category, where responses from sub-sections report an average of three groups, which is equal to that of the sub-sections in the advanced rural area. From the party's view, however, it is probably desirable that in the same social setting the more remote sub-section does not have more complex group activity than the next higher level of organization, the section. Thus insofar as more group activity in general complicates the party's activity, at lower levels of its hierarchy, the party appears to be more harassed in the more remote, rural areas.

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[16] The proportion of sub-sections to sections varies also with societal settings. In the urban category (41 cases) there were 31 sub-sections, in the advanced rural (127) 51 sub-sections, and in the retarded rural (136) 83. The relation between social structure and party organization is analyzed in more detail in the author's *Political Change in Morocco*, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–259.

The overall organizational differentiation in relation to level of group development is shown in Table IV. In the urban social structure there are so many groups that they probably have little effect on party organization. In the advanced rural sector, however, roughly half of the sections were established where a more complex group structure exists, which contrasts sharply with the organization of only a fifth of the sub-sections where more groups existed. This pattern is not repeated in the more remote rural setting, where about the same proportion of sections and sub-sections exists where there are more groups. Looking at high level group development alone, about four-fifths of the responses (38 of 47 cases) came from sections in the advanced areas, but only two-fifths (11 of 26 cases) from sections in the more distant areas. This confirms the previous finding that the party is not as closely related to the incidence of high group occurrence in the remote areas as it is in the advanced rural areas. Preconceptions of the nationalist party as a monolithic organization on the *local* level may well need reconsideration. Indeed, part of the nationalists' struggle for more influence at central levels may be stimulated by their apparent tendency to lose influence in regions developing more groups since independence.

TABLE IV. GROUP DEVELOPMENT BY SOCIETAL CATEGORY AND LEVEL OF PARTY ORGANIZATION

| Organizational Level | Urban | | Advanced | | Retarded | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0–4 | 5–7 | 0–4 | 5–7 | 0–4 | 5–7 |
| Section | 4 | 6 | 37 | 38 | 42 | 11 |
| Sub-Section | 7 | 24 | 42 | 9 | 68 | 15 |
| | No Response<br>0 | | No Response<br>1 | | No Response<br>0 | |

Possibly the best indicator of local difficulty is the loss of members, a subject which is almost never discussed outside the party. For this reason an analysis has been made even though the data are fragmentary.[17] In the urban setting the rise of other groups does not appear to have resulted in large party membership changes, although conclusions here must be qualified by the complex group structure that no doubt exists beyond the limits of this inquiry. Because so few groups were nationally organized before independence, the rural results are more valuable. In both the retarded and the advanced settings about 40 percent of all the secretaries indicated that members had been lost, and in both they also indicated that about a third of the losses took place where a more complex group structure existed. Viewing cases of low level group development alone, however, the party has had much less difficulty holding its own in the more remote regions. In the advanced regions more experienced local leadership and a longer history of party activity have not protected the party against membership losses in either high or low level group situations. In the retarded rural areas few groups seem to have meant few losses in the more recently organized remote areas, while more numerous groups appear to detract from party strength.

The proliferation of groups might also be expected to produce more disciplinary problems as members become neglectful of their Istiqlal duties or possibly even begin to agitate against the party. While there is a clear indication that party problems do increase in the urban setting, the results in both rural settings require more careful interpretation.[18] More than two-thirds of the secretaries in both report disciplinary problems or discharges. However, the difficulties reported tend to occur more at a low level of group development in the more retarded societal category. In these areas of more recent nationalist organization, the appearance of more groups has a decidedly adverse affect on discipline. In the same setting fewer groups have been associated with fewer disciplinary problems. Somewhat the same as in the matter of membership loss, a higher development of groups seems to have the most noticeable effect in the more distant regions.

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[17] Urban, 14 no responses; advanced rural, 72; and retarded rural, 80.

[18] Urban "no responses" 5 and "yes" 1; advanced rural 10 "no responses" and 1 "yes"; retarded 24 "no responses" and 1 "yes." On the whole the party secretaries were much more willing to answer questions specific about local conditions than to make broad estimates of the party's local effectiveness.

If trends in group development are a threat to the nationalists in some regions, it is important to know how, if at all, the Istiqlal has reacted. Since the party's organization has been built during the same period that the other groups were established the situation has a fairly equal time span for all organizations. Two indicators have been selected to see how the Istiqlal may try to sustain its support when confronted with more complex group behavior. An analysis of the number of elections for party offices and of the frequency of section meetings shows that as more groups were established the party attempted to increase its contacts at local levels and to invigorate local leadership. Even more significant for the Istiqlal's future was its apparent ability to react more strongly in the advanced societal setting, where it has the better organization, and to react less strongly in the more retarded setting, where the trends of group development have already been shown to be working against its interests.

The party secretaries were asked how many section meetings took place over the previous six months and the replies were tabulated, using six or more meetings as the breaking point.[19] The party expects each section to meet at least once a month, although this goal is seldom reached. The well established cell system in the cities makes comparison with the urban results difficult. In the more advanced rural category only about a fourth of the secretaries met the party's goals, while in the more dispersed retarded rural category the over-all record was better, but still delinquent. The level of group development seemed to make more difference in the advanced setting, where low level group development produced very few meetings. Where more meetings were held in the advanced rural setting, however, three-fourths of them took place where groups were highly developed, which contrasts strikingly with the figure of about a fifth occurring in situations of more complex group structure in the more distant areas. The Istiqlal's record on meeting locally is thus absolutely better in the more advanced regions and also more closely correlated with group activity.

The general results are very similar in the case of local party elections, which have been differentiated where two or more had been held since independence.[20] In absolute terms the chance of elections being frequent was much greater in the more retarded setting. In all cases the Istiqlal has permitted its performance to fall far below its claims. In nearly a third of the cases, and even more in remote areas, there has apparently been only the organizational election. Although it is unlikely that the Istiqlal has operated in a way to encourage political expression locally, major differences do appear in the two social settings where more elections have been held. Two-fifths of the more numerous elections in the advanced setting correlate with more complex group structure and only about a fifth in the retarded setting. Again the advanced setting seems to have a party organization more attuned to group development, although the rural setting displays a somewhat greater electoral effort on the whole.

The level of group development and the societal categories have revealed more unexpected results in the more remote regions of which we generally know much less. The lower correlation of sections with more numerous groups in the retarded areas may help explain why the Istiqlal has remained weak in the remote countryside. More group behavior has been accompanied by larger membership losses, more disciplinary problems, fewer elections and fewer section meetings. In the more advanced setting, on the contrary, more group activity appears to have favored smaller membership losses and roughly the same amount of disciplinary problems at all levels of group development. There is a tendency to hold more elections and more section meetings where more groups exist, both of which suggest responsiveness to increased local activity. In short, the Istiqlal seems to react so as to achieve its party interests best in the advanced setting, while in more remote areas it does not seem to act so much like a responsive, specialized political organization. Insofar as the occurrence of more groups indicates generally increased political activity, the Istiqlal was certainly less well prepared in the remote areas. This was apparent in the party's failure to hold more meetings or to concentrate more section level offices in locations where more groups existed.

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[19] In the section meeting data there were 5 "no responses" and 1 "no" in the urban setting; 19 "no responses" and 15 "no's" in the advanced rural; and 21 "no responses" and 4 "no's" in the retarded rural setting. The "no's" probably meant no meetings, but they have been kept separate.

[20] Urban "no responses," 5; advanced rural, 39; retarded, 35.

The last analytical step was to investigate in what ways the party may have responded ineffectively, since the tests described above do not deal with efforts that may have been made without results. Such endeavors should be most easily detected in the characteristics of the communication system. Three indicators have been used: the number of written instructions received per month from the section, the same from the regional party inspector, and the number of visits by the inspector. In general, it turned out that the party has not engaged in more frequent communication as group activity increases and may be simply uninformed as to conditions at its base. This conclusion must be qualified by the lack of information concerning improvements in the content or reliabilty of the communication system since 1955. However, the party's apparent passivity and, as will become evident below, its heavy reliance on personal contact, confirm the previous indications that it is not attuned to broad changes in group behavior.

The greatest use of written instructions among sections and sub-sections and the highest correlation with high development is found, as one might expect, in the cities.[21] The effectiveness of this system, as well as the need for it, is also reflected in the less frequent personal contacts with party inspectors in the cities than the countryside, even though such contacts could have been more easily multiplied in the urban setting. The over-all proportion of relatively frequent written communications with both sections and inspectors remains nearly the same in both the advanced and retarded rural areas. This eliminates the possibility that the peculiar characteristics of the party's response to more group behavior, noted above, might be associated with major shifts in written communication patterns. Some changes in written communications with sections were observed, however, as societal settings and group structure varied. In the advanced rural setting high frequency written communication is divided roughly equally between secretaries reporting both high and low numbers of groups. In the retarded setting, however, there is a somewhat greater tendency to direct high frequency communications to party offices situated amid more complex group structures. The over-all result generally confirms previous findings. In the advanced areas the Istiqlal is probably more effective due to more extensive rather than more intensive organization. Efforts appear to have been made in the retarded areas to direct more communications toward the more active areas, even though the total level of communications is lower. The findings for written communications with regional inspectors are very similar.[22]

More noticeable variations in communications, as societal and group structure factors vary, can be traced in the personal contacts between the inspector and his local secretaries as shown in Table V. The secretaries were asked to note how many times they had been visited by the inspector in the previous six months. In the advanced societal setting personal contact with the inspector is quite clearly channeled along the lines of more complex group activity. In the more remote areas, where personal communication is greater on the whole, the inspectors' visits have much less chance of being directed at areas of more group activity than at areas of less activity. Although the group structure is probably less oriented to the party in the retarded social setting, and possibly because of this, the party has not appeared to communicate in patterns that would seem to best serve its interests as judged by the occurrence of more groups. The apparent weakness may be partially alleviated by the Istiqlal's continuing effort to organize groups where it does make contacts and to extend nationalist activity into unorganized regions; but the data suggest that increased

TABLE V. INSPECTORS' VISITS, BY SOCIETAL CATEGORIES AND LEVEL OF GROUP DEVELOPMENT

| Number of Visits | Urban | | Advanced | | Retarded | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0–4 | 5–7 | 0–4 | 5–7 | 0–4 | 5–7 |
| None or one | 2 | 10 | 60 | 16 | 36 | 12 |
| Two or more | 9 | 18 | 15 | 28 | 47 | 12 |
| No response | 1 | | 8 | | 24 | |
| "Yes" | 1 | | | | 5 | |

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[21] Urban "no responses," 5 and "yes," 1; advanced, 23 and 9; retarded, 25 and 8.

[22] Urban "no responses," none; advanced 23, and 9 "yes's"; and rural retarded, 25 and 8. The rate of "no responses" is slightly higher in the advanced rural regions than in the more retarded where party secretaries are somewhat less well educated. This confirms the view that the rural organization, although less effective in its organization, may have more enthusiastic and militant secretaries. In the field work they generally appeared to be younger, to have more party education and to be more devoted. A local leadership study, *Perspectives of a North African Nationalist,* is now in manuscript form.

group behavior is less subject to Istiqlal influence in the distant parts of the country.

## V. PARTY DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The preliminary findings reported here imply that a nationalist party in a developing country, and probably most groups as well, may quickly saturate or fully load its communication system. Because of limited resources and lack of skilled local leadership, it is easier to get a group started than to keep it operating with reasonable effectiveness, or even more ambitiously, to expand its activity. Locally this means that there may be a tendency for organizations to restrict themselves to their initial body of more enthusiastic supporters. There are important feedback effects, as has been seen here. A political party has considerable difficulty in trying to differentiate and possibly also to respond to its supporters. The discontinuities that have appeared, especially in the more retarded areas, support the conclusion that more groups, even where they exist, may find it difficult to articulate the interests and views of their members. Strong centralization within the party or group may develop not so much from the desires of the leaders as from their uninformed state.

A number of questions remain for future investigation and point the way toward some unexplored possibilities for systematic, comparative research. A finding of special interest is the difficulty the nationalists have had in building an organization in the retarded area that was attuned to increasing group activity. Possibly this happened intentionally because of the distribution of the existing party cadre or the purposeful avoidance of areas where more groups might compete with the party. Field research does not support these speculations, however, and it rather seems that the party has simply not been capable of using its organization with maximum effectiveness. This was denoted by the distribution of the party's hierarchical structure and also by the number of section meetings. In its most general form the conclusion raises an extremely important question. We may make serious errors if we suppose that the responsiveness and effectiveness we take for granted in party organizations in advanced social systems can be matched by organizations of apparently comparable organizational capacity in less advanced social settings. Even the best regulated and best manned organization, whether it be working on behalf of a party or a political group, is seriously limited by the social milieu in which it operates. Building a national political organization is difficult enough; sustaining one may be equally so. The Istiqlal data suggest that there are possibly even more serious difficulties in stimulating more widespread political participation and political awareness through voluntary associations in a developing country.

In the advanced rural areas the Istiqlal possessed a natural historical advantage since its activities had in fact expanded as and where social and economic activity intensified. In this sense the party organization was guided and even provided with articulate supporters by the effects of colonialist development. It did not need to make important organizational decisions on the use of resources, methods of recruitment, etc., but needed only to agree on the not-too-difficult questions of the best strategy to embarrass the colonial powers. The party has faced a very different problem in the post-independence period in the retarded areas where it was itself an important instrument of social change, and where it lacked the support activity of the colonialist period. The organization apparently suffered a serious decline in effectiveness as measured by its responsiveness to changes in group activity of other kinds. These speculations are supported by the tendency of the party to lose the fewest members where few groups had been organized, and by the increase in disciplinary problems as more groups became established in the rural retarded setting.[23] The epoch of organizational opportunity is now closed for the Istiqlal and for many similar nationalist parties around the world. Can they overcome the imbalance and vulnerability that have become apparent in the post-independence period, as new groups spread into the more remote areas and as the nationalists' initial organizational advantage becomes a handicap?

The findings contained in the first part of this article are of more general significance in the application of group analysis to developing nations. Much of our speculation about groups in advanced political systems has implicitly assumed that party activity was somehow temporally and structurally a resultant of a given level of group activity. Whatever the historical evidence, the structural argument leads to serious errors in the analysis of developing countries. A variety of factors have contributed to the rapid politicization of a large number of citizens in new nations, as is suggested by the consistent predominance of parties in Tables I and II. The regularity with which the Istiqlal-drawn sample correlates with opposition party activity strongly suggests that relationships in groups of many kinds are heavily influenced by national political considerations. The parties tend to precede the proliferation of other kinds of groups and may, in fact, perform important support activity for other groups. If comparative studies show that this condition generally prevails among the developing nations, it would contribute substantially to explaining the difficulties of increased political participation through parties and groups. It seems very likely that group activity as a whole may be more politically charged and more partisan which, in turn, contributes to the bickering and stalemate that has so frequently characterized party activity in underdeveloped countries.

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[23] The use of indicators of this type helps to hurdle one methodological barrier to quantitative study of rapidly changing countries. In the pre-independence period political activity for the nationalists was largely confined to the more advanced areas where the Protectorate powers would allow them to go. In the post-independence period a very different unit of analysis is needed, the political system of all Morocco. Since the groups studied did not exist until independence, some indicators were needed that were unaffected by this discontinuity.

The trends identified in group activity in the new nation also have important implications for the ways in which individual participants may relate their groups to national politics. A strong orientation toward national politics may detract from the achievement of more specific, concrete goals and may culminate in discrediting both the groups and the parties. Although we know little of how the more active citizens of a new nation relate their behavior to national affairs, the hypothesis seems worth offering that the kind of group activity found in Morocco and similar new countries may actually hasten individual disillusionment and create frustration toward national politics, particularly in the more remote areas where observable results tend to be more highly valued. Cumulative, widespread group activity cannot be depended upon to create a more effective, more responsive political system. The citizen of the new nation may be the victim of his own excessive concern with national politics, since the development of subordinate forms of political expression may be seriously handicapped. Upon observing the stagnation of the party-directed efforts, the new citizen has only the alternative of the more highly regimented group activity under government direction.

This study has attempted to demonstrate that analysis of group behavior in relation to broad societal differentiations may well be of more value in the study of developing nations than more conventional group analysis of decision-making situations. Particularly in new countries the governmental processes are poorly defined, transient and easily manipulated. Group analysis is generally less vulnerable on these counts, especially in reference to nationally organized groups that have fulfilled ascertainable organizational prerequisites of communication, local leadership and widely accepted goals. They can be sufficiently distinguished from other groups to permit careful empirical study. Their qualities are, in turn, comparable to the general characteristics of the major societal groupings that can be formed in most new countries but that would otherwise be difficult to discern and almost impossible to study quantitatively under present conditions.

If group analysis is pursued explicitly the pitfalls that Professor Rothman has rightfully pointed out can be avoided. There are, in his words, difficulties in explaining "patterns of a social system in terms of the concrete units of which it is composed."[24] When group analysis is inadvertently extended to make sweeping generalizations concerning a different unit of analysis a serious error has been committed. But this does not deny the usefulness of group analysis in ordering data dealing with units as complex as entire societies or its helpfulness in discovering variables of value in societal analysis. As theory and concepts are formed for the study of human behavior in larger units it may also become possible to reduce or transform propositions from one framework to another and, thereby, to overcome some of the experimental obstacles to the study of societies as a whole and enrich theory formation in several fields of analysis.

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[24] "Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group Approach," this REVIEW, Vol. 54, (March 1960), p. 28.

# DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADERSHIP IN THE SENATE

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Party leadership in Congress has been one focal point for the sustained attack on the structure and performance of the American party system that has gone on for a decade and a half. Academic critics and members of Congress, individually and in committees, supplemented by a wide array of interested citizens and groups, have laid out blueprints for institutional reorganization. While there is some variety in their prescriptions, it is not hard to construct a composite model of party leadership in legislation on which there has been a fairly wide consensus among the reformers.[1]

The fount of party policy would be a reformed national convention, meeting biennially at the least. The obligation of the majority party in Congress, spurred by the president if he were of the same party, would be to carry out the platform put together by the convention. For this purpose frequent party conferences would be held in each house to consider specific measures. Some would be for the purpose of discussion and education, but on important party measures the members could be bound by a conference vote and penalized in committee assignments and other party perquisites for disregarding the will of the conference. Party strategy, legislative scheduling, and continuous leadership would be entrusted to a policy committee made up, in most schemes, of the elective officers of the house and the chairmen of the standing committees. Some have suggested a joint policy committee, made up of the policy committees of the respective houses, which might then meet with the president as a kind of legislative cabinet. The committee chairmen would not be exclusively, and perhaps not at all, the products of seniority. Power to override or disregard seniority, regularly or in exceptional cases, has been suggested for the conference, the policy committee, or the principal elective officer of each house. Individual chairmen would be expected to push the program of the conference and policy committee through their respective committees, that being the principal justification for their membership on the policy committee.

The same kind of organization would obtain in the minority party, though of course it would not bear the same responsibility for legislative program and scheduling.

Despite the frequency with which this model

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[1] Some representative selections from the voluminous literature are: *Organization of Congress*, Hearings, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18 (1945), pp. 28, 77–8, 334, 801, 805, 822–23, 846, 851, 872, 931; *Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946*, Hearings, Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948), pp. 38–9, 66, 118–19, 210–11; *Organization and Operation of Congress*, *ibid.*, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951), pp. 276–78, 287–90, 460; Committee on Congress, American Pol. Sci. Assn., *The Reorganization of Congress* (Wash., D. C., 1945), pp. 53–54; *Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System*, Report of the Committee on Political Parties, Amer. Pol. Sci. Assn., 1950, pp. 50–65; R. Heller, *Strengthening the Congress* (Wash., D. C., 1945), pp. 6–9; George B. Galloway, *Congress at the Crossroads* (New York, 1946), esp. ch. 4; Estes Kefauver and Jack Levin, *A Twentieth Century Congress* (New York, 1947), pp. 96–142.

(with some variations) has been sponsored by informed and respected persons, precious little of it has made any headway in Congress. Policy committees have been created, it is true, first by both parties in the Senate and later by the Republicans in the House of Representatives. But they are not composed of committee chairmen nor do they perform the functions hopefully suggested for them. Beyond that Congress has not gone. The reason can not be simply congressional hostility to change; other reforms proposed at the same time (notably professional staffs for committees and individual senators, and a reduction in number and simplification of jurisdiction of committees) have been successfully carried out.[2]

A basic premise of this paper is that the reformers' model has failed to attract support in Congress because it does too much violence to the political context in which members operate—that is, to the relationships of the members with the constituencies which they serve and must please, and to the internal power systems of the respective houses. An attempt will be made briefly to establish this point. A second premise is that the preoccupation with reform has obscured the fact that we have no really adequate model of party leadership as it exists in Congress, and that none can be constructed because we lack simple descriptions of many of the basic working parts of the present system. The major portion of the paper will be devoted therefore to an attempt to describe some of the operations of the principal elective officer of the Democratic Party in the Senate, the floor leader, especially in the eight-year period that Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas occupied that position. The description will be based primarily on personal observation and on interviews with men who have served as Democratic leader or worked on his staff, and secondarily on the small store of scholarly and journalistic material available. The description is only a partial one. Leadership in the Senate is highly personal and exceedingly complex. People who know a great deal about it are prevented from describing it by the heavy work loads they bear and the restrictions of confidentiality. The justification for a study with obvious limitations is the importance of the subject and the possibility that it will stimulate others to add to it.

It should be understood that the paper makes no value judgments about the actual operations of Senate Leadership nor the many proposals for change.

## I. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

One of the most durable notions in commentaries on American politics holds that the national convention is the supreme organ of the party and so the platform it draws up ought to have strong moral claims on the leadership in Congress. The advocates of party responsibility (who support the proposition) are too sophisticated, to be sure, to defend the convention out of hand as it now exists. It should be made smaller and more representative, they say, and its sessions should be longer so that more deliberation may occur.

The prognosis for these reforms, it must be said, is poor; the dominating influence of television runs in the other direction. Conventions get larger and noisier and their sessions shorter, and largely successful efforts are made to prevent them from deliberating at all. But what no amount of reform can change is the central fact that the convention's main business is to nominate a presidential condidate who has a chance to win; and a presidential candidate, like a man running for Congress, has a constituency to think about. It is fashionable to say that a member of Congress has a local constituency, the president a national one, but both statements, while technically true, are only partially correct in a political sense. Either man is free to be as national in his concerns as he pleases so long as he does not neglect the overriding importance of the people who can elect or defeat him. In the president's case these are primarily the voters in populous two-party states of the industrial North, and especially (because of the unit rule in the electoral college) the minority blocs within them which may swing a close state, and perhaps a close election.

The member of Congress recognizes the convention for what it is, a device of the presidential party, and the deliberations of the platform committee for what *they* are, a forum in which the party determines the maximum program which can be stated without shattering the party. The platform is a useful instrument for gauging the extent to which one wing of the party can go in meeting its constituent problems without alienating irrevocably another wing of the party which has opposing constituency interests; indeed, it is the only party device which provides quite this test. But not all party members can support all parts of such an instrument with equal fervor. The attitude of the member of Congress toward the platform is precisely the same as that of the president: he uses it, condemns it, or ignores it as it suits him in dealing with *his* constituency. This suggests then one of the insuperable (at present) obstacles to powerful central party leadership in Congress: the member's relationship to his constituency is direct and paramount. The constituency has a virtually unqualified power to hire and fire. If the member pleases it, no party leader can fatally hurt him; if he does not, no national party organ can save him.

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[2] George B. Galloway, "The Operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946," this REVIEW, Vol. 45 (March 1951), pp. 41–68; *Congressional Reorganization Revisited* (College Park, Md., 1956); "Congressional Reorganization: Unfinished Business," in Earl Latham (ed.), *The Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson* (Chicago, 1958), pp. 214–27.

Arguments for responsible party government fall before the lessons of life. The most powerful effort to advance party responsibility in this century was made not by political scientists but by Franklin Roosevelt when he tried to purge intransigent Democrats in 1938. Every politician in the country knows how that came out—just as he knows that the prestige of national party leadership was not enough to save Senate Democratic leaders Scott Lucas and Ernest McFarland, nor Republican Policy Committee Chairman Homer Ferguson, nor Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairmen Tom Connally and Walter George. He knows that the efforts of popular presidents to help favorite candidates have been generally unsuccessful and that, on the other hand, senators like the senior LaFollette (one of five chosen from its history by the Senate for special honor), Borah, Langer, Byrd and many others have made careers of party dissidence. He knows how much his own success has turned on his knowledge of constituency interests and prompt service to them. When constituents demand that he follow national party leadership the member responds quickly; in the early months of Franklin Roosevelt's regime many congressmen boasted that they voted "down-the-line" with his program. That kind of regularity would be permanent if voters wanted it. In the long haul they neither want nor respect it, and members of Congress act accordingly.

This is not to say that the member's identification with a national party is meaningless to him. Far from it. His attachment is intensely practical and probably deeply sentimental. Without its label he would have almost no chance to win. Party victory enhances his chances and adds to the sweetness of triumph the solid perquisites of the majority. Within the legislative body he depends on it for services and for almost indispensable cues for voting on a wide range of technical issues. But the legislative party, as David Truman has put it, "is mediate and supplementary rather than immediate and inclusive in function."[3] It is important, but not crucial.

The second immovable object in the way of legislative party leadership is the system of specialized standing committees. The establishment of standing committees with preemptive jurisdiction over categories of legislation is more than a division of legislative labor, it is an allocation of political power. The committee chairmen, especially when they are clothed with the immunity of a seniority rule, are chieftains to be bargained with, not lieutenants to be commanded. A party leadership of formal power, as distinguished from one of persuasion and accommodation, is incompatible with specialized committees.

The direct relationship of representative to constituent, and the specialized committee, are not the only hindrances to central party leadership, but they are formidable. It is significant that the politicians who operate the two great representative systems which are most often compared, the British and the American, are acutely aware of these basic elements in their respective power structures. British governments have rigorously suppressed everything likely to enable the individual member to build up independent support—residence requirements, private bills, services to constituents, personal expertise. And they have made their parliamentary committees small editions of the House of Commons, few in number, large in size, and unspecialized (except for Scottish business).[4] The Americans have done just the opposite. The persons least enthusiastic about a policy committee made up of committee chairmen probably were the committee chairmen themselves, who had no wish to trade sovereignty for a vote in council. Moreover, some standing committees of Congress have with good logic resisted dividing into subcommittees, which inevitably stake out their own claims to preemptive power.[5]

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[3] David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party: A Case Study* (New York, 1959), p. 95. His chapters 4 and 8 are especially valuable for their analysis of Senate leadership.

[4] Ivor Jennings, *Parliament*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 268–79, 355–80, 454–72; R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (London, 1955), pp. 241–53, 546–58; Leon D. Epstein, "British Mass Parties in Comparison with American Parties," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 71 (March, 1956) pp. 97–125.

## II. THE FLOOR LEADER'S JOB

The elective party officer in the Senate upon whom, more than any other, falls the burden of central leadership is the floor leader. Needless to say, it is not the same job at all times. Much depends upon the leader's objective situation *vis-à-vis* the White House and upon his subjective view of his relationship to the presidency.

One situation is that of a majority leader with a popular and aggressive president of the same party in the White House who makes strong demands on Congress. Good examples would be John Worth Kern in Woodrow Wilson's administration,[6] and Joseph T. Robinson in that of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The support of that kind of president gives the leader great leverage with his colleagues so that he can accomplish much, but his power (however personally skillful he may be) is essentially derivative. The president may push him into unwelcome adventures, perhaps without consultation or even warning.

A second situation, perhaps the most difficult of all, is that of a majority leader with a president who is legislatively aggressive without being able to muster adequate popular support for his program. This was the position of Senators Scott Lucas and Ernest McFarland with President Truman. Lucas especially was in sore straits. Truman regarded his remarkable reelection victory as a mandate, particularly for the civil rights pledges he had made. Lucas shared Truman's goals and believed it was his job to advance them, but he was not so optimistic about what could be done. Taking from the president's long list of legislative demands a few upon which Democratic senators might unite, he hoped to make a legislative record before hopelessly splitting the legislative party over civil rights.[7] Nevertheless he loyally put the civil rights legislation first, with the results he had predicted.

Other situations carry their own problems. The least difficult relationship perhaps is that of the majority leader with a president of his party who is not legislatively aggressive, the relationship enjoyed by Senators Taft and Knowland with Eisenhower. Not unlike it perhaps was the situation of majority leader Johnson, who had to carry the programming responsibilities of the majority without a Democratic president.

The leadership of the congressional minority, with the opposition's man in the White House, offers opportunity as well as problems. It is a good position from which to rally the troops; the initiative rests with the opponent, but there is no compulsion for the minority to take party stands on divisive issues. The leader of a minority with a president of his party would seem to have the worst arrangement possible. His relationships with the White House and his senatorial colleagues deserve close study.

The job of the majority leader obviously will be affected by his notion of his responsibilities toward a president of his party. William S. White contends that the Senate expects that a floor leader of a party occupying the presidency "will not so much represent the President as the Senate itself," and that the image of him as the president's man is a popular heresy born of the days of Roosevelt's enormous prestige. David B. Truman argues that "the fundamental complexity and subtlety of the role lie in the fact that the elective leaders are, and probably must be, both the President's leaders and the party's leaders."[8] They may both be right, without affecting the proposition that the perception of the leader's role may vary considerably with the incumbent.

Alben Barkley, for instance, regarded himself as responsible for Roosevelt's program, but he resigned his leadership when the president sharply criticized and vetoed a tax bill passed by Congress. Congress considers revenue legislation to be peculiarly within its own domain and the veto was bitterly resented. Barkley was promptly reelected unanimously by his colleagues and the president made amends as gracefully as he could.[9] Senator Lucas shared Barkley's general view. He believed that if a leader could not agree with his president 80 percent of the time, the leader should resign. In constant touch with the White House over a direct telephone, Lucas put Truman's program ahead of his own health and his political career. His successor, Ernest McFarland, had no

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[5] An example is the House Committee on Banking and Currency which has only recently, with reluctance, established subcommittees and has tried, without much success, to avoid specialization by numbering (not naming) them after the British fashion.

[6] See Claude Bowers, *The Life of John Worth Kern* (Indianapolis, 1918), ch. 17.

[7] William S. White, "Rugged Days for the Majority Leader," *New York Times Magazine*, July 3, 1949, p. 14 ff.

[8] William S. White, *Citadel: The Story of the U. S. Senate* (New York, 1956), pp. 96–98; Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 298–99.

[9] Alben W. Barkley, *That Reminds Me* (Garden City, N. Y., 1954), ch. 12.

direct telephone and wanted none. His relations with Truman were good, but he liked the long mile between the Hill and the White House; it was not too far for the Senate's ambassador to travel. His general view seems to have been shared by two other leaders very unlike him and each other, Senators Knowland and Taft.

Lyndon Johnson, as majority leader, did not work with a Democratic President, and it would be presumptuous to speculate about hypothetical relationships. But he *did* work with a Republican President for six years, and this relationship is illuminating. Johnson regarded the presidency as the one office in the American system which can give national leadership. He scoffed at the notion that his own initiative, in the absence of presidential leadership of Congress, made him a kind of "prime minister." His own description of his activity was that "we prod him [Eisenhower] into doing everything we can get him to do, and when he does something good we give him a 21-gun salute." He consistently refused to turn the Democrats in the Senate loose to attack Eisenhower at will, believing that no president can be cut down without hurting the presidency itself—with the American people the losers. Johnson worked with Eisenhower with dispassionate professionalism, supporting or differing with him as he believed he should.

Needless to say, Johnson was very far from regarding the Senate as a rubber stamp for any president, or even as a body which waits to deliberate upon what he sees fit to initiate. It is doubtful that any leader was ever more consciously proud of the Senate as an institution, nor more determined to preserve and expand the unique and independent role which the Constitution and its history have made for it.

## III. THE LEADERSHIP OF SENATOR JOHNSON

Lyndon B. Johnson was Democratic leader in the Senate from 1953 through 1960. With Robinson and Barkley, he is one of only three men in recent times to hold the position for an extended period, and he was by general agreement the most skillful and successful in the memory of living observers. What accounts for his success? How did he perceive his job? What powers had he and what strategems and tactics did he employ?

*Philosophy and Approach.* Johnson was a legislative pragmatist. He believed it possible to do anything that was worth the effort and the price, and so considered every problem from the standpoint of what was necessary to achieve the desired objective, and whether the objective was worth the cost. He learned early and never forgot the basic skill of the politician, the ability to divide any number by two and add one. But to find a ground on which a majority could stand, he did not regard as "compromise." "I always seek the best and do the possible," he said. "I have one yardstick that I try to measure things by: Is this in the national interest? Is this what I believe is best for my country? And if it is we outline it to these fellows of various complexions . . .", Democrats as different as Byrd and Morse, Republicans as far apart as Case and Dworshak. Johnson respected these differences: "The thing you must understand is that no man comes to the Senate on a platform of doing what is wrong. They will come determined to do what is right. The difficulty is finding an area of agreement . . ." To do that, "first you must have a purpose and an objective and the vision to try to outline what the national interest requires, what the national need is. Then you lay that on the table, and are as reasonably patient and as effective as you can be, from a persuasive standpoint."[10]

This is the way to "do the possible" and pass bills—the pragmatist's test of legislative achievement. More than that, he wanted the bills to become laws. Johnson consistently declined to pass strings of bills he knew Eisenhower would veto. "What do you want," he demanded, "houses [or farm legislation, etc.] or a housing issue?"

Johnson's emphasis on persuasion was crucial. He said the "only real power available to the leader is the power of persuasion. There is no patronage; no power to discipline; no authority to fire Senators like a President can fire his members of Cabinet."[11]

His formal powers certainly were not impressive; as Truman says, the majority leader must build his influence "upon a combination of fragments of power."[12] The office of Democratic leader, it is true, combines all the most important elective positions—Chairman of the Conference, of the Steering Committee, of the Policy Committee. (The Republicans fill these positions with four different men.) Each position adds something to his influence and to the professional staff he controls. The Steering Committee handles committee transfers and assignment of new members, and Johnson's voice as chairman was highly influential, to say the least. One of his most successful political acts was his decision in 1953 to put all Democratic senators, even new ones, on at least one important committee. As Chairman of the Policy Committee he had substantial control over legislative scheduling (in close collaboration with the minority leader), which gave him not only the power to help and hinder but an unequalled knowledge of legislation on the calendar and who wanted what and why. A tactical power of importance was what Johnson called the "power of recognition"—the right of the majority leader to be recognized first when he wanted the floor. He exploited this right with great skill to initiate a legislative fight when and on the terms he wanted.

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[10] "Leadership: An Interview with Senate Leader Lyndon Johnson," *U. S. News & World Report*, June 27, 1960, pp. 88–93, 89.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 88. *Cf.* Richard Neustadt's argument that the President's power, too, is essentially the power to persuade. *Presidential Power* (New York, 1960), ch. 3.

[12] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 115. For the formal powers and relationships of the floor leader, see Floyd M. Riddick, *The United States Congress: Organization and Procedure* (Manassas, Va., 1949) pp. 86–100; for historical accounts, George H. Haynes, *The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice* (Boston, 1938), pp. 480–483; and

The "power of persuasion" may be abetted by some favors Johnson was in a position to perform. He could help a senator move his pet legislation, not only in the Senate but, through his friendship with Speaker Rayburn and other crucially influential leaders, in the House as well. The senator, it should be added, did well to observe a "rule of prudence" and not ask for too much. Because there were always members who would help him on legislation of little interest to themselves, Johnson could muster a respectable vote for a senator's bill or amendment that was bound to lose—a substantial boon to a man who wants his constituents to take him seriously. Johnson had largesse to bestow in the form of assignments to special committees, assistance in getting appropriations for subcommittees, and appointments as representatives of the Senate to participate in international meetings. Because intelligence flowed in to him and he was the center of the legislative party's communication network (in a system which lacks formal, continuous communication among the specialized committees which do the work), a cooperative member could be enormously better informed through the leader's resources than his own. A master of parliamentary technique, Johnson could tell a senator how to do what he wished or untangle the Senate from a procedural snarl, instructing senators what motions to make and bringing them and the chair in on cue.[13]

Nevertheless persuasion was, in Johnson's case, overwhelmingly a matter of personal influence. By all accounts, Johnson was the most personal among recent leaders in his approach. For years it was said that he talked to every Democratic senator every day. Persuasion ranged from the awesome pyrotechnics known as "Treatment A" to the apparently casual but always purposeful exchange as he roamed the floor and the cloakroom.[14] He learned what a man wanted and would take, and he asked for help. He did not hesitate to "cross the aisle"; Republican votes saved him more than once, sometimes to the surprise and chagrin of *their* leadership. Although he had, as Stewart Alsop said, "a real talent for friendship, and that talent is the final weapon in Johnson's huge armory," some of his colleagues undoubtedly found his overpowering personality somewhat trying to live with.[15] Johnson sometimes approached those senators he was not "easy" with through the Democratic Whip, Senator Mike Mansfield, or the Secretary to the Majority, Robert G. Baker. Always the goal was the same: the combination that would yield one more than half the votes. Because he so often found it, because he spurned the hopeless fight, he was able to fashion a myth of invincibility which was itself mightily persuasive: when he moved, it was taken for granted that "Lyndon's got the votes."

Johnson always actively cultivated a close working relationship with the Republican leader, except for rare and calculated clashes. This served to broaden his leadership to include the whole body, adding to his control over it and his ability to obtain the magic majority.

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Lynn Haines, *Law Making in America* (Bethesda, Md., 1912), ch. 3; for a personal account, Alben W. Barkley, "The Majority Leader in the Legislative Process," in Amry Vandenbosch (ed.), *The Process of Government* (Lexington, Ky., 1949).

[13] See, as one example, the Senate debate on H.R. 5836, a postal rate bill, on February 28, 1958. Many of the "cues" have been edited from the *Record*, but enough remains to suggest Johnson's domination of an intricate parliamentary process. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 104, pp. 3105–3148.

[14] Stewart Alsop, "Lyndon Johnson: How Does He Do It?" *Saturday Evening Post*, January 24, 1959, p. 13 ff., 43; W. S. White, "Two Texans Who Will Run Congress," *New York Times Magazine*, Dec. 30, 1956, p. 5 ff.

[15] Alsop, *ibid.*, p. 43.

This relationship moreover made "the leadership" more nearly invulnerable to incipient rebellion. It also satisfied the Senate's historic sense of its role as the conservator of minority rights, and greatly improved the temper of the proceedings.

*Strategy and tactics of influence.* Although it is not likely that he ever quite used these terms, Lyndon Johnson's legislative strategy frequently reflected an acute awareness that senators must play many different and often conflicting roles, and that one task of leadership is to structure a situation so that a member can select a role which will allow him to stand with the party.

One evidence of this awareness was the care with which he tried to keep his own roles straight. As a senator from Texas, for instance, he had to give the oil and gas industry the same kind of support that other senators give the principal industries in their states.[16] Before he became leader, he did not hesitate, as a Texas senator, to lead the attack on Leland Olds' reappointment to the Federal Power Commission.[17] In the submerged oil lands controversy of 1953, on the other hand, Johnson voted as a Texas senator but stayed carefully in the background, leaving spokesmanship for the states' rights position to his Texas colleague, Price Daniel, and to Florida's Senator Holland. As a consequence, northern Democrats were able to make an issue of Republican support of the bill and of President Eisenhower's signing it. Likewise, when the annual attempt was made to reduce the depletion allowance granted in the tax code to producers of oil and gas, Johnson carefully stayed out of the floor debate. The so-called natural gas bill (to forbid the Federal Power Commission to regulate the sales by independent producers of natural gas to interstate pipe line companies), which comes up periodically, caused more trouble. Johnson could leave its sponsorship to other oil state senators until he came to announce a legislative program at the beginning of a session. Failure then to include the natural gas bill simply could not have been explained away in Texas. Again, when liberal Democrats staged a filibuster against the Dixon-Yates contract in 1954, Johnson stood aloof for two weeks while the issue was made, then stepped in as leader to end the filibuster when the point of diminishing returns was reached. The timing was well calculated. Majority support for anti-monopoly and rural electrification provisions in the Atomic Energy Act had been achieved by the filibuster and they were promptly voted when it ended.

Even more important as a leadership technique was the manipulation of the role perceptions of other senators. This was an important part of Johnson's major effort as minority leader to reunite his then bitterly divided legislative party. He exploited every opportunity to get his colleagues to think, not as northerners or southerners, liberals or conservatives, but as Democrats. A homely illustration is suggestive. In 1954 when some Republican orators came close to accusing Democrats of disloyalty, many southern Democrats tended to shrug it off as attacks on Harry Truman and northern liberals. But each time Johnson talked to a southern colleague he produced a freshly typed copy of some of the statements about Democrats made by Republican wavers of the "bloody shirt" after the Civil War. The parallel was striking and the lesson plain.

A better illustration perhaps was furnished by the appointment in the same year of one Albert Beeson to the National Labor Relations Board.[18] The Democratic minority on the Labor and Public Welfare Committee was strongly opposed to Beeson, whom organized labor accused of anti-labor bias, because they said his failure to sever his relations completely with a California corporate employer constituted a conflict of interests. This left conservative Democrats unmoved; they recalled many years when the NLRB had been frankly stacked in favor of labor. The Senate vote on Beeson seemed sure to provide yet another occasion for a sharp division between northern and southern Democrats.

Then a careful reading of the committee testimony showed that Beeson's statements had shifted from one hearing to another. Immediately Johnson saw the way: Beeson should be opposed not for conflict of interest, but for flouting the dignity of the Senate. The key man he perceived to be Senator Walter George: as a conservative southerner, he was almost sure to support Beeson; but as a *senator*, proud of the Senate and sensitive about its dignity, he would vote against a man he believed guilty of misrepresentations to its committee. Either way, he would take most southerners with him.

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[16] For a sympathetic statement of Johnson's problem by a northern liberal senator, see Richard L. Neuberger, "Making a Scapegoat of Lyndon Johnson," *New Republic*, July 4, 1955, pp. 9–10.

[17] Joseph P. Harris, "Senatorial Rejection of Leland Olds," this REVIEW, Vol. 45 (September, 1951), pp. 674–92.

[18] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 100 (1954), pp. 1049–51 (February 1), 1970–2005 (February 18).

The Democratic Policy Committee decided to rally Democrats against Beeson, not on conflict of interest but for false statements to its committee. The minority report was written that way. Speeches were written for Democrats, stressing the theme that the Senate's dignity had been flouted. Lister Hill, a southern Democrat, dominated the presentation. A Republican senator detected the shift in emphasis; had the conflict-of-interest objection been dropped? The Democrats assured him it had not, but said no more about it. The strategy called for delay over the weekend, to rally more votes, but when Johnson knew George was convinced the speeches were cancelled and a vote taken. Beeson was confirmed, but the Democratic minority had stood solidly together on the kind of issue which usually divided them. The Beeson incident, multiplied many times in their two years in the minority, taught the Democrats once more the habit of voting together.

The concentration on Senator George illustrates two other tenets of Johnson's strategy of leadership. One is that in most situations a single man holds the "key" to it. The problem is to know how to turn the key. A second is that a highly esteemed senator may be used as an "umbrella" on a controversial issue, for other senators who feel they can safely vote with him. Thus a southern senator could feel secure in the explanation that he voted "just like Mr. George."

Both were strikingly demonstrated in the enactment of two bitterly controversial labor bills in 1958. The first came in April when Senator Kennedy's Labor and Public Welfare subcommittee reported a welfare and pensions plans disclosure bill.[19] The principal hazard to the bill was the prospect that far-reaching amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act might be piled on it, killing any chance it had to pass the House—a threat which materialised when minority leader Knowland announced his intention to do just that. But the move was anticipated. For three days the Senate stalled while Johnson conferred almost continuously with Kennedy, Lister Hill (chairman of the full committee) and John McClellan. Senator McClellan was the "key" to the situation. His Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field had issued an interim report in March urging many of the amendments which Knowland intended to offer.[20] An agreement was reached: Hill and Kennedy pledged that they would offer a labor reform bill by June 10, and McClellan promised to vote against his own amendments until they had received proper committee consideration.[21] The Senate thereupon was thrown into 12-hour daily sessions until the bill was passed.[22] Fourteen amendments (six by Knowland) were beaten down, 12 by roll-call votes. Only one Democrat voted against his party consistently, and only two others voted against it even once. Only one amendment (prohibiting convicted felons from serving in the administration of pension and welfare funds) was adopted.[23]

When the general labor reform bill was reported promptly on June 10, it too had the united support of Johnson, Hill, Kennedy and McClellan.[24] Consequently, only one relatively insignificant amendment (continuing Taft-Hartley's non-communist oath for labor leaders and extending it to employers) was adopted over the opposition of the bill's sponsors, while 20 amendments were defeated. Once again most Democrats stood firmly together. Senator McClellan furnished the "umbrella" for conservative Democrats; when he publicly and repeatedly urged support for the bill as "the best that can be passed in this Congress," he made it safe and respectable for them to vote for it.[25]

Parenthetically, these bills also illustrated Johnson's strategy of alternately riding with loose reins while the Senate handled miscellaneous business and rested from its exertions, then keeping it in early and late on a major bill. The long, driving sessions undoubtedly reduced the Senate's notorious tendency to waste time.

There was a place in the Johnson scheme of things for floor debate. It furnished a forum for senators who love to talk; it registered positions and who held them; it kept the Senate in session while the serious business of legislation was going on somewhere else. Johnson knew how to make skillful use of the versatile Democratic "bench". But what emerged from Johnson's own statements and from examples of his work was the view that good legislation is not the product of oratory and debate but of negotiation and discussion, designed not to make issues but to find common ground that equal, independent and dissimilar men could occupy.

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[19] S. Rept. 1440 (on S. 2888), 85th Cong., 2d sess., April 21, 1958.

[20] S. Rept. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d sess., March 24, 1958.

[21] See Joseph Alsop's syndicated column, "Matter of Fact," for April 28, 1958.

[22] Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, P.L. 836.

[23] For the extended debate, see *Congressional Record*, Vol. 104, 85th Cong., 2d sess., for April 23–26, 28, 1958.

[24] S. Rept. 1684 (on S. 3974), 85th Cong., 2d sess.

[25] S. 3974, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1958. The debate is in *Congressional Record, ibid.*, for June 12–14, 16–17. McClellan's statement is at p. 11087.

A small-scale model of a typical operation was the amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1955. Labor and liberals wanted to increase the number of workers covered and to raise the minimum wage from 75 cents to $1.25 an hour. Eisenhower supported a 90-cent minimum wage. Southern Democrats would go no higher than that and opposed any increase in coverage. Johnson found the formula: $1 an hour with no additional coverage. Both sides were warned that amendments might be dangerous to it. The issue was settled with less than an hour of debate.[26] This procedure, with all factors intensified, explains how two civil rights bills were got through the Senate.

### IV. OTHER AGENCIES OF PARTY LEADERSHIP

The roles appropriate to other agencies of party leadership—the Conference (or Caucus), the Policy Committee, the Steering Committee (committee on committees), and standing committee chairmen—have been the subject of recurring controversy within Congress as well as outside it, as they probably will continue to be. No attempt will be made to settle it here. Instead we shall show how Democratic leaders generally and Senator Johnson in particular made use of these agencies, and then consider some criticisms and suggestions made recently by Democratic senators.

The party conference theoretically is the supreme organ of the legislative party, as the national convention is of the national party. Actually, its influence on policy has waxed and waned. Democrats historically have been more willing than Republicans to be bound by its decisions. Beginning in 1903, the Senate Democratic Conference could bind its members by a two-thirds vote, though there were occasional individual rebels. Conference discipline reached its peak in Woodrow Wilson's administration. It was so effective (or oppressive) that Nebraska Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock introduced, during the 1915 ship-purchase bill debate, a resolution requiring senators "to vote in accordance with their own convictions and judgments"; and open rebellion broke out against it after World War I. An even more stringent rule binding Democrats to support an Executive measure on a majority vote in conference was adopted at the beginning of the New Deal era, but a member was excused if he had conscientious objections to a bill or if it ran counter to pledges made to his constituents.[27]

The principal function of the Democratic Conference in recent years has been the selection of party leaders at the beginning of a Congress. Senator Johnson also used it at the beginning of a session to present his own "State of the Union" speech on the legislative program. (Developments in the second session of the 86th Congress will be discussed later.) His frank opinion was that "not much" can be accomplished in conference. Issues which really divide the legislative party cannot be settled that way; indeed, differences are exacerbated and new rifts may be opened. For example, in 1954 (his second year as minority leader) Johnson responded to criticism of the infrequency of conferences by calling one. Two issues were carefully selected for discussion because the legislative party seemed to be united on them, the contested election of Senator Dennis Chavez and the question of tying together the Alaska and Hawaii statehood bills. The party united happily behind Chavez and agreed on the statehood issue, but a member's speech on the latter almost upset the concord. Party members frequently stand together for different reasons, but talking about those reasons may only open old wounds and drive them apart. Floor debate may do the same, but it is not so likely, since many members are usually absent and arguments are not made directly to each other.

More than any other party agency, the Policy Committee has become what the floor leaders have chosen to make it.[28] Senator Barkley—Democratic leader in 1947, when the policy committees were established in an appropriation for the legislative branch—determined the method of selection. To sit with three *ex-officio* members (Leader, Whip, Secretary to the Conference), he chose six members on the basis of geography, deliberately omitting the older party leaders (at the cost of some resentment) and committee chairmen. He knew that men of established power would be hard to control. He wanted younger men, more pliable, willing to work hard to make reputations, who should be easier for him to work with. His method of selection prevailed—though in time, because succeeding leaders only filled vacancies, Policy Committee members gained in personal power and some became committee chairmen. Some leaders have thought privately that members should resign when they assume chairmanships, but this is not the practice. But the dominant consideration in filling vacancies still is the one Barkley established: the new member should be a man the leader *wants* on the committee. Senator Lucas left a seat vacant two years rather than take a man he did not really prefer to have. McFarland, too, in honoring geographical and ideological considerations, nevertheless chose men he considered friends. Senator Johnson tended to appoint older men with established positions of leadership. But in the 86th Congress he added the members of the Legislative Review Committee to the Policy Committee meetings, which gave wider geographical representation and assured that there would always be three freshman senators present.[29] Like Barkley's inclusion of the Whip and Secretary to the Conference, this practice is likely to become custom.

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[26] "Democratic Strategy," *New Republic*, June 20, 1955, pp. 3–4.

[27] Haynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 474–78.

[28] For a detailed analysis of both party policy committees in the Senate, see Hugh A. Bone, *Party Committees and National Politics* (Seattle, Wash., 1958), pp. 116–96, and his "An Introduction to the Senate Policy Committees," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (June 1956), pp. 339–59.

Their use of the Policy Committee has varied with the leaders. Barkley set out to have weekly meetings but seldom did; his leadership was personal, intuitive, and informal. Both Lucas and McFarland held weekly meetings. Lucas used it to select bills for Senate consideration, make the legislative schedule, and help plan floor strategy. Vice President Barkley was invited to attend the meetings, which he often did, and after committee discussion to add his comments. Discussion led to general agreement; no votes were taken and no decision was considered binding on the party. McFarland considered the Policy Committee a kind of "cabinet." He too cleared the legislative program with the committee, but he used it primarily for discussion, to give him a sense of what was possible.

When Senator Johnson chose new members of the Policy Committee he tried to balance considerations of geography, seniority, ideology, and influence in the Senate. He wanted men he could work with, but each also should represent a power group in the legislative party. They were men he would have to deal with if there had been no Policy Committee, though in that event he probably would have chosen to work with them individually rather than as a group. A Policy Committee meeting therefore was like a conference of chieftains. Each man had independent power; each unofficially represented a group. He brought more than intelligence on Senate attitudes; he brought influence also, since other votes were almost sure to go with his. The Policy Committee was far from being "the Johnson organization" in the Senate, although some of its members sometimes helped with tactical operations.

The meetings were for discussion, to thrash out ideas on an issue. Few votes were taken, and the minutes were brief and confidential. The Policy Committee made few decisions or announcements, although a statement sometimes was issued through the Committee to suggest broad party support. Thus the Policy Committee's declaration that the McCarthy censure vote was not a party issue probably was more effective than a statement by the leader alone. But Policy Committee decisions committed no one, not even the members of the committee themselves.

Johnson's employment of the Conference and the Policy Committee was criticized by some Democratic senators in the 86th Congress, with the result that more frequent conferences were held in the second session. The first public criticism came from Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin in three Senate speeches in the Spring of 1959.[30] Proxmire called for "regular caucuses with specific agendas proposing consideration of our legislative program," a strengthened Policy Committee which would "find and express the party position on vital over-all issues," and closer adherence to the party platform. He was supported, in whole or in part, by Senators Clark, Morse, McNamara, and Douglas.

A motion was made at the first conference of the second session (January 7, 1960) to hold conferences every two weeks or whenever 15

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[29] The Legislative Review Committee in the 86th Congress consisted of Senators E. L. Bartlett (Alaska), Clair Engle (California), and Philip A. Hart (Michigan). The function of the Legislative Review Committee is to keep up with the objections of Democratic members to bills on the calendar and to voice them on calendar call, so that the legislation will not pass "without objection."

[30] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 105, pp. 2814–20 (February 23), 3559–78 (March 9), 5956–59 (April 15).

Democrats requested it, but this was withdrawn when Johnson reiterated his willingness to call a conference on any Democratic senator's request.[31] Five days later, at a second conference, Senator Gore's motion that the Policy Committee be made into "an organization for evolving a coherent party policy on legislation," with its membership increased to 15 and selected by the Conference, was defeated 51–12. A motion to confirm Johnson's power to fill vacancies on the Democratic Steering Committee was adopted 51–11. After that, several conferences were held. Senator Gore has said that one of them "paid off in Democratic unity in the passage of the first aid-to-education bill in 11 years" on February 4 by a 51–34 vote after only two full days of debate.[32] Another conference on February 15 discussed the report of the Joint Economic Committee and the Administration's proposal to remove the ceiling on federal bond interest rates.[33]

Without a systematic survey of Democratic senatorial reaction to the conferences, it is safe to say only that sentiment has been mixed. Much can be and is said in favor of more frequent conferences. They provide a good way for members to learn about broad problems beyond the scope of their committee work. Younger members may find it easier to talk there than on the floor of the Senate, and may prefer an institutionalized procedure for expressing their views to the leader and learning his plans. Perhaps the strongest argument is simply that it seems like a better, more democratic way to run a party.

The critics of the conference say that so long as members are not bound it is futile and this is quickly reflected in the attitudes of senators toward it. Those not in favor of the policy under discussion tend to stay away; their votes have to be corralled in the traditional manner, through individual conferences with the leader. More senior members may not come because their opinions can be made effective where decisions are actually made. Other members avoid them simply because of business more pressing than a non-binding caucus. Furthermore, no real division of sentiment is likely to be reflected in candid discussion in a party conference. Aside from the danger of intensifying differences, there is the likelihood that views stated in confidence will be "leaked," probably in distorted form, to the press. The result of all these factors, say the critics, is a rather academic discussion, poorly attended, which was not requested in 1960 by any member after the middle of February.

From the lively senatorial discussion of party leadership three pertinent points might be emphasized. One is that the proponents of change do not want increased party discipline. As Senator Proxmire put it: "I will follow the dictates of my conscience against the decision of a caucus as readily as a decision of any leader, if I believe my course to be right and theirs wrong."[34] The goal is discussion, not decision. The problem of putting together a majority remains. A second is that the Policy Committee could be changed in size, composition and method of membership selection without increasing its influence. This seems to be the history of the Republican Policy Committee. There is no tradition of leadership in the Policy Committee. Its influence depends upon the use the leadership makes of it. A third is that Johnson did not believe (and his view apparently was shared by most Democratic senators) that either the Conference or the Policy Committee was a proper agency to make policy. That function belongs to the standing committees. Johnson has said that if members want to influence policy "the first place to make it is in committees of which they are members . . . If they cannot get a majority vote there, how do they expect me to get a majority vote out here?"[35]

Johnson's acceptance of the standing committees as the primary source of legislative policy did not deny to their chairmen the benefits of his friendly persuasion. What they had in committe, what they could get out and when ("Give me a bill!"), what could pass the Senate—these were the topics of repeated personal conferences.

One of the most important and least generally appreciated arms of party leadership was the group of people Stewart Alsop called "the biggest, the most efficient, the most ruthlessly overworked and the most loyal personal staff in the history of the Senate," most of whom had been with Johnson for many years.[36] Lucas and McFarland tried to keep staff members assigned to them for the party separate from their state offices. Johnson used the best man for the job, whether it was state or party. Because he took ideas from anyone and used those he liked, Johnson got a steady flow of them from his staff. They had much to do with his ability generally to move first with the best information.

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[31] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, January 8, 1960, p. 43.

[32] *Ibid.*, January 15, 1960, p. 91.

[33] *Ibid.*, February 12, 1960, p. 224.

[34] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 105, p. 2817 (February 23, 1959).

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 9260 (May 28, 1959).

[36] *Op. cit.*

### V. CONCLUSION

Suggestions for change in the leadership structure of the Senate seem to fall into two classes. The first class, which has had strong academic sponsorship, has sought to strengthen central leadership through conference and policy committee, looking toward the party responsibility of the British for their model. These suggestions have failed because they do not fit the character of the American representative system, with its direct responsibility of representative to constituent, nor the internal power system of Congress, with its specialized committees presided over by senior officers. They have sought to impose party coherence through organizational devices, and to take power from those who have it and assign it to those who do not. The second class of suggestions has aimed not at a more disciplined party but at additional leverage for a minority group within the legislative party. These have so far had small success because their sponsors *are* a minority.

What should be fully exploited by academic writers on the Senate is the insight which can be gained from studies of strong leadership which *has* emerged there from time to time. Whether it is exercised by a formal leader or some other person, it reveals much about the structure of the Senate as a social system precisely because it is indigenous to the Senate.

Systematic analysis of Lyndon Johnson's tenure as Democratic leader should be especially rewarding. As a majority leader without the leverage furnished by a president of his party, he had to make the best use of purely senatorial tools of influence. In this he succeeded to the point that he could manage the enactment of two laws on the most divisive domestic issue of our time. This brief description of some aspects of his leadership suggests that the successful senatorial leader is one who (1) can and does help individual senators to maximize their effectiveness in playing their personal roles in the Senate, and (2) structures roles and alternatives so that a maximum number of senators can join in support of the proffered solution of an issue.

# COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

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Any attempt to understand the legislative process, or to reckon how well it fulfills its purported functions, calls for a careful consideration of the relationships among congressmen. The beginning weeks of the first session of every congress are dominated by the internal politics of one phase of those relationships, the assignment of members to committees. Since congressmen devote most of their energies—constituents' errands apart—to the committees on which they serve, the political stakes in securing a suitable assignment are high. Competition for the more coveted posts is intense in both houses; compromises and adjustments are necessary. Members contest with each other over particularly desirable assignments; less frequently, one member challenges the entire body, as when Senator Wayne Morse fought for his committee assignments in 1953.[1]

The processes and patterns of committee assignments have been only generally discussed by political scientists and journalists. Perhaps the reason for this is too ready an acceptance of the supposition that these assignments are made primarily on the basis of seniority. Continuous service, it is true, insures a member of his place on a committee once he is assigned, but seniority may have very little to do with transfers to other committees, and it has virtually nothing to do with the assignment of freshman members. On what basis, then, are assignments made? Surely, not on the basis of simple random selection.

A recent student sees the committee assignment process as analogous to working out a "giant jig saw puzzle" in which the committees-on-committees observe certain limitations. These committees

> . . . must, of course, be guided by the number of vacancies and by the number of applications for transfer. Care is taken to attain geographical distribution, if not balance. Attention is paid to group desires and to the experience and training of individual legislators. And balance among the various factions of the party is sought. Beyond these more or less objective factors, being in the good graces of the party leader is certainly important in getting on major committees.[2]

This statement leaves significant questions unanswered. What, for example, is meant by geographical distribution or balance? Is every section or region represented in each party on each committee? Or does the committee's subject matter jurisdiction guide the type of geographical representation the committee-on-committees considers? Is the number of assignments allotted to a state party delegation on particular committees restricted? Do state party delegations develop a "vested interest" in certain committees and attempt to maintain continuous representation on them? What groups actively seek representation for their interests on the various committees by campaigning for an individual congressman to fill a vacancy? How influential are they? The study of committee assignments should also throw light on party factionalism, the differences between the parties in performing this organizational task, and the importance attached to the professional and group backgrounds of legislators.

As a step toward answers to these questions this study looks into the formal and informal processes of committee assignments in the House of Representatives.[3]

The special hazards of this study deserve mention. No attempt was made to sample the House. The information derived from each Congressman must be used with caution, for legislators view events from a variety of perspectives. And finally, in all likelihood, some

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* This study was made possible by the support of the Ford Foundation and Wayne State University. Neither of them, of course, is responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation.

[1] Ralph K. Huitt, "The Morse Committee Assignment Controversy: A Study in Senate Norms," this REVIEW (June, 1957), pp. 313–329.

[2] George Goodwin, Jr. "The Seniority System in Congress," this REVIEW (June, 1959), pp. 412–436.

[3] Data have been derived from unstructured interviews with members and staffs of the various committees, personal letters and similar papers, official documents of various types, and personal observations. I interviewed members of the committees-on-committees, deans of state delegations, and other members affected by the decisions. The survey covered the 80th through the 86th Congresses, with special attention to the 86th.

of the subtleties and nuances of the process have escaped observation. Despite these limitations, relatively crude techniques of analysis can yield significant results. For what sometimes frustrates our understanding of the most unique part of the American legislative process—the committee system—is the lack of organized data and the failure to analyse readily available data.

### I. THE COMMITTEES-ON-COMMITTEES

In one of the more notable features of the reorganization of Congress in 1911, each party created a committee-on-committees to distribute committee assignments, on the theory, still asserted, that a party committee offers at least an opportunity for all party members to receive suitable assignments. Such a committee would go a long way toward eliminating the arbitrary judgments of the Speaker who, in the past, had used committee assignments as rewards and punishments, to help insure his control of pending legislation.

Though both parties use a committee for this purpose, their methods of selecting its members differ. Each committee therefore needs separate treatment, with comparisons from time to time.

*Democrats.* By custom the Democratic members of the House Ways and Means Committee, together with the Speaker and Majority Floor Leader (or the Minority Floor Leader when Democrats are in the minority), have constituted the committee-on-committees since 1911. This arrangement is evidently an outgrowth of the former practice of selecting the chairman of Ways and Means as the Majority Floor Leader. Because the Democratic members serve in this dual capacity, and although they are formally designated by the Democratic caucus, they are in fact self-perpetuating. The Speaker and Majority Floor Leader participate extensively in the Committee's deliberations and, of course, have considerable influence on the decisions.

The method of organizing the work of the Committee-on-committees in the 86th Congress was typical. Each member of the Committee was assigned a geographical zone within which his own district lies. (See Table I) All zones except two were geographically contiguous. Requests for committee assignments coming from members were handled by their respective zone committeeman. For example, representative Aime Forand from Rhode Island was responsible for the assignment and re-assignment requests of all Democratic representatives from districts within his zone, which includes, in addition to his own state, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts and Vermont. As can be seen from Table I, each zone representative served an average of approximately 18 members.

Although committee deliberations are closed, the procedure followed is well known among most House members. Each zone representative, speaking in order of seniority, nominates candidates from his zone for the various committee vacancies, usually with supporting arguments. Thereupon the Committee votes on each of the vacancies, and the nominee receiving the highest number of votes is designated to fill it.

The volume of work before the Committee varies, depending chiefly on the changes resulting from the preceding election. Almost always, however, there are more applications than vacancies; in the 86th Congress 124 applications were made for 75 places to be filled. The major committees were naturally most in demand; applications exceeded vacancies for all committees except District of Columbia, House Administration, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Post Office and Civil Service, and Science and Astronautics—all regarded as lesser committees. Applicants usually list their order of preference, taking into account not only their personal desires but also advice from other members and their own assessments of where they stand the best chance to land at least an acceptable assignment. Without encouragement from above, an applicant, however much he might prefer to be on the Appropriations Committee, say, would hardly bother (or venture) to ask for what he realizes he has virtually no chance of getting.

Much more than committee structure and manner of procedure is involved in making assignments. Animating and guiding these formal mechanisms are the norms and customs observed when assignments are sought. The pervasive seniority rule, for example, works in a manner not commonly appreciated. Members seeking assignments, and particularly freshmen, channel their requests through the "dean" or senior member of their state party delegation. In negotiations between the Committee-on-committees and the applicants he plays a crucially important role in securing assignments. It is his special responsibility to see that his members receive adequate representation on the various committees. In performing this task, he tries to protect or maintain the delegation's place on a major committee when a vacancy occurs and the seat has previously been held by a member of the delegation; he consults with, and advises, the members of his delegation seeking assignments as to what their chances are, and which committee assignments he will support for them. The dean's decisions must be made in consideration of the needs of

TABLE I. HOUSE DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE-ON-COMMITTEES AND ZONE ASSIGNMENTS, 86th CONGRESS

| Committee Member | Zone | Dems. in State Del. | Freshmen |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mills (Ark.) | Ark. | 6 | (1) |
| | Del. | 1 | (1) |
| | Kans. | 3 | (2) |
| | Okla. | 5 | (0) |
| | | 15 | (4) |
| Forand (R. I.) | R. I. | 2 | (0) |
| | Conn. | 6 | (6) |
| | Me. | 2 | (1) |
| | Mass. | 8 | (1) |
| | Vt. | 1 | (1) |
| | | 19 | (9) |
| King (Calif.) | Calif. | 16 | (4) |
| | Alas. | 1 | (1) |
| | Ariz. | 1 | (0) |
| | Nev. | 1 | (0) |
| | Utah | 1 | (1) |
| | | 20 | (6) |
| O'Brien (Ill.) | Ill. | 14 | (4) |
| | Wis. | 5 | (2) |
| | | 19 | (6) |
| Boggs (La.) | La. | 8 | (1) |
| | Ala. | 9 | (0) |
| | Miss. | 6 | (0) |
| | | 23 | (1) |
| Keogh (N. Y.) | N. Y. | 19 | (2) |
| | | 19 | (2) |
| Harrison (Va.) | Va. | 8 | (1) |
| | S. C. | 6 | (0) |
| | | 14 | (1) |
| Karsten (Mo.) | Mo. | 10 | (0) |
| | Iowa | 4 | (3) |
| | Minn. | 4 | (1) |
| | | 18 | (4) |
| Herlong (Fla.) | Fla. | 7 | (0) |
| | Ga. | 10 | (0) |
| | | 17 | (0) |
| Ikard (Texas) | Texas | 21 | (1) |
| | N. Mex. | 2 | (1) |
| | | 23 | (2) |
| Frazier (Tenn.) | Tenn. | 7 | (0) |
| | N. C. | 11 | (1) |
| | | 18 | (1) |
| Machrowicz (Mich.) | Mich. | 7 | (1) |
| | Ind. | 8 | (6) |
| | Ohio | 9 | (3) |
| | | 24 | (10) |
| Metcalf (Mont.) | Mont. | 2 | (0) |
| | Colo. | 3 | (1) |
| | Idaho | 1 | (0) |
| | Nebr. | 2 | (2) |
| | N. Dak. | 1 | (1) |
| | Ore. | 3 | (0) |
| | S. Dak. | 1 | (0) |
| | Wash. | 1 | (0) |
| | | 14 | (4) |
| Green (Pa.) | Pa. | 16 | (4) |
| | N. J. | 5 | (2) |
| | | 21 | (6) |
| Watts (Ky.) | Ky. | 7 | (2) |
| | Md. | 7 | (3) |
| | W. Va. | 5 | (2) |
| | | 19 | (7) |
| Total | | 283 | (63) |

his state, the qualifications of his own members, and the necessity for adjusting the requests among his members to prevent duplication on committees. It falls to his lot also to discourage and dissuade members who have unrealistic designs on the major committees—Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means.

The importance of the deans of the state delegations may be illustrated negatively. Connecticut, for the first time since 1936, elected six freshman Democrats in 1958. Since the entire delegation was composed of freshmen, no senior member could serve as the dean and apparently there was no time or forethought to form an agreement to become part of an area delegation. So when the committee assignments were made, only two of the six, Chester Bowles and Frank Kowalski, felt that they had been given as good representation as they were entitled to. Bowles got the assignment of his choice, Foreign Affairs, and Kowalski was assigned to Armed Services because of his extensive military experience. The remaining four were given committee places they did not prefer, namely Science and Astronautics, Education and Labor, Government Operations, and a dual appointment to the District of Columbia and Post Office and Civil Service Committees. The four dissatisfied Connecticut congressmen complained, two of them quite bitterly, that their committee positions would not help them to be re-elected—that they had received the "left over" assignments. These assignments had not been made from any desire to penalize them, but apparently because they were orphans with no dean or senior member to fight for their preferences or look after their interests.

If the Democratic Committee-on-committees is judged as a system of collective responsibility among men of equal status, then it is clear that the use of members of a permanent standing committee for this purpose has had almost the opposite effect. Each member does not carry equal weight on the committee. The status and rank of each Democratic member of Ways and Means are carried over to the Committee-on-committees. The ranking Democrat serves as chairman and the status of the other ranking members is unquestionably enhanced by the fact that they also serve as Ways and Means subcommittee chairmen when the Democrats are in the majority. These are the senior members in an institution that respects seniority.

Ways and Means members have had considerable congressional experience prior to their assignment. For the period 1913 to 1958, only five of 86 assignments to this Committee were given to congressmen without any seniority; and each of these five had had previous, but interrupted, congressional service. On the average, members have served at least three consecutive terms prior to being placed on the Committee, and the average is closer to five terms if computations are based simply on prior, rather than continuous, service before selection. The stability of the Committee's membership is also increased by the fact that, although a congressman may sometimes shrink from its responsibilities, only one member has ever left the Committee by his own request. What turnover there is results from death, resignation, or loss of party control, rather than from transfers or election defeat.

For a key functioning unit of the Democratic party's legislative apparatus, so much continuity in the Committee-on-committees makes it ill-designed for flexibility and responsiveness to electoral changes and public opinion trends. Rather, it is more analogous to a firmly entrenched bureaucracy, not completely immune but well insulated, and capable of considerable resistance to any pressures placed upon it.

*Republicans.* The Republican Committee-on-committees is specially set up for its function and is responsible for no other. It is composed of one member from each state having Republican representation in the House; thereby, a lone Republican from any state is automatically included. Each state delegation determines its member on the Committee. This method might be thought to provide an opportunity to select a new member for each new Congress, but the normal pattern, on the contrary, is for the senior member of the delegation, usually the dean, to assume membership on the Committee and hold it as long as he desires or remains in Congress. Table II shows the membership of the Republican Committee-on-committees for the 86th Congress.

The point is sometimes argued that the Republicans make it possible for each state delegation to assume a greater share of the organizational responsibility than the Democratic committee assignment process allows, and consequently that the decentralized Republican method is much more responsibe to electoral changes. Actual Republican practice tends to contradict this argument. For the Republicans allow each representative on the Committee-on-committees to cast as many votes as there are Republicans in his delegation. This concentrates the power over committee assignments in the hands of the senior members from the large state delegations. In the 86th Congress, members from seven states—California, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—controlled 97 of the 153 committee votes.

Not to mask the realities of power, the Republican committee assignments are handled by a Subcommittee which, in the 86th Congress for example, was composed of the senior members from these seven states and two others, with one vote each, evidently added to give a voice to large geographical areas (intermoun-

TABLE II. HOUSE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE-ON-COMMITTEES, 86TH CONGRESS

| State | Member | Votes | State | Member | Votes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arizona | John J. Rhodes | 1 | New Jersey | Frank C. Osmers | 9 |
| California | James Utt | 14 | New York | Mrs. K. St. George | 24 |
| Colorado | J. Edgar Chenoweth | 1 | North Carolina | Chas. R. Jonas | 1 |
| Florida | William C. Cramer | 1 | North Dakota | Don L. Short | 1 |
| Idaho | Hamer Budge | 1 | Ohio | Clarence J. Brown | 14 |
| Illinois | Leo E. Allen | 11 | Oklahoma | Page Belcher | 1 |
| Indiana | E. Ross Adair | 3 | Oregon | Walter Norblad | 1 |
| Iowa | Charles B. Hoeven | 4 | Pennsylvania | Richard Simpson | 14 |
| Kansas | Edward H. Rees | 3 | South Dakota | E. Y. Berry | 1 |
| Kentucky | Eugene Siler | 1 | Tennessee | Howard H. Baker | 2 |
| Maine | Clifford G. McIntire | 1 | Texas | Bruce Alger | 1 |
| Massachusetts | William H. Bates | 6 | Utah | Henry A. Dixon | 1 |
| Michigan | Clare E. Hoffman | 11 | Virginia | Joel T. Broyhill | 2 |
| Minnesota | H. Carl Anderson | 5 | Washington | Jack Westland | 6 |
| Missouri | Thomas B. Curtis | 1 | West Virginia | Arch A. Moore | 1 |
| Nebraska | Phil Weaver | 2 | Wisconsin | John W. Byrnes | 5 |
| New Hampshire | Perkins Bass | 2 | Wyoming | E. Keith Thomson | 1 |
| | | Total—153 | | | |

Subcommittee Appointed by Minority Leader

| State | Member | Votes | Seniority |
|---|---|---|---|
| California | James Utt | 14 | 4 consecutive terms |
| Idaho | Hamer H. Budge | 1 | 5 consecutive terms |
| Illinois | Leo E. Allen | 11 | 14 consecutive terms |
| Michigan | Clare E. Hoffman | 11 | 13 consecutive terms |
| New Jersey | Frank C. Osmers | 9 | 7 non-consecutive terms |
| New York | Katharine St. George | 24 | 7 consecutive terms |
| North Carolina | Charles Raper Jonas | 1 | 4 consecutive terms |
| Ohio | Clarence J. Brown | 14 | 11 consecutive terms |
| Pennsylvania | Richard M. Simpson | 14 | 7 consecutive terms |
| | Total—99 | | |

tain and southern) that would otherwise have gone entirely unrepresented. Together the Subcommittee members controlled about two-thirds of the full committee's votes. None of them had served less than four terms in Congress. By custom the Subcommittee is appointed by the Minority Leader (or Speaker, as the case may be) on the authority granted by a resolution of the full Committee. The resolution leaves the membership of the Subcommittee apparently at the discretion of the party leader, but the example just given shows how far he is hemmed in by the practice of appointing the same members from the larger delegations each time a new Congress convenes. The change in the minority leadership in the 86th Congress had no discernible effect on this part of the organizational process.

The Subcommittee receives and considers *all* applications for assignment and transfer, and the full Committee invariably accepts all of its recommendations. Subcommittee sessions are informal and each member is free to speak for or against any assignment. Information on newly elected members is obtained from the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee and the party leaders pride themselves on having extensive knowledge not only of the professional and personal backgrounds of their colleagues, but also of the constituencies they represent. Members of the full Committee who are not on the Subcommittee are entitled to participate in the determinations if they desire, but they seldom do.

Republicans from small states sometimes object that as a result of the system of proportional voting and large-state domination of the Subcommittee they have no real voice in committee assignments and are often overlooked for assignments to the better committees.

Along the same line they complain that the Republican procedure allows no mechanism whereby the small state delegations can combine their voting power in the Committee-on-committees. The critics point to the Democratic practice of letting smaller state delgations select a joint dean in order to be able to negotiate for committee assignments from a position of strength.

Actually, the principal difference between Republican and Democratic practice in formal organization is that the Republicans have built into their system a voting formula that rewards heavy Republican areas; the Democrats offer no comparable leverage to the large delegations. Nor is it likely that Democrats would even consider such a plan as long as the seniority system prevails. For it would only lessen the power of the Southern Democrats by putting more control over committee assignments into the hands of the larger northern, midwestern, and western delegations, with their very different traditions and interests.

There is little to distinguish the manner and procedure followed by an individual Republican or Democratic congressman in securing an assignment. Republican freshman members also work through the deans of the state delegations, but the deans, unlike their Democratic counterparts, are usually members of the Committee-on-committees.

Despite these differences the arrangements in both parties for handling committee assignments have one basic feature in common. Both committees-on-committees are so constituted as to be virtually immune to immediate pressures brought about by electoral changes. This is no accident. Its justification rests on a number of considerations congenial to the norms and customs of the entire body. If junior or freshman members had the responsibility for making committee assignments they would immediately be thrust into difficult and delicate positions, particularly in deciding on transfer requests from senior members. Such decisions might well be controversial enough to damage permanently a junior member's career within the legislature and possibly outside of it. In private as well as public life, organizations seldom allow the newcomer—unfamiliar with the subtleties and the institutional trappings of the process—to make important personnel decisions; and committee assignments are party personnel decisons of the most crucial importance. Senior members simply would not willingly tolerate decisions made in this way. If forced to do so, the pressures, roadblocks and penalties they could evoke might be so severe and difficult to overcome that order in the whole legislative process might be endangered. The system has evolved as it has for these reasons, as well as for more positive benefits, such as the desire to rely on the more knowledgeable judgments of those with greater experience in the legislature.

Finally, the system is intended to give the process a tone of moderation and detachment. Members with seniority are less threatened by an election two years hence, being less subject to the vicissitudes of a competitive district. After years of experience in a collective body, senior members are readier to recognise the need for compromise and adjustment if work is to be done. Although competitive ambitions among members may be intense, prolonged debate over committee assignments would delay the conduct of legislative business which is already too long delayed by the employment of existing institutional and parliamentary devices.

*The Role of the Party Leaders.* The role of the party leaders in making committee assignments is difficult to define; no simple definition fits all the realities. Generally speaking, the leadership of each party in the House is formidable and independent to a great degree, though the leaders' power varies with their personal relations with the other members. David Truman explains the dependence of the rank-and-file upon the party leaders as follows:

> The machinery of the House and of its parties is normally available to the ordinary member only, so to speak, on its own terms, because the source of its strength is also the source of its disabilities, namely, numbers. In a House of 435 [now 437] or in a body roughly half that size, as one of the parties, there is a tendency . . . for the real and formal leadership closely to coincide. A formal, standardized system of communication and control is indispensable to the conduct of affairs in a body of that size. . . . This standardization of the communication structure implies that initiative tends to be centralized or at least that there are central controls on the flow of business. These the rank-and-file member cannot command or, as sometimes happens in the Senate, supplant. Hence, excepting some aspects of his own voting decisions, the independence of the ordinary member is restricted.[4]

The Democratic and Republican leaders not only play the principal role in the selection of the members of their respective committees-on-committees, but their personal judgments also tend to become the norm for major committee assignments. In practice, the leadership of both parties is directly involved in assignments to all the major committees, though the leaders do not usually concern themselves with applicants to lesser ones.

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[4] *The Congressional Party: A Case Study* (New York, 1959), p. 195.

The party leaders use their power over committee assignments variously, to reward members who have been loyal and cooperative, and to reinforce the strength of their own positions by rewarding members whose loyalty may be suspected but whose strength may no longer be safely disregarded. Party leaders working with the committee-on-committees have in a number of instances offered important committee positions to members with demonstrated followings who were regarded as prospective threats. Such offers are made for the obvious purpose of securing cooperation, and so are frequently labelled as "sell-outs" or "the buying-off process" by some discontented members. Value judgments on particular cases will vary with individual viewpoints, but it must be recognised that Congress is not the only place where adjustments in the power structure are designed to accommodate or to absorb potentially strong rivals.

A specific example may be offered from the 86th Congress. Prior to the opening of the first session a group of liberal Democrats announced their intention to mobilize forces in the House in order to bring about the passage of legislation they favored. While the movement was underway—letters were being sent to the new Democratic members, as well as to incumbents sympathetic to their cause—Speaker Rayburn intervened, promising to use his influence to prevent the Rules Committee from blocking their bills. The Speaker, working with Chairman Wilbur Mills of the Ways and Means Committee and Majority Leader John McCormack, in order to demonstrate his willingness to cooperate with the group, offered one of their leaders, Lee Metcalf of Montana, an appointment to the Ways and Means Committee. Contrary to expectations, Metcalf said he did not want the assignment; he contended that he preferred to be on Interior and Insular Affairs—important for Montana. The leaders insisted, however, that he had a responsibility to his party to accept the post, and he finally did. Metcalf was the logical choice in a move to head off a possible revolt, because his previous behavior had satisfied the party leaders that he was a "responsible" legislator—a concept that warrants further examination presently.

## II. CRITERIA FOR COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS

The committees-on-committees have rules to govern them in assigning members to the twenty permanent standing committees. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 limited members of the House to service on a single committee, but this provision has since been amended as follows: (1) Three committees are *exclusive*—namely, Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means. A member who serves on any of these can serve on no other committee. (2) Ten committees are *semi-exclusive;* members may serve on any one of them and any one of the seven non-exclusive committees. The ten are: Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking and Currency, Education and Labor, Foreign Affairs, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Judiciary, Post Office and Civil Service, Public Works, and Science and Astronautics. (3) Seven committees are *non-exclusive.* A member may serve on any two of these seven, or any one of them and any one of the ten semi-exclusive committees. The seven are: District of Columbia, Government Operations, House Administration, Interior and Insular Affairs, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Un-American Activities, and Veterans Affairs.

The 1946 Act also fixes the total membership of each committee, although changes can be and are made for the duration of a Congress by means of a House resolution. Party ratios on the Rules and Ways and Means committees are fixed by agreement among the party leaders, while the ratios on other committees ordinarily reflect the House division.[5]

Beyond these ground rules, experience has developed other criteria used in determining committee assignments. In discussing them here, the exclusive committees are treated separately first, because of the special attention given to filling vacancies on them. I will then turn to the variables that affect assignments to all of the committees.

*Assignments to Major Committees.* The three exclusive committees, Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means are regarded by all in both parties as being of special importance. Other committees—among them Agriculture, Armed Services, and Public Works—deal with issues that affect vital congressional and national interests, but none can lay continuous claim to the power and prestige of the top three. As one Congressman stated, "If you get appointed to one of the top three, you have 'arrived.' "

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[5] In the 87th Congress a serious conflict arose over the Rules Committee ratio. There was newspaper talk of "purging" two ranking Democratic members, Colmer and Whitten, both from Mississippi, who had supported the Dixiecrat presidential candidacy of Mississippi's Governor Barnett in the 1960 campaign, and who regularly voted with Chairman Howard Smith in the coalition of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans that controlled the Rules Committee. But Speaker Rayburn, in order to break the "stranglehold" the coalition would have over the impending legislation of the Kennedy Administration, advocated instead an increase in the Committee's size. The conflict was resolved in Rayburn's favor by a narrow margin with the entire House participating in the vote. The subsequent appointments, however, were made along the lines suggested in this article.

Although the manner of attaining positions on these committees varies, each nominee must fit a bill of particulars. In practice, as indicated earlier, these lesser leaders are selected by the party leaders in consultation with the members of the committee-on-committees, rather than the other way around. A nominee's name may be first brought up by the party leaders, a committee member, or even by someone not involved in the mechanics, but whatever the technical circumstances surrounding the introduction of his name, if the nominee is assigned, he bears the party leaders' stamp of approval. This is true in both parties.

The principal factors involved in selecting members for a major committee may be grouped under three broad headings: (1) legislative responsibility, (2) type of district represented, and (3) geographical area represented.

(1) *Legislative responsibility.* The most crucial test is whether a candidate is a "responsible" legislator, as the leaders of both parties use that term. What does a member have to be or do—or avoid—in order to be regarded as a responsible legislator?

According to the party leaders and the members of the committees-on-committees, a responsible legislator is one whose ability, attitudes, and relationships with his colleagues serve to enhance the prestige and importance of the House of Representatives. He has a basic and fundamental respect for the legislative process and understands and appreciates its formal and informal rules. He has the respect of his fellow legislators, and particularly the respect of the party leaders. He does not attempt to manipulate every situation for his own personal advantage. In the consideration of issues, he is careful to protect the rights of others; he is careful to clear matters that require clearance; and he is especially careful about details. He understands the pressures on the members with whom he cannot always agree and avoids pushing an issue to the point where his opponents may suffer personal embarrassment. On specific issues, no matter how firm his convictions and no matter how great the pressures upon him, he demonstrates a willingness to compromise. He is moderate, not so much in the sense of his voting record and his personal ideology, but rather in the sense of a moderate approach; he is not to be found on the uncompromising extremes of the political spectrum. Although the notions of those interviewed were somewhat vague on this point, a responsible legislator is apparently one who does not believe that the Congress is the proper place to initiate drastic and rapid changes in the direction of public policy. On the contrary, he is more inclined to be a gradualist, and to see public policy as a sort of "synthesis of opposing viewpoints." In short, a responsible legislator is politically pliant, but not without conviction.

A legislator can demonstrate his responsibility in many ways: how he manages a major bill; what he contributes in committee work; the sort of testimony he presents before other committees; the nature of his remarks on the floor—all these are tests of his responsibility. If he behaves properly in these settings and refrains from criticizing the party leadership—and gets reelected at home—his chances of being selected for a major committee post are very good. In the interviews, both Democrats and Republicans emphasized repeatedly the attention paid to the past performance of major committee applicants. For the major committees are "closed corporations," and their membership is composed only of those who have served their "apprenticeships" on lesser committees for considerable periods of time. Even in an instance in which party leaders feel compelled to appoint a member of a dissident wing of the party in order to gain greater cooperation, they will tend to select the member who most closely conforms to the norms of responsibility.

When the question was raised how Southern Democrats, who might be regarded as uncompromising on many questions, yet were appointed to major committees, the interviewees immediately pointed out how the Southerners differ from many of their "uncompromising" northern colleagues: they never denounce the legislative process as ill suited for public policy formation, they are never frustrated by its intricacies; rather, they master its techniques and use them skillfully and artfully to support their positions. "After all," one Congressman commented,

> the Southerner usually joins this body free from the pressures many of the rest of us face and is usually eager to make his mark. Membership in Congress is the highest political office he is likely to attain and he will devote full time to the

legislature. Other members often entertain higher political ambitions or may have to devote the majority of their time to keeping things running smoothly in their districts.

(2) *Type of District Represented.* It would be rare indeed for a member to earn regard as "responsible" in only one or two terms. No freshman has been assigned to the Rules Committee since the Legislative Reorganization Act was passed and only 14 have been assigned to the larger Appropriations Committee and two to the Ways and Means Committee (Table III). So the concept of responsibility is connected with an element beyond the member's personality, an element that takes into account the nature of his district. The members of the committees-on-committees have something more in mind here than simply a particular member's ability to be reelected. Long tenure by itself is an obvious objective fact, and common sense proof that a district is "safe"; but this is not enough. It is not necessarily to the point either that the member's district may be safe for the incumbent but not for any one else. The essence of the criterion lies in the terms on which the member is returned rather than in the fact of his return alone. The committee-on-committees wants to feel that his district will not only reelect him but also allow him to operate as a free agent, enabling him to make controversial decisions on major policy questions without constant fear of reprisals at the polls. His district must not be one that forces him to take definite, uncompromising positions, for this would jeopardize his usefulness in committee work. In the terminology of Eulau, Wahlke *et al.*, the district should be one that elects its member as a "trustee" or a "politico" and not as a "delegate."[6] This requirement is of special importance in considering assignments to the Rules Committee; many members would not relish being on this committee despite its power, simply because it is inevitably involved in practically every issue before the Congress.

A related reason for the "safe" district requirement is based on the idea that important committee posts should belong to the professional, the veteran politician who has earned his way up the ladder—the "politico" in preference to the "trustee." A politician from a safe district has fought and won enough political battles to nail down a district and thus help his party maintain control of the House. In short, he is a sure vote in the battle for control and he should receive the rewards of the system.

TABLE III. COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS TO FRESHMEN, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 80TH–86TH CONGRESSES

| Committee | Number of Freshman Assignments | |
|---|---|---|
| | Repub. | Dem. |
| Exclusive Committees: | | |
| Appropriations | 8 | 6 |
| Rules | 0 | 0 |
| Ways and Means | 2 | 0 |
| Semi-Exclusive Committees: | | |
| Agriculture | 13 | 11 |
| Armed Services | 1 | 11 |
| Banking and Currency | 15 | 20 |
| Education and Labor | 17 | 27 |
| Foreign Affairs | 4 | 10 |
| Interstate & Foreign Commerce | 8 | 10 |
| Judiciary | 15 | 14 |
| Post Office & Civil Service* | 22 | 35 |
| Public Works | 20 | 20 |
| Science & Astronautics† | 0 | 8 |
| Non-Exclusive Committees | | |
| District of Columbia | 13 | 8 |
| Government Operations | 24 | 26 |
| House Administration | 11 | 19 |
| Interior & Insular Affairs | 17 | 28 |
| Merchant Marine & Fisheries | 24 | 26 |
| Un-American Activities | 6 | 1 |
| Veterans' Affairs | 33 | 30 |
| Totals | 253 | 310 |

* Reams of Ohio, Independent, assigned to Post Office and Civil Service in 82d Congress.

† Created by 86th Congress.

Data from *Congressional Directory*, 1st Session of each Congress. Includes only Representatives with *no* previous service at any time. Some Representatives received double assignments, so totals shown are higher than the total of freshmen in each Congress.

Members of the committees-on-committees felt no compulsion to explain away or camouflage this requirement. On the contrary, they argue that a realistic appraisal of the factors operating in our political system reveals that if a member sits on a congressional committee in which compromises must continually be made on matters of major policy, he cannot come from a district that does not allow him flexibility.

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[6] "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (Sept. 1959), pp. 742–756.

(3) *Geographical Area.* A legislator who is responsible and who comes from a district that allows him considerable independence on issues still has no guarantee that he will be selected to fill a major committee vacancy. He simply has a better chance than others. A third factor serves to narrow the range of choice. For both party committees tend to follow the practice of selecting a member from the same state party delegation as the member who vacated the seat, in order not to disturb the existing geographical balance. For example, upon the death or defeat of three members of the Ways and Means Committee, the Kentucky, Michigan, and Pennsylvania Democratic delegations asserted a prescriptive right to have members from their respective delegations chosen to fill the vacancies. Moreover, this practice sometimes extends to other committees. The Ohio Republican delegation, for example, insists that it should have one of its members on the Public Works Committee at all times.

Along this line, each party attempts to have every section of the nation represented on the Appropriations and Ways and Means committees. These are the only two committees, however, on which geographical balance is regarded as especially important. Actually the only geographical rule applied to all committee assignments provides that no state party delegation shall have more than one representative on any committee, except for the largest state delegations where strict application of the rule would be impossible.

*General Criteria for All Committee Assignments.* The most important single factor in distributing assignments to all other committees is whether a particular place will help to insure the reelection of the member in question. So although it might abstractly seem desirable and logical to place an urban congressman on the Agriculture Committee to protect consumer interests, there is little operative political warrant for such an assignment. Not only do congressmen from urban areas usually refrain from applying for such vacancies when they occur, but the committees-on-committees also insist that members coming from predominantly agricultural areas have first call on them in order that they may use the assignments to protect their tenure in office. Both parties take it for granted that wheat, cotton and tobacco areas should have the majority of representation on the committee. The leaders know that assignment of an urban congressman to the Agriculture Committee would only make him "fair game" for each of the farm lobbies.

The same general reasoning applies to other committees as well. Assignments to Public Works, Interior and Insular Affairs or Merchant Marine and Fisheries are usually based on the ecological make-up of the members' districts, so as to allow them to serve their constituent interests and protect their incumbency. For example, South Dakota Democrat George McGovern's application for transfer to the Agriculture Committee from the Education and Labor Committee was approved primarily on the grounds that his former assignment handicapped his effectiveness in providing service to his constituents and was a disadvantage to him since it had become a major campaign issue in his farm district.

When two or more members stake a claim to the same assignment, on the ground that it is essential to their electoral success, both party committees usually, if not invariably, will give preference to the member with longer service. Members have often maneuvered for a position on a particular committee long before a vacancy existed, and sometimes even long before other applicants were first elected. But open importunity may be self-defeating, for no one likes a pest.

*Some Special Cases.* The assignment of members to the Education and Labor Committee—with jurisdiction over the explosive issues of school aid, segregation and labor-management relations—has called for the most careful attention to the constituencies of applicants. As the party committees have seen it in recent years, this assignment is no place for a neutral when there are so many belligerents around. Their assignments have produced a standoff between antagonists,[7] and a suggestion during the 86th Congress, dropped in the end, for a partition of the Committee as an alternative to the prospective accession of Adam Clayton Powell of New York to its chairmanship upon the retirement of Graham Barden of North Carolina. Apart from the Southerners and a handful of others from districts safe enough to allow them comfortable independence, Democrats have felt that only members who can afford politically to take an outright pro-labor position—*i.e.*, who get union support for election—should be assigned to this committee.

Members from farm or middle-class suburban districts are discouraged from applying. Service on this committee by a member whose district is relatively free of labor-management or segregation conflicts would only result in raising issues in his district that could prove embarrassing and even politically fatal to the member.

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[7] *Cf.* Seymour Scher, "Congressional Committee Members as Independent Agency Overseers: A Case Study," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (Dec. 1960), pp. 911–920.

Republicans appear to have concluded, too, that it is impossible to take a moderate position on labor-management issues. They also dissuade members from applying for this committee when it might impair their chances for reelection. Republican assignees, however, are more likely to take a pro-management or nonlabor view for the obvious reason that fewer Republicans receive overt political support from organized labor; more have close ties with management groups.

For the Democratic Committee-on-committees, a special issue affects assignments to what has been commonly described as an unimportant committee, the District of Columbia Committee. Southern legislators attach a great deal of importance to their efforts to maintain representation on that committee and to control it. The objective is to block home rule for the District, with all the implications of extensive Negro participation in District political affairs.

More generally, southern congressmen have a more or less collective understanding that in order to maximize their influence on the legislative process they need to spread their strength over all the committees. This involves maneuvering for positions on the "housekeeping" committees. Although *a priori* calculations might seem to argue that dispersing members over twenty committees would weaken rather than strengthen southern control of the House, in actual practice the seniority rule vindicates their strategy. Collectively, congressmen from the South build up more seniority than any other sectional contingent and reap their rewards in committee and sub-committee chairmanships when the Democrats are in the majority.

*Organized Interest Group Participation.* All members of the committees-on-committees recognized that organized groups outside Congress take a hand in the assignment process from time to time. The influence of such groups is thought to be important, but little evidence is available on its nature and extent. Sometimes, though not often, organized groups formally endorse a nominee for a committee vacancy. For example, Representative Harold B. McSween (Dem., La.), when applying for assignment to the Agriculture Committee, had letters of endorsement from American Farm Bureau representatives placed in his application file. Democrats attempt to placate organized labor by placing pro-labor representatives on the Education and Labor Committee, while Republicans attempt to satisfy the National Association of Manufacturers by appointing pro-business members to the same Committee. The most widely publicized groups connected with assignments to the Ways and Means committee are spokesmen for the oil interests. Democratic members and staff personnel frequently mentioned in interviews that a nominee's acceptability for assignment to this committee often hinged on whether he demonstrated a willingness to oppose any attempts to reduce the oil depletion tax allowance.

Nevertheless, organized groups, with occasional exceptions, appear to refrain from direct intervention in committee assignments; overt intrusion is apt to be resented and so be self-defeating. Rather, they have certain "expectations" about the type of person who should be selected for the vacancies on committees which affect their interests. Each group usually counts several members "friendly" or responsive to their needs. Organized interests do not often concern themselves too much with the selection of a particular member of the "friendly" group so long as one of them is eventually chosen.

*Other Considerations.* The proposition is sometimes advanced that geographical balance is a deliberate objective in distributing assignments to all committees. If so, it has a low priority. There is no evidence of systematic effort to provide each section with representation on the various committees proportional to its representation in the House. The Appropriations and Ways and Means committees may be considered as exceptions, but even here a much more pressing consideration is representation for the large tax-paying states. An examination of the membership of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee clearly shows that geographical balance is not necessarily a primary goal for all committees. Of the 19 Democratic members of this committee in the 86th Congress, 17 were from districts west of the Mississippi, and of the twelve Republican members six were from western states. Both committees-on-committees will, indeed, listen sympathetically to an applicant who argues that his section of the nation has no representation on the committee of his choice, but this argument is not a compelling reason for making the assignment. Ordinarily, applications are based on district and state delegation, not regional, considerations. Republican New Englanders, for instance, do not approach committee assignments from the viewpoint that each committee should have a New Englander on it. A notable exception to this generalization sets the Southern Democrats apart; as stated earlier, they regularly try to have Southern representation on all committees.

Party factionalism is a more serious concern than geographical balance. Republicans and Democrats alike, who were responsible for making committee assignments, vigorously denied the existence of factions within their parties; but readily admitted that their respective groups harbored members with widely divergent viewpoints. Occasional alignments emerge, they acknowledged, but these are regarded as fleeting in character. They asserted that no committee's party representation should be composed exclusively of members who view political issues from the same perspective and claimed to have made a reasonable effort to see that divergent viewpoints within each party find expression on each committee. We have already noted, however, that members on the extremes of the political spectrum are usually passed over for vacancies on the major committees; and a member's location on the spectrum is assessed by the party leadership and the committee-on-committees. It is a matter of opinion, therefore, how well founded is the frequent claim that party representation on each committee is balanced ideologically.

Unfavorable assignments, of little political value to the recipients, are sometimes deliberately given by the powers that be as a mark of disapproval, or for reasons that might be described as "for the good of the order." In one recent instance Dale Alford, Democrat from Arkansas, was said to have been assigned to the Post Office and Civil Service Committee because some members of the Committee-on-committees felt that he had violated the "rules of the game" in his campaign that displaced former Representative Brooks Hays, a widely respected member, in the wake of the Little Rock controversy. Also, there was surprising agreement among those interviewed that the Democratic transfers to the newly created Science and Astronautics Committee—not taken seriously in the House—were made in order to provide the transferees with sinecures, and so to remove some of the less qualified members from the other committees. The transfer offers were made attractive to senior members by promises that they would receive subcommittee chairmanships, which would provide them opportunities to build their niches within the legislative bureaucracy.

The professional background of an individual legislator is seldom in and of itself the controlling factor in his assignment. However, some general rules relating to the professional backgrounds of legislators are followed by both parties. Almost without exception, lawyers only are appointed to the Judiciary Committee. Members with outstanding experience in international relations or with extensive military service are regarded as excellent choices for the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services committees respectively. Other things being equal, former bankers and financiers may be given a slight edge over competing applicants for such committees as Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Banking and Currency. The same holds true for farmers who apply for the Agriculture Committee and for members closely identified with the labor movement who apply for the Education and Labor Committee. But all agreed that holding elective office, particularly a state legislative office, outweighed any other type of professional experience as a qualification for any committee assignment. Holding elective office is regarded as a profession by members of the committees, and they feel that the rewards of the system should go to the professionals. Although the patterns of committee assignments tend to document the importance of professional background, it would be a mistake to assume that the committees-on-committees seek out applicants on this ground. Normally, the reverse is true. Applicants tend to apply for assignments where they think their professional skills can be used to best advantage.

The manner in which a congressman campaigns for a committee is an important factor in the outcome. For example, a member seeking an assignment often solicits the support of members already on the committee. Another technique is to obtain the support of influential political leaders, such as endorsements from the governor, senators, or members of the state legislature. If an individual is comparatively unknown in national politics, he may attempt to familiarize the members of the Committee-on-committees with his background and training as it relates to the type of service he can give on the committee he desires. All these tactics, properly employed, can go a long way toward helping a member get favorable consideration by his party. He must be careful, however, to avoid giving the impression of exerting undue political pressure on the members of the Committee-on-committees. For example, if the committee tells him that a vacancy has already been promised to another, he is *expected* to accept this decision. Attempts to challenge either committee's decisions are generally regarded as serious departures from the norms of conduct in the House.

Religious considerations are not ignored in judging the qualifications of applicants. Most Democratic members interviewed conceded that it was important, when possible, to have at least one Roman Catholic on the major committees, and particularly on the Ways and Means and Education and Labor Committees. Republicans, on the other hand, contended that religious factors had no bearing on their assignments.

Racial and ethnic factors also enter into the calculations occasionally. For example, the Democratic committee-on-committees thought it made sense to appoint Charles Diggs, Democrat and Negro from the 13th District in Michigan, to the House Foreign Affairs Committee because of his race and because of the emerging prominence of Africa in international affairs. In his letter of application to the Committee, Diggs argued on these grounds. Republicans denied considering racial factors as they denied the relevance of religion.

Finally, a few committee assignments are made virtually at random. Usually a handful of lesser places are left over after the committees-on-committees have argued and settled all the applications. These may be handed out more or less indiscriminately to freshman members. At least two circumstances contribute to this result. One occurs when members fail to make their preferences known or to attract any advance support for their applications. This may stem simply from a freshman member's innocence of the process, or, as in the case of the Connecticut Democratic delegation, from the absence of any senior spokesman in their behalf. A second arises when the committee-on-committees members, along with the party leadership, have too many prior commitments to give serious consideration to each applicant's stated preference. These commitments may extend to members who are obviously less qualified than those who were passed over.

### III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Committee assignments in the House of Representatives involve all the complexities of an organization whose members "are not automatons but reasoning men and women acting in a setting in which they are subject to a bewildering barrage of conflicting or, at the least, inconsistent, demands—from within their constituencies. . . . "[8] Caution is consequently in order in formulating generalizations to describe the assignment process. In this study I have not tried to go beyond an assessment of the factors taken into account at the time the assignments were made, by those who made them. Whether the behavior, then or later, of those who were assigned is consistent with the reasons given for the assignments, or vindicated expectations expressed, is outside the scope of my endeavor.

From the data, several conclusions can be advanced as hypotheses for future studies:

(1) Despite some important differences in the formal structure, both the Democratic and Republican committee assignments are handled by small groups composed of senior members appointed and greatly influenced by the party leaders.

(2) Party leaders, working in conjunction with their committees-on-committees, use assignments to major committees to bargain with the leaders of party groups or factions, in order to preserve and fortify their leadership positions and conciliate potential rivals, as well as to reward members who have cooperated.

(3) Assignment to the major committees is restricted, with some exceptions, to members who have served two or more terms, who are "responsible" legislators, and who represent districts which do not require them to take inflexible positions on controversial issues.

(4) Although a number of factors enter into committee assignments—geography, group support, professional background, etc.—the most important single consideration—unless it can be taken for granted—is to provide each member with an assignment that will help to insure his re-election. Stated differently, the most impressive argument in any applicant's favor is that the assignment he seeks will give him an opportunity to provide the kind of service to his constituents that will sustain and attract voter interest and support. In distributing assignments the party acts as a mutual benefit and improvement society, and this for the obvious reason that control of the House depends on the re-election of party members.

(5) With minor differences, both parties apply the same criteria for making committee assignments. This does not necessarily imply that there are no differences between Republican and Democratic assignees. It does show that both parties tend to emphasize factors beyond the ideological commitments of the members, and that calculations of party advantage lead them both to substantially the same criteria.

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[8] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

# REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS: THE CASE OF THE HOUSE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE

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Students of American politics are told that our political system is fundamentally a *representative* democracy. Concepts of representation, since Burke, have commonly employed his distinction between action taken in response to instructions from constituents and action based on an independent appraisal of the national interest.[1] A very recent analysis has offered a refinement of this, by distinguishing three types: "delegate," "trustee" and "politico."[2] Theory and history alike tell us, however, that a representative does not invariably act in only one of these roles. There have been a number of empirical studies of representatives, few of which concentrate on specific policy fields;[3] and studies also of the play of interests in the enactment of specific legislation, but without a systematic account of the legislative committee members involved, acting in their representative capacities as they saw them. How then can we tell when to expect a representative to view his role in one way rather than another? The aim of this article is to shed a little light on some aspects of this broad question by means of a case study.

The subjects of the study were the members of the House Agriculture Committee and their action on the omnibus farm legislation (H. R. 12954 and S. 4071) in 1958 (85th Congress, second session).[4] Most of the data were obtained from interviews[5] with thirty of the thirty-four Committee members but, in addition, the specific stands of members in subcommittees, the full committee, and on the House floor were traced, through the printed hearings and the *Congressional Record* of floor debates. Finally, other interested and knowledgeable people were interviewed, newspaper accounts were studied, and the characteristics of constituencies were examined.

For analytical purposes the most useful concept I developed, to account for the behavior of a representative, was one I shall call his "policy constituency". This may be defined as those interests within his geographical or legal constituency which he perceives to be affected by the policy under consideration. When he regards these interests as actively and homogeneously concerned, they are ordinarily suf-

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[1] Some of the most useful studies of representation are: Charles Beard and J. D. Lewis, "Representative Government in Evolution," this REVIEW, Vol. 26 (April, 1932), pp. 223–40; Francis M. Carney, "Concepts of Political Representation in the United States Today," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles 1956; Alfred de Grazia, *Public and Republic* (New York, 1951); John A. Fairlie, "The Nature of Political Representation," this REVIEW, Vol. 34 (April and June, 1940), pp. 236–48 and 456–66; H. F. Gosnell, *Democracy, The Threshold of Freedom* (New York, 1948); James Hogan, *Election and Representation* (Oxford, 1945). For an extended bibliography see Charles O. Jones, "The Relationship of Congressional Committee Action to a Theory of Representation," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1960, pp. 413–28, from which materials for this article were drawn.

[2] Heinz Eulau *et al*, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (Sept., 1959), pp. 742–756.

[3] Two studies which do concentrate on specific policies are: Lewis Dexter, "The Representative and His District," *Human Organization*, Vol. 16 (Spring, 1957), 2–13; and L. E. Gleeck, "96 Congressmen Make up Their Minds," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 4 (March, 1940), 3–24.

[4] I selected a committee which is more likely than most to be constituency-oriented. Commonly, representatives from farm areas are anxious to get on this committee to represent their constituency interests, though interviews with Republican members indicate that this generalization would now need modification since recent farm policies have not been notably successful. See the accompanying article by Nicholas A. Masters, "House Committee Assignments," in this issue of the REVIEW, above, pp. 345–357.

[5] Focused interviews were conducted in March, 1959. An interview guide was followed but it was kept flexible. I wrote as the respondents discussed the questions and typed the responses immediately after the interview. All respondents were guaranteed anonymity.

ficient to determine his public stand. When he sees them as weak, indifferent or divided, other factors come into play. But he is affected too by the nature of the committee institution within which the policy is being formed.

## I. THE HOUSE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE AND ITS WORK

*Organization.* In 1958 a Republican President was again faced with a Democratic Congress in a congressional campaign year. The margin of control for Democrats in the House Agriculture Committee was a less-than-comfortable four votes; the split was 19 to 15. The margin in subcommittees was one vote in most cases.

Harold D. Cooley (D-North Carolina) was chairman in 1958, as he had been in every Democratic Congress since 1949. Members did not class him among the strong House committee chairmen, but respected him as fair and honest. W. R. Poage (D-Texas) was vice-chairman. The Agriculture Committee was the only House committee in 1958 to have a vice-chairman and one member suggested that this was due to the chairman's complete and admitted willingness to share the responsibility of leadership with the very forceful, knowledgeable, and capable "Bob" Poage.

The ranking minority member in 1958 was William S. Hill (R-Colorado). Like Cooley, he was not considered a strong leader and it became apparent that Charles Hoeven (R-Iowa) was recognized as the spokesman of the minority viewpoint. Hoeven has since become the ranking minority member.

The principal work units in the House Agriculture Committee are the subcommittees. In 1958 there were 18 subcommittees of two kinds—ten commodity subcommittees and eight special-action subcommittees. The former are more important since they consider legislation designed to solve the many crises for specific commodities. Usually a member is assigned to at least one commodity subcommittee of his choice. The chairman consults the ranking minority leader but has the last word on appointments. Actually few decisions have to be made, since most commodity subcommittees are permanent and their membership is continuing; only the new members need assignments. The size of subcommittees varies considerably (from 12 for tobacco to five for rice), giving the chairman some flexibility in case several members are interested in one commodity.

Finally, the House Agriculture Committee has been able to rely on a small expert staff consisting of a counsel, research director, majority and minority clerks, and five staff assistants.

*Representing Agriculture.* As might be expected, congressmen from constituencies with significant interests in farm policy make up the membership of the House Agriculture Committee. In 1958 there was but one exception to this rule—Victor Anfuso, Democrat from Brooklyn. Thirteen of the 19 Democrats came from areas where tobacco, cotton, peanuts, and rice are the principal commodities. Republican Committee members came from areas producing corn, hogs, small grain, wheat, and areas where the farming is diversified. Table I shows the geographical distribution of members.

Committee members may be classified by commodities of greatest interest to their constituencies, as in Table II. Commodities receiving price supports are grown in the constituencies of members of all six groups there listed. The *basic* commodities, so labeled by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, are corn, cotton, tobacco, rice, wheat, and peanuts; price supports have been mandatory for them. An increasing number of *non-basics* have also received price supports, *e.g.*, milk and wool. The "diversified" (mainly non-basics) group often find their interests conflicting with those of representatives in the other groups. They complain that their farmers are at a disadvantage since their non-basics either do not receive price supports or receive less support than the basics; the price supports for the few basics grown do not make up for the deprivation of profits attributable to acreage and marketing

TABLE I. GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION ON THE HOUSE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE*

| Land-Use Area | Democrats | Republicans | Totals |
|---|---|---|---|
| Northeast | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Appalachian | 5 | — | 5 |
| Southeast | 3 | — | 3 |
| Mississippi Delta | 2 | — | 2 |
| Southern Plains | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Corn Belt | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| Lake States | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Northern Plains | — | 3 | 3 |
| Mountain | — | 2 | 2 |
| Pacific | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Totals | 19 | 15 | 34 |

* Based on the areas presented in Bureau of Census and Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, *Land Utilization, A Graphic Summary, 1950* (December, 1952), p. 5.

TABLE II. COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES' COMMODITIES*

1. *Corn and Livestock*
    - Harrison (R-Nebraska)
    - Harvey (R-Indiana)
    - Hill (R-Colorado)†
    - Hoeven (R-Iowa)
    - Polk (D-Ohio)
    - Simpson (R-Illinois)†
2. *Cotton and Rice*
    - Abernethy (D-Mississippi)
    - Albert (D-Oklahoma)
    - Gathings (D-Arkansas)
    - Grant (D-Alabama)
    - Jones (D-Missouri)
    - Poage (D-Texas)
    - Thompson (D-Texas)
3. *Dairy, Livestock, Small Grains*
    - Johnson (D-Wisconsin)
    - Knutson (D-Minnesota)
    - Quie (R-Minnesota)
    - Tewes (R-Wisconsin)
    - Williams (R-New York)†
4. *Diversified* (non-basics)
    - Anfuso (D-New York)
    - Dague (R-Pennsylvania)
    - Dixon (R-Utah)
    - Hagen (D-California)
    - McIntire (R-Maine)
    - Teague (R-California)
5. *Tobacco*
    - Abbitt (D-Virginia)
    - Bass (D-Tennessee)
    - Cooley (D-North Carolina)
    - Jennings (D-Virginia)
    - McMillan (D-South Carolina)
    - Matthews (D-Florida)
    - Watts (D-Kentucky)
6. *Wheat*
    - Belcher (R-Oklahoma)
    - Krueger (R-North Dakota)†
    - Smith (R-Kansas)

* Members were classified on the basis of their constituencies' principal commodities, as listed in the *Census of Agriculture*, Vol. I, 1956, and interviews with the members.

† These members were not interviewed. Simpson, Williams and Krueger clearly belong to the groups to which they have been assigned. Hill might also have been included in the wheat group.

controls (the complaint of California cotton farmers); and they must pay higher prices for the basics as well as pay higher taxes.

Almost without exception the six groups show an alignment between commodity interests and party allegiance. The corn and livestock group has five Republicans and one Democrat; the cotton and rice group, seven Democrats; the dairy, livestock, small grains group, two Democrats and three Republicans; the diversified group, four Republicans and two Democrats; the tobacco group, seven Democrats; and the wheat group, three or four Republicans.[6] Consequently, different commodities will ordinarily be favored when different parties are in control. For example, cotton, rice, and tobacco usually receive more attention when the Democrats are a majority in the Committee.[7]

Committee organization has been strongly influenced by the commodity problems in agriculture. First, subcommittees are established to deal with currently critical commodity problems. Second, members are assigned to commodity subcommittees on the basis of their constituency interests. Table III shows the high correlation prevailing. Only one Democrat (Anfuso) was assigned to no commodity subcommittee representing producers in his constituency and he has no agricultural production at all in his Brooklyn district, though the poultry trade is important there.[8] Two Republicans (Harrison and Dixon) found themselves on subcommittees of little or no concern to their constituencies. Significantly both of these members were identified by other members as being supporters of Secretary Benson's recommendations.

Party considerations dictate that some mem-

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[6] Four, if Hill were also assigned to it. Anfuso is assigned to the diversified (non-basics) group because he does not fit elsewhere. The overlap between the corn and livestock, and the dairy, livestock, small grains group is explained by the fact that livestock production is important to both but corn is more important in one and dairy products in the other.

[7] Recent Democratic victories in the middle west have changed the pattern somewhat. There are more Democrats from corn, livestock, and dairy constituencies than previously.

[8] Anfuso almost monopolized the Committee hearings on the extension of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, since many New York City firms were testifying. His activity in these hearings provided unexpected evidence of constituency-representative relationships.

TABLE III. CONSTITUENCY INTERESTS AND COMMODITY SUBCOMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS*

| Member† | Major Agricultural Interests in Constituency | Commodity Subcommittees |
|---|---|---|
| *Democrats* | | |
| Poage | Cotton, Livestock, Peanuts | Cotton; Livestock & Feed Grains (C) |
| Grant | Cotton, Peanuts, Wood Products | Forests (C); Peanuts |
| Gathings | Cotton, Rice, Soybeans | Cotton (C); Rice; Soybeans-Oilseeds |
| McMillan | Cotton, Tobacco, Peanuts | Forests; Peanuts (C); Tobacco |
| Abernethy | Cotton | Cotton; Dairy Products (C); Soybeans-Oilseeds |
| Albert | Cotton, Livestock | Livestock and Feed Grains; Peanuts; Wheat (C) |
| Abbitt | Tobacco, Peanuts | Tobacco (C); Peanuts |
| Polk | Feed Grains, Livestock, Dairy | Dairy Products; Tobacco |
| Thompson | Rice, Cotton, Peanuts | Rice (C); Poultry-Eggs |
| Jones | Cotton, Livestock, Soybeans | Rice; Soybeans-Oilseeds (C); Wheat |
| Watts | Tobacco, Feed Grains, Seeds | Tobacco; Wheat |
| Hagen | Cotton, Alfalfa Seed, Potatoes, Fruit | Cotton; Soybeans-Oilseeds |
| Johnson | Dairy, Forests, Livestock | Dairy Products; Forests; Poultry-Eggs |
| Anfuso | None | Poultry-Eggs |
| Bass | Tobacco, Cotton | Tobacco; Wheat |
| Knutson | Wheat, Dairy, Feed Grains | Dairy Products |
| Jennings | Tobacco, Livestock | Livestock and Feed Grains; Tobacco; Wheat |
| Matthews | Tobacco, Peanuts, Vegetables | Livestock and Feed Grains; Tobacco |
| *Republicans* | | |
| Hoeven | Feed Grains, Livestock | Livestock and Feed Grains; Soybeans-Oilseeds |
| Simpson | Feed Grains, Livestock | Cotton; Livestock and Feed Grains; Soybeans-Oilseeds; Tobacco |
| Dague | Tobacco, Truck Farming, Poultry, Dairy | Tobacco; Wheat |
| Harvey | Feed Grains, Livestock | Livestock and Feed Grains; Soybeans-Oilseeds |
| Belcher | Wheat | Cotton; Peanuts; Wheat |
| McIntire | Forests, Poultry, Potatoes | Forests; Poultry-Eggs; Tobacco |
| Williams | Dairy, Truck Farming | Dairy Products; Rice |
| Harrison | Feed Grains, Livestock | Peanuts; Poultry-Eggs |
| Dixon | Wheat, Potatoes, Small Grain, Sugar Beets | Forests; Poultry-Eggs |
| Smith | Wheat | Peanuts; Wheat |
| Krueger | Wheat, Small Grains | Rice; Wheat |
| Teague | Vegetables, Fruit, Small Grains, Cotton | Cotton; Forests |
| Tewes | Dairy, Tobacco, Livestock | Dairy Products; Tobacco |
| Quie | Dairy, Feed Grains, Livestock | Dairy Products; Tobacco |

* The major interests were deduced from the *Census of Agriculture, 1954*, Vol. 1, 1956, and from interviews with members.

† Members listed according to committee rank. Chairman Cooley, whose principal interests were tobacco, cotton and poultry, and William Hill, whose principal interests were wheat, feed grains, and sugar beets, were *ex officio* members of all subcommittees by virtue of their positions as chairman and ranking minority member, respectively.

bers must be on subcommittees of no concern to their constituencies: there must be Republicans on the cotton subcommittee and Democrats on the wheat subcommittee. For the most part, members who have little interest in the proceedings are expected either to remain silent during hearings or not to attend.

*The Work of the Committee—1958.* In 1958 serious problems existed for cotton, rice, wheat, dairy products, and corn. These crises involved four of the six commodity groups shown in Table II, leaving the tobacco and diversified groups with little direct and positive interest in the legislation. The Committee decided to employ the "omnibus" procedure so as to get as much backing for the bill as possible. Apparently the leadership on both sides agreed to this, though some Republicans complained about such obvious "logrolling."

The work of the Committee proceeded according to plan with the cotton, dairy products, livestock and feed grains, and wheat subcommittees holding extensive hearings. The result was a 62-page bill (H. R. 12954) which included eight titles. In addition to titles designed to solve immediate crises, titles to extend certain popular programs were added so as to increase the bill's dubious chances of passage.[9]

The Committee voted on June 13 to report H. Res. 12954 favorably, but on June 25, the Rules Committee's motion to debate the bill (H. Res. 609) was lost in the House, thereby defeating the bill.[10] Shortly afterward, on June 27, the Senate passed its farm bill (S. 4071) and sent it to the House. The House Agriculture Committee amended S. 4071 to bring it into line with their previously defeated bill and reported it on August 4. On August 6, Chairman Cooley moved that the House suspend the rules and pass S. 4071 as amended. The motion received a simple majority, but not the two-thirds vote required for such a motion, and so S. 4071 was also defeated. The House Agriculture Committee made a final attempt to modify their amendments to S. 4071, and on August 14 Chairman Cooley once again moved that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill as amended. This time S. 4071 was accepted after a short debate by a voice vote, and on August 28 it was signed into law by the President. (P.L. 85–835)

In general, H. R. 12954 solved the cotton, rice, and feed grain problems to the satisfaction of Committee representatives from those areas and they were apparently willing to trade their support. Their modifications of S. 4071 were attempts to bring that bill closer to the provisions of H. R. 12954 for these commodities. The wheat and dairy titles in H. R. 12954 had little support outside the groups representing those interests. Though the Secretary of Agriculture and the American Farm Bureau Federation had objections to all titles in H. R. 12954, their most serious protests were directed against the dairy and wheat titles. Cotton and rice representatives were willing to drop these objectionable titles when the bill reached the House floor in order to save the sections of the bill they wanted most. Neither wheat nor dairy was included in S. 4071.[11]

TABLE IV. HOUSE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE VOTE ON HOUSE RESOLUTION 609*

| Democrats | | Republicans | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yea | Nay | Yea | Nay |
| Cooley | Hagen | Harvey | Hill |
| Poage | | Smith | Hoeven |
| Grant | | Quie | Simpson |
| Gathings | | | Dague |
| Abernethy | | | Belcher |
| Albert | | | Harrison |
| Abbitt | | | Dixon |
| Polk | | | Krueger |
| Thompson | | | Teague |
| Jones | | | Tewes |
| Watts | | | |
| Johnson | Not Voting or Paired | | Not Voting or Paired |
| Anfuso | | | |
| Bass | | | |
| Knutson | McMillan | | McIntire |
| Jennings | (paired for) | | (paired against) |
| Matthews | | | Williams |

Totals

| | Yea | Nay | Not Voting or Paired |
|---|---|---|---|
| Democrats | 18 | 1 | 1 |
| Republicans | 3 | 11 | 2 |
| Committee | 21 | 12 | 3 |

* Compiled from data in the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, pp. 392–3. Members are listed according to committee rank.

S. 4071 was more in line with the Secretary of Agriculture's recommendations for fewer controls and lower supports.[12] Its ultimate passage, even with the modifications to bring it closer to H. R. 12954, was generally conceded to have been a victory for the Eisenhower Administration.

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[9] The titles were: I—Foreign Trade; II—Rice; III—Cotton; IV—Wool; V—Wheat; VI—Milk; VII—Feed Grains; and VIII—Miscellaneous. Titles I and IV in particular were included because they were popular programs.

[10] The reported vote in Committee was 21–10. The House vote on H. Res. 609 was 171–214.

[11] The dairy situation illustrates the in-fighting. Evidently the cotton and rice Democrats were opposed to any dairy legislation. Hearings were held but only after long delays. The Secretary of Agriculture's objections to the "self-help" bill proposed by dairy representatives were given the spotlight of a full committee hearing rather than a less sensational subcommittee hearing. The title which resulted was developed at the last minute and had little support, even among the national dairy groups.

[12] See *The Congressional Digest*, Vol. 37 (March, 1958), pp. 75–7, for details of the Administration's recommendations.

### II. MEMBER DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

The vote on the rule to debate H. R. 12954 was split along party lines (Democrats for, Republicans against) with the major exception of urban Democrats. Of the 59 Democrats who indicated opposition (either by voting against, pairing against, or answering the *Congressional Quarterly* poll), 47 were from metropolitan or mid-urban districts. Several Committee members charged that the opponents of H. R. 12954 had tried to identify it as a "consumers' tax" bill in order to win the support of the urban representatives. The Committee vote, also split along party lines, is indicated in Table IV.

*Opinion of the Legislation.* Members were asked in interviews for their opinions of the legislation, both H.R. 12954 and S. 4071. Two conclusions emerged. First, there was little unqualified opinion in support of either bill. Of the 30 members interviewed in regard to H. R. 12954, three considered it good, five said that most of it was good, fifteen were equivocal (some sections good, some sections bad); and seven considered it poor. Of the 28 who were interviewed in regard to S. 4071, four labeled it good, eight thought it "mostly good", fourteen were equivocal, and only two considered it bad. Table V distributes the opinions by commodity group.

Several comments are appropriate. The commodity groups can be classified into the principal beneficiaries of H. R. 12954 (corn and livestock, cotton and rice) who enjoyed broad support; the champions of controversial titles who were also directly and positively affected (dairy, wheat); and the onlookers who were not involved or only indirectly affected (diversified, tobacco). Examined in this way the most favorable opinions were offered by those most affected: six of the eight "good" or "mostly good" responses came from representatives of the main beneficiaries. The middle category, concerned with controversial titles, tended to be suspicious of the bill. Both dairy and wheat members suggested that their titles would be sacrificed once the bill got to the floor.

Though it might be expected that Demo-

TABLE V. MEMBER OPINION OF THE LEGISLATION, BY COMMODITY GROUP*

| Commodity Interest | H. R. 12954 | | | | S. 4071 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Good | Mostly Good | Equivocal | Bad | Good | Mostly Good | Equivocal | Bad |
| Corn and Livestock | | | | | | | | |
| Democrats† | | | 1 | | | | | |
| Republicans | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | |
| Cotton and Rice | | | | | | | | |
| Democrats | 3 | 2 | 2 | | 1 | | 6 | |
| Dairy, Livestock, Small Grains | | | | | | | | |
| Democrats | | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| Republicans | | | | 2 | | 2 | | |
| Diversified | | | | | | | | |
| Democrats# | | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | |
| Republicans | | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |
| Tobacco | | | | | | | | |
| Democrats | | 1 | 6 | | | 1 | 6 | |
| Wheat | | | | | | | | |
| Republicans | | | | 2 | | 1 | 1 | |
| Totals | 3 | 5 | 15 | 7 | 4 | 8 | 14 | 2 |

* In answer to the question, "Did you consider H. R. 12954 (S. 4071) a good bill, a bad bill, something in between, or just what?"

† Polk not interviewed on S. 4071.

# Anfuso not interviewed on S. 4071.

cratic tobacco representatives would actively support a bill from a Democratic committee, they were equivocal about H. R. 12954. On the basis of such comments as, "Frankly, I didn't think it would help very much," indications were that the tobacco representatives did little more than vote for the rule to debate. Nothing in either bill was of primary concern to their constituencies.

The diversified group offered very little favorable comment on H. R. 12954 and only one of them, a Democrat, voted for the bill on the floor. Once again, the bill gave very little direct, positive benefit to the group's constituencies though, as will appear, it soon became evident that they did have a constituency interest in the bill.

Opinion on the second bill shows a party split. Though the Republicans had less direct constituency interest in the bill (except for the corn and livestock group which considered it "good" or "mostly good"), nine of eleven committee Republicans considered the bill "good" or "mostly good." The Democrats were more qualified, with many of the cotton and rice group stating, "It was the best we could get." The tobacco group was no more enthusiastic about S. 4071 than they had been about H. R. 12954. Republicans obviously considered this a better bill because it was not a clear-cut victory for Democratic commodities. Though Republican commodities had not fared too well, the Democrats were not able to write the legislation with a free hand. Republicans from diversified farming areas were much more satisfied with S. 4071 since it reduced controls and price supports.

Second, the members' opinions, not only of the bill as a whole but also of specific titles, were influenced by their constituencies' interests. When asked what they liked most and least about the bills, members whose constituencies were directly affected replied that they liked best those sections which were designed to solve commodity problems in their own constituencies. On H. R. 12954, four from the cotton and rice group mentioned those titles, one from corn and livestock, both members from wheat, and two from dairy. The same held true for S. 4071.

Members were reluctant to say what sections they liked least. Some spoke in general terms, mentioning the over-all cost, the politics involved, the issues not faced, etc. Only the dairy title drew much critical comment. Ten members (six Democrats and four Republicans) suggested that the dairy title was not good legislation and was harmful to the bill. The most numerous response for S. 4071 was that no sections were "least liked."

As a follow-up question, members were asked which sections had beneficial or adverse effects on their constituencies. Once again, the replies supported the conclusion. In discussing H. R. 12954 all groups directly affected by the bill mentioned most often, as being beneficial, those titles of greatest interest to their respective constituencies. The most frequent response from the two least affected groups (diversified, tobacco) was that no section was beneficial. For S. 4071, those most affected were the cotton and rice and corn and livestock members. They all mentioned the titles of interest to their constituencies as most beneficial. Other groups either chose some section which was of tangential importance or stated that none was beneficial. Hardly any member admitted that any sections adversely affected his constituency.

*Concepts of Representation.* Members were also asked to discuss what they relied on in their action on the first bill (H. R. 12954)—independent judgment, constituency wishes, a combination of factors, or something else. The results are summarized in the following conclusions.

First, a majority of members stated that in making up their minds they relied on independent judgment or a combination of factors (22 of 27 interviewed on this question). There was no important difference between Republicans and Democrats on this question. (See Table VI.)

Second, analysis by commodity groups reveals that those groups least positively affected by the legislation most often responded that they relied on "independent judgment." But the record shows that the diversified group did act to benefit constituency interests.

The members' replies must be weighed after taking into consideration both the importance of the legislation to their constituencies and the effect of their action for their constituencies. Of the ten who said that they followed independent judgment, four were from the tobacco group and three from the diversified. One other member from the diversified group said he supported his party in this instance but usually relied on independent judgment.

Despite these replies, two observations are pertinent: (a) all tobacco representatives who relied on independent judgment nevertheless voted in support of their party[13] and (b) the

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[13] Some tobacco representatives noted the importance of the wheat and feed grain titles for

TABLE VI. BASES ASSERTED FOR ACTION ON H. R. 12954*

| Commodity Groups | Independent Judgment | Constituency Wishes | Combination | Other (Party) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corn and Livestock† | | | | |
| Republicans | 1 | | 2 | |
| Cotton and Rice | | | | |
| Democrats | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Dairy, Livestock, Small Grains | | | | |
| Democrats | | | 2 | |
| Republicans | 1 | | 1 | |
| Diversified♯ | | | | |
| Democrats | 1 | | | |
| Republicans | 2 | | 1 | 1° |
| Tobacco** | | | | |
| Democrats | 4 | | 2 | |
| Wheat | | | | |
| Republicans | | 1 | 1 | |
| Totals | 10 | 3 | 12 | 2 |

* In answer to the question, "What did you rely on in your action on H. R. 12954—(1) independent judgment, (2) the wishes of your constituency, (3) perhaps a combination of these, or (4) something else?"

† Polk not included.

♯ Anfuso not included.

° Usually relied on independent judgment.

** Cooley not included.

voting action (against the bill) of the diversified group tended to favor the best interests of their farmers—as they themselves described these interests. As one member put it: "Benson is an asset to me. I agree with him and there is nothing political involved because his philosophy is good for my farmers." All of the diversified group who responded "independent judgment" indicated that a continued program of high supports and controls for *basic* commodities was bad for their farmers, who grow principally non-basics.

The other three members who mentioned independent judgment were from the corn and livestock group (an admitted Administration and American Farm Bureau Federation supporter—he thought their programs would be best for his constituency in the long run); the cotton and rice group (a generally inactive member who "didn't have too much information from my constituency"); and a dairy Republican who said, "I only had this chance to vote against the cotton deal."

Third, those groups most directly and positively affected by the legislation relied on a "combination" or on "constituency wishes." Replies of these members indicated they were well aware of the problems involved in representing *all* interests in their legal constituency on such a piece of legislation.

Nine of the twelve responses indicating a reliance on a combination of factors came from members whose constituency interests were directly affected by the legislation. Some of the most detailed analyses of the process of representation were offered by senior members who replied that representation on policy was not a simple choice between independent judgment on the one hand and constituency wishes on the other. Typical of the extended remarks are the following:

> I understand the problems of that area [his district]. I know what is best for the farm section. And I think that the majority in my area reflect my views.
>
> I am in close contact with them at all times. I meet with them, ask their opinions on all matters. I don't use polls. I know the people. I vote my convictions and hope that they [constituents] will follow these. They expect this—unless a real organized group is excited about something. They generally expect that you have more information than they do.
>
> I am sent here as a representative of 600,000 people. They are supposed to be voting on all the legislation. I try to follow my constituents—to ignore them would be a breach of trust—but I use my judgment often because they are misinformed. I know that they would vote as I do if they had the facts that I have. A lot of people expect you to use your judgment.
>
> Under our form of government you have to rely on a combination. If I know the views of the constituents I will vote these views—as a representative, I must—but when I don't know I substitute my best judgment. There is not one case in a hundred where I do know their views fully. I figure if they knew what I know . . . they would understand my vote. Most of us vote what we believe is sound, based on the information and our judgment. This can be changed if the people express themselves clearly enough. This, however, is improbable and doesn't happen very often.

Even the junior members in these groups had definite ideas about how their constituencies were affected:

> I thought that it was a good bill and then I

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their constituencies. They thought these might eventually affect their livestock farmers (using the slogan, "cheap feed means cheap livestock"). Many of their farmers relied on wheat as an alternative crop.

thought that I could go ahead in view of the referendum and support the bill. If there weren't a referendum [included in the bill], I would have checked [with the constituency] but I felt I could go ahead. On some legislation I hear from the people and rely on their judgment . . . [after probing for specifics]. On labor legislation I rely on groups in my area since I don't know too much about it.

I depend on a combination. I should educate them; they don't really care how you vote. I make up my mind and then temper it with what the people want. After all, I think as they do.

One member who relied on constituency wishes was frank in explaining his position:

> I vote for what I think will be the best economic interests of my people. Throughout the years I have gained an idea of what those best interests are. This is the way representative government should work.

Fourth, an analysis of members' extended discussions coupled with an examination of their interest and activity on the legislation reveals the importance of a concept of "constituency" in the action of members.

Those who purported to rely on independent judgment were of three types: members who had no commodities to represent on the legislation but opposed the bill—an action evidently in the best interests of their constituencies; members in the tobacco group who supported their party but had no direct interest in the legislation (though some expressed indirect interest); and members who had a constituency interest in the bill but said they relied on independent judgment in their actions, though this did not seem the case in fact.

Those relying on a combination of factors argued that defining constituency interests was no simple, straightforward interpretation. In their subcommittee work on the bill, however, these members—the most active of all who worked on the bill—evinced a shrewd conception of their constituencies' commodity interests.

Clearly, more evidence than the self-explained motivation for voting is relevant in appraising a representative's action and in interpreting his conception of representation: his work in subcommittee on acceptable compromises, *e.g.*, or his interrogation of witnesses in hearings, or his part in the Committee's executive sessions. The data gathered here from such successive stages of action as these tend to confirm Eulau's typology of "delegates," "trustees" and "politicos," and his suggestion that a representative might act in more than one of these roles.[14]

TABLE VII. METHODS FOR DETERMINING CONSTITUENCY WISHES*

| Method | Democrats† Mentioning | Republicans Mentioning | Totals |
|---|---|---|---|
| Just know it (live there, sense it) | 8 | 5 | 13 |
| Meetings | 6 | 3 | 9 |
| Correspondence | 4 | 3 | 7 |
| Questionnaire | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Newspaper | — | 2 | 2 |
| Testimony | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Advisory Committee (to advise on agricultural policy) | — | 1 | 1 |
| Telephone calls | — | 1 | 1 |
| Visitors | 1 | — | 1 |

* In answer to the questions, "How did you find out what your constituency wishes were on this bill?" and "Are there other ways you use to tap opinion and get information about your constituency's agricultural interests? What are these?"
† Does not include Cooley, Polk, or Anfuso.

*Knowing the Constituency.* In order to discover some of the relationships and means of communication between the representative and his constituency, members were asked how they knew their constituency wishes on H. R. 12954. Table VII summarizes the responses. The most important method, members said, was a type of individual "sounding-board" procedure. Some of those mentioning "intuition" or "sixth sense" observed that their own identity with the culture or mood of the district made it natural that they would know their neighbors' wishes. Responses which typified the members' analyses were:

> You are in a position to know, of course, on a lot of things. I live there—there are many things I just know. I don't have to ask anybody. There are very few bills where I have to guess. If I did, I wouldn't be here as the representative.
>
> I am a native of ———. I get letters—though I don't get very much mail. I have sent out questionnaires but I don't now. It is just the fact that I know and I can judge their needs.

Some of the members pointed out that they were farmers and reasoned that this gave them a special ability to know the needs of fellow farmers. Others indicated that their familiarity with the district through campaigns or frequent visits made it possible for them to know. Either way, they were identifying a "policy constituency."

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[14] Above, note 2.

Though such responses suggest that the representative has a concept of his constituency interests on legislation, there is still no reliable evidence as to how he develops it. But whether he gets it by divination, intuition or instruction, it appears to dominate his behavior as a representative where its outline is sharp.

### III. CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions suggested by this case study can be set forth somewhat more systematically as follows:

1. If a policy measure is seen to affect substantial interests in a representative's legal constituency, then he will rely on his perception of the interests affected (his "policy constituency") when he acts at the working level (usually the subcommittee) in regard to this measure.

A. Institutional arrangements affect his ability to represent his policy constituency. The House Agriculture Committee is organized to allow a maximum of constituency-oriented representation.

B. The representative has a "sense" of constituency interests drawn from first-hand experience in the "legal" constituency and this "sense" influences his perception of a policy constituency.

C. Party allegiance is an important modifying factor.

(1) The legislative majority party may demand a vote in support of its policies. The legislative minority party may demand a vote in opposition to the majority's policies. The Administration may press for support for its stands.

(2) Representatives, whether or not affected by the legislation, tend to support their party's position more as the action moves beyond the basic working level, and most at the final vote.

2. If a measure is seen to have little or no direct effect on interests in a representative's legal constituency, then he will tend more readily to look to his political party for a cue when he acts in regard to this measure.

A. The representative will tend the more to suggest that he relies on "independent judgment," the less his constituency's interests are seen to be directly or positively affected by a policy.

B. He will vote in support of his political party but will not actively support the policy in other ways if his constituency interests are not perceived to be affected.

A final comment suggests a further and more tentative generalization. In this case study it became necessary to reconcile actions of certain members who seemed motivated by different forces at different action points. Table IV shows that 11 Republicans voted or paired against the rule to debate H.R. 12954. Of these, seven were from constituencies which had a direct, positive interest in the legislation. Four of the seven were particularly active in effecting compromises in titles of major concern to their constituencies. They were apparently satisfied with the respective titles, yet had no difficulty in rationalizing opposition to the entire bill on the House floor. Further, while members of the diversified group apparently did little to obstruct the work on H.R. 12954 at the subcommittee level (thereby following an apparent norm for Agriculture Committee members), it nevertheless became obvious that some of them worked actively to defeat the bill on the House floor.[15]

An adequate concept of representation should account for a total action pattern, not merely a final vote. The representative on the House Agriculture Committee can view his composite role retrospectively as one in which he has taken several separate actions to make up a total pattern in regard to the omnibus farm legislation. He also can recognize that on different occasions he felt differing demands upon him in his several capacities, as a member of a party, a representative of a constituency, a member of a committee, of a Congress, of interest groups, etc. He was able to reconcile, compromise or avoid some of the inherent conflicts in these demands, at least in part, because of the multiple action points. Examples of such reconciliations in this case study justify a final hypothesis which merits separate study:

3. If a representative has a multiplicity of conflicting demands upon him in any series of actions on policy, he can satisfy many of them, over a period of of time, because of the multiplicity of action points at successive stages in the legislative process.

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[15] Minority party members are more likely to feel conflicting demands since the majority party's commodities will probably be favored. Some majority party members will find, however, that they are not as directly concerned with the legislation and so will be less actively involved at all stages of action.

# SEMINAR EXERCISE

## THE CHAIRMAN'S PROBLEM

Bertrand de Jouvenel
*Visiting, University of California (Berkeley)*

One of the major obstacles to the progress of political theory lies in the fact that people speak of rights without paying attention to the feasibility of their exercise. I propose to raise here some elementary problems relating to the right of speech. It is one of the basic tenets of our democratic political philosophy that all people (over a given age) have an equal right of speech. Making this right operational however gives rise to difficulties which have not been faced.

### I. THE CHAIRMAN'S PROBLEM

I shall start out with a very simple problem, which moreover has the advantage of evoking familiar pictures: this is the chairman's problem. I find myself chairman of an assembly, and regard all participants as formally equal, which commits me to treating them equally. Feeling bound by this principle, I decide as follows: the duration of the meeting is $m$, the number of participants $n$: I shall give the floor to each participant for a time $m/n$; thus the equal right of speech will receive practical application. Assume that the meeting is to be crowned by a vote (the time of actual voting not figuring in $m$): before the participants cast their equal votes, they will have had equal opportunities to influence the voting, *i.e.*, they shall have had, insofar as depends upon me, equal voices.

Now if $m$ the duration of the meeting (in speaking time) is three hours, and if $n$ the number of participants is 12, my procedure is susceptible of being applied: it grants the floor to each participant for a quarter of an hour. This is not a long time but still it may be enough.

But, keeping $m$ at three hours, let us set the value of $n$ at 5,400. Then, adhering to the same rule for the allocation of time, I shall give the floor to each participant for 2 seconds, which is absurd.

Aware of this absurdity, I shall have to scrap my rule. On what principles shall I then exercise my chairmanship? Assuming that I cannot stretch the duration of the discussion ($m$ is a datum), time is my scarce resource. How shall I divide it up? My ideal denominator, the number of participants, will not do. I shall then use as my denominator the minimum time (call it $k$) required to develop a meaningful argument. But the consequence thereof is immediately apparent: my number of speakers shall now be $s=m/k$; which means that it will be *indifferent to the number of participants* formally entitled to speak.

Let us leave $m$ at three hours and set $k$ at a quarter of an hour: then I shall have a maximum of twelve speakers no matter how great the assembly. Which means that the greater the assembly, the greater the proportion of those who are denied in fact the right granted to them in principle. In an assembly of 48, three out of four will be denied the effective exercise of their formal right. In an assembly of 5,400 no less than 449 out of 450 will be denied in practice their theoretical right.

I had a reason for using a figure in the five-thousand range. In that range, according to historians,[1] stood the number of the Athenian citizens, who, on the most important occasions, responded[2] to the calling of the popular assembly in the days when it was the sovereign decision-making body of the City. We are told that this body met from sunrise to sundown; call it twelve hours. But all the speeches which have come down to us suggest that the time taken by an individual orator was at least one hour. Thus, at the outside, there were twelve orators, probably less. We must conclude that in this direct democracy, the right to speak was in fact exercised only by a very small minority, and that there must have been some principle of selection of this small minority.

Looking to figures has yielded us three important results: (1) With an upper time limit for discussion $m$ and a lower time limit for the formulation of a speech $k$, the feasible maximum number of people exercising the right of speech is determined. (2) Therefore with an increasing number $n$, the formal right to speak is a delusion for an increasing proportion of those entitled to this formal right. (3) In any system which grants formal rights to more than can effectively be given the opportunity of exercising them, there must be some device whereby those who are allowed the actual right are singled out from those to whom it formally belongs.

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[1] *Cf.* Gustave Glotz and Robert Cohen, *La Grèce au Ve siècle* (Paris, 1931), p. 270.

[2] The body of citizens was from five to eight times greater.

These remarks lead us to consider a number of problems.

## II. THE *m* LIMIT

Going back to my position as chairman, let us assume that I greatly take to heart the principle that each participant, entitled to the same right, should have an equal opportunity to expound his views. The one thing I cannot do is to share out the time into units so small that nobody can make sense. Therefore my first obligation is to set the value of *k*, of which more anon. Supposing I have set it at 15 minutes, I now feel impelled to break the *m* limit. I shall thus tell the assembly that having made up my mind that 15 minutes is the mimimum time for an opinion, I propose that each member should have his 15 minutes. Supposing that I have 5,400 participants, this means that we must sit for 1,350 hours in all, or, assuming 9 hours a day, a session of 150 working days.

I shall first make the wild hypothesis that this suggestion is adopted, and carried out, and I shall add the even wilder postulate that attendance and attention are consistently sustained throughout. Even giving myself such unattainable conditions, I shall fail in my attempt to afford each and every member an equal opportunity of influencing the vote occurring at the end of the 150th day, because the speeches made in the later days will obviously be more present to the memory of the voters than those made in the earlier and now distant days.

But obviously the suggestion is absurd. First, in some cases, a decision must be reached before this great space of time. Second, in all cases, the participants will prove unwilling to sit through this long succession of speeches. If they are a body of citizens, as in Athens, they have private affairs to attend to. If they are a professional decision-making body, as in the case of our parliaments, they have other issues to decide.

The *m* constraint is based upon there being a time limit to the attention which any one person will give to the discussion of any specific subject: this time limit varies with the individual's talent for concentration, with the importance in his eyes of the subject discussed, and especially in function of the other obligations or interests which compete for his attention.

To illustrate the existence of an individual *m* limit, let us consider the case of the democratic-minded radio producer.

*The case of the democratic-minded radio producer.* Let us picture a well-meaning radio-producer, who decides to use his powerful network so as to give the public a full discussion of an important public issue. He is a principled man, who firmly believes in equal right of speech, and therefore he widely advertises that anyone, whoever he may be, who wishes to talk on this issue shall be granted say ten minutes. Let us suppose that he gets a great number of requests, and that, desiring his audience to judge each opinion on its merits, he decides that his speakers will follow each other in an order determined by chance, and that each will be announced by a numeral, not by name. He then begins to carry out his program up to the exhaustion of his number of speakers.

What can we expect to happen in terms of the audience? Eliminating influences due to more or less favorable hours or days, we can safely forecast that the audience will fall off very rapidly. Thus, even if our producer calls himself satisfied with the total number of ears-minutes afforded to the whole series, he will have utterly failed to ensure to all his speakers an equal hearing: the later they come the fewer listeners they get. Thus letting them exercise an equal right to speak will not have afforded them an equal hearing.

*Maintaining the congregation.* Throughout we have been thinking of exercising the right to speak as equivalent to getting the opportunity of addressing a given congregation and we shall go on doing so now.

The opportunity of addressing the congregation lies in the hands of the chairman, given the congregation. But the congregation is not in fact given. It may melt away, as in the case of our radio audience. Much the same phenomenon can be observed in parliament, when a debate is long-drawn: members wander off, and if they do not leave the room bodily, at least their minds wander off.

The chairman's problem, therefore, does not reduce, as would-be speakers are apt to think, to fairly distributing the congregation's time between speakers; it is also and indeed mainly a problem of upkeep, of keeping the congregation together and attentive. This obliges him on the one hand to limit the overall time of discussion; but it also forces him to look in his selection of speakers toward those who are most apt to command attention.

## III. THE *k* CONSTRAINT

Let us now turn to the *k* constraint. This letter designates the time which I, as chairman, deem to be the minimum necessary to develop adequately an opinion on the subject under discussion. I offer no justification for my setting of *k* because I would find it difficult to explain the complicated computations which intervene in my mind and of which I am hardly aware. First I make some assessment of the difficulty of the subject. The more complex it seems to me, the more prone I am to raise *k*. Though my assessment of the difficulty of the subject is inevitably subjective, I am apt to take it as objective, and there is no practical harm in so calling it. But now I must take into account the qualification of the audience. It is to be hoped that I have not been chosen as chairman while having qualifications lower than the median qualification of the assembly. I shall assume that my qualification is quite a bit higher than median.

I must then take into account the fact that the expenditure of words required to convey an argument increases as the qualification of the listener decreases. An expert can convey his argument to a fellow expert in the same field with an economy of words or symbols, which makes his message incomprehensible to a layman. When speaking to the latter, the short-hand of jargon or conventional signs must be made explicit, and redundance must be introduced to increase the probability of understanding. Therefore, the lower the qualification of the audience, the more I must raise *k*.

We have now reached a conclusion which is capable of two alternative formulations. One: the more complex the subject and the less qualified the audience, the higher I must set *k*. Two: the greater the difficulty of the subject for the given audience, the more I must raise *k*. The two formulations are of course equivalent and the choice between them depends upon one's desire to include or exclude the notion of "intrinsic" difficulty.

But having come to such a conclusion, I have not exhausted the factors to be considered in the setting of *k*. We may not disregard what experience teaches us: *i.e.*, that conveying the same argument to the same audience is a feat which some orators achieve in far less time than some others: for the given achievement, there is a considerable difference in speed. Obviously I cannot set *k* so that it suits only the fastest of potential speakers, in which case the allotted time would be inadequate for all others. But can I set *k* so that it suits the slowest of potential orators? Obviously not.

I am constrained by an inelastic *m*: total discussion time is fixed. Therefore the higher I set *k*, the fewer the speakers I can allow. Already, if the subject be one of some complexity and the audience of low qualification, I have to set *k* pretty high. I now want to set *k* so as to allow a maximum number of speakers. It is clear that I can maximize my number of speakers only by restricting my choice of speakers to those who require least time to develop their argument.

Let us set out the problem as one of simple arithmetic. Discussion time is 3 hours, and we shall make the assumption that 16 potential orators require for their exposition times which from the first to the last rank from 15 to 30 minutes, growing by one minute as we proceed from one person to another. The 16th potential orator would require 30 minutes: if that is the value at which I set *k*, equal sharing of time between the orators limits me to six speakers. If however I set *k* at 22 minutes, I can then afford eight orators, but they have to be the eight swiftest expounders.

## IV. CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF SPEAKERS

Thus attention to *k*, with *m* held constant, gives me a recipe for choosing those who will be called upon to exercise the right of speech, *i.e.*, those who can formulate their argument, under given conditions, with maximum economy.[3]

But while we considered *m*, it became apparent that, apart from cases where the duration of the assembly is exogenously determined, which are many, *m* can be considered as somewhat elastic, rising if the speakers be men who are capable of retaining attention. Here is another distinct criterion for the selection of speakers. It may occur that the two criteria coincide—a clear and concise speaker is apt to retain attention—but also the two criteria may not coincide because a "big name" is apt to attract attention even if its bearer be a diffuse speaker.

The two criteria which have been formulated arise logically from the problem examined. These criteria are in fact applied when for instance the B.B.C. organizes a broadcast discussion: the name which appeals to the audience, and the ability to make points swiftly are both taken into consideration.

But another consideration also arises, and is of major importance. If a discussion is wanted, different opinions must be advanced. How is the chairman to choose bearers of different opinions, without making a prior selection of opinions on his own account? The procedure generally accepted is to choose bearers of opinions, different from each other, but of which every one is accepted by a notable portion of the body politic. The men's individual opinions are then severally representative of a body of opinion.

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[3] The conclusions are unaltered if one imagines that those who can develop their argument with maximum economy use up not their equal share of total time but only that which is necessary to them.

This completes our cursory examination of "the chairman's problem:" he recognizes men whose names are apt to retain attention, who are representative of different bodies of opinion, and who are apt to present their argument with maximum economy.

### V. THE CRITERIA SEEN FROM THE ANGLE OF *Bonum Commune*

The criteria we have found for dealing with the chairman's problem are in no way surprising. They are those which any reasonably competent chairman applies in fact. They can however be assailed from two angles, from the *Bonum Commune* viewpoint and also from the individual rights viewpoint.

Beginning with the first, it may be said: (1) that a glamorous name, capable of retaining attention is not a guarantee of wisdom; (2) that the several opinions which are widely held may all be wrong, and that the best opinion may not be representative of a body of opinion; (3) that an argument may be presented tersely thanks to the neglect of important considerations, and that its economy of words may correspond to a poverty of substance.

To the first point, the answer must be brief. The chairman, should he feel entitled to pick out the wisest, may well doubt his ability to discern them, and if he does not doubt it, the congregation may well call it into question. The second point will be dealt with as we come to discuss the criteria from the angle of individual rights. The third point is well taken.

We like our problems to be simple and our decisions to require little thought. Therefore if speaker A presents a problem as complicated and B as simple, we are apt to prefer B's argument. Rightly so, if B has taken the complexities into account and reduced them to simplicity, but wrongly if B has made the problem simple by overlooking important aspects, which is most frequently the case. There is a sure recipe for presenting any problem as simple: it is to disregard factual information and to reason discursively from general principles. The principles and the reasoning are easily grasped by listeners who are thus readily convinced, while many are apt to resent the effort required from them by speaker A who pours out and marshals a great deal of factual information.

We are prone to buy our opinions in the cheapest market: and that is the market where particular opinions are mass produced from general principles. This is a major danger which afflicts assemblies: it can be guarded against only by the chairman's closest attention to providing participants with the factual information relevant to the issue; and if the assembly cannot be asked to digest the adequate amount of factual information, then it is not the proper body for deciding the specific issue.

### VI. THE VIEWPOINT OF THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

We started out, concerned not with the problem of reaching the right decision (a *Bonum Commune* problem) but with the gap which may occur between the right of speech and its exercise. Our examination of the chairman's problem has made it clear to us that the gap cannot fail to be considerable.

Our main point throughout this discussion has been that time is a scarce commodity, *i.e.*, the time during which a congregation can be held together attentive to speakers from a floor or pulpit, or the time during which an audience can be expected to remain attentive to a broadcast, is a limited quantity. The problem is not different in kind if we think, not of speakers competing for the opportunity of addressing a gathering, but of people addressing letters for the correspondence column of a newspaper: here it is the space which is limited. The editor who returns to the letter-writer a printed note expressing regret that his communication could not be printed due to lack of space refers to a real concrete problem. There is a bottle-neck of space in the correspondence column (or columns) as there is a bottleneck of time in an assembly. However the editor's answer by no means satisfies the letter writer who sees other letters printed while his has not been. Nor does lack of time pleaded by the chairman satisfy the would-be speaker who has not been recognized while others have had their say.

There is no place (as far as I know) in the political theory of democracy for the simple and glaring fact of bottlenecks. Individuals are told at every moment that they have an equal right of speech, and they find out in any concrete instance that the opportunity of expression is denied to them. This breeds the feeling that democratic principles are a lie. And indeed if the principle of right of speech is so formulated as to convey the impression "you shall have the opportunity of being heard by the congregation, equal to anyone else's" then it is a lie, because it is impossible to give such an opportunity. This comes back to the old idea so often forgotten that any right is meaningless which does not have as its counterpart an obligation in someone else towards whom the claim must be directed. Now, giving to everyone the right of being heard by the congregation would mean settling upon the congregation the obligation of listening to each and everyone; and that is not feasible.

People who are taught and told that they have an equal right of speech find out in fact that the avenues of expression are guarded by people who turn down their application. They do not realize that this is a necessity since here we are dealing with a scarce commodity which cannot be divided into less than given quantities. They are merely aware of being turned down, and are apt to believe that the guardians of the avenues of speech have turned them down personally: from there it is just one jump to thinking that the right to speech which rightly belongs to all (is this not tirelessly stated?) is in fact confiscated by a few, who form an Establishment. Whether or not the guardians of the many different avenues of expression do in some loose manner form one company, and can be called an Establishment, or whether in fact such guardians are in the several cases *ad hoc* and are linked in one body by our innate tendency to mythologize, is a sociological problem which does not concern us here. I personally lean to the second view. Different avenues are guarded by different people, and the only sameness which obtains is the sameness of the denial of the exercise of the right of speech.

Clearly this denial applies to a greater proportion of applicants, the greater the concentration of the avenues of expression. Say that every day one out of ten thousand readers of a newspaper feels moved to write to the paper. And say that there is room for ten readers' letters. A newspaper with a circulation of 300,000 will deny 2 out of 3 letter writers. A newspaper with a circulation of 3 million will deny 290 out of 300.

Thus if you have 10 of the smaller circulation newspaper instead of the one with the large circulation, you have less frustration. The same of course holds for assemblies. Thus every phenomenon of concentration in the media of expression or in the centers of discussion and decision-making tends to decrease the percentage of received candidates among those who postulate for the exercise of the right of speech.

If one does not want people to feel that they are cheated it is important to explain to them this phenomenon of "scarcity" and also to make reasonably clear the criteria of selection used to choose among the many who have a formal right the few who are called to exercise it. It is better to stress the positive scarcity features of the system and the criteria used to allocate this scarce resource than to stress the formal right which can in so few cases be exercised. In fact *a system of expression is characterized by just these two things: its bottlenecks and the criteria for admission through the bottlenecks.*

## VII. THE RIGHT TO BUTTONHOLE

There is however a sense in which the right of speech can be exercised by each and everyone; it is the right to buttonhole, to address a fellow citizen, one to one, and convince him to hear you out (that is the speaker's business in which he may succeed or fail) and having done so to convince him of your opinion (that again is the speaker's business in which he may succeed or fail). By such "artisan" procedure, you may command successively the attention of $n$ people, and in consequence you may collect these $n$ people in a hall, and so fire them with your opinion that they shall go abroad and collect $n^2$ and then $n^3$ people, etc. You may thus constitute a congregation of your own. That this should be allowed is essential to a free society; that and not that *anyone* should be given the right to address *any* congregation.

Now consider the problem which arises in the case of Primus who has collected through toil and trouble a congregation of his own doing. An outsider Secundus, comes in and claims the right to address this congregation on grounds of the right of free speech. Is Primus bound to give him the floor? I doubt it. He can reply to Secundus: "I have made up this congregation. Go thou and do likewise."[4]

## VIII. CONCLUSION

It is essential to lay stress upon feasibility problems. Exclusive emphasis upon formal rights must inevitably breed in citizens the feeling that they are deceived, since the enunciation of such formal rights leads them to think that they should be enabled to exercise rights which in fact give rise to scarcity situations, frustrating the hopes aroused by the enunciation of formal rights.

With increasing centralization we move from the viewpoint of the right of speech to situations of increasing scarcity, which make the actual enjoyment of the formal right more and more subject to narrower bottlenecks. This is not generally understood and people feel mystified. This can be remedied only by speaking increasingly in terms of feasibility.

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[4] This would lead into another subject: the inequality of means for the building of a congregation and the increasing comparative disadvantage of the artisan process.

# COMMUNICATIONS

## KENDALL'S LIBERTY WITH MILL

To the Editor:

Professor Kendall, in his article, "The 'Open Society' and Its Fallacies" (in this Review, December, 1960), asserts that John Stuart Mill in his essay *On Liberty* denies the existence "of any truth whatever unless it be the truth of the denial itself." Kendall goes on to argue that a society based on Mill's alleged skepticism cannot give preference to any doctrine or elevate any opinion to the status of a "public truth."

This interpretation does not entirely do justice to Mill. Although he stresses the importance of competition among ideas, he does not deny the possibility that some ideas may be found to be true. The function of competition among ideas is precisely to establish a reliable body of knowledge. Just what constitutes a true idea Mill discusses in his other works, but that he did have a theory of truth cannot be denied.

One may not accept Mill's theory, but one cannot very well accuse him of thoroughgoing skepticism. Since he believes in the possibility of distinguishing between true and false ideals, he naturally asserts the superiority of true ideas over false ones. Moreover, he thinks that eventually society may and probably will develop a body of "preferred doctrines" or "public truths," to use Kendall's terms. The following passage in Chapter II of *On Liberty* makes clear Mill's position in this matter:

> As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested. The cessation, on one question after another, of serious controversy, is one of the necessary incidents of the consolidation of opinion; a consolidation as salutary in the case of true opinions, as it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions are erroneous.

Mill thus believes that truth may and ought to be a unifying rather than a disintegrative force in society. "The highest aim and best result of improved intelligence, it has hitherto been thought, is to unite mankind more and more in the acknowledgment of all important truths. . . . " He does not deny the validity of this aim nor the possibility of its being realized.

Kendall is on firm ground when he describes the formidable obstacles that confront freedom of discussion in any society, and he is probably right in criticising Mill for not giving sufficient weight to these obstacles. Moreover, one can agree with him on the dangers of a deeply divided society. Whether the principle of free discussion should be devalued in the face of these admitted obstacles and whether all schisms in society can be attributed exclusively to the free expression of opinions are debatable questions.

These issues, however, go beyond the point I want to make here. In my opinion, Kendall's attack on the "open society" is weakened by his failure to give a balanced interpretation of Mill's treatment of freedom of discussion. Mill was not the complete skeptic and relativist portrayed in this article.

I trust this difference of opinion will not lead to "violence and civil war."

Arnett A. Elliott
*University of Tennessee*

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To the Editor:

In a recent article in the Review (December 1960), Willmoore Kendall attacked the fallacies of the "open society" as represented by John Stuart Mill in his essay "On Liberty." In the name of the academic orthodoxy to which he appealed I submit a few comments and questions.

I agree wholeheartedly that anyone who participates in an intellectual exchange must from the moment he begins "make manifest, by his behavior, his sense of duty to act as if the other participants had something to teach him—the duty, in a word, to see to it that the exchange goes forward in an atmosphere of courtesy and mutual self-respect." But surely one should grant such courtesy and respect even more to the dead (who cannot reply) than to the living. His accusation that John Stuart Mill was, like Machiavelli, "a teacher of *evil*" is certainly lacking in respect, if not in truth. The charge that Mill was a man who conceived himself "a new prince in a new state," who felt obliged to "destroy" what had preceded him, so that he might create "what he feels stirring within him," might be applied to

Nietzsche—can it be applied equally to Mill? What is Kendall's evidence? He would have readers believe that Mill's open society is rooted in "demonstrably evil teachings," but exactly what is the evil? Kendall's rhetorical questions are not evidence and certainly not proof of it.

According to him, a major difficulty with Mill's doctrine is that it is rooted in skepticism and relativism. He also asserts that "Everything reduces itself for Mill to intellectual argument, where you either win or lose or draw by the sheer appeal to reason. . . ." If he wishes to attack the relativistic implication of Mill's thought he ought to specify exactly what he means by "reason"—in order to avoid further relativistic confusion. Was Mill's appeal to utility synonymous with this "sheer appeal to reason"? And what exactly does Kendall mean when he says that "Mill's freedom of speech doctrine is not merely derivative from a preliminary assault upon truth itself; it is *inseparable from* that assault and cannot, I contend, be defended on any other ground"? Does he mean that Mill assaulted all forms of truth knowable by evidence and reason? Or only the doctrine of Truth with a capital T, or truth as embodied in dead dogmas? Readers are asked to become *passim's* slaves to find out.

To come to the heart of the matter, Kendall argues that Mill's proposals misconceive the strategic problem. "*Fortunate*," he says, is that society that has a small minority of people capable of valuing the pursuit of truth in the way Mill suggests; "*fortunate*" is that minority if it is given the leisure and resources to pursue truth; and "*wise* that society whose decision makers see deeply enough into things . . ." to provide this minority with the necessary leisure and resources. This is not to state a problem but to underscore two platitudes. The problem is how, in practice, to achieve this happy state of affairs. Mill's strategy he calls "Utopian" in the worst sense of the word because it is obviously Utopian to ask society to give the select minority "freedom to treat publicly all questions as open questions, as open not only to itself in the course of its discharge of its own peculiar functions but for everybody. . . ." He concludes that "by asking for all, even assuming that all to be desirable, we imperil our chances of getting that little we might have got had we asked only for that little." This is to assume that liberty of speech should be sought from wise rulers as a gift, not sought on the basis of any principle, unless begging can be called a principle. Furthermore, in a broader context, it is worth recalling that Christianity itself was once considered Utopian, anarchistic and destructive of the public truth.

His second objection to Mill raises the historical issue: we have no experience of unlimited freedom of speech as Mill defines it, or of the open society as Popper defines it, "unless after a fashion and for a brief moment, in Weimar Germany—an experience no organized society will be eager to repeat." Does he want readers to believe that Weimar Germany was a bad society or failed as a society because it allowed too much freedom of speech? The breakdown of the Weimar republic owed more to the depression, to class conflicts, and to Hitler. Further on he argues that such a society as Mill prescribed will "descend ineluctably into ever deepening *differences of opinion*, into progressive breakdown of those common premises upon which alone a society can conduct affairs by discussion . . . ," until there is at last a civil war. This may or may not be true. Weimar Germany, however, is again not a convincing illustration. First, because there never was a complete dedication to liberal principles in the Weimar republic; second, because the political breakdown of the republic occurred not before but after the economic crisis. As long as the republic was prosperous, men tolerated one another's presence in that society. When conditions became more difficult many men were eager to attack, and some were willing to betray, the state. But let us not conclude that the Third Reich was inevitable, because of the relative toleration practiced in the Weimar republic.

In discussing the "central paradox of the theory of freedom of speech" Kendall asserts that "in order to practice tolerance on behalf of the pursuit of truth, you have first to value and believe in not merely the pursuit of truth but Truth itself, with all its accumulated riches to date." Perhaps. But does Truth (with a capital T) include all the dogmas, miracles, and fanaticisms that have been accepted as Truth in history? Who decides what is Truth? And should we believe in it because the evidence convinces us, or because an authority has said we must?

Doubtless a tolerant society cannot be consistent if it silences opinion, but have we any reason to believe that it must of necessity "persecute?" The man who challenges skeptical society is entitled to a hearing. If he convinces skeptical society that it should cease to be skeptical and tolerant, then that is the end of skeptical society. What no man may do is demand special treatment or the right to use force. To argue that toleration must lead to persecution is a syllogism worthy of Orwell's *1984* society, but not, I think, of Mill's.

Only trivial doctrines are free of difficulty. If Mill did nothing else he forced people to think about freedom and the problems of maintaining and defending it. For this, if for no other reason, I think we might all charitably thank Mill.

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## THE "TWO-CHINAS" POLICY

TO THE EDITOR:

Dr. A. S. Whiting in his letter regarding my discussion of the Barnett volume, *Communist China and Asia, Challenge to American Policy* (in this REVIEW, December, 1960) seems to require that all reviews of books provide something by way of summary of their contents.

This was the second review I had done of the Barnett volume. In my first review I did say more of a general nature about the volume. However, having done this, my conclusion as to the real burden of the study was sharpened by a second examination of it, and I decided to concentrate on this feature, to the exclusion of more general but less important comments.

This is not an unwarranted or unprecedented use of the book reviewer's function. To me, Barnett's final coming out for a so-called "two Chinas" policy is so much in error and disregard even of those facts which he himself states, that it merits special, if not exclusive attention of a reviewer of his volume. I therefore make no excuse whatever for giving disproportionate attention to it.

It is something like reviewing a book on arithmetic, which after numerous pages of fair-to-middling stuff, suddenly concludes that the implication to be drawn from all this is that two plus two equals only three and a half! Wouldn't almost any commentator be excused for a tendency to play up the major error of the volume more than whatever else it had said? Since, whether Whiting and others agree with me or not, this is about my reaction to the "two-Chinas" thesis, perhaps my review is not so illogical and puzzling after all. It is sometimes more important to expose "stuff and nonsense" than merely to summarize rather generally some of the main contents of a work. After all, this study, as its title indicates, does emphasize in a major way the question of U. S. foreign policy regarding China in the future.

Whiting is always free to approach the problem of reviewing a book in his own way. So, I trust, am I.

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## ON GOLEMBIEWSKI'S "GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS"

TO THE EDITOR:

In the December 1960 issue of the REVIEW Robert T. Golembiewski takes me to task for a criticism of David Truman. I had argued that groups should be regarded as political actors, while such concepts as role and status were abstractions from reality and hence on a different analytic level. Golembiewski's point is that all concepts are abstractions from reality and that, therefore, the distinction is "fatuous."

The first part of his statement is correct, and I am at fault for the sloppy use of language. However, the distinction I intended is far from fatuous. It is, as Levy[1] has pointed out, one between concrete and analytic structures. Concrete structures are "those patterns that define the character of units that are at least in theory capable of physical separation (in time and/or space) from other units of the same sort." Analytic structures are "the patterned aspects of action that are not even theoretically capable of concrete separation from other patterned aspects of action." Parsons makes the same point in distinguishing between concrete "phenoma" and "analytic concepts."[2]

The analogy to science which Golembiewski adduces is appropriate; that is, the distinction is one of the same order as between atom and valence. However, if one wishes to use this kind of analogy (and analogies drawn from the natural sciences are always dangerous), this is not the one to apply to Truman. *The Governmental Process* is better compared to an approach to physics which insists that the units of analysis are molecules and denies the relevance of either smaller or larger systems, or of analytic concepts such as mass, force, and valence, and then seeks to include these on an *ad hoc* basis to explain a limited range of phenomena.

Groups as social systems are systems of action; they are one kind of collectivity, and they are concrete structures. From the point of view of the social system *as a whole* they are but one type of actor. Truman attempts to analyze the social system in terms of these concrete structures, denying or ignoring the relevance of other concrete structures (individuals) or of such analytic structures as values, role, or status. He then employs the concept status/role quite specifically to explain a limited range of behavior. Had he examined the implications of the literature he cites, he would have recognized that the concept status/role is only meaningful within a framework which approaches societies as social systems, and makes use of such concepts as "institutions."

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[1] Marion J. Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society* (Princeton, 1952), pp. 88–9.

[2] Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937) pp. 33–4 and 616.

For example, Truman uses "role" to help explain the behavior of judges. But the role of a judge and the influence of this role upon his behavior is only meaningful within a framework that considers legal institutions and the judicial function conceptually relevant to the study of a social system. Nor, as Truman is obviously aware, can these be reduced to groups, without defining group so broadly as to make the term meaningless, and then building epicycle upon epicycle.

Further, the role structure of any group (defined in a rigorous manner) within an ongoing social system can not be fully understood unless one recognises that ongoing groups have purposes determined both by the structure of the larger systems of which they are part, and by individual members considered as personality systems.

However, to accept all of this is to destroy immediately the claim that individual attitudes are primarily determined by group interaction. It also points up the need for a much more complex set of concepts than Truman has said need to be employed, and the need to recognise that a social system should not be regarded merely as an aggregate of the groups of which it is composed.

Golembiewski also mistakenly interprets the concluding remark of my article (that the mature insights of political scientists may prove more valuable than inadequate and misleading conceptual schemes) as an attack upon any attempt to conceptualize. The statement connoted neither more nor less than it denoted. It was not intended as an attack upon conceptualization or attempts at conceptualization. His remark that all analyses are based upon more or less articulated conceptual frameworks is merely a debater's point; no one would deny it. However, at least in the present state of our discipline there is much to be said for writing which does not attempt to be too methodologically self-conscious or to solve all conceptual problems at the same time.

Golembiewski and I do agree on one point. He likens the attack on Bentley and his disciples to "nipping at the heels" of creative giants. In comparison to the bold, creative and difficult task of conceptualization, criticism is a far "meaner" endeavor. However, it too has a function.

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# BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

*Morgenthau*, The Purpose of American Politics. John H. Hallowell. 378

*Hitch and McKean*, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, James R. Schlesinger . . . . . 379

*Aron*, France: Steadfast and Changing; *Pickles*, The Fifth French Republic; *Williams and Harrison*, De Gaulle's Republic. Nicholas Wahl . . . . . 380

*Allen*, Soviet Economic Warfare. Roy D. Laird . . . . . 381

*Ahmed*, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism. P. J. Vatikiotis . . . . . 383

*Bontecou, ed.*, Freedom in the Balance; Opinions of Judge Henry W. Edgerton Relating to Civil Liberties; *Levy*, Legacy of Suppression; Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History. Herbert J. Storing . . . . . 385

*Vernon*, Metropolis, 1985. Charles Adrian . . . . . 386

*Schubert*, The Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept. Robert H. Salisbury . . . . . 387

*Corson*, Governance of Colleges and Universities. John H. Romani . . 388

## BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Political Theory, History of Political Thought, and Methodology . . . . . 391

American Government and Politics . . . . . 401

Foreign and Comparative Government . . . . . 421

International Politics, Law and Organization . . . . . 439

Other Books Received . . . . . 456

# BOOK REVIEWS

*The Purpose of American Politics*. By HANS J. MORGENTHAU. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960. Pp. xi & ix, 350. $4.50.)

A nation that has begun to question the purpose of its existence is already in grave danger of disintegration and much of the current debate in America about the purpose of American politics reveals more about the anxiety of our times than it does about our "purpose." Unlike their eighteenth-century forbears Americans in the twentieth century find it difficult to speak of any truth as "self-evident," if, indeed, they can speak of truth at all. While this may be regarded as a growth in intellectual humility it is more likely to be a failure of intellectual nerve. Professor Morgenthau brings to the current debate a brilliant, analytical mind, an objectivity that is not purchased at the price of moral indifference, a clarity of style that reveals an orderly mind and disciplined spirit and an earnestness that commands our attention and response.

Professor Morgenthau raises the debate above the level of platitudinous exchanges and insists, quite rightly, that the question of national purpose in the twentieth century is not going to be answered by "the ritualistic reiteration of the traditional formulations." He asks us to consider not only what must be preserved from our historical heritage but what must be discarded as well. From the very beginning of our history as a nation, the American mind and American experience have been directed to "the establishment of equality in freedom," and "what makes America unique among the nations is that it has achieved at least in a certain measure what other nations—by no means many—have aspired to." To have substantive meaning, equality and freedom must be related to some transcendent purpose derived from some conception of an objective order. But if it is asked: "what is the transcendent purpose for the sake of which equality and freedom are sought?" it must be said that America, even from its beginnings, has no one answer to that question but rather a variety of answers. And "the only permanent commitment of the American consensus is to the freedom to compete on equal terms for the opportunity to determine the content of that consensus."

Professor Morgenthau examines with penetrating insight a number of the political, social and economic crises that have tested the genuineness of the American aspiration for equality in freedom. He shows how the social reform movements beginning in the 1890's and culminating in the 1930's succeeded not only in giving new meaning and vitality to the American purpose but also in exposing the falsity of the Founding Fathers' "simple juxtaposition of government as the institutionalized denial of equality in freedom and society as equality's natural abode." He correlates the domestic challenges with the challenges to the American purpose from abroad, and points out that just as "America lost its innocence in relation to itself when society engendered out of its own womb that ubiquitous, crude, and brutal domination of man by man which the Constitution and the American political system were thought to have confined, tamed, and restrained," so "America lost its innocence in relation to the outside world when power politics proved to be impervious to the American offer of its apolitical purpose." He shows how America responded out of fear and despair to this loss of innocence with McCarthyism and how irrelevant that response was. Yet he points out that the period of tranquility which followed the demise of McCarthyism sprang from the very same inability to understand and cope with new problems.

From 1860 to 1932 the American purpose was renewed through controversy concerning the meaning of equality in freedom as it faced successive challenges in experience. Today, Professor Morgenthau argues, controversy has been replaced by conformity, and the preservation of the *status quo* has emerged as "the ultimate substantive purpose of society." The *status quo* is interpreted as meaning the enjoyment of a high standard of living. The identification of material well-being with the American purpose has led to the decline of objective standards of excellence and to the acceptance in their place of the notion that what the majority wants should prevail. "What the crowd desires and tolerates becomes the ultimate standard of what is good, true, beautiful, useful and wise. What you can get away with, then, is morally permitted; what you can get accepted in the market place, to paraphrase the famous saying of Holmes, becomes the test of truth; art is what people like; what can be sold is useful; and what people will vote for is sound." It was in the light of transcendent principles of justice that equality and freedom in the past achieved substantive meaning, but with the disappearance of those principles equality and freedom have become emptied of any real meaning. No longer can the question be asked: equal and free *for what?* With the disappearance of objective standards of excellence and the exaltation of equality for its own sake representative democracy degenerates into majoritarian democracy with the paradoxical result that actual popular control over the government declines. And "as the power of the people has declined, so has the power of the government" and what should be the substance of governmental power "is being arrogated by numerous semi-autonomous public and private agencies, business enterprises, and labor unions." In his discussion of some of the problems of contemporary democratic government Professor Morgenthau would agree with much that Walter Lippmann has had to say in *The Public Philosophy*.

Professor Morgenthau's analysis of the tasks which confront us today is perceptive, but when he suggests that we shall meet these tasks most successfully by relying upon "what Machiavelli called *virtù* and *fortuna*" the prescription would appear, to me at least, to belie his own diagnosis of our ills. In an interesting appendix on the meaning of morality called forth by the Van Doren scandal, Professor Morgenthau says: "The moral law is not made for the convenience of man, rather it is an indispensable precondition for his civilized existence. It is one of the great paradoxes of civilized existence that—in contrast to the existence of animals and barbarians—it is not self-contained but requires for its fulfillment transcendent orientations." Now this is precisely what Machiavelli would deny; he would insist that politics can be most successful only when it ignores transcendent reality and the demands made by it upon men. Professor Morgenthau wants to hold fast both to the tradition of natural law and to the "realism" of Machiavelli, but I do not think he has shown us how to reconcile the one with the other.

JOHN H. HALLOWELL

*Duke University*

*The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age.* BY CHARLES J. HITCH AND ROLAND N. MCKEAN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. xiii, 422. $9.50.)

It is fortunate that at the very moment that substantial revisions in our military establishment are being considered, this authoritative guide to clear thinking about the economic aspects of the defense problem has been published. To what degree it will influence policy remains to be seen. Its principal objective is to present a *way of looking* at military problems that stresses the economic choices involved in selecting the pattern of defense expenditures which will provide maximum military effectiveness in light of the agreed-on military budget. Rather than the economic or fiscal considerations being viewed as in conflict with strategic or military considerations (as is so frequently the case), the technological, strategic, and economic considerations are here treated as inter-related aspects of the same problem. The study itself is subdivided into three main sections. The first deals with the resources available for defense purposes, the second with the problem of obtaining efficiency in the use of resources, and the third with certain special problems, including such diverse subjects as research and development, logistics, deterrence, mobilization, disarmament, and the like. In the latter section chapters are contributed by specialists other than the authors. As a whole the book is well written and in the first two sections the organization is admirable; in the third, however, the combining of discussions of a range of problems by a number of contributors makes the organization somewhat less cohesive.

Perhaps the most novel aspect of the book for most readers is the development of systematic quantitative analysis which is given in Part II. This approach involves the testing of the efficiency of alternative methods of achieving some objective through the building of models which provide an estimate of the relative gains and costs to be obtained from the employment of each method. For low-level decisions this approach is usually called *operations research,* for high-level decisions it is called *systems analysis.* Unfortunately for the ease of vital decision-making, however, the higher the level of the decision the less significant are quantitative estimates taken by themselves. For quantitative analysis to provide decisive results some criterion must be adopted, and it is the criterion problem, as the authors make abundantly clear, that raises the main question concerning the limits to which quantitative analysis can be pushed. For low-level decisions—the size of inventories, the location of airbases, the length of runways, even the procurement of various types of aircraft (a hypothetical example of which is given in the book)—the criterion problem is manageable. For higher level decisions—whether to devote additional resources to more missiles, anti-submarine warfare, or civil defense—no clear criterion would be appropriate, for it would fail to handle the complexities of choosing a strategy. The reasons for this are the existence of uncertainty and the impossibility of comparing incommensurables. The authors are keenly aware of these difficulties and devote considerable time to suggesting ways to cope with them. In the final analysis, they take the reasonable position that despite the fact that quantitative analysis cannot answer all strategic questions, its employment reduces the area of the unknown and thereby provides great assistance to decision-makers in handling those decisions which are inevitably qualitative.

Political scientists are interested in obtaining efficiency, but they are far more interested in the policy implications of the quest for efficiency than in the particular techniques by which it is obtained. For this reason, it is likely that Part I, which discusses the more traditional problems of how much resources should be devoted to defense and the construction of the military budget, will be of special interest. Its appeal will be heightened by the fact that one of the authors has recently been selected as Comptroller of the Department of Defense; here in the narrow area of budget formation this book, despite its excellences elsewhere, is most likely to affect policy. The authors make clear that there is no obviously "optimal" size of the defense establishment based on "needs." Determining the size of the establishment means acceptance of greater or less insecurity, and this decision is inevitably a political one which will appear arbitrary to observers (because in the final analysis it must be arbitrary). One way in which Congress can be persuaded to make rational decisions regarding the size of the defense budget is to present the budget in a more revealing way than at present. The authors advocate breakdown of the budget into meaningful programs or "end-products" in place of the present emphasis on both "objects of expenditure" and meaninglessly comprehensive programs like "major national security." By indicating the purposes of particular programs and how they would fit into our overall strategy, and by providing a realistic breakdown of the additional costs in each program, Congress will be enabled to weigh the desired size of the defense program (*i.e.*, the diversion of resources from the private sector) more intelligently.

One underlying assumption of the study is that governments will be interested in a defense establishment of optimal size characterized by efficiency. Governments are somewhat ambivalent about such matters. Congress may be reluctant to institute program budgeting because it makes clear the price of *effective* programs and the costs of "economization," thereby making it harder to employ the meat axe. Officers are not interested in the logic of maximization when it is disruptive of traditional procedures or pet projects. The authors point out that the present method of budgeting annually leads to a dangerous undervaluation of the future, but any participant in an administration seeking re-election in four years time will be subject to the inevitable pressures to emphasize present performance and costs at the expense of the future. In practice, it is harder to reconcile the desires of generals, of Congressmen, and of those interested in efficient budgeting than the writers are ready to concede.

Such minor qualifications, however, do not detract from the value of so lucid and provocative a study. In a brief review it is impossible to give the full flavor of the book with its many keen insights and fine details as well as its masterful treatment of the larger issues. It raises the right questions and suggests answers to the problems of military security which are likely on inspection to provide the basis for future improvements in policy.

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
*University of Virginia*

*France: Steadfast and Changing.* BY RAYMOND ARON. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. 201. $4.75.)

*The Fifth French Republic.* BY DOROTHY PICKLES. (New York: Frederic A. Praeger, 1960. Pp. 222. $3.50.)

*De Gaulle's Republic.* BY PHILIP M. WILLIAMS AND MARTIN HARRISON. (New York: Longmans, Green, Pp. 279. $.600.)

While clearly among the best books in English on today's French politics, these three employ radically different approaches that neatly pose the problem of how best to study new political institutions. Leaving this matter aside for the moment, the preference of this reviewer goes to the brilliantly written collaborative work of Messrs. Williams and Harrison. It is basically a shrewd analytical essay, set in a framework of racy, yet meticulous, narrative history. To be sure, the very freedom of their format makes the book more exciting reading than the consciously formal and descriptive text of Mrs. Pickles. But even so one wonders why she felt obliged to withhold so much of the fruits of her great experience with current politics while at the same time squeezing the unjelled institutions into the mold of a rather traditional treatment. Monsieur Aron, of course, has little awe for the formal arrangements, but he too seems to force his material: primarily a study of the "French problem" as it stood in the last year of the Fourth Republic, his book views the new institutions as a series of temporary contradictions and the new politics as a series of paradoxes which will probably give way to those enduring patterns of behavior that he describes at length with his usual incisiveness and sense of measure.

The excellence of the Williams-Harrison volume derives from three simple, yet all important qualities. It is written with such care from such a wealth of research and interviews that it presents an account of the rise of the Fifth Republic that, for comprehensiveness and reliability, will not be surpassed for some time. In turn, this quality helps to make of the book a paragon of objectivity, providing it with all the needed insight and information for an evaluation of the arguments both for and against the new régime. Knowing the facts of circumstance as well as the larger historical context, moreover, the authors were not obliged to fall back on easy historical and ideological analogies. Precisely because of their vast knowledge, they were able to offer judgements more damning, yet fairer, than those of any other writer. How much more convincing is the charge that the new régime is inefficient when the critic can offer as evidence a detailed picture of how many of the new reforms were drafted (*e.g.*, the aside on p. 168 noting that one cabinet meeting dealt with no less than fifty important reform ordinances)! Finally, it is worthwhile remarking, especially for American scholars, that a powerful, concise, elliptical and ironic style vastly improves the vehicle of information and analysis. Can there be, for example, a better way of explaining the complex and evolving relations in May 1958 between the uneasy Algerian coalition of army, settlers, and Gaullists, and the Pflimlin government in Paris, than in terms of a poker game? Anyone who has lived through those events can testify to the striking aptness of the analogy. Can one sum up any better de Gaulle's Baroque method of approaching domestic and foreign policy goals simultaneously than by saying: "He was never a man to kill only one bird with a stone" (p. 179)? It is true that at times their concision and ellipsis leads to ambiguities, as in the discussion of the party politics preceding the formation of the Pflimlin cabinet. And the profusion of parenthetical insertions tends often to confuse rather than illuminate. But for sheer enjoyment for general reader and scholar alike, Messrs. Williams and Harrison are to be congratulated.

The purpose of Mrs. Pickles was, of course, different in that her volume is evidently an elementary text to serve as a worthy sequel to her excellent little text on the institutions of the Fourth Republic. Its usefulness is all the greater since she has taken pains to recall and contrast former constitutional arrangements and party phenomena with those of the present. Moreover, for its size the volume is amazingly comprehensive, again an example of the merits of British concision. Her analyses of the constitution and the formal legislative procedure are the best I have read, although it is a shame there are relatively few concrete illustrations and so little on the reforms and policies of the new régime.

At the other extreme, Monsieur Aron's series of essays presumes considerable knowledge of French politics, notwithstanding the effort made in the footnotes to explain some of his more parochial allusions. Although the book has suffered badly in translation and contains probably a larger number of factual errors than it should, it fully lives up to the expectation of pithy epigram and common sense insight we are used to from this modern Tocqueville. Monsieur Aron convincingly sweeps away various myths about France's economy, her colonial practices, and her foreign policy, concluding that the nation's troubles in the last thirty years were due less to a deterministic legacy of the past than to the over-heavy responsibilities and circumstances of the present. But is there not the truism of radical common sense in the insistence that political circumstances are the major cause of France's ills, while admitting, as he does, that the past has conditioned her responses to these circumstances?

To the limited extent Raymond Aron deals with present day French politics he treats it within a framework of broad generalizations about French society that inform us inadequately of the "why" and "what" of political change. Mrs. Pickles, on the other hand, narrows her view to essentially the constitutional mechanism and formal party structure, running a risk thereby at the hands of both institutional and historical change. By choosing the method of political history, with its rigorous insistence on understanding the period of change itself, rather than the larger social processes or the resultant temporary institutional structure, Williams and Harrison have presented a model for those who wish to study new political régimes, commodities that will certainly continue to be in large supply.

NICHOLAS WAHL

*Harvard University*

*Soviet Economic Warfare.* BY ROBERT LORING ALLEN. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960, Pp. x, 293. $5.00.)

Repeatedly one hears the assertion that a major obstacle to an improved relationship between the United States and the emerging, underdeveloped nations lies in our too close relationship with the former colonial powers.

A price that we must pay for our friendship with England and France is that of sharing in the receipt of the hatred directed at these former colonial masters. Without doubt, there is truth in this view. For example, American ties with France via NATO undoubtedly serve to convince many Algerian nationalists that we also must be in sympathy with France's anti-revolutionary actions. The great tragedy is that far too many point to the faults of our friends and the successful efforts of the Soviets in this realm as the total explanation for our own failures in the attempt to strengthen our position among the underdeveloped nations, thus failing to recognize that the peoples in many of these areas feel they have ample reason to despise us regardless of the faults of friends and the successes of our opponents.

Even if we were in no way linked with the former colonial masters, even if the Soviet bloc had refrained from all attempts at economic warfare (or subversion) among the emerging nations, the United States would still be a major target of animosity.

Robert Loring Allen is an able economist and his thoughtful analysis of *Soviet Economic Warfare* provides many important insights into the Khrushchev regime's decision to open a new battleground. "Relatively small amounts of resources have been involved and the greatest Soviet efforts have been concentrated on just a few countries—Afghanistan, India, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia." Moreover, "It is most immediately apparent that the Soviet bloc's impact is far out of proportion to the amount of resources involved and does not adequately discount the quality of performance." Professor Allen amply demonstrates the causes of Soviet successes—and failures. Unfortunately, however, he completely neglects any consideration of what in the opinion of many is a major reason for the Soviet bloc's disproportionate successes.

Dollars will not buy everything, and they will not further the Western cause in the face of self-defeating, contradictory foreign policies. For every dollar's worth of confidence and increased economic stability purchased by the taxpayer's dollar in enlightened aid and trade programs, at least two dollars worth of serious harm is purchased by shortsighted self-seeking activities of American private investors in the underdeveloped areas, backed by a State Department policy primarily geared to furthering the short run private interests of a United Fruit or a Standard Oil, rather than the long run interests of the American people.

Few in the West will disagree with Professor Allen's assertion that the totalitarian states are destructive of human values and that the goals of all Soviet international economic activity are directed to furthering the ends of the Soviet state, but his implication that by contrast private international economic activity is necessarily directed to the promotion of human values is hardly borne out by the sad history of economic imperialism. Too often "what is good for General Motors" is not good for either America or Guatemala. Unfortunately, in spite of some increased enlightenment in the actions of American companies (such as promises to take out only 50% of profits), the reality of international politics is that many peoples in the underdeveloped areas, not without reason, regard the foreign private investor as someone dedicated to exploiting the areas' raw material and labor for selfish gain. When the company store is owned by a wealthy foreigner there is even more reason for hatred.

On the official governmental side, the recent discussion of the bankrupt nature of our foreign policy as revealed, for example, in the reports of the actions and attitudes of Ambassadors Whelan in Nicaragua and Smith in Cuba can only be regarded as significant cause for Soviet successes. With or without the predominance of American private interest in Cuba, a Batista may have evolved. Nevertheless, Moscow did not have to lift a finger either to invent a Castro or to convince the Cuban people that their economic and political ills stemmed in part from American policies. Supported by State Department activity, the American private investor in Cuba must share heavily in the blame for the Cuban disaster, that is unless the rules of politics change at the water's edge and in Cuba "he who pays the piper . . . " does not apply.

Repeatedly Professor Allen argues that the nature of Soviet actions "carried on through state trading agencies and intergovernmental agreements, tends to have the effect of increasing the role of the government by necessary, extensive regulation and control." This is a goal of the Soviet program. "The political dangers in such transfer of economic powers to the government should be obvious" (p. 175). However, bent upon improving their economies, what are the alternatives for the underdeveloped states? They may accept the Soviet system and Soviet domination, at the price of all hope for securing human liberties. Or they may continue, as in the past, encouraging greater private investment without controls; but as seen earlier they feel there is good reason to fear economic colonialism as much as the old-fashioned kind. Finally, through nationalization, they can encourage both private and public investment in their economies, but with governmental guarantee that such funds will be spent primarily for development rather than for the enrichment of the foreign investor. What better hope than nationalization is there for the assurance of advancement and continued political independence, *particularly from Soviet domination?* Does Professor Allen deny the democratic successes of the British and Swedish models, or does he really believe that all forms of nationalization represent an inevitable step toward a totalitarian Soviet form? Surely he knows that the Soviets themselves regard the democratic socialists as a major obstacle to their goal of world Communization. Indeed, as the author himself records. "Perhaps as influential and effective in combatting Communism has been the democratic left, which exercises real political influence in most countries." Unlike Professor Allen, however, the "democratic left" is persuaded that under democratic controls increased centralization of economic activity can be a step away from totalitarianism.

In spite of this serious shortcoming in Professor Allen's work, which after all represents debatable differences in outlook, his work is a valuable summary of the University of Virginia's Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Economic Affairs' Soviet Foreign Economic Relations Project, brought up to date by the author's own additions. Unfortunately, other than a bibliography of his colleagues' publications arising out of the Project, this book is almost totally lacking in documentation and thus will be of little direct aid for further research.

The tables presented in an Appendix are a useful summation of bloc trade activities. The author's analysis convinces this reviewer that many of us have credited the Soviets with too great a success in the realm of economic warfare. The beginning student, or the old Soviet hand, desiring a careful review of recent Soviet international economic activity, will find what he is after in this book. Moreover, convincing argument is presented to indicate that although the bloc will "retain its self-sufficiency policy . . . economic motivation is playing an increasing role in Soviet bloc foreign economic activities with underdeveloped countries. . . ."

Unfortunately, Professor Allen's closing observation revives previous criticism of his work: "One thing is certain; the West *will* find that combination of public and private activity and those methods which will promote and expand an equitable economic system and a value system which attaches the highest priority to man." This reviewer emphatically agrees that we must work to "promote and expand . . . a value system which attaches the highest priority to man." However, those whom Allen would classify as belonging to the "democratic left" will submit that a blind commitment to policies based upon a *laissez faire* outlook (*i.e.*, in particular, that freedom from governmental regulation of economic activities is the mainstay of human freedom) can lead only to a disaster for political democracy in the complex modern world.

Roy D. Laird

*The University of Kansas*

*The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism.* By J. M. Ahmed. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1960. Pp. xi, 135. $5.00.)

This is without doubt one of the outstanding contributions to the study of modern Egyptian nationalism. While brief, Mr. Ahmed's book is a thorough survey of the writing and thought of some of the most influential men of letters in Egypt during the British occupation, 1882–1922. The survey is refreshingly straightforward and meaningful, and its central thesis—the relevance of nationalist thought during the period under survey to the present Egyptian search for some national formula—is modestly but subtly put forward without arrogant over-emphasis. The presentation is fortunately unencumbered by theoretical or other clichés.

In a well-written introduction the author discusses the impact of the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt in 1798 characterized by the uncertainty, stirrings, and gradual though reluctant political awakening of an incipient Egyptian national leadership. Adib Ishaq, Abdullah al-Nadim, Rifa'a Rafi al-Tahtawi were the trumpeters of Egyptian national awakening in the 1850's and 1870's. The chapter on Islamic Liberalism is largely devoted to the influence of Afghani and Sheikh Muhammad Abduh on the generation of nationalist leaders active during the British occupation. In this chapter, Mr. Ahmed emphasizes the "positive aspect" of Egyptian nationalism in its formative stages and the commitment of its leaders to the principles of imported European liberalism as the fundamental premise for the establishment of a modern Egyptian nation-state. At the same time, the author discusses, with the help of appropriate quotations, the major preoccupation of Muhammad Abduh and his disciples with the reform of Islamic religious practices and institutions—a process of evolutionary change which would eventually accommodate traditional Islamic society to the necessities of modern existence.

Mr. Ahmed is careful to point out that early nationalist effort in nineteenth century Egypt was primarily directed at educational reform (especially the Azhar University), "to transmit European knowledge, and relieve the language from the many impediments it had been gathering in the three centuries of stagnation," and that this activity reflected the introduction of the "country's elite" to the principles of European liberalism. It was thus in his role of reformer and teacher that Sheikh Muhammad Abduh bequeathed to his disciples the earnest desire gradually to change society and equip it "for the responsibilities of freedom."

The subsequent confrontation between Abduh's followers and secularists on the one hand, and fundamentalists on the other is brought out in a delightful chapter entitled "The Girondists of Egypt." Mr. Ahmed skillfully observes the influence of British administration upon the writings of such men as Ahmad Fathi Zaghloul, Qasim Amin, and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, especially in the preoccupation of these men with social reform and the achievement of civic virtues.

In contrast to Muhammad Abduh's lukewarm attitude toward political activity, those influenced by his reform ideas and educational philosophy formed the nucleus of political party formations at the turn of the century. It should be noted here that one might take exception with Mr. Ahmed's remark that "After his [Abduh's] experiences in the period of Arabi and his term of exile in Paris and Beirut, he seems to have decided to abandon political activity because something else was more urgent." Sheikh Abduh's activities as Grand Mufti and Azhar scholar involved him in politics directly, even though not in any organized manner. That he abandoned the pan-Islamic ideas of his earlier colleague Afghani there is no doubt. Indeed, the development of political parties after 1907, discussed by Mr. Ahmed in Chapter IV, was a reflection of this deviation on the one hand, and a rejection of the extremist politics of Mustafa Kamil or the Islamicism of Sheikh Ali Yusuf on the other.

The last chapter in the book is devoted to a discussion of the work of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, the sole survivor of this early group of political writers and leaders at the turn of the century. The "philosopher of the generation," as Lutfi is still called by educated Egyptians, continued in the tradition of the early struggle "to arouse the national consciousness of the country." Here again Mr. Ahmed successfully points to the "inner-directed" type of nationalism: the internal reform of Egyptian life and society leading to a state based on political liberty and constitutionalism. "Our nationalism must rest on our interests, not our beliefs," was a formula Lutfi advocated partly to temper the immoderate and wild agitation of extremists.

Throughout the survey, Mr. Ahmed appears to underline the contention of these reforming nationalists that "no political revolution could take the place of a gradual transformation of the mind and heart of Egypt." At the same time he maintains (in his Postscript) that "Contemporary Egypt takes many of her symbols from the pre-First World War years of preparation; and many heroes of that period . . . are now being resuscitated . . . Modern intellectual life in Egypt is in many ways extending or resuming that of the preparatory period which is the subject of this book." It is apparent nevertheless that the military ruling class in Egypt since 1952 has reversed the premise of these early nationalists, preferring a political revolution to direct the transformation of Egyptian thinking. With this attitude, the junta that came to power in July 1952 rejected the constitutional liberalism of their nationalist predecessors. Arabi's spirit may have been evoked by the junta soon after their coup, but Mr. Ahmed argues earlier in his book that the "Girondists," followers of Muhammad Abduh and European liberalism, were not too fond of Arabi's methods.

Mr. Ahmed's suggestion that Lutfi al-Sayyid and his contemporaries were "laying the foundations of the later political and social resurgence of Egypt" may be well-taken theoretically. As to their literary legacy, many Egyptians might take exception to the author's thesis. The new generation of young writers—not Naguib Mahfouz, for whom Mr. Ahmed has a very high regard, but Yusuf Idris, Numan Ashur, Ihsan Abdel Quddus, and Yusuf Sibai—are not trained men of letters as their predecessors were. Indeed, they rebelled against not only their predecessors' thought, but their style as well (compare for example Idris' *The Critical Moment*, al-lahza al-hariga). Moreover, the symbols today are national rather than personal political freedom, efficiency and performance rather than debate and public control of policy. The arch-symbol is the Leader, not any institutionalized process of political decision-making. Finally, the new generation of younger writers seems to have a genuine mass following (among those who can read) to an extent never enjoyed by the educated leaders of the first three decades of the present century.

On the whole this is an unusually competent work on a subject most American political scientists would unfortunately relegate to the historian. Its importance, however, cannot be overlooked by students of Egyptian and Middle Eastern politics, or by students of the politics of the so-called new states. Now that Egypt is becoming increasingly influential in wider Arab national affairs, the appearance of Mr. Ahmed's book should receive the welcome and commendation it deserves.

P. J. VATIKIOTIS
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*Freedom in the Balance; Opinions of Judge Henry W. Edgerton Relating to Civil Liberties.* EDITED BY ELEANOR BONTECOU. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1960. Pp. 278. $5.75.)

*Legacy of Suppression; Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History.* BY LEONARD W. LEVY. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1960. Pp. 353. $6.50.)

"You are one of the truest voices of our constitutional tradition." With these words, Yale University conferred the LL.D. upon Judge Henry White Edgerton of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In the field of civil liberties Judge Edgerton speaks with special vigor, and political scientists will welcome the addition to the Cornell Studies in Civil Liberty of this volume of his civil liberties opinions.

It is true that Edgerton's voice has often been in a minority, but he has an impressive record of support by the Supreme Court. A persistent pushing forward along the liberal path is evident in his severe scrutiny of the government loyalty program and the Un-American Activities Committee; in his denunciation of restrictive covenants and segregated public education; and in his defense of the rights of the despised, the feared, and the unorthodox. In the words of Eleanor Bontecou, the editor, "his own passion is for the preservation of a free society with all that that implies." What it implies, in Edgerton's view, is freedom, with no "ifs," "ands," or "buts."

Yet the reader is left with a faint dissatisfaction. Partly this is due to an inherent deficiency of any such collection of opinions; it is a play in which no one but the hero is allowed on the stage—and Edgerton's chief antagonist, Judge Prettyman, is a formidable one. More important, Edgerton's passion for freedom sometimes seems to warp his judgment. It is not necessary, for example, to deny the fact that the loyalty program caused some innocent suffering to wonder whether the dismissal of Miss Bailey from her position in the United States Employment Service really constituted "forced idleness" and thus "a cruel as well as unusual punishment," or whether the law of free speech is well served by defining punishment as simply "infliction of harm," including such harm as ostracism by private individuals. In this area where free speech and national security collide, Judge Edgerton's views have, understandably, found less support in the Supreme Court, although it cannot be said that the high court has provided an adequate guide of its own. Indeed, wherever else students of American government disagree, most of them would probably agree about the unsatisfactory condition of the law in this area.

One way of beginning to investigate the reasons for this unsatisfactory condition is to explore our constitutional tradition with regard to the relation between free speech and the preservation of a free society. In his *Legacy of Suppression*, Lenonard W. Levy, Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Brandeis University, examines the origins and original understanding of the First Amendment protection of free speech. He raises the question whether it was the intention of the Framers to reject common law notions of free speech and press, which acknowledged "the power of government to punish words that do not directly incite to acts in violation of law." While touching on some of the broader aspects of the problem of free speech, his main concern is with the bed-rock question whether the Framers intended to wipe out the doctrine of seditious libel, as Professor Chafee, Justice Holmes, and many others have asserted. Levy's answer, based on thorough research among masses of original materials, is an emphatic no. Neither in the Anglo-American liberal tradition nor in American thought and action after the Revolution does Levy find any substantial denial of "the notion that the state might be criminally assaulted merely by words, even by words which had no consequence other than producing disesteem or contempt in the minds of the people." As for the First Amendment itself, no one can say for sure what the Framers meant—perhaps they did not know themselves—but the evidence tends to support the proposition that the freedom of speech-and-press clause "substantially embodied the Blackstonian definition [of free speech as freedom from prior restraint] and left the law of seditious libel in force. . . ."

At last, under the pressure of the Sedition Act of 1798, American libertarians began to formulate "a broad definition of the meaning and scope of liberty of expression for the first time in our history." Even then, it has be be remembered that the debate was strictly partisan, that most of the Republicans thought that the *state* governments could punish for seditious libel, that Republican state administrations in fact did so when they came to power (sometimes at Jefferson's suggestion), and that Jefferson probably encouraged such prosecutions even in the federal court. Thomas Paine, liberal and condemned libeller, summed up the thinking of the Framers, including the Republicans, when he argued that liberty of speech and press means liberty from prior restraint; Jefferson's famous assertion that error of opinion might be tolerated, when reason was left free to combat it, is, according to Paine, "sound philosophy in cases of error. But there is a difference between error and licentiousness."

Levy is admirably impartial in setting the historical record straight. However, his certainty that the Framers' conception of free speech is wrong prevents him from achieving his objective of showing the laws of these early times as "they appeared to persons who lived in those respective periods." Thus in his descriptions of prosecutions he often fails to say what the alleged libel was, although people at that time would have considered this crucial in judging the merits of the case. He scarcely considers the fact that seditious libel was only a misdemeanor, and that large numbers of people were in fact willing to run the risk of a relatively light punishment for the sake of exposing governmental corruption or stupidity. He is so convinced that "a good government or an honest administrator could not be injured by error of opinion or even by malicious falsehood," that he seems incapable of even considering the contrary belief which was held by almost all early Americans.

The Framers of the First Amendment thought it necessary for all government, and especially free government, that the people should have a good opinion of it; they thought that truth does not *always* prevail in an ungoverned market-place of opinion; and they thought therefore that it is the duty of free government to preserve the foundation of good opinion on which freedom itself depends. These ideas do not necessarily and under all circumstances lead to the doctrine of seditious libel, any more than they necessarily lead to un-American activities committees or loyalty programs. Their practical application is a matter of judgment, in which the obvious danger of any interference with expression of opinion must weigh heavily. The great difficulties and dangers of such judgments appear to have led some modern libertarians to attempt to free themselves from the need to make judgments at all. The mere words of the First Amendment, unqualified and undefined, are their guide. One consequence of this doctrinaire liberalism is the incapacity of our modern jurisprudence to deal with one of the most pressing legal problems of our age, the relation between free speech and the preservation of free government.

Levy expresses some concern that he may be condemned as an apostate from libertarianism, "or what is even worse, . . . hailed as a convert to the 'new conservatism'. . . ." On the contrary, he deserves praise, in the style of his praise of the Framers, for doing much more than he intended. He has reminded us of the full resources of authentic liberalism, which its strident and over-simplifying contemporary exponents have tended to obscure.

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*Metropolis, 1985.* BY RAYMOND VERNON. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. xiii, 252. $5.00.)

The metropolitan-area study is a post-war vogue engaged in by legions of high-priced talent, including apprehensive central business district leaders, eager foundation executives desiring to deliver hammer blows to social problems, middle-range corporate executives anxious to win Brownie points with those in the executive suites by giving the company an image of good citizenship, and academicians hoping to divert some applied research funds to fundamental questions. These studies may be divided generally into two types. Studies in the smaller standard metropolitan areas (just as we were getting accustomed to calling them SMAs, the Census Bureau came up with SMSA, for which there is little that can be said), usually concentrate on governmental reorganization and are often oriented toward traditional chamber of commerce boosterism. Local supporters of these studies generally believe that the community can still grow, even within the core city, and that a streamlined, integrated, professional local government will help attract industry. In the giant metropolises, a different concept prevails. Here the number of local general- and special-purpose governments is so great that not even the most earnest advocate of metropolitan area-wide governments imagines that sweeping structural reorganization is possible. Some may not even consider it necessary. Study advocates in these areas, instead, are most interested in the economic base and, collaterally, in the fate of the central business district. They fear that their metropolis is obsolescent. These concerns are shared by land-owners, merchants, bankers, and labor leaders alike, if my personal observations are correct.

In a study of the New York area, we would expect that the staff work would be done primarily by economists, using economic concepts and study techniques, and this is the case. It might be well to leave to other journals the task of evaluating the economic-base findings. In general, they show that while the New York area has many problems, prospects for future economic health and happiness are good. As for the body politic, the researchers make clear their opinion that local government (state and Federal governments are treated in incidental fashion only), is not the most important of the forces shaping the future of the metropolis; but one suspects that the coming task of local governments may be more significant than Vernon and his colleagues concede.

*Metropolis, 1985*, as a summary volume, offers a history of the economic factors that produced the great urban complex, traces the principal developments, and offers a projection of current trends over the next quarter of a century. In conducting this study, a team from the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard sought to quantify as many aspects of the regional economic base as possible. This approach placed an emphasis upon such measures as municipal expenditure levels, job opportunities in public employment, and net wealth and revenue-producing ability of sub-areas. Apparently one contributor, Robert C. Wood, made use of research methods which sought to relate suburban governmental patterns and service difficulties to economic indices, and Vernon suggests that the characteristics of the population and economy of the older cities produces more governmantal problems for them than are to be found even in the less wealthy of the new communities with their high get-going costs. The aging of the older municipalities will create increasing problems if the physical facilities are to remain safe, sanitary, industrially usable, and aesthetically acceptable. These problems will also be a divisive force adding to inter-municipal suspicion and distrust.

Considerable attention is paid to one problem that is especially related to the future good health of Gotham and that is in considerable part controllable by local governments: transportation. Even though the automobile is threatening to choke the region to death, prospects for placing greater emphasis on the use of public transit in preference to individual automobiles are poor because of the political fragmentation of the area. Few local politicians can afford to support rapid transit schemes which, if they should ever come to pass, would be practically guaranteed to take retail business to Manhattan and away from the merchants of their own constituencies.

As for local governments generally, economist Vernon barely escapes being cynical. He does not expect them to fail, but he holds out little hope that battalions of do-gooders and professional administrators will substantially alter the secular trend. Briefly, in making projections he assumes that there will be enough response to critical problems on the part of local governments to keep the economy from collapse, but not much more than that. He believes that "local governments will muddle through." He sees them doing no better and no worse than this simply because there is a "total absence of a basis for assuming anything else."

The series of which this is the summary volume impressively analyzes the economic process within America's largest urban complex. For the political scientist who is accustomed to viewing a metropolitan area in terms of structural, sociological, social-psychological, or historical factors, this study is an effective reminder of the overwhelming importance of man's concern for bread—and for split-levels—in the shaping of governments.

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*The Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept.* By Glendon Schubert. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960. Pp. x, 224. $5.00.)

Professor Schubert has undertaken a task that may win him few friends in the political science fraternity. He has attempted a comprehensive examination of the professional literature written during the past three decades with a view to identifying major intellectual groupings and examining critically the positions of each grouping on the question: How, in American politics, is the Public Interest to be achieved? In the course of his analysis he considers nearly 150 writers, many of them critically, most of them in such a way as to categorize their ideas. One suspects that few of Schubert's subjects will altogether approve of what he has done with their work. This is all the more reason to express here this reviewer's enthusiasm for the book. There are many points with which one may take issue, including at least one or two fundamental assumptions. More of these later. But the volume is challenging throughout; its categories are both comprehensive and discriminating; its style and level of insight are well above the professional average. Everyone who utilizes the notion of "the public interest" in his teaching or writing has an obligation to read and come to terms with Schubert's book.

Schubert develops three categories into which he feels statements about how the public interest is to be realized fall. These are Rationalist, Idealist, and Realist. Within each he examines what the writers have to say about how constituency, Congress, the Presidency, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary should function to maximize the public interest. He concludes that Rationalists are pro-public and anti-interest group as they seek the mechanisms to assure that the popular will is translated into public policy. Some Rationalists prefer the disciplined party, others seek to consult the people directly. Some look to a strong Presidency, others to a cabinet-style system. Whatever the variety, however, the common ground lies in the assumption that a popular will exists and that decision-making processes should be rationalized to execute that will.

Idealists are anti-party and anti-interest group. They believe that the public interest is to be found in the higher law and manifested in the conscience of every public official. Parties and interest groups, the "orthodox appurtenances of democratic politics," are hindrances to the achievement of the public interest and can be tolerated only to prevent an even greater debasement of the system. They are certainly not means to the good society.

The Realist category gives Schubert the most trouble. His Realists include the group theorists, those who emphasize the individual and psychological character of decision-making, and the "Due-Process Realists, who find the public interest in the structuring of decisional processes to insure full consideration of the facts, hypotheses, and values relevant to the particular decisions involved." As Schubert notes, many of his Realists deny that there is any use in talking about the public interest and are more inclined to concentrate on analytical-descriptive statements of the way policy is made. His discussion of the Realists is confusing because he sometimes treats the analytical statements as though they advocated the decisional processes they describe. However, Schubert also finds the Realists employing notions like "potential groups" as means of sneaking the public interest in by the back door. Other Realists may elevate their analytical findings to a normative plane, and thus rescue the public interest. In this regard, Schubert's own preference seems to be that if one must talk about the public interest, the Due-Process Realists are the least objectionable.

In a final chapter, Schubert considers some other recent critics of the public interest. He insists that "A theory of the public interest in governmental decision-making ought to describe a relationship between concepts of the public interest and official behavior in such terms that it might be possible to attempt to validate empirically hypotheses concerning the relationship." He finds that no such theory exists and that, as a consequence, the concept is "significant primarily as a datum of politics." It may be, however, that Schubert has employed an irrelevant criterion. For all the talk about processes rather than policy content, one cannot escape the feeling that what most public interest "theorists" are concerned about is content after all. A disciplined party system is better than an undisciplined party system because it is likely, in the judgment of the Party Rationalists, to produce more satisfactory public policy. The Due-Process Realist thinks that maximizing the consideration of relevant data will produce more rational, *i.e.*, better, decisions. The Idealist prefers his choice for "wise men" because, essentially by definition, wise men will make sound decisions.

Thus the whole professional effort to divorce process from content must lead to confusion as long as the object of analysis is normative. That the substantive norms are so often unstated does not improve the clarity with which the procedural recommendations are made. To ask for empirical tests of such prescriptions, however, seems quite beside the point. The suggestion that a specified institutional reform —let us say, more disciplined parties— will lead to more (or less) social welfare legislation is, in principle, subject to empirical verification. To substitute "the public interest" for the legislative result really eliminates the possibility of testing. It also emasculates the statement politically. Indeed the public interest may have been most important, especially to political scientists, as a kind of professional disguise, shielding them from public controversy. The unfortunate thing is that the disguise has often been so impenetrable, even to its wearer. Schubert is to be congratulated for helping so much in the unmasking.

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*Governance of Colleges and Universities.* BY JOHN J. CORSON. (New York: McGraw-

Hill Book Company, Inc. 1960. Pp. vi, 209. $5.50.)

This volume represents a first and exploratory attempt to examine the nature of college and university administration in the light of our existing knowledge of administrative theory. It is based upon the direct observation of a selected group of institutions, a rather extensive review of the literature in the field of academic administration, and a large number of conversations between the author and persons throughout the country who are concerned with the problems of college and university administration. Sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation, the study was conducted by Mr. Corson, who brought to the assignment both a sympathetic attitude and a broad understanding of administration gained from extensive experience as a government official, management consultant, and teacher. The end result is a provocative discussion of the major elements and issues involved in the governing of American colleges and universities.

Starting from the premise that administration is a process or activity common to all organized, cooperative human endeavor, the author examines first the role and function of the major groups within a college and university which participate in the governing process. He segregates these groups into three categories: university-wide officers (boards of trustees and presidents), academic officers (deans and department chairmen), and faculties. The formal (legal) and actual participation of each group is analyzed with regard to its function and role in the areas of educational program, faculty selection, finance, physical facilities, student affairs, and public and alumni relations. The conclusions that faculties tend to exercise far greater influence in educational program and faculty selection than any of the other groups, that the boards of trustees restrict themselves largely to questions of finance and physical facilities, and that presidents find themselves limited in the influence they have over institutional policies and operations are not new. Rather, they substantiate what most academicians already know about college and university administration.

The value of the book lies essentially in the discussion of these findings in terms of general administrative theory and practice. The critical questions for the author as well as for anyone deeply concerned about the effective administration of colleges and universities are: What are the major differences between academic and non-academic administration? What are the reasons for these differences? What are the implications of these differences?

As the author applies his understanding of administration to the answering of these questions, he notes that in most non-academic institutions responsibility for policy determination is focussed in the chief executive and governing boards of these organizations. Decisions by these persons are, for the most part, made in terms of relatively clearly defined statements of purpose. They have a bench mark against which the addition or elimination of an activity or program can be measured. Beyond this, non-academic administrators are helped in the communications process by a defined hierarchy and by the identification of the members of the organization with both the general and specific goals of the organization.

To a large degree, the same conditions do not exist within the framework of a university or college. Responsibility for decision-making in the field of educational policy and programming is diffused and decentralized. Departments, and sometimes individual faculty members, in effect determine institutional policy regarding the offering of a certain program. The difficulty lies in the fact that neither the president nor the academic officers have any clearly established statement of purpose against which proposals for modifications in program can be evaluated. By what criteria can one say that a new chemistry laboratory is more important than the addition or establishment of a language laboratory? Decisions to allocate resources to one or the other are made daily, but there is uncertainty as to how these decisions help in the effectuation of overall institutional policy and goals. Any review of the programs of a college or university suggests that what is offered and what facilities are available reflect largely the bargaining strength of the different segments of the institution, rather than an evaluation of these programs in terms of some basic objective.

An underlying reason for this is that within a university or college, it is generally assumed that what is good for an English department, political science department, chemistry department, and others is not only good for the institution as a whole, but for society as well. Added to this is the primary orientation of the individual faculty member to his own discipline or profession, rather than to the institution itself. Are these assumptions and attitudes conducive to the solution of the problems which colleges and universities face—the demands imposed upon them not only by an increasing number of students, but also by government, business, community and other groups for a wide variety of educational and research services? How can an institution of higher education more rationally determine what resources, and in what amount, should be allocated to professional education, adult education programs, a larger full-time student body, or additional contractual research? In some manner, there must be a review of these competing demands for resources in terms of the organization as a whole. For the present, most academic institutions do not have effective processes and machinery through which to conduct this review.

At no point does Mr. Corson attempt to set forth a program for the reform of academic administration. He notes that our existing knowledge is so limited that any specific suggestions are not really possible at this time. What is needed, therefore, is much more research directed not only towards defining present practice more precisely, but asking the normative questions of whether certain procedures, developed largely as a result of tradition, should be permitted to continue. To assist this effort, the author has outlined in each chapter areas where such additional research might be profitably undertaken. One idea which strikes this reviewer as being particularly interesting is the conduct of studies examining both the successful and not so successful institutions to isolate the variables responsible for the differences. If we had this kind of data, we might then be more sure of what makes for a great institution than we are now, and plot our courses accordingly. It can only be hoped that the Carnegie Corporation, Mr. Corson, and others will not let this good beginning go for naught.

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# BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

## POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

*Autocracy and Democracy.* By Ralph K. White and Ronald O. Lippitt. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. Pp. x, 330. $6.00.)

*The Effects of Leadership.* By Hanan C. Selvin. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960, Pp. xiii, 270. $5.00.)

*Social Status and Leadership.* By Melvin Seeman. (Columbus: The Ohio State University, 1960. Pp. xi, 156. $3.00 paper, $4.00 cloth.)

For over two millennia, the "problem of authority" has been a central concern of political science in the West. Arguably, many national communities have "solved" this problem, but the continuing flow of "leadership" studies, such as these three, suggests that the working consensus —if there is one—may be unstable.

The leader-follower situations in the three studies are rather different. The White and Lippitt book, which is (in part) a reorganization and summary of the 20-year old studies by Lewin, Lippitt, and White, deals with the relationship between adult counselors and 11-year old boys in after-school clubs. The Selvin study is concerned with Army officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) and enlisted men in basic training companies. Seeman's book studies community superintendents of schools (and school principals) as leaders and school teachers as followers.

In methodological terms, all three books are examples of "the" behavioral sciences approach. In the rigor and elegance of their research designs, however, they vary considerably, a variation that doubtless derives in part from the varying intractabilities of the three research situations. The studies summarized in the White and Lippitt book were classically experimental, and the design of the original work, though not flawless, remains both a model of elegance and a testimony to the continuing possibility—given the investigator's creativity in identifying "sufficiently" tractable situations—of experimentation in the social sciences. The Selvin study is, essentially, an analysis of secondary materials—that is, it is an analysis, according to a design invented by Selvin after the data were collected, of data that were not collected by Selvin and that were originally collected for purposes that were not Selvin's. Given these limitations, his analysis of what was, methodologically, a cross-sectional "public opinion survey" exhibits both ingenuity and sophistication. Seeman's data come from self-administered questionnaires to school leaders and followers, and from focused interviews with the superintendents. The questionnaires rely upon ratings, and Seeman's analysis seems to assume that ordinal, like cardinal, numbers can be added and subtracted.

The substantive findings of the three studies also vary considerably. The Lewin, Lippitt and White research, using three different kinds of leadership behavior or role as the major independent variable, showed that the exposure of different groups of boys to adults playing different leadership roles produced different behaviors among the boys—differences that were generally in hypothesized directions.

Selvin's study was more complicated. His major dependent variables concerned the participation by Army trainees in a variety of off-duty activities. The independent variables were of two sorts: the trainees' "averaged" *perceptions* of leader behavior ("leadership climate") in their respective companies, and individual characteristics of the trainees, such as age, marital status, and formal education. Although the varying climates in different companies did differentiate the incidence therein of varying sorts of off-duty activity, the effects of the trainees' individual characteristics "are not at all similar in the three leadership climates, and the effects of leadership bear unequally on different kinds of men" (p. 139).

Seeman's study is unique among these three in treating leadership variables (leadership ideologies and leadership styles) as dependent. His independent variables were various "status measures." The analysis, too detailed to summarize here, partly supported one of the status hypotheses; it "confirmed" the other two, but in directions contrary to those that Seeman had originally hypothesized.

All three studies share a feature that limits their generalizability: each deals with a situation that afforded the bulk of the followers no very direct way to take part in selecting a new leader or in deposing an unsatisfactory one. Utopian and real instances of this rather highly structured type of situation are not hard to find: the medieval kingship; the early modern absolute monarchy; the enlightened, benevolent despotism advocated by Voltaire; and the governmental (and industrial) bureaucracies of the Twentieth Century. Given such situations, it is plausible to argue or assume, and it is sometimes possible to show, that a leader's behavior is highly influential, if not exclusively crucial, in determining the "happiness" or "welfare" and the "productivity" of his followers. So much many writers of the medieval and early modern manuals for the education of princes must have assumed, if we are to make sense of the moral exhortations that the typical *de regimine principum* contained. So much Lewin, Lippitt, and White and the large "human relations" and "democratic leadership" research that they stimulated have shown to be the case in a wide variety of situations—most of them rather highly structured.

But the major theoretical difficulty with such situations is that, though numerous, they are still "special." Although Selvin's findings on the causal efficacy of individual characteristics would have enabled him to confront the problem of generalizability, he avoids it. Self-consciously and avowedly, he confines his programmatic remarks to the case of the formal organization: given certain organizational goals, personnel assignment policy should take into account the individual characteristics of subordinates as well as the leadership qualities of their superiors. Seeman, forced by the unfortunate behavior of his correlations to re-examine his basic assumptions, insists that the norms of American culture concerning leader behavior are inconsistent and equivocal, and that awareness of these inconsistencies is prerequisite to any study of leadership in an American context.

White and Lippitt venture to leap from the world of the boys club to the world of the nation state. The result is not happy. Not only, as is the case with some psychologists, do they exhibit a tendency to treat culture and social structure as mere epiphenomena; they also tend to view political democracy as a question of leader behavior, rather than as a system for rejecting, as well as selecting, leaders. Not surprisingly, they view the problem of identifying democratic men and getting them to serve as leaders as one of the crucial problems of modern political democracy.

As Selvin's and Seeman's studies suggest, there are reasons for hoping that, in contemporary leadership research, the near-monopolistic position of leader behavior as *the* independent variable may be about to be broken. The observability and causal efficacy of the phenomenon have been adequately demonstrated, and future research might well devote attention to other leadership-related phenomena.—CHARLES D. FARRIS, *The University of Florida.*

*The Effects of Mass Communication.* BY JOSEPH T. KLAPPER. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960. Pp. xviii, 302. $5.00.)

This book was sorely needed. Such a niagara of special studies of communication media has overwhelmed us, particularly in the past two decades, that the ordering of findings and the reconciliation of theory seemed impossible tasks. Prof. Klapper, therefore, is to be applauded for rationalizing this chaos by reviewing some 1,000 pieces of writing (only part of the vast body of literature, as he points out) and doing it in the context of a series of theoretical generalizations.

The theory employed he calls "phenomenistic"—a view which "is in essence a shift *away* from the tendency to regard mass communication as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, toward a view of the media as influences, working amid other influences, in a total situation." The five basic generalizations he works with implement this position. Mass communication is seen primarily as "a contributory agent, but not the sole cause."

The book is organized into two sections. The first deals with the generalized effects of persuasive communication—reenforcement, minor attitude change, and conversion. The author is concerned here with the analysis of five mediating forces: predispositions (including selective exposure, perception, and retention); groups and group norms; interpersonal dissemination; opinion leadership; and the nature of the media in a free enterprise society. A separate chapter discusses the relevance of the "communication situation," which involves a look at differential sources, contents, and the differential persuasive power of media types.

Part II concentrates on the effects of specific types of media content, such as violence and escapist material, as well as on such problems as the effect of adult TV fare on child audiences. The most up-to-date studies are reported and compared.

One comes away from this synthesis with a feeling of both satisfaction and frustration. The sheer volume of research is staggering. The conceptual and technical ingenuity and sophistication of much of the research effort is impressive. And yet, ironically, we are told there is a "paucity of data." We are repeatedly warned that the problem "requires further research." Above all, on the big theoretical issues, it is quite clear that controversy rages: on, for example, the role of personal influence in attitude change; on whether the mass media, particularly TV, induce passivity; on the social apathy effects of escapist media content. We have data and theory, but the author reminds us that his generalizations are exploratory and "their emendation (is) both inevitable and desirable."

Nevertheless, this honest appraisal of the status of research in this area need not dismay us. Professor Klapper points the way to filling the gaps in our knowledge, to confirmation of conjectures and suggests how we may assault the major unanswered questions. His theoretical launching pad can move us from the "post-hole-digging" research approach to more systematically planned designs.

For the political scientist this book has value, even though we may not be curious about the results of such specialized research as the effects of TV on our children's behavior. Prof. Klapper's book demonstrates both how few political scientists have done research in this field, and also how relevant such research is to the study of the political process. It may be unfortunate that he excludes explicit reference to the work of the few political scientists who have contributed in this area, notably the brilliant work of Harold Gosnell in his 1924–25 study entitled *Getting Out the Vote.* But the point is clear: we have largely ignored the subject. The "political" contributions have been made by those in other disciplines studying the voting process, especially the study by Lazarsfeld, et al., *The People's Choice.* Yet, helpful as such work has been, we have not begun to grapple with the problems related to the impact of communication on political behavior and the role of communication in the political system. The long-range effects of communication on politics is an area which, as the author notes, badly needs scientific exploration. Those who are genuinely concerned with these research priorities can profit immensely from Prof. Klapper's provocative survey and evaluation.—SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD, *University of Michigan.*

*The American Historian: A Social-Intellectual History of the Writing of the American Past.* BY HARVEY WISH. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1960. Pp. 366. $7.50.)

*Essays in American Historiography: Papers Presented in Honor of Allan Nevins.* EDITED BY DONALD SHEEHAN AND HAROLD C. SYRETT. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1960. Pp. 320. $6.00.)

In recent years American historians have increasingly engaged in self-analysis. The development of intellectual history and the debate which followed Charles A. Beard's attack on traditional methods of historical research have been followed by the publication of many histories of American history, biographies of American historians, and articles on the meaning and value of history. These works are in this pattern.

Professor Wish follows the biographical approach which he used in *Society and Thought in America.* In each chapter he uses the work of a historian as a point of departure for an essay on the histories written during a specific period. Beginning with a discussion of Bradford and Mather, he closes with a chapter on Allan Nevins.

The author's grasp of the subject is apparent, for he adds to his penetrating analysis of the work of each historian statements of the views of other critics. He devotes ten pages to a discussion of the historians who have written about the South, correctly, if somewhat clumsily, observing that "No other area in American historiography reflects so baldly the influence of subjective influences on historians as in the case of the Old South, the Civil War, and Reconstruction." Wish probably exposes his own philosophy in the statement, "Human values of course are not an indigenous part of the historical narrative; they are put there by a moralist disguised as a historian, and the conclusions are partly shaped by this fact."

Students of political science will be especially interested in the chapters on Charles A. Beard. In his discussion of Beard's economic interpretation of history, Wish refers to Robert E. Brown's excellent critique of Beard, but neglects Forrest McDonald's equally important work; perhaps it appeared while his manuscript was in press.

Wish's treatment of the theory of historical relativism advanced by Beard and Carl L. Becker is not entirely satisfactory. He summarizes their views, but fails to treat the problems raised by the theory, especially in its extreme form. Undoubtedly Beard, Becker, and others who, in Cushing Strout's phrase, led the "pragmatic revolt" among American historians, were correct in the repudiation of the views of such men as Henry Adams, who attempted to forecast the future by using a formula based on the second law of thermodynamics and the rule of phase. Many eminent historians have disagreed with Beard's theories, to be sure, but Wish practically ignores them. Certainly the fact that the historian is affected by what Becker called "the climate of opinion" is generally accepted today, but many historians decry any tendency to use history as a propaganda tool, and hold that the historian's recognition of the unattainability of ultimate truth is not sufficient reason for his abandonment of the quest.

The final chapter of Wish's book is an evaluation of the work of Allan Nevins, whose definition of the historian as one who works "in a spirit of critical inquiry for the whole truth" has surely become an aphorism among members of the profession. He praises Nevins for his industry and his felicitous style and correctly places him among those " 'who have a higher ideal of truth'." While they must admit that " 'their effort to attain it is often doomed to failure'," they " 'will never give up the attempt'."

The second work is in a well-established tradition, in which students prepare a work in honor of their teacher. Inevitably, the essays vary in interest and in value. Edward N. Saveth, in a fine essay on scientific history in America, concludes that historians have been too much concerned with theory; "in a universe without hitching posts," he says, the historian is merely an honest man who uses the best available methods in his search for truth in the past.

Robert C. Black, in an essay on the Confederacy, follows well-worn paths. The South is the South because of the Negro; the sectional conflict was a result of slavery; the Negro was the cause of it all. His soundest point is the observation that the death of the Confederacy did not mean the end of the South; indeed, he might well have inquired whether the manner of that death did not prolong the life of the South about which he writes. Donald Sheehan seems to call on historians of Reconstruction to commit themselves to moral judgments; he criticizes them for an open-mindedness which is close to indecision. Jacob E. Cooke, emphasizing the same view, asserts that "the rationale of the Southern caste system was elaborated" in the period 1877–1910, completely ignoring the widespread, even dominant, racist theories of the antebellum defenders of slavery as well as the prevalence of similar views elsewhere, as Wish clearly shows in his discussion of historians of the South, and as James P. Shenton shows in his discussion of racism and imperialism.

James A. Rawle, in a survey of historiography between the Civil War and World War I, discusses, among others, Charles A. Beard, but fails to mention either Brown or McDonald, and seems to confuse Beard's advocacy of a wider and more utilitarian New History with his attack on the methodological premises of traditional history.

Among the stronger essays are those of Joseph A. Borome, on evolution, and Sidney Ratner, on pragmatism. Ratner comments on the influence of pragmatism on such political scientists as Charles E. Merriam and T. V. Smith, as well as on Justices Holmes and Brandeis and Dean Pound.

Despite a few errors, such as Wish's statement that Bell I. Wiley published *Southern Negroes* at Emory University, these are valuable additions to the literature of American historiography. Students of the subject will find in the generous notes in both works good suggestions for further reading.—Henry L. Swint, *Vanderbilt University*.

*The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age.* By Bruno Bettelheim. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960. Pp. ix, 309. $5.00.)

At first it seems that this is only a modest contribution to the flourishing social psychoanalytical genre wherein analysts like Horney, Kardiner (of *Sex and Morality*, not *Psychological Frontiers*,) and Reich tell us what is wrong with us as a civilization and what we must do to be better. In this company, and viewed in this light, it suffers a kind of anemia: the ideas have not the crystal clarity of a Karen Horney, the style is not graced with the gift of music which Erik Erikson provides, the original and penetrating thought of an Erich Fromm is nowhere to be found in this book. There is, moreover, a tendency to rather exotic interpretations: "The farther up in the [Nazi] hierarchy a man stood, not the more, but the less influence did he have on shaping decisions, and the more he lived only by the leader's will." Opposed to the Allied policy of forcing German citizens to confirm with their own eyes the existence and horror of the concentration camps, Bettelheim says, "the net effect of their visit to the camps was probably to convince them how right they had been all along in not opposing the Gestapo." (No effect on their efforts to rewrite history or their preference for refurbishing the memory of Hitler for another time?) Still, the discussion of the problems of achieving autonomy through new forms of consciousness, improved child care, and a subtle attack on the depersonalization of mass society offers sustenance for the mind and material for conversation.

But the theory and interpretation of this rather general and, with certain exceptions, slightly shopworn nature represents only about a third of the book; the remainder, dealing with the Nazi concentration camps, is absorbing, and, if Bettelheim's own previous writings are excepted, new and insightful. "A main thesis of this book," he says, is "that a repressive regime can so disintegrate the personality of adults that out of pure anxiety they can firmly believe what they would know to be false if their anxiety permitted them to know it." In elaborating this and other theses, he draws on his own experience in Dachau, vividly—all too vividly—illustrates the points he has to make, and searches for a political psychology of behavior in extreme situations. It is a range of experience which hardly occurs to most of the well-bred well-fed men who write about political affairs; it deserves examination for its own sake, for the pathology it reveals. But even more important, it serves the same purpose for social-psychological analysis which is served in another way by the extreme situation seen in the psychoses. From schizophrenia, we learn something of the dissociative thinking processes which the sane employ from time to time. From the terror of the camps, Bettelheim draws inferences about a society characterized by emotional detachment, selective amnesia, the psychology of "the victim," and, in a series of gruesome lines, the pathology of men so demoralized, so eager for death, that they dig their own graves and then lie down in them.

The more general inferences from these extreme situations have to do with the nature of "social" man when he has been deprived of his "identity," has lost social ego-nourishing supports, and been led, over time, to think of himself as indistinguishable from all others. Just as the schizophrenic is the caricature of the normal day-dreamer, so the concentration camp inmate is the caricature of the normal isolated migrant worker, mill-hand, or bachelor Negro share-cropper. In this small cosmos of horror, there is something of the shadow of the mass state. It is this which makes Bettelheim leave his clinic and his child patients and write again and again of the margin of psychological disaster on whose shores he believes we live. Here he is, so to speak, a Jeremiah but not a Cassandra; he warns of impending danger but he does not prophesy defeat. "If I read the signs of our times correctly," he says, "we have taken the first steps toward mastering the new conditions of life in an age of atomic power" and have moved hesitantly toward "achieving a higher integration."—ROBERT E. LANE, *Yale University*.

*The Gift of Rome*. BY JOHN AND ESTHER WAGNER. (New York: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1961. Pp. xi, 224. $4.00.)

What, if anything, can a political novel (which this book is) say about the political process that cannot be said as well or better in non-fictional form? The good political novelist offers not propositions but fecundity, in the sense that he suggests new and stimulating perspectives for looking at political situations. He explores more imaginatively and freely than our validated propositions the ways in which personalities, settings, political institutions, interests and social conditions explain each other or constitute aspects of the same totality. He does this without evidence of validity except that his formulation may seem compatible with what we know and sense and that it lights up what previously puzzled us. Precisely because the novelist is more free than the scholar to depict his understanding of reality without the obligation to offer systematic evidence, he need not abstract arbitrarily defined elements for rigorous analysis. He thereby loses precision but may gain a more useful perspective and a fuller meaning. *Darkness at Noon* and *The Masters* leave the reader with an understanding of how to relate personality to organization, to the past, to others' roles, and to social conditioning that goes beyond the propositions organizational theorists and social psychologists have so far been able to validate.

If these are the virtues of the good political novel, *The Gift of Rome* is a fairly neat example of how not to write one. The plot deals with an important trial in ancient Rome: a trial which brings to a focus political and social divisions and passions. The great advocate and Praetor, Marcus Tullius Cicero, is able to win acquittal and popularity for an accused man who is technically guilty by arousing public passion in his favor, demonstrating the wickedness of his accusers, and identifying the accused with a politically popular movement. The chief protagonists are wooden and are stereotypes of good and evil. Woven around the trial are subplots compounding the best of Fu Man Chu and Perry Mason.

Sterile characterization and banal plotting are compatible neither with good literature nor with good political science. The book does offer some important propositions about government, and they are probably valid; but they are precisely the kinds of propositions that can be discussed and tested satisfactorily only in research, not in a novel. Many of us are no doubt already convinced that judicial decisions reflect dominant group interests, and that this is especially apparent in political show trials; and we would no doubt be willing to admit the probability that legal advocacy in such a trial is not necessarily successful in the degree that it is logical, but rather in the degree that it makes a wide, deep, and emotional public appeal. These seem to me to be the chief political propositions the authors suggest. To summarize the political insights of Koestler or Snow in two sentences would be an absurdity; to do it for *The Gift of Rome* is to give the authors the benefit of the doubt.—MURRAY EDELMAN, *University of Illinois*.

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## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*U. S. Senators and Their World*. By Donald R. Matthews. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960. Pp. xvi, 303. $6.00.)

Presumably the world of U. S. senators these days would include the entire globe and some anxious probings into outer space but Donald Matthews, a professor of political science at the University of North Carolina, does not really try to cover that much. His book is about "the people who served in the Senate during the critical years between 1947 and 1957 and how they behaved." This is quite enough, and Professor Matthews handles this undertaking very well indeed.

His approach combines three different kinds of scholarly enterprises.

The first is a careful and certainly the most complete composite portrait of 180 senators to be found anywhere. Every source of biographical data has been mined to furnish a detailed group biography containing data on age, sex, class, occupation and about everything else which might occur to a student of politics and politicians.

The second is an attempt to reconstruct the way senators live and behave, based on ten months of close observation and interviews with 109 senators, staff members, lobbyists and journalists. No attempt was made to see a "representative" sample or to follow a formal schedule of questions. The emphasis was on focused interviews with a rough cross-section, people with whom the author enjoyed or was able to establish good rapport. No notes were taken during the interviews. The latter were transcribed as nearly verbatim as possible immediately afterward, on the basis of which direct quotation (without attribution) is frequently attempted in the text.

Professor Matthews' reasons for proceeding this way, which are based chiefly on the obstacles to dealing with senators any other way, seem to me perfectly sound, and what he has to report is fresh, sophisticated, unfailingly interesting and, to the best of my knowledge, quite true. He suggests how senatorial behavior is affected by the Washington environment, and then deals in more detail with the internal life of the institution—with its folkways (described by him in this Review, Vol. 53, December, 1959, pp. 1064–89), party leadership and committee operations. He then analyzes senatorial relations with those other political actors, the lobbyists and reporters, and with the enigmatic constituency which can so casually terminate the most illustrious career with dreadful finality. The final chapter depicts life on the chamber floor and assesses realistically the relative importance of actions which occur there.

The third kind of enterprise seems to be an attempt to impose on the data all the quantification they will bear, and here the assessment must be mixed. Most of the 62 tables and 31 figures present information clearly and in detail and are highly useful. But the attempt to relate biographical data to behavior seems to me not really successful. Particularly is this true when a categorization of senators based on two variables only—social status and previous political accomplishment—is employed. Of the four categories, one contains only seven and another four percent of all the senators, with the result that cells frequently are too small to have much significance.

Again, as an example, the author attempts to determine whether senators who obey the folkways enjoining talkativeness and prescribing specialization actually are more effective (*i. e.*, get more of their bills passed). Leaving aside the obvious complaints that bill-passing is a collective, not an individual, accomplishment, and is not the only nor perhaps even the most important function of the Senate, the results still provoke wonder. When they lead the author to say, "Some rank and file minority senators are more effective than committee chairmen. . . . Some new and very green members of the District of Columbia Committee were, at least during the Eighty-third and Eighty-fourth Congresses, more effective than very senior senators of the Appropriations Committee," it is time for the common sense which is displayed on every page to assert itself and question what, if anything, is being measured.

The overall judgment nevertheless certainly must be that this book is a solid scholarly achievement which probably will be the standard work on the Senate for a long time.—RALPH K. HUITT, *University of Wisconsin.*

*Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of Bar and Bench, 1887–1895.* BY ARNOLD M. PAUL. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1960. Pp. viii, 256, $4.75.)

The development of substantive due process during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, and the *Debs*, *E. C. Knight*, and *Income Tax* cases constitute a story which has not gone unnoticed or unsung. What Mr. Paul sets out to do in this most recent account is to supplement it with quotations and summaries from the speeches, opinions, and writings of lesser known lawyers and judges, as well as to give relatively long accounts of the three leading cases, and then conclude with a chapter on "Conservatism and the Judiciary: An Appraisal."

While many of the quotations from and references to lawyers, treatise writers, and judges who are less well known than Choate or Cooley or Fuller are not altogether new, they, together with the obscure materials here used, do help to give the story a dimension that is lacking if the account is restricted to a few decisions of the Supreme Court. A very large portion of the book, however, is devoted to the major cases and especially to *Pollock*, which receives two long chapters or almost one-fourth of the whole. By contrast, the chapter on analysis and appraisal is brief and adds little to the previous discussion. Of course, the story of the income tax controversy is always a good one, especially if there are generous quotations from the lively speeches of counsel and from the vigorous dissenting opinions. The story is well told here. What I question is not the telling of that story or, for that matter, the point of view of the author, but whether it is sufficient, when dealing with this problem and this group of well known cases, to deal with the doctrines therein embodied as though they were espoused, in those years, primarily by reactionary men of the law. Moreover, are these cases as representative of the entire range of decisions reviewing the constitutionality of statutes, whether state or national, as the author seems to imply in his concluding paragraph? And why did the rules enunciated in these major cases remain in good standing so many years? Some were, to be sure, modified within a few years; the income tax amendment was adopted in 1913; most of the substantive due process of the 'nineties was not by-passed or overruled until the hasty "switch in time" of 1937.

Mr. Dooley, we are told, "over-simplified" in his aphorism, "th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns." Well, he used only one sentence in which to wrap up his point. Has the pithy remark of the Sage of the Saloon no relevance except the intended reference to the *Insular Cases?* I think it has, though the evidence is elusive. Cleveland received a majority or a plurality of the popular votes in three successive elections. He also sent federal troops to put down the Pullman strike, and he appointed Fuller and Peckham to the Court. Was he following the election returns? Not Bryan, the critic of the Court, but McKinley, its defender, won in 1896 and 1900. Were the decisions of 1895 so unrepresentative of mass opinion?

The extent to which certain of the due process decisions and the three cases of 1895 were not altogether typical of the Court's rulings might be suggested by asking how the author reconciles his dedication to the memory of Mr. Justice Holmes with his peroration about the decades in which there was "a full proliferation of judicial obstructionism. The Supreme Court of the United States became, instead of an instrument of constitutional democracy, an impediment to constitutional democracy." Is that a clear and certain truth? Why, then, was Mr. Justice Holmes with the majority in over three-fourths of the cases of his years on the Court (1902–1932) in which state action was held contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment? And, of course, these cases are but a small fraction of those before the Court in his long period as a Justice. He was with the majority in nearly all of the decisions sustaining state and Congressional legislation. The Court did hold up, or render ineffective, certain kinds of regulatory or tax legislation, but that was only one phase of its work. Nor is it as yet quite surely established that when it intervened in the years here under discussion, as contrasted with 1935–1936, it was invariably going against popular sentiment.—BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, *The University of Texas.*

*Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict on the Court.* By WALLACE MENDELSON. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1961. Pp. x, 151. $4.00.)

This little book deals with the often dormant but always present question of what role the Supreme Court should play in American political life. Professor Mendelson has chosen to explore this question through the two great traditions of judicial activism and judicial self-restraint as exemplified in the work of Justices Black and Frankfurter—the two acknowledged spokesmen of these schools of thought in our time. The result is a tightly packed but readable exposition of the agonizing nature of the justice's job. The book rises far above the level of the ordinary academic treatise. Professor Mendelson has done more than simply explore the cases. There is good history here and unobtrusive learning as well as disciplined, and thoughtful evaluation. Moreover, Professor Mendelson has the stuff of the artist in him. He can discuss cases against the whole panorama of American constitutional history in clear, often elegant, language. One has the distinct feeling upon laying aside this book that much of what has previously been written on the subject is pretty shallow stuff.

The book contains five chapters, a section on notes and references, and separate case and subject indices. Chapter one, largely introductory in nature, deals with the broad developments in American constitutional law since the Civil War. The next three chapters are concerned with what Professor Mendelson views as the three basic problems in our constitutional law—separation of powers, the conflict between liberty and authority, and federalism. In these chapters he traces "the impact of two great minds upon the new Court's struggle with these problems." In chapter five some conclusions are drawn while Black's activism and Frankfurter's restraint concepts are evaluated and placed in historical perspective. From these pages Justice Black emerges as the dedicated idealist in search of a dream who uses the power of judicial review to support the weak, the poor, the needy and the downtrodden. He is seen as a generous, warm-hearted, zealous defender of individual liberties little concerned with opposing interests. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, emerges as the wise, humble, detached, "coldly cerebral" pragmatist, somewhat contemptuous of misplaced noble sentiment, who looks to the legislature to resolve the basic economic as well as libertarian dilemmas "lest the freedom of the people to govern themselves, well or badly, be hampered by 'judicial legislation'."

Professor Mendelson observes that neither tradition can wholly prevail "to the complete exclusion of the other. . . . " Yet if he had to choose, the author would appear to line up with Frankfurter. This reviewer thereby feels constrained to raise some questions in the other direction. Is it not possible that Frankfurter's deference to the legislature is based on a romantic, mechanistic notion of the legislative process which does not square with the realities of modern politics? Is it not true that the alternatives of public policy particularly in the area of individual freedom are seldom defined clearly enough to make the emergence of a consensus based on fact possible? And does not the Court have a duty to help teach us not to inflict *mortal* wounds upon ourselves?—ROCCO J. TRESOLINI, *Lehigh University.*

*The Enlargement of the Presidency.* By REXFORD G. TUGWELL. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1960. Pp. 508. $6.95)

This volume is a fresh survey of the historical growth of the American presidency and an exposition of the heavy responsibilities which history and the welfare-security state have heaped on the office. Tugwell's commentary, although frequently tumbling and discursive in style, contains an instructive discussion of most of the administrations since 1789, the executive habits of the principal incumbents, and their conceptions of presidential power. The author invites acceptance of his reluctant conclusion that the leadership burden on the President of the United States has brought the office, if not the man, to the breaking point. The measures which he suggests to alleviate the administrative crisis, although described in terms that are never systematic, conclusive, or clear, include electing the members of the House of Representatives at large rather than by districts and the establishment of some kind of plural presidency. The "enlargement" of the presidency, as a consequence, possesses a dual significance: the massive increase of functions and responsibilities by historical and administrative accretion over the years and, as an aspect of reform, the enlargement of the office in numerical terms to provide for a sharing of the superhuman burden of leadership. Stated in its most simple terms, the Tugwell formula seems to say that presidential power should be divided in order to strengthen its execution.

For this reason it is surprising that the author pays such brief attention to the post World War II presidency and, in particular, to the complex responsibilities, the duties and the problems, and the labyrinthine administrative apparatus associated with the Cold War. It seems apparent, even from the distorted perspective of our own time, that the current security responsibilities of the President account for the most decisive enlargement of the presidency since Washington appointed Hamilton his First Secretary. This striking analytical weakness is offset, however, by a penetrating evaluation of the pre-World War II development of the presidency set within a useful framework of rules which the author contends have guided the exercise of presidential power—the Rule of Restraint, which is inherent in the constitutional structure and has been observed generally by presidents in their dealings with Congress and the judiciary; the Rule of Necessity which in moments of crisis has forced presidents to go beyond normal constitutional limits; and the Rule of Responsibility, a product of the administrative-welfare state, which came to life in the Wilson era and today denotes an all-encompassing presidential obligation to the welfare of the American people.

It is of some interest, in view of the author's past political persuasion, that he levels severe blows at Jefferson and Jackson together with the frontier "horde" which largely constituted their following ("Jackson was indeed a kind of manic Jefferson"), while Harry Truman attracts equally heavy criticism. According to the author, Franklin Roosevelt's successor "allowed [!] a cold war to begin," authorized the use of the atomic bomb "when the Japanese had been trying to surrender for six months past," and handed to his own successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower ("who occupied the office with obvious relish"), an office "degraded by indignities." Here lie the seeds of revisionism. These lapses, particularly because they appear to be offhand comments and are without supporting evidence, are regrettable in a book rich in its scope and insight. It is regrettable, too, that the author's vague proposal for a plural executive, made at a time when executive power is already dangerously dispersed, is not explained with greater care.—Richard P. Longaker, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

*The Cabinet and Congress.* By Stephen Horn. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. pp. x, 310. $6.00.)

The subject of this book is a hardy perennial of political reform—the proposals that Cabinet members be seated in Congress or answer questions in regular sessions thereof. One-half of Stephen Horn's study is a well-documented chronicle of this controversy, from 1787 to the present. The other half is an informed analysis, based on contemporary materials, of the failure of either proposal to come to a vote in the legislature.

Through the use of biographical and questionnaire data, Horn explains the opposition of approximately three out of four members of Congress. The key variable seems to be length of service, especially committee seniority. The more senior a congressman, the more satisfied he is with existing channels of communication, through committees and personal acquaintance. The Kefauver proposal, for example, was killed in the 1940's by strategically situated legislative veterans, Rayburn, Sabath, and Cannon in the House and Byrd in the Senate. The intermittent movement for change has been most strongly supported by congressional newcomers, who chafe at their relationship to the administration. They have difficulty obtaining information and wield little influence over the direction of legislative control. However, as these newcomers begin to reap the rewards of seniority, their attachment to existing procedures grows and their support for the reform proposal wanes.

Executive attitudes toward the idea have been mixed. A revealing chapter on decision-making in the Budget Bureau reports that a majority of those asked (including the political scientists therein) favored the reform. No President since Wilson has evinced any enthusiasm for the idea; and Cabinet opinion has been sharply divided. Horn feels that the "most significant" argument against either proposal is one posed by executive branch skeptics—that Cabinet member-legislative alliances might be strengthened at the expense of presidential efforts to unify and direct Cabinet member activity. He believes that a question period would help the President by forcing policy coordination among top executives. The book lacks, however, a discussion of the problems of presidential policy coordination on which to ground this assertion.

Horn's dissatisfaction with existing devices of legislative control lead him to favor the question period as likely to produce "a fuller revelation of national policy" and hence "the essentials of accountability." A President's-eye perspective on the problems of managing a Cabinet might lead one to be less sanguine. In any case, we are indebted to the author for bringing to this debate a body of empirical data on which all future discussions must be based.—Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *University of Rochester.*

*Politics and Grass.* By Phillip O. Foss. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960. Pp. ix, 236. $4.50.)

The first sentence in the Prologue of this impressive study of grazing district administration in ten Western states reads: "The 'public domain' is the landed estate of the American people." The remainder of the book convincingly shows that national "ownership" of this huge, run-down estate has been and is still largely a fiction.

Until the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934, free private use of the unappropriated and unreserved Federal lands went to first-comer stockmen and to newcomers who were strong enough to muscle in. This regime of unregulated private enterprise led to serious over-grazing, depletion of the range, chronic disputes among rival users, and some bloody range wars. Every-man's-land often was no-man's-land. The stated purposes of the Taylor Act were to prevent overgrazing and deterioration of the public lands, to provide for their orderly use and improvement, and to stabilize the livestock industry dependent upon the public range. Implementing the Act, the Secretary of the Interior established 59 large grazing districts which in 1955 embraced a total of almost 160 million acres under control.

Whose control? "A high degree of organizational decentralization coupled with a powerful advisory board system and low appropriations has acted to minimize the possibility of real federal control and has buttressed the old system of local control of the range by rural elites."

Clearly, the advisory boards—district, state, and national—have been far more than advisory. Composed largely of politically influential leaders of the stockmen's associations, the boards in fact make policies and regulations and supervise the administration of such laws. The handful of federal administrators are confronted with an essentially "monopolitical" situation, one in which the entrenched stockmen's interest has little or no competition from other interest groups. "The administrator and his staff are alone [even *sans* DeVoto now]—except for the stockmen who are with them always.

What do the ruling stockmen want? Mainly to be let alone to enjoy the status quo of grazing privileges at low fees, and to perpetuate their effective subsystem of "private government" on the federal grazing lands. They want range improvement, but not if that means higher grazing fees and greater risks of bureaucratic regulation. The whole picture is vastly complicated by the fact that private base ranchlands are bought at prices which reflect a major part of the capitalized value of appurtenant public grazing permits. Major reductions of numbers of animals permitted (in order to protect the range from overgrazing) or increase in grazing fees, or both, presumably could mean financial disaster for many present owners and their creditors. (Senator McCarran of Nevada successfully insisted that the original Taylor bill be amended to provide in effect that a lawful permittee may not be denied renewal of his permit if his grazing unit is pledged as security for "any bona fide loan.")

Foss's admirably realistic case study of the political subsystem for making and carrying out grazing policies may somewhat overstress the dominant role of the stockman-dominated advisory boards. The great power of the stockmen is obvious, but the bureaucrats are not strictly or ultimately "alone" when they persistently challenge violations of the Federal Range Code or when they press for significant changes of policy. In fact, both of Foss's special case studies ("The Battle of Soldier Creek," chapter 7, and "The Grazing Fee Controversy," chapter 8) show relative victories—after brutal attrition—for the federal "good guys." If the grazing administrators got little explicit support in Congress, they did at times find backing elsewhere: from some high quarters in the Department of the Interior, from hearing examiners, from the General Accounting Office, and in the federal courts. True, such checks and balances do not operate continuously or with intimate effectiveness in the "advisory" boards' grass roots administration, and the bureaucrats' awareness of the demonstrated power of the stockmen no doubt often suggests that discretion is better than valor. Moreover, discretion sometimes means that administrators so fully accept the views of the stockmen that they "have acted as the spokesmen and chief lobbyists for their clientele."

A more healthily competitive politics could arise, Foss suggests, if advisory board membership were more diversified. Wildlife interests are now represented in a very minor way; and if the idea and practice of planned multiple uses of the public domain gets wider support, pressures for more diversified representation on the boards will increase. The success of these pressures without long delay may depend, I suggest, on some prior diversification of membership on the relevant committees and subcommittees of Congress. If the congressional aldermen from the western wards are allowed to continue virtually to make the statute law for the public domain, the "national landed estate" is unlikely to serve as well as it might the broadest long-run interests of the people of the West or the nation.

This scholarly study by a mature political scientist who has lived many years with his subject brings much light into one corner of our domestic politics. It deals with a very special subsystem, but as Foss points out, "our government may be composed in large part of an agglomeration of these 'unique' subsystems." We need many similar examinations of other subsystems, done in a comparably careful and thoroughly realistic fashion.—FRED A. CLARENBACH, *University of Wisconsin.*

*Gifford Pinchot: Forester-Politician.* BY M. NELSON MCGEARY. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. Pp. xii, 481. $8.50.)

History textbooks no longer give much space to

Gifford Pinchot, and, when they do mention him, tend to link his name exclusively with conservation and with his adversary in his most spectacular conservation battle, Richard A. Ballinger. But Pinchot's career was far more important and interesting, especially to political scientists, than his banishment to a few passing paragraphs suggests. Professor M. Nelson McGeary of Pennsylvania State University has done political science as well as history a service in this excellent biography by rescuing Pinchot from increasing obscurity.

To be sure, Gifford Pinchot's most enduring monuments are the American forestry profession, the national forests, and the U. S. Forest Service, all of which can be said without great exaggeration to be his creations. In addition, however, he "was one of the group of about twenty-five members of Congress, half a dozen governors, and other friends of insurgency, who formally organized the National Progressive Republican League on January 21, 1911, at Senator La Follette's home." He was one of the leaders of those in this group who swung away from La Follette to back instead Theodore Roosevelt's bid for the 1912 Republican presidential nomination (earning the lifelong animosity of La Follette, who believed Pinchot had betrayed him). He was one of the draftsmen of the Progressive Party platform of 1912 (which he wanted to be "by all odds the most radical adopted by any party in the United States except the Socialists") when the Progressive Republicans established their own party to oppose the Taft wing. Though unsuccessful in his quest for a U. S. Senate seat in Pennsylvania (he ran on the Progressive ticket in 1914, and failed in primary fights for the Republican senatorial nomination in 1926 and 1934), he was four times Governor of that state (elected in 1922, 1924, 1930, and 1932). It was not just in conservation that he left his mark.

Professor McGeary's book treats fully Pinchot's roles in both forestry and politics. The first half covers the years up to his dismissal from the Forest Service in 1910, years in which forestry was his dominant and almost his only interest. The second half deals with his remaining thirty-six years, during which forestry, though not forgotten by any means, took a place beside other issues in the broader range of political problems that commanded his attention. On the whole, the author wisely confines himself to the public figure instead of trying to capture the whole man; consequently, the intervals when Pinchot was not in or trying for public office are only hurriedly sketched. It is no disparagement of this fine book to hope that one day the personal side of Pinchot will enjoy the same expert treatment his public career here receives.

For the picture of the periods of officeholding and office-seeking is painstakingly thorough and detailed. Drawn with the care and the methods of the historian, it reflects also the special interests and sensitivity of the political scientist and the skill of a competent writer. It is a fully documented, highly intriguing, revealing study of a vigorous (indeed, an almost uncontrollable) bureau chief, a political maverick, an energetic chief executive, and an indefatigable lobbyist. Above all, it constitutes a fascinating record of a fairly typical "patrician reformer," whose independence of means furnished him with the leisure to devote himself entirely and uncompromisingly to the causes he adopted; whose family connections provided him with a springboard to influence; whose sense of social responsibility made him a relentless foe of "the trusts," "the plutocracy," the utility "magnates," and the despoilers of natural resources, as well as an early advocate of social legislation later enacted by the New Deal; whose convictions were so strong and whose dedication was so unswerving that he became a militant, crusading, rather self-righteous and intolerant zealot almost as trying to his friends and supporters as to his critics and opponents; and whose not altogether modest self-appraisal induced him to leave behind what is estimated to be the largest individual collection of personal papers in the Library of Congress.

Like many other biographers, Professor McGeary clearly developed intense admiration, respect, and affection for his subject, but he never permits these sentiments to warp his judgment. The presentation is balanced and judicious, a lasting and valuable contribution to the literature of American history and government. HERBERT KAUFMAN, *Yale University*.

*Henry A. Wallace: Quixotic Crusade 1948.* BY KARL M. SCHMIDT. (Syracuse, N. Y., Syracuse University Press, 1960. Pp. xii, 362, $5.50.)

Here is a fascinating, painstaking, and convincing, if sad, analysis of all facets of the Wallace Progressive Party from its rise to its demise. Wallace's Presidential campaign in 1948 and the whole of the third party movement are deftly placed among the stark realities of American political institutions and practices and especially the hysteria following World War II.

The movement, at once played down and variously attacked and branded by the press as Kremlin-inspired, Communist-dominated, and just irresponsibly idealistic, attracted to its banner and to its leader many political moderates with sincere and strong humanitarian leanings, as well as some overpublicized elements from the Communist left. It raised and dashed hopes, had some successes, especially in raising money through its dramatic campaign meetings, and ultimately led to bitter disappointments and broken reputations. At no point in the "crusade" did the unwanted Communists ever dominate, even in platform making.

It is clear that the split in the Democratic Party after 1946, the growing popularity of Wallace, the way he had been dropped by Roosevelt for the Vice Presidency in 1944, and his later dismissal as Secretary of Commerce by Truman in behalf of a get-tough policy toward Russia, opened the way for a third party, with Wallace as its obvious candidate. This was a movement that Communists were quick to support. They did not inspire it; some of them did, however, move quickly toward the controls of the Progressive Party's machinery. Not until just before election did Wallace appear to awaken to the situation and repudiate Communist backing.

Hoping to work toward his ends (international peace and cooperation, and domestic welfare) within the ranks of the Democratic Party, Wallace delayed his decision to become a third-party candidate until the necessity of state primary election schedules forced him to decide. Once he decided, his willingness to speak of milk being cheaper than blood, his Sermon on the Mount approach, and his belief in progressive capitalism often left his public behind. His fight for peace and for common decency in human life everywhere appealed to many, but his tendency to put more attention on his program than upon details of party organization may have been costly. The support of Communists was tolerated on democratic principle, but Wallace later came to believe that the 100,000 estimated votes he received from Communists probably cost him 3,000,000 non-Communist votes.

To the political scientist and alert citizen alike, here is a careful presentation of many aspects of the American political process: a third party with a humanitarian program, an attempt to give voters a choice between real alternatives, various campaign and publicity techniques (including testimony at Congressional hearings), the battle against trickery in election administration, the courageous leadership and its varied experience when faced with abuse by conservatives and segregationists, inexcusable misrepresentation in the press, the fly-paper qualities of old party labels to hold voters in line, and the impact of third party programs on that of a parent party. Tabular appendix, bibliography, and index aid the serious student.

May it now be asked whether the Democratic Party and the distorted image given in the American press have so tarnished the words "progressive" and "liberal" that any candidate or group non-conformist enough in the future to raise a third party banner will have more strikes than ever called on them before they even are up to bat? The question may be asked whether the use of "Quixotic" in the subtitle is entirely justified.—RICHARD C. SPENCER, *Coe College.*

*Political Persuasion By Television: Partisan and Public Affairs Broadcasts in The 1956 General Election.* BY I. R. MERRILL AND C. H. PROCTOR. (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1959. Pp. ix, 83. No Price. Paper.)

This study of the impact of television on a political campaign was sponsored jointly by the National Educational Television and Radio Center and by WKAR-TV, the educational television facility at Michigan State University. The design borrows heavily from previous voting studies, especially that of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. Specifically the authors hypothesized that three intervening variables (party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation) would affect dependent variables, such as size of TV audience for political programs, size of audience for educational TV political programs, and likelihood of change in vote due to TV stimulus.

In order that the effect of the intervening variables could be measured, an attempt was made to hold environmental and demographic factors (independent variables) constant. The sample was confined to the city of Lansing and a panel from the full sample was selected out which was confined to households in the $4,000 to $7,000 bracket and which contained equal proportions of Republicans and Democrats. This panel was interviewed before and after the election and respondents were requested to record on a diary card the programs they had viewed during the campaign period. Response rate and method for selection of the panel are unspecified in the report but some of the summary statistics suggest a high sampling error. For example, the ratio of males to females varies by as much as 20% for adjacent categories on the party identification code. Total panel size was 245.

Presentation of materials and general development of the argument is clear and specific. A convenient 3 page summary of the findings appears at the beginning of the book.

The investigators found that persons who watched all the convention programs viewed fewer campaign speeches than those who only saw "most" of the convention programs. They suggest in explanation that conventions have more spectator interest than campaign speeches which require participation by the viewer. An alternative explanation, which is just as plausible and simpler, is that persons with considerable leisure time will tend to give continuous attention to a spectacle like a convention but will tune away quickly from repetitive and undramatic campaign speeches. Persons who are highly involved politically, on the other hand, will generally be so busy that they can catch only "most" of the political fare on TV.

Perhaps their most interesting finding is that Eisenhower's Madison Square Garden broadcast on October 25, 1956, seems to have switched the votes of some Democratic identifiers. Among respondents identifying Democratic, but with issue or candidate orientations in the Republican direction, 14 out of 20 who saw that broadcast voted for Eisenhower whereas only 4 out of 12 with the same characteristics who had not seen the broadcast did so. The difference is significant but the cases are very few. The authors attempted to hold other possible factors constant and suggest further that persons in conflict may actually seek resolution by tuning in a broadcast. But why did some persons in conflict tune in this program while others did not? It is possible that an unmeasured factor, such as the influence of family or peers, produced both behaviors.

The soundest findings are that persons motivated by all three of the SRC factors viewed more political programs and that viewers of political programs on educational TV had significantly greater issue orientation than other viewers.

In summary, the study is clean and not overly ambitious in design. The field work phase is glossed over in the report and leads one to suspect high sampling error. The analysis is careful and, with a few exceptions, is thorough. None of the findings is particularly startling but they do add a few more grains of sand to the empirical basis on which a science of politics must someday be constructed.—LESTER W. MILBRATH, *Northwestern University.*

*The Nature and Control of Urban Dispersal.* EDITED BY ERNEST A. ENGELBERT. (Berkeley: University Extension, University of California. 1960. Pp. iv, 130. $2.00.)

Recent years have brought with them the realization of how little is actually known about the forces which govern and determine the character of urban dispersal. The last decade also has witnessed an increasing emphasis on planning as the critical key to urban expansion, if not the principal answer to the metropolitan "problem." Here lies the nub of the difficulty that confronts the planner and policy-maker. How can urban dispersal be planned and controlled in an intelligent fashion when knowledge of the phenomenon itself is so meager? This dilemma makes itself evident throughout the present work and adds a common theme to a collection of otherwise disparate essays.

This volume is the second of a series of three on the general topic of planning for metropolitan areas. Like its companion works, *Planning for the Economic Growth of Southern California* and *Transportation and Metropolitan Planning,* it consists of a collection of papers presented at an annual meeting of the Southern California Planning Institute. Since the third volume in the series—that on transportation—was given priority in publication, appearance of the present work was considerably delayed. The ten essays which comprise the volume range widely in subject matter from a review of significant planning developments here and in Great Britain to a discussion of basic metropolitan structures. They include an evaluation of methods for controlling sprawl, a plea to direct growth toward the less fertile lands on the urban fringe in order to preserve the more productive soils for agricultural and greenbelt uses, and an overview of the impact of decentralization on local government resources.

One of the more interesting papers in the collection is Robert Daland's "The Impact of Urban Dispersal on Local Governmental Costs and Services." Daland questions the commonly held assumption that dispersion *per se* increases governmental costs. He suggests that it is poor planning rather than low population density which raises service expenditures in fringe areas, an observation which attacks one of the major arguments for the compact integrated city. Since Daland's paper was written, considerable research has been done on this general topic but the findings still remain inconclusive. Another paper, "Metropolitan Planning and Urban Dispersal" by Engelbert and Walters, raises some pertinent questions about the framework and posture of current planning. Noting that urban planning is too prone to appraise all segments of city and fringe structure in terms of their ties to the central area or core, the authors condemn this approach as running counter to the powerful forces of urban dispersal. They also criticize the tendency to blame the failures of metropolitan planning on inadequate governmental structure rather than on the planning process itself. As they cogently observe, planners must accept the fact that major changes in the local and metropolitan governmental pattern are unlikely in the near future and must accordingly develop plans which will push forward improvements within this framework.

The volume adds little that is new to the literature of urban dispersal. Several of the essays, however, have substantial merit and the majority more than adequately serve the purpose and occasion for which they were written. Taken as a whole they give a fairly sophisticated picture of the problem of dispersal and a review of some of the thinking and work that is going on in this field. Unfortunately, the collection suffers from the unusually long delay in publication. What may have been new insights five years ago, are frequently commonplace observations today.—HENRY J. SCHMANDT, *University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee)*.

*The Power of the Purse*. BY E. JAMES FERGUSON. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961, Pp. viii, 358. $7.50.)

The American Revolution was born out of controversy that centered on the power to tax. It is by no means surprising that the colonists, both during the Revolution and thereafter, would be reluctant to endow their central government with fiscal authority that was so closely linked with British tyranny and absolutism. Nevertheless, a federal government with adequate fiscal powers did emerge in the years from 1776 to 1790 and this emergence is analyzed here.

The author is a member of the history faculty at the University of Maryland and the present volume is one in the series of publications for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg. While Ferguson does not write history with the *verve* of a De Voto or a Schlesinger, Jr., this is nonetheless a highly readable volume with adequate attention to the personalities that enliven the period. The author has searched the record intensively in the National Archives and in public and private document collections. The footnotes are copious but not burdensome.

The public finances of this period have not been fully examined before, and this alone would justify the study. But, in addition, the author approaches his subject with an understanding of both the economics of money and banking and the nature of public administration. The result is a sympathetic re-interpretation of the fiscal policy of the Continental Congress, a subject which has usually had harsh treatment as a case study in the evils of paper currency.

The author begins with a description of the conditions that required currency finance during the Revolution, with the relations between state and national finance, experience with foreign borrowing and with domestic procurement policy. The economic consequences of these strands of policy are examined and the nature and inevitability of the wartime inflation analyzed in detail. The crisis came in 1779 when wartime supplies could be obtained only by impressment, with compensation by means of certificates issued by field commanders. The certificates were free to circulate, at discounted prices, and thus added further to the inflation.

The beginnings of order appeared in 1780, with the appointment of Robert Morris as Head of the Department of Finance. Morris, and the group of conservative merchants who worked with him, were a part of what the author calls the Nationalist Movement—the forerunners of the Federalists. The history of the decade until 1790 centers on their efforts to link finance and politics in the establishment of a national government. Their support came not only from large landowners and commercial interests, but also from public creditors generally, who now held depreciated national and state debt issues. The economic position of these groups required a national government with power to tax, fund the debt, pay interest thereon and stabilize the currency. This was "high finance," whose objectives were eventually realized under the Constitution and Hamilton's legislation of 1790.

Morris and the Nationalists accomplished their goals by moving vigorously through a series of financial and administrative reforms. These included the introduction of competitive bidding for army supply contracts, the regularization of foreign borrowing, the creation of the Bank of North America and the introduction of a national impost (tariff). In the process the lines between the public and the private sector were not always distinct, and Philadelphia merchants were able to establish their own credit at the same time that they established the credit of the national government. The author points out that the unclear division between private interest and public duty was wholly explainable in terms of the ethics and practice of this period of merchant capitalism. Even Hamilton, personally above reproach, was the source of information which his friends used, on appropriate occasions, to add to their speculative profits in government securities. The record of profiteering and double-dealing eventually came under review by Congressional investigating committees, and in 1789 the first conflict of interest statute was enacted.

A major contribution in this volume is the careful analysis of the economic issues surrounding funding and the assumption of state debts. The author has prepared detailed statistical analyses of debtholdings of various types, classified by size of holding and by state, and an analysis of the nature and quantity of the transactions (speculation) in debt issues. The interests involved in funding and assumption were most intricate, extending to such matters as the settlement of state accounts with the Congress, the relative position of original debt purchasers and later holders, and the role of foreign speculators. The author untangles this complex, including the ironic anti-climax when Hamilton's program was enacted in a crude political trade for the location of the national capital and a generous settlement of southern state claims.

The study closes with an examination of the larger implications of the Beard thesis that the personal economic interests of the founding fathers dictated specific provisions of the Constitution. This the author finds to be much too narrow a view. The fathers were motivated by economic interests shared by all political conservatives of the time. Shays' Rebellion and all other debtor discontent could be dealt with harshly and this the fathers did. But the personal pecuniary profit of the authors of the Constitution cannot explain their decisions on the larger issues. The outcome was "... a reasonable compromise of varying shades of the conservative opinion which the new government represented."—JESSE BURKHEAD, *Syracuse University.*

*Little Rock, U.S.A.: Materials for Analysis.* EDITED BY WILSON RECORD AND JANE CASSELS RECORD. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company. 1960. Pp. 338, $2.25.)

This volume is a compilation of documents and articles related to the school desegregation crisis at Central High in Little Rock, Arkansas, during the fall of 1957 when nine Negro children attempted to enter the all-white school.

The readings begin with the Supreme Court school decision of May, 1954, and the Southern Manifesto of March, 1956, and continue through the events of September, 1957, the Little Rock school board recall election of May, 1959, and the reopening of the school in August, 1959. A final section is devoted to interpretative articles, expressions of opinion, and analyses by commentators representing all points of view.

Almost all the materials are derived from published sources, principally the *Southern School News*, the *Race Relations Law Reporter*, and national and local newspapers and periodicals. Of particular value are the many articles, editorials, and letters to the editor reprinted from the *Arkansas Gazette* of Little Rock. There are also a few original pieces written for this volume, including one by a southern white historian who was a leader in the Little Rock NAACP for four years on the role of that group in these dramatic events. It indicates in considerable detail that the national leadership of the NAACP was not only not "masterminding" the Little Rock school fight but was often less than enthusiastic about the strategy the local branch pursued.

The book is obviously intended to facilitate research among high school and college students. Twenty pages are given over to a discussion of how to write and document term papers. For the serious scholar, the book is primarily valuable as a useful compilation of the vast and scattered writings on Little Rock. In the interests of including as many items as possible, many are not reprinted in their entirety, but in extract form.—JAMES Q. WILSON, *University of Chicago.*

*Major Problems in State Constitutional Revision.* EDITED BY W. BROOKE GRAVES. (Chicago: Public Administration Service. 1960. Pp. xiv, 306. $6.50.)

The revision of state constitutions persists as one of the thorny problems in American statecraft. Despite the efforts of some 200 constitutional assemblages that have been convened since Revolutionary days, groups recently inquiring into the state of health of our federal system consistently exhort states to get their governmental houses in order. The present volume, a joint venture of Pi Sigma Alpha and the Public Administration Service, is designed to succor those confronted with the practical problems underlying successful constitutional revision.

Two major objectives of the book are set forth succinctly in the foreword: "What is a good state constitution, and how does one go about getting one?" To provide this kind of information (the authors conclude that previous major works in the field are out-of-date), the volume draws upon the expertise of a score of political scientists and public administrators who set forth their ideas in 17 separate articles concerned with various facets of the general problem. The reader will recognize most of them as long-time students of state and local government.

The first part of the book, entitled "Methods and Procedures" of constitutional change, describes and evaluates various components of the process such as restricted and unrestricted conventions, and the roles assumed by such auxiliary agencies as constitutional commissions, citizen's groups, and consultants. The experiences with "successful" revisions in older states like New Jersey and Missouri, as well as the newer areas, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Alaska, are set forth in detail along with an exhaustive catalogue of individual amendments proposed in the period from 1946 to 1956. Also included is a chapter dealing with practical considerations in staging a constitutional convention.

Interesting as much of this information may be, it is doubtful whether it will really enable individuals to succeed where others have failed at constitutional revision. The plain fact is that we know very little about the "politics" of constitutional change. What are the configurations of forces favoring and opposing reform? What are their motivations, and what techniques do they employ? What elements of the electorate are disposed toward change, and how can their active support be rallied in effective campaigns? Until this kind of basic information is available, we are forced into such facile explanations of successful efforts as, "It is also a matter of some importance that both the New Jersey and Alaska conventions were on university campuses which boasted no barrooms or cocktail lounges." (Apparently "successful" conventions in Hawaii and Puerto Rico were not so removed from the fleshpots, and one wonders how some of the venerable founding fathers would have fared under such an environment.)

The second major part of the volume deals with the major substantive areas of concern to constitution-drafters: a bill of rights, the branches of state government, taxation and finance, local government, intergovernmental relations, etc. Again helpful suggestions are proferred, but in many instances the advice does not go much beyond a general plea for keeping detailed matters out of the constitution and a paraphrasing of pertinent provisions of the Model State Constitution. This is particularly surprising in light of the comment in the Foreword that this document is "now much out of date and, in some respects at least, itself much in need of revision."

Despite these criticisms it should be recognized that this volume does draw together in manageable form fugitive materials on constitutional revision (an excellent bibliography is included in the Appendix) that will be of some benefit to those interested in the practical problems of change. By and large it adheres to the editor's vow to maintain coherence and avoid repetition, no mean feat with its multiple-author format. Whatever sins the volume evidences are more those of omission than commission. The blame for this cannot be laid at the doorstep of the authors alone; the profession as a whole is responsible. Two of the authors point out that there is room for rewarding work in this area for specialists in such varied fields as law, administration, politics, public finance, comparative government and political theory. We must apply the best in theory and empirical research alike if we are to bring the problem of state constitutional reform into the mainstream of developments in the broad field of political science.—RICHARD A. WATSON, *University of Missouri.*

*Edward Randolph and the American Colonies, 1676–1703.* BY MICHAEL GARIBALDI HALL. (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press. 1960. Pp. xi, 241. $5.00.)

New light continues to be thrown upon the antecedents and early beginnings of the American political system. No serious student of American politics can afford to ignore entirely the colonial period when so many of our ways and traditions were being shaped, nor be oblivious of the men, colonists and old-countrymen alike, who participated actively in the process. Furthermore, in this day of crumbling colonial empires and aspiring young nations, the British experience in building and then losing the Old Empire prior to 1783 may offer valuable insights to the modern mind.

The slender volume by Michael G. Hall is a case in point. For the first time we have a comprehensive, thoroughly documented overview of the career of Edward Randolph as a royal official in the American colonies. Hall lays down his thesis in the first paragraph of his Introduction: "England's North American empire, the old colonial empire before the War for Independence changed everything, was born not at the beginning of the seventeenth century but at the end, in those forty critical years 1660–1700 . . . what brought about the transition was in no small part the work of Edward Randolph." The next two hundred and twenty pages constitute an effective demonstration of the thesis.

Randolph has always been a villain in American historical tradition, and Hall has laid in no supply of whitewash, but he does attempt to be fair to his subject. The result is a realistic, convincing picture of a driving, relentless Crown servant who was quite unable to comprehend any view other than that of royalist authoritarianism and Anglican conformity. Hall is obviously at home in his subject, as he moves deftly through the maze of British politics and policies, or follows Randolph in his various tension-filled tours of duty in the colonies. The book is based on extensive research in widely scattered primary sources, and is concluded by a useful bibliographical essay.—DOUGLAS EDWARD LEACH, *Vanderbilt University.*

*The Autobiography of Ray Lyman Wilbur, 1875–1949.* EDITED BY EDGAR EUGENE ROBINSON AND PAUL CARROLL EDWARDS. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960.) Pp. xii, 687, $10.00.)

Ray Lyman Wilbur crowded three careers into one life time. He was a physician, university president, and public servant; and he gained distinction in all three fields. This autobiography contains, therefore, something of interest to students of medical history, of higher education, and of the politics of the period from 1917 to 1933. It is a running account of Dr. Wilbur's varied experiences, written in more or less chronological order as he recalled them with the assistance of fairly complete records. Throughout the narrative there are interspersed comments revealing the author's judgments upon such matters as medical education, controversies over medical care for the aged, academic freedom, university administration, efforts to preserve peace and intercultural understanding in the Pacific, and a host of other educational and political questions in which, at some time, the author was directly involved. Many of these judgments are still significant and thought provoking today, but they are so buried in the text, or even in footnotes, that only the careful reader may notice them.

Nearly one-half of the volume is devoted to Dr. Wilbur's experiences in public affairs. These include not only his four years as Secretary of the Interior, but also his association with the Food Administration in 1917–1918, his role in the founding and administration of the Institute of Pacific Relations, his participation in the Havana Conference of 1928, and his somewhat tenuous connection with the candidacy for the presidency of his friend, Herbert Hoover. The story of Dr. Wilbur's experiences in the Interior Department is described in six detailed chapters. These combine a recital of specific issues which he faced with comments upon problems of general policy which fall within the jurisdiction of that department.

The historian will find little new information in this volume, though the narrative will add some details which may be reflected in the footnotes of the future. The real contribution of the autobiography is that it reveals, better than many autobiographies, the true character of its author—honest, straightforward, conservative, given to unconscious moralizing, and remarkably tolerant of dissent. Those who were acquainted with Dr. Wilbur will find that he comes alive in these pages. Others may find in this volume a revelation of his personal qualities and manner of thinking which will be more helpful in understanding his era than would a recital of his achievements.—HAROLD WHITMAN BRADLEY, *Vanderbilt University.*

*Government and Politics: A Reader.* EDITED BY ARNOLD A. ROGOW (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. 1961. Pp. xi, 692. $4.25.)

To provide a supplement and a partial synthesis to descriptive texts in introductory courses in political science, A. A. Rogow has edited a comprehensive and provocative volume of paper-bound readings. The articles, representing a stimulating variety of writers from Harry Golden to Woodrow Wilson to C. P. Snow, are grouped into five sections dealing with the foundations, the organization, the structure, and the functions of government. Each section in turn is subdivided into several chapters (a total of 77 selections) that are introduced by some pertinent annotations of the author. In fact some of the introductions make one lament that the author did not write his own textbook to accompany the selections.

Aside from the first-rate introductions there are many selections that are quite striking, notably articles on the social and economic consequences of residential segregation, problems of urbanism, and the Chinese communes, and a piece documenting the weaknesses and the evasions of the money and elections law in Great Britain. Such articles tend to reflect Rogow's concern that "the great issues" are inadequately studied by political scientists. Thus the focus is on analysis of broad political, economic and social developments rather than on historicism, political theory, or methodology. Most of the articles raise value questions in the broadest sense and teach the student that there are choices among policy alternatives in almost all areas of our political and social life. Moreover, to Rogow, political science is not only a policy science, it is also a comprehensive science of social analysis—undergraduates in the beginning course thus need to do more than learn "principles." They need to know a good deal about the relationship between institutions, behavior, and values and pushing them in this direction is perhaps the greatest merit of a broad-gauged selection of readings.

The volume's only handicap, particularly for the beginning one-semester course, is its tendency to fall between the two stools of the introductory course in political science and that in American Government. Nevertheless, this is a most useful volume and sets a very high standard. It brings controversy to the classroom and focuses on problems which are, or should be, of concern to students, professors, and citizens-at-large. Most helpful to the instructor is a thorough index (something not usually found in readers), and a table correlating the book with the most commonly used texts.—CHARLES R. FOSTER, *Cornell College.*

*Government in the Fifty States.* BY WILLIAM ANDERSON *et al.* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1960. Pp. xi, 509. $6.50.)

With this volume Clara Penniman contributes a new addition to the texts designed for courses in state government. The anomaly of a new title that is identified as a revised edition, and is attributed to three authors when one is primarily responsible, is explained in the preface as due to the circumstance that the work is founded on a state and local government text written a decade ago by Anderson and Weidner. The original authors served only in a consultative capacity as the re-titled book was written.

Sufficient coverage of local government is retained to provide a setting for an understanding of state government problems and operations. This is accomplished in the first portion of the volume, a chapter grouping which also includes the standard content on federal-state and interstate relations, plus that on state constitutions. Apart from this organizational emphasis on intergovernmental relations, the chapter alignment is quite orthodox.

The general treatment seems designed to emphasize the fundamentals, without elaborate detail, in a manner that relates the institutional and procedural framework to the realities of government operations and political behavior. Interpretative discussions are one device used to assure recognition of the kinds of group conflicts that underlie policy decisions; short "case" studies are another.

The perspective is mature, the insights are sensible, the style lucid, and the basic facts are there. Indeed, the volume has real merit as a ready source of information about trends in general state practice and about the ways in which the results of recent research have affected thinking relative to state government.

A reviewer reads, I suppose, most closely the chapters in such a book that are devoted to areas in which he claims some special knowledge. That type of reading does, of course, disclose points at which one wishes the presentation were somewhat different in illustrative content or emphasis, or regarding which he might like to see references in addition to those provided by the author. The reasonably resourceful teacher should, however, have no difficulty in making these adjustments and supplementations as he brings state government into the classroom with the aid of this text. —JACK F. ISAKOFF, *Western Reserve University.*

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

# AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
*University of Maryland*

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## FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

*South Asian Affairs: Number One; St. Antony's Papers No. 8.* EDITED BY RAGHAVAN IYER (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 1960. Pp. 155. $3.75.)

*South Asian Affairs: Number One* is a collection of five papers on various aspects of Indian, Pakistani and Ceylonese history and politics, the research on which was done at St. Antony's College, Oxford University. The eighth issue in the St. Antony's Papers series, it is edited by Raghavan Iyer, elected the first Agatha Harrison Memorial Fellow of St. Antony's, who also contributes the longest paper, an exasperatingly brilliant essay entitled "Utilitarianism and All That—The Political Theory of British Imperialism in India."

The remaining four—"The 1958 Revolution in Pakistan," by Guy Wint, currently Leverhulme Research Fellow attached to St. Antony's; "The Soviet Re-assessment of Mahatma Gandhi," by Kyril Tidmarsh, staff member of the International Labour Office; "The Rise and Secession of the Congress Socialist Party of India (1934–1948)," by Hari Kishore Singh, lecturer in political science at the University of Banaros; and "The Problem of Indian Immigration to Ceylon," by Nimalasiri Silva of the Foreign Service of Ceylon—are all directly historical and descriptive in approach. If all these five essays may be viewed as a sample of the approach to the study of South Asian affairs at Oxford's newest college (St. Antony's was founded in 1950 to emphasize the study of history, political science and international relations) it seems clear that its research scholars are not primarily concerned with the pursuit of analytic frameworks for the "scientifically" comparative study of politics, and the attendant creation of a special esoteric terminology. Beautifully clear English still seems to be the preference. Of course, these two elements need not be mutually exclusive; unfortunately, much too often they apparently are.

In his analysis of the 1958 army take-over in Pakistan, Wint is struck with seemingly parallel trends in other parts of Asia and asks whether the Pakistani experiment holds similar answers for other Asian nations. Yet the elements of uniqueness in the Pakistani situation make him answer in the negative: "The nature of the Pakistani army is so peculiar to the country, the personality of General Ayub so exceptional, that Pakistan's example may not be very significant for other countries. Other countries may suffer the same misgovernment as Pakistan under its parliamentary regime. But they cannot rely on the military remedies producing the same efficient and moderate results."

Raghavan Iyer's stimulating and original study of the political theory of British imperialism in India, which in length is half the book, touches upon a controversial subject which is often ignored or treated with overwhelming simplification by students and scholars. Especial exception must be made of A. P. Thornton's *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies* and Professor Stokes' *English Utilitarians and India.* The latter work, of course, deals only with a segment of the field, while the former deals with the entire Empire. Iyer rightly denies "the enthroning of a particular theory or school of thinkers as the chief determinant over a century of foreign rule." He postulates four distinct strands to the theory of imperialism in India: "The Burkean doctrine of imperial trusteeship, the utilitarian theory of state activity that was propounded mainly by Bentham but also by the two Mills, the Platonic conception of a ruling elite that would act as wise guardians, and the Evangelical zeal to spread the gospel so as to elevate the character and save the souls of even perversely unwilling people." Each of these, naturally, had "several aspects and assumed a variety of forms, with differing degrees of theoretical purity." Each strand contained within itself the seeds of its own perversion. The Burkean doctrine led at times of crisis to the trustees becoming "overbearing and even oppressive." The utilitarian theory could "degenerate into Hobbesian coercion and concentration of power." The Platonic conception was distorted on occasion by the idea of "the chosen race." And the Evangelical spirit, based often upon prejudice and ignorance, caused fear and resentment among large segments of the Indian people. The concept of trusteeship appealed especially to the British Parliament, "utilitarianism to the imperial government in India, guardianship to the civil service and evangelicalism to non-official bodies and societies."

Yet the question remains. How far can this seemingly neat and meaningful theory be applied to so many of the specific events resulting out of the interaction between Great Britain and her Indian Empire? Iyer, himself, is prepared to admit that "the interaction between the four doctrines was too subtle and complex to be reduced to any simple or stable relationship. There were affinities as well as contradictions between them all. . . . The four doctrines do not go to make up a symphony; there were too many discordant notes, too many jerks and surprises, too many disagreeable noises." Were the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, for example, granted India as a result of the impact of Burkean trusteeship or Benthamite utilitarianism? What was the role of political liberalism (a term used on rare occasion by Iyer, but nowhere adequately defined by him); what were the roles of the pressures put upon the Imperial Government by the Moderate and Extremist wings of the Indian national movement? Yet, this slight criticism cannot deny the erudition, the style, the sweep of imaginative insight that Raghavan Iyer displays in this piece of pioneering research in the field of political theory.
—MINOO ADENWALLA, *Lawrence College.*

*The Government of the Fifth Republic.* BY J. A. LAPONCE. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. 415. $6.50.)

The subtitle of this book by Professor Laponce of the University of British Columbia is "French Political Parties and the Constitution," and these two subjects receive approximately equal attention. The opening chapter entitled "The End of the Fourth Republic" is followed by eight chapters dealing with the political parties and one dealing with pressure groups. Then a chapter on "The Drafting of the 1958 Constitution" is followed by seven chapters which treat the constitutional organization of the Fifth Republic, elections to the National Assembly and the Community. There is a brief conclusion; an appendix which contains, among other useful items, a translation of the constitution and translations or summaries of selected articles from various organic laws; and a selected bibliography.

The book contains much useful information, particularly on the structure and organization of the parties, both in parliament and out. The analysis of the constitution is competent, although some central points, like the implications of the dissolution power and the separation in composition of the parliament and the cabinet, might have been more fully explored. The treatment of the parties is comprehensive in that their history, organization, programs, leadership and electorates are all discussed, and the analysis of the constitution is detailed and set against a background of brief comparative references to the institutions of the Third and Fourth Republics.

This particular organization tends to give different perspectives to the discussions of the parties and the constitution. The chapters on the parties rely heavily on data which antedate the Fifth Republic and, except for the chapter on the UNR, they are not specifically oriented toward the peculiar circumstances of the Fifth Republic. The author refers to the parties' electoral fortunes in 1958 and he comments on their current outlooks and problems. There are references, for example, to the confusion of the Communist party over De Gaulle's Algerian policy, to the Socialists' move into the opposition, to the role of the UNR as a powerful competitor of the Conservatives and to recent organizational changes made by the parties. But the discussion of the parties is generally separated from the new system within which they operate, with the result that there is little treatment of the politics of the Fifth Republic. Both the parties and the constitution are carefully described, but the two are not shown together in a way which would illuminate their impact on each other.

There are some errors and questionable points of interpretation. The Socialists withdrew from the government between 1951 and 1955, but they were not always in the opposition, as they supported the government of Mendès-France; De Gaulle made no speeches opposing the first post-war draft constitution; the book suggests that the new rules governing the responsibility of the government to parliament are more restrictive of parliament than they actually are by neglecting to indicate that deputies can introduce a motion of censure whenever the government engages its responsibility on a measure, even if these same deputies have already unsuccessfully done so during the same session.

In the discussion of the Conservatives, Professor Laponce refers to both their urban and rural base, but he underestimates the extent of the latter. I think that this is primarily because he apparently thought that the bulk of the Poujadist votes of 1956 went to the UNR in 1958. An important recent electoral study, which was not available to Professor Laponce while he was writing his book, indicates that those votes went mainly to the Conservatives. There is more variety of outlook among the Conservatives on economic and constitutional questions than Professor Laponce's effort to treat them as a bloc suggests.

The book displays more confidence in the capacity of various electoral systems to alter other aspects of the political system than the evidence warrants. The list system of the Fourth Republic did return fewer new members to parliament at each election than the single-member district system of the Third Republic did, but it is by no means certain that this was a consequence of the list system itself and not of some other political characteristic of the Fourth Republic which differed from the Third. A comparison of the first four post-war elections in France and England has shown a larger percentage of new members elected to parliament in France than in England. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that the list system strengthens national parties or that the single-member district system weakens them; the most that can logically be deduced from the use of the list system is that it might strengthen the party organization on the enlarged constituency level, and still a candidate with a strong independent base of electoral support has great bargaining power with his party under any kind of electoral system.—Roy Pierce, *University of Michigan.*

*Das Ende der Parteien 1933.* Edited by Erich Matthias and Rudolph Morsey. (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag. 1960. Pp. xv, 816. DM 40.00.)

In this massive volume, a publication of the Commission for the History of Parliamentarism and the Political Parties in Bonn, members of the "younger generation of historians," as they call themselves, provide a narrative, party-by-party treatment of the disintegration of the Weimar party system from the fall of the Great Coalition in 1930 to the final, humiliating self-dissolution of the parties in 1933.

Werner Conze, chairman of the Commission which sponsored the studies, introduces the work with an essay on the constitutional position of the parties in the Weimar political system and Alfred Milatz concludes with an analysis of the parliamentary, presidential and significant regional elections from 1930 to 1933. Between these two essays are individual monographs on the seven leading parties, excluding the National Socialists, with space allocated roughly according to political importance. All but one of the monographs are followed by a collection of documents, mostly from personal and party records, which support the text.

The two most extensive monographs are those by the editors, respectively, on the Social Democratic Party and the Center Party. Matthias's essay on the SPD, to give some idea of proportion, runs to 100 pages and is followed by 75 pages of documents. A substantial treatment is given also to the German National People's Party in the monograph of Friedrich Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen. The remaining four parties are given shorter though no less scholarly treatment. Matthias and Morsey collaborate on the German Democratic Party, or Staatspartei as it became in 1930. Karl Schwend, who was a participant in some of the activities he describes and is the only one of the contributors who cannot be counted as a "younger" historian, writes on the Bavarian People's Party. The German Communist Party is handled by Siegfried Bahne and the German People's Party by Hans Booms. The essay by Booms is an intermediary report, deliberately brief and not followed by documents, from a longer study now in progress.

What is documented at great length and with high interest in this book is the failure of the Weimar parties, once they had broken the back of party government under the Weimar constitution, to do anything other than smooth the way for the National Socialist takeover by their ineptitude, resignation and lack of realism. There was, as Professor Conze says, a two to three year period between the end of party government and the beginning of one party rule in which the alternative was not simply "Weimar or Hitler." There was time for reform, almost any kind of reform, but the parties were not up to it.

A great deal more might be said about the valuable collection of materials which this book represents. There are 46 photographs of party leaders, of campaign literature and cartoons, and of political "human interest" scenes. The documents range from one-sentence pleas by party members in 1933 to be stricken from party rolls to elaborate analyses of party positions in the improbable political situation of that year. The photographs and the documents, of which there are 128, are separately catalogued. The editors refer to this book as an "interim report." Given the difficulties of obtaining access to all existing documents in a politically divided country, the contributors to this book have done a thorough job in presenting relevant materials for the study of a tragic episode.—D. R. REICH, *Harvard University.*

*Politik: Statskundskab i grundtraek.* BY POUL MEYER. (København: Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck. 1959. Pp. 218. D.Kr. 19.)

Students of Scandinavian politics and government will be both pleased and dismayed by this "text" which has been composed for use by the first group of political science students in the Danish university at Aarhus.* The dismay stems from the admittedly hasty composition, the lack of source notes and extended bibliography, and the obvious failures in proof-reading. However, the work is unique, being the first formal effort to introduce in Denmark, however sketchily, many of the major themes in modern political science as well as, perhaps of more value, to open up Danish politics and government for study in terms which break away from that country's long tradition of historic and legalistic method.

That the Danish beginners are in for meaty fare, and perhaps for some confusion, can be seen in the first few pages as Professor Meyer plunges at once into some rapid explanation of what the discipline means by calling on the works of Machiavelli, Duguit, Kelsen, Lasswell, and Easton. Despite an implied apology that the Danish term *statskundskab* (knowledge of the state) does not contain the word "science" (*videnskab*), the author quite rightly sets the proper perspective by noting that, unlike American political science, the Danish study cannot look back on a list of authors who have assembled the "facts" of Danish politics. "On the contrary," he writes, "we lack to an uncomfortable degree 'facts' on Danish politics. Temporarily, therefore, the main duty of Danish political science must become descriptive-analytical in character."

In support of the newer approaches to politics, however, a section on Political Behavior is included which shows some of the author's potential as he juxtaposes thinking drawn from jurisprudence, economics, sociology, and philosophy as well as political theory and modern polling in a brief but provocative survey.

Fortunately for the beginning student and of most value to foreign students interested in an exposition of the main features of Danish politics and government, Meyer turns the remaining two-thirds of the volume to a descriptive account which not only outlines the Danish governmental institutions but also makes frequent comparative references to Norway and Sweden. Of these institutions the Judiciary is notably, but understandably, missing except in indirect references.

A chapter on Representation is especially good as the author draws on some of the voluminous statistical material that has collected dust in Denmark. The work is enlivened by a variety of critical comments on certain institutional formations and administrative practices, particularly concerning the formation and enactment of the budget and the overly traditional nature of Danish public administration in general. While the chapter on Political Parties is bettered even in English by Dankwart Rustow, it is one of the first efforts by a Dane to go beyond the surface of the subject. A concluding chapter on Interest Organizations becomes preoccupied with association law, in which the author is the recognized authority in the country, but the attempt at least broaches a topic that has only recently become a matter for public conversation in Denmark. Especially interesting is the discussion of the internal pressures existing within the group complex of a single "interest" and of the "importance of belonging" to the Organization.

It is to be hoped that a revised and extended study of the full range of Danish politics and government will soon find the author's time, and that his students will begin the more specific studies so long lacking in that country.— GERALD R. McDANIEL, *University of California* (*Berkeley*).

*Tropical Africa.* BY GEORGE H. T. KIMBLE. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1960. Pp. 603, 506. $15.00. 2 vols.)

Seven years ago the Twentieth Century Fund decided to sponsor the preparation of a study of tropical Africa. At the time there were two independent states in the area—"that part of the mainland and those offshore islands lying between the Sahara and the Limpopo River." At the end of 1960 there were twenty-two, seventeen having been proclaimed in 1960, a record of change the significance of which testifies to the Fund's wisdom in foreseeing the urgent need for a comprehensive and authoritative statement of the background facts necessary to enlightened understanding of Africa's "explosion into the future." *Tropical Africa,* which magnificently meets this need, testifies to the Fund's good fortune in engaging George H. T. Kimble, then Director of the American Geographical Society, to write the study. Mr. Kimble has drawn upon frequent visits to Africa, a wealth of published material, and forty-six "working papers" by as many specialists. The result is a work of sound and uncompromising scholarship, distinguished by the author's pungent prose and enriched by an abundance of maps, tables, and photographs.

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* For a review of the new political science curriculum at the Aarhus University see Poul Meyer, "Statskundskab ved Aarhus Universitet," *Nordisk Administrativ Tidsskrift,* no. 3, 1959, pp. 233–38. (Summary in English.)

Professor Kimble, now Chairman of the Department of Geography at Indiana University, has organized his study on a subject-matter rather than a country-by-country basis, an approach which enables him to portray that which is common and to acknowledge much that is uncommon. Between Chapter 1, a fast-moving profile of economic life sixty years ago, and the final Chapter 24, a thoughtful reading of the shadows cast ahead by the present shape of events, the author's design embraces all of the essentials, physical, economic, social, and political. As the survey proceeds from the "fabric of physical and economic threads" to the "mosaic of peoples, cultures, and beliefs," the difficulties in the way of achieving the author's objective mount. The common characteristics become harder to identify, and the differences harder to account for. The search for the most instructive ingredients in the political arena is particularly tortuous. The degree to which Mr. Kimble has surmounted the difficulties is impressive; for example, the chapter on nationalism is a notably clear and systematic analysis and the chapter on the machinery of government is a skillful compression.

In the chapter on colonial policies, wherein the author chooses to record many of the immediate imperatives relevant to political change, the reader's appreciation of these imperatives is blunted by a number of flaws. Portuguese policy in Africa can no longer, if it ever could, adequately be defined by reference exclusively to official statements. In a more significant lapse, there is an insufficiently instructive basis for interpreting the all-too-spectacular events in the Congo since 1958. It is not to argue with Kimble's unwillingness to judge events to suggest that the reader is entitled to some help in determining why, if the Belgians genuinely understood the Congo's exposure to the "winds of nationalism," such understanding produced a series of assumptions which "spelled paternalism." There is little guide to an understanding of the about-faces in Belgian policy announced in 1959, no explanation of why a dedication to "orderly colonial development" should somehow have been followed by so much disorder. And although the British "are given to inordinate optimism," this delightful characteristic seems to be synonymous with recklessness or miscalculation in many of the situations as described by Kimble. Thus he manages, while assembling the evidence to prove that the grant of independence to Ghana was an act of folly, to compliment the British for having made it. Dwelling essentially on the disabilities in the way of African self-government in the territories of British East Africa, he manages mainly to confirm that 1961 will prove to be a year of statesmanlike folly there.

Professor Kimble's unfailing and informed sensitivity to tropical Africa's pervasive diversity is a mark of wisdom. The phenomenon is one of the area's most formidable political facts of life. Preoccupation with diversity can, however, become attachment to diversity. It is dangerous, in the search for generalizations about the moral basis of future African polities, to suggest that, "if self-determination means anything in tropical Africa, it means freedom for each of the 600-odd [ethnic] groups to be autonomous."

No amount of honest fault-finding can detract or should be taken to detract from the fact that this work is a unique and extraordinary answer to Americans' pressing need to be informed about Africa. Boldly conceived and superbly executed, *Tropical Africa* is at once the most comprehensive survey of the area ever published in the United States and easily the most readable ever published anywhere.—GRADY H. NUNN, *University of Alabama.*

*Social Change in Latin America Today: Its Implications for United States Policy.* BY RICHARD N. ADAMS, JOHN P. GILLIN, ALLAN R. HOLMBERG, OSCAR LEWIS, RICHARD W. PATCH, AND CHARLES WAGLEY, WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY LYMAN BRYSON. (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, 1960. Pp. xiv, 353. $5.00.)

This is a collection of essays by six anthropologists, all of them well-known "names" in the Latin-American field. John P. Gillin writes on changing class structures in Latin America in general, while the other five chapters deal with specific countries. Thus, Allan R. Holmberg's contribution deals with Peru, Richard W. Patch's with Bolivia, Charles Wagley's with Brazil, Richard N. Adams' with Guatemala, and Oscar Lewis' with Mexico. All of the authors are veterans of considerable field experience in the countries about which they write. All, moreover, agree that "all of the countries to the south of us, in varying degrees but all in some measure, are undergoing social, economic, and political changes which pain and bewilder their people and make them more difficult to deal with."

Like most symposia, this book is uneven. The six contributions are of varying merit, and—beyond a generalized concern with social change—deal with different subjects. Thus Gillin, focusing on changes in class systems, occupies himself largely with the emergence of what he calls the "middle segment," a concept intriguingly akin to that recently advanced in John J. Johnson's *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). Wagley and Lewis have written comparable chapters on social change in the wake of political revolution, dealing, in one case, with post-1930 Brazil and, in the other, with post-1940 Mexico. In both cases, emphasis is placed upon population growth and urbanization, with considerable attention devoted to the rapid economic development of both countries. Holmberg, on the other hand, reports on the Cornell University project at Vicos, Peru. He sees the effort devoted there to the development of new community leadership as a case study in guided change. Adams divides his attention between describing the class structure of Guatemala and dabbling in the country's recent political history. Patch's contribution, the most political of the six, offers a remarkably sophisticated analysis of the social and political implications of the MNR revolution in Bolivia.

The book exhibits a difficulty which appears to be an increasingly common characteristic of volumes undertaken by the Council on Foreign Relations. This is the problem of apparently strained interplay between what the principal authors are interested in, when it is *not* United States foreign policy, and what the Council is interested in, which *is* foreign policy. In the present case, although the book is called *Social Change in Latin America Today: Its Implications for United States Policy*, the contributing authors never really settled the question of whether they ought to be concerned with the foreign policy implication of the change processes the various chapters deal with. This indecision detracts from the value and the consistency of the book. Although the late Lyman Bryson's introduction clearly states that the principal authors, because they are scientists, "do not offer definite suggestions as to what our Latin-American policy ought to be," Lewis is alone in actually refraining from making such suggestions. The others—scientists or not—jump freely into the foreign policy game. Gillin, as "a layman speaking to other laymen," presents a wide variety of suggestions for the State Department; Holmberg and Adams recommend a restructuring of some of the technical assistance programs; and Wagley urges, harmlessly enough, that an attempt be made by the government of the United States to understand the Vargas revolution in Brazil. Patch offers a hard-hitting and insightful analysis of United States foreign aid, carefully distinguishing between technical coöperation and economic assistance, and making useful suggestions on the intricate problems of coördination of these two types of programs.

The word "today" is printed in the largest type used on the dust jacket of the book, which is presented as a fresh and new contribution to our understanding of one of the more crucial problems of the contemporary world. Yet some of the chapters are neither fresh nor new. Gillin's essay, published here in 1960, is the product of research supported *in 1951* by the Carnegie Corporation; accordingly, his treatment of the "middle segments" enjoys none of the benefits of John J. Johnson's significant work in this field, published in 1958. Lewis' chapter was written *in 1956*, when he was a Guggenheim Fellow in Mexico. The task of providing fresh insights and seeking new evaluations thus falls upon a substantially reduced percentage of the corps of authors.

The book seeks to bring together a number of promising ingredients. For one thing, there is no denying that the volume deals with an important subject. Few questions with regard to Latin America are more pressing today than social change there and the formulation of sensible United States policies toward it. Certainly the Council on Foreign Relations is to be applauded for its attempt to throw light on such crucial issues. Further, the six scholars gathered together for the task constitute an impressive array of talent. Each of them is a well-established and unquestionably competent Latin Americanist. However, the book falls short of delivering the full promise of these exciting ingredients, largely through the failure of the participants to pull together. This reviewer is not an opponent of individual freedom of inquiry, and he is even willing to concede that some disparity or divergence must be expected within any symposium. By the same token, it does not seem unreasonable to ask for a minimum amount of agreement or "teamness" among the contributors on such questions as whether or not the project is to be concerned with United States policy and the extent to which the authors might be willing to take a fresh look at the issues put before them.—George I. Blanksten, *Northwestern University*.

*The British West Indies. The Search for Self-Government.* By Morley Ayearst. (New York: New York University Press, 1960. Pp. 258. $5.00.)

The momentous changes in the British West Indies since World War II have not been adequately treated by political scientists. Most of those whose area specialty embraces the Caribbean are primarily Latin Americanists, and most students of British colonial policy and administration have concentrated on the dependencies in Asia and Africa where the situations have seemed more critical. But in the British West Indies, too, the old colonial order has been giving way and a period of political ferment and constitutional experimentation is at hand.

Morley Ayearst, Associate Professor of Government at New York University, has taken a major step toward remedying the neglect of these developments. His volume provides the most substantial political analysis of the British Caribbean territories alone and in their entirety since H. Hume Wrong's *Government of the West Indies* (1923). This new work should prove of value to a wide audience, including those who have no great interest in these particular colonies. Its investigation of their transition to self-government contributes materially to a fuller understanding of the problems associated with such a movement in newly-developing and racially mixed societies generally.

Professor Ayearst describes in detail, with emphasis on the post-war period, the changing structures and roles of the legislative and executive organs in each of the dependencies as they have progressed diversely through successive stages of colonial tutelage. This evolution is traced carefully for the most part, although no reference is made to the important constitutional changes agreed to for the Leeward and Windward Islands at the London Conference of June 1959 nor to those implemented in Jamaica the following month. Such omissions are curious in view of the fact that the story is carried forward to April 1960 for British Guiana.

A fascinating picture emerges of the numerous ways in which adjustments may be sought (frequently through convention rather than formal amendment) between the growing demands of the local leaders and the interests of the imperial power. Very instructive comments on the benefits and drawbacks of the various arrangements add to the value of this survey.

The book contains more than mere constitutional history, however. Indeed, what is most significant about Ayearst's contribution is his treatment of political attitudes and behavior in these colonies. No one has done a better job of analyzing the forces motivating West Indian politicians and voters and their response to these forces. Nowhere else (except in Ayearst's own earlier articles in *Social and Economic Studies*) can there be found so incisive an interpretation of political parties and of economic and racial groups in the area.

The one complaint which might be made of his general approach is that the movement toward federation does not seem to be sufficiently related to "the search for self-government," or, indeed, to West Indian politics generally. It seems a bit artificial to relegate the discussion of federation almost entirely to a rather brief final chapter in a volume with such a subtitle. Greater attention to the positions of the various territories and of groups within them regarding the issues involved in federation would, moreover, leave the reader better prepared to understand the strains experienced by the federal government since its establishment in 1958.

Ayearst succeeds in maintaining a remarkably well-balanced viewpoint throughout. He finds little to criticize in British policy and feels that the pace of constitutional advance has been proper on the whole, but he is far from being a "laureate of imperialism." He notes the danger of demagoguery, corruption, and violence in West Indian politics, but is not unduly critical of the record to date and is quite optimistic about the chances for sound parliamentary democracy in an independent federation.—JESSE HARRIS PROCTOR, JR., *Duke University*.

*Socialism in One Country: 1924–1926. Part II.* BY EDWARD HALLETT CARR. (New York: Macmillan. 1960. Pp. viii, 493. $7.50.)

This book—the sixth of a ten-volume history of the USSR—is the second installment of a trilogy dealing with Soviet developments during 1924–1926. Whereas the companion volume stressed the economic policies of the period, this study examines the political struggles in the Communist Party and institutional changes in the "Soviet order." In 1924, areas of freedom still existed within the Party, making it possible for historians who have access to documents and writings of the time to reconstruct in significant measure the clash of personalities and issues. From painstaking analysis of Russian source materials, Professor Carr has produced an authoritative history of the era—a clearly written work that is rich in detail and documentation.

In treating the political struggle, the author describes the formation of the Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin alliance, the defeat of Trotsky, and the subsequent breakup of the triumvirate. This phase of the account ends as Zinoviev and Kamenev join with the discredited Trotsky in a desperate effort to regain their footing against Stalin's advance. Adequate reference to economic developments supplies a context within which the political maneuvering may be viewed.

Despite wide areas of ideological agreement, the contending factions exaggerated their differences and combed the Leninist scriptures to support their claims. Trotsky's rivals sought to undermine him by attacking his theory of "permanent revolution," picturing him as a heretic who had deviated from Lenin's teaching. Trotsky was ill-equipped to resist such onslaughts; unable to face the prospect of expulsion, he yielded to the Party's discipline. In the early stage of the struggle, Stalin displayed great restraint, letting his allies take extreme positions and casting himself as an apostle of moderation and Lenin's "true" disciple. Trotsky won some support among the youth and the Party's intellectuals, but he made little headway among rank-and-file Communists. The author points out that "socialism in one country"—initially advanced by Stalin to offset Trotsky's theoretical position—developed wider symbolic appeal as programs of industrialization were introduced, for it represented a fusion of *socialist* and *nationalist* loyalties.

The outcome of the succession struggle, however, was not decided by reasoned arguments over doctrine, but by clever manipulation of the levers of power. Even the arts and the Komsomols felt the impact of the Party cleavage. Carr has made an important contribution in his analysis of the geographic basis of the power struggle, especially the subjugation of the Leningrad wing of the Party by the rival Moscow faction.

The power struggle was accompanied by certain institutional developments which are thoroughly treated in this study. In addition to his analysis of internal Party dictatorship, the author discusses the developing patterns of federalism (the account of economic regionalization has interest for students of post-Stalin economic reorganization); the "revitalization" of the soviets, prompted by centralized administration and by the shortcomings of rural Party organization; the evolution of the professional army; and the tightening of the security agencies, aided by new concepts of Soviet law.

In the study of such a complex epoch, a single volume must necessarily confine its analysis to selected aspects of Soviet development. Although interpretation is finely woven into historical narrative, the reader looks forward to the next episode, which will enable him to view the completed picture and to reflect upon the author's overall appraisal of the era. While the present volume will be interesting to the general reader, it is an essential reference work for the Soviet specialist.—John E. Turner, *University of Minnesota.*

*The Soviet Cultural Offensive.* By Frederick C. Barghoorn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. Pp. vii, 353. $7.50.)

In recent years the once relatively uncomplicated word "diplomacy" has been encumbered with more than a score of descriptive and qualifying adjectives purporting either to expand its meaning or to give it a more fastidious quality of precision. The most conspicuous consequence of these dubious refinements has been needlessly to embellish the vocabulary of international relations with a staggering and bewildering array of unedifying clichés. In an oblique way, these innovations reflect a world undergoing massive social, ideological and technological convulsions in which the forms, moods, methods, instruments and even objectives of diplomacy are being subjected to corresponding transformations.

One of the more useful of the new concepts of diplomacy is Cultural Diplomacy, the subject of Professor Barghoorn's imaginatively written book, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive.* This illuminating study is simultaneously a comprehensive appraisal of the cultural instruments of Soviet foreign policy and a perceptive analysis of the limits and opportunities of cultural diplomacy in general. While the author subjects the cultural manipulation of the Soviet Government to harsh criticism, the book is at the same time a grudging tribute to the imagination and efficiency of Soviet diplomacy in utilizing culture to promote foreign policy objectives.

Soviet cultural diplomacy is defined by Professor Barghoorn "as the manipulation of cultural materials and personnel for propaganda purposes" and again as the "systematic utilization of information, artistic, scientific and other cultural materials, symbols and personnel, and ideas, as instruments of foreign policy." There is also a strong note of implied ethical condemnation of cultural diplomacy as an institution when Professor Barghoorn states in the Preface that Soviet cultural diplomacy "is the complex amalgam of propaganda, deception, and sometimes mutually profitable transactions with non-Soviet states," which "from a non-communist point of view usually seems to be a perversion of cultural exchange and intercultural communication."

The perversion and distortion, and even manipulation, of culture as an instrument of foreign policy would appear at first blush to be a singularly sinister enterprise incompatible with the notion of culture itself. Thus while Professor Barghoorn rightly observes that the idea of cultural diplomacy "is still so new to American foreign policy that it is doubtful if one could yet very meaningfully speak of an American cultural diplomacy," he also goes on to question "whether, in the sense in which we have been using the term, we shall ever be full-fledged practitioners of this art." While it is true that modern cultural diplomacy is essentially a creature of the Soviet Union, for whom it has been a remarkably effective instrument, culture has always been employed by states as a conscious instrument of policy (perverted or otherwise). One thinks almost instinctively of the various "civilizing" missions of European colonial powers. The forms, dimensions, and instruments as well as the ideological and moral values and goals of the Soviet State are qualitatively different. The fact that its policies seem more effective in terms of their purposes and objectives should not deceive us into confusing a self-serving insistence on the sanctity of culture with our relative ineptitude in employing culture for diplomatic advantage in foreign relations.

If culture can be useful as a manipulative instrument of foreign policy, there is little reason to believe that it will enjoy special immunity from the routine vices of diplomacy. Since the objective of all forms of diplomacy is to facilitate the implementation of national goals and purposes in international relations, the moral quality of diplomacy tends to emerge from the balance struck between the imperatives of the national interest and the moral restraints of a given society. While the balance in Soviet behavior reflects a point which results in a narrow range of ethical limits on Soviet foreign policy, the United States must develop its own unique forms and methods whereby it can employ its rich and variegated cultural resources for diplomatic advantage without at the same time outraging its fundamental political traditions and moral principles.

The outstanding merit of Professor Barghoorn's book is the lively way in which he traces the evolution of Soviet cultural diplomacy, from its implicit origins in Marxist-Leninist ideology itself, through the erratic, experimental, and often contradictory phases of the Stalinist era, to the accelerated cultural offensive since the late dictator's death. The book is both descriptive and analytical in method, frequently leavened with episodic personal encounters which Professor Barghoorn narrates with the artistry of an accomplished raconteur. He devotes attention not only to the patterns of organization and control over cultural life, recruitment and training of personnel, but also to the coordination of Soviet cultural policy with other aspects of Soviet diplomacy in various regions of the world. The configurations of Soviet-American cultural relations receive special attention at the hands of Professor Barghoorn, who gives an exhaustive appraisal of effects upon both countries together with a perceptive projection of possible future lines of development.

It is Professor Barghoorn's view that the Soviet Union has received greater benefits from the current cultural exchange program because by and large it operates within guide-lines established by the Soviet Union, masquerading under the rubric of "reciprocity." He suggests as a substitute a program within the framework of what he calls "equivalency," which would blunt the special advantages which the Soviet Government enjoys under the present formula without at the same time destroying the possibilities of genuine mutual benefits from intercultural contact.—VERNON V. ASPATURIAN, *The Pennsylvania State University.*

*The Conscience of the Revolution.* BY ROBERT VINCENT DANIELS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. xi, 526. $10.00.)

This is a nearly exhaustive survey of the spectrum of deviation which has plagued the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since its beginnings in spite of the oft-repeated claims regarding monolithic unity. Professor Daniels has devoted the bulk of this volume (chapters two through thirteen) to the 1917–1929 period. The various pre-1917 deviations from Lenin's monopoly on wisdom are dealt with rather briefly in the first chapter. Thus this is a thorough treatment of the 1917 controversy over "permanent revolution" and the subsequent disagreements regarding collaboration with other socialists and conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the rights to be accorded the non-Russian nationalities, the role of trade unions in the new order, the Military Opposition, the Workers' Opposition and the correctness of the New Economic Policy. Six chapters deal with the events occurring between Lenin's illness and Stalin's effective isolation of the Right Opposition in 1929 and center upon the Trotskyite opposition in 1923–1924, the Zinoviev-Kamenev Opposition of 1925 and the United Opposition of 1926–1927.

While much of this account will be familiar to the initiated, the degree of detail and the innumerable lengthy quotations and the 59 pages of notes will make it useful even to those who are well acquainted with the period under consideration. Professor Daniels has exercised the historian's prerogative in eschewing any systematic treatment of post-1929 events and purged personalities on the grounds that "the study of Soviet history after 1929 is balked by puzzles that the absence of documentation makes insoluble." Yet in the two concluding chapters he does give some attention to the subsequent fate of the oppositionists and the post-Stalin rehabilitation of certain of the purge victims and relates the deviations to a broader Russian context. However, more recent oppositionists have not been given their due.

One of the qualities of this study is that it emphasizes the various nuances which have arisen within the Soviet Communist movement and have been magnified into heresies by the leadership in spite of the fact that these men were agreed on more than divided them. Disagreements arose because certain Communists were motivated by revolutionary idealism and enthusiasm while others advocated caution and still others preached tactical inflexibility and expressed disillusionment with the new bureaucracy and its policies. A source of confusion—for which the author bears no responsibility—lies in the fact that the categories of "Left" and "Right" could be applied at various times to the same individual. Thus Lenin was a "leftist" in 1917 regarding the need to seize power and several months later became a "rightist" when demanding a peace treaty with the

Central Powers. Kamenev and Zinoviev were "rightists" in 1917 in opposing the seizure of power but within nine years were to join the "Left" demanding an end to the NEP. Bukharin was a "leftist" in 1918 on the peace treaty and on nationality policy but did an about-face on the latter issue in 1923 and was later leader of the "Right Opposition." Russian "leftists" opposed concessions to the non-Russian nationalities under Soviet rule while Ukrainian "leftists" demanded them. These are only a few examples of a phenomenon of contradiction inherent in the subject matter. They illustrate the arbitrariness with which a point of view regarding policy can be branded a "deviation."

Professor Daniels' clear analysis of the failure of the oppositionists gives recognition to their lack of control over the Party bureaucracy; their general willingness to recant is explained in terms of their being charged with the cardinal sin of becoming a second party. Thus the fear of being excluded from the ranks of the chosen faithful caused almost all oppositionists to be fettered psychologically before they deviated, and Lenin's Tenth Congress resolution on Party unity further doomed their efforts. Membership came to mean unquestioning acceptance of Party policies under threat of expulsion, and submission became inevitable.

The author has traced the various deviations and protest movements with great skill and has made extensive use of unpublished but now catalogued papers in the Trotsky Archives at Harvard. The very few lacunae of a secondary nature do not detract from what is manifestly a volume reflecting some years of diligent and thoughtful effort.—JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR., *University of Washington.*

*Settling Disputes in Soviet Society.* BY JOHN N. HAZARD. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1960. Pp. xiv, 534. $9.50.)

Professor Hazard's searching inquiry into Soviet legal institutions in their formative years comes at a most opportune moment. Having now entered the first stage of the "transition from socialism to communism," the Soviet Union has initiated the gradual transfer of various functions from the state to "social" organizations and thus allegedly has taken the first steps toward the ultimate "withering away" of the state. And the much-advertised "comradely courts" of today seem to echo somewhat the earlier communist striving after "simple justice" that constitutes the subject-matter of Professor Hazard's study.

Drawing on a wealth of primary Russian sources, the author discusses, first of all, the initial communist efforts to establish in Russia a primitive single-court system based on simplicity and informality and operating without professional prosecutors or defenders and with few if any rules of procedure. Professor Hazard then proceeds to show in the main body of his study how and why this original striving after simplicity was soon to give way to a far more elaborate, highly centralized hierarchy of legal institutions. This hierarchy consisted of a four-tier judiciary operating under full-fledged codes of criminal and civil procedure and supplemented by additional special courts, a tightly-knit pyramid of bureaucratized public prosecution, and a unified defenders' system of state-controlled colleges of advocates. He notes, however, that the dreams of a simple system of popular justice lingered on and began to gain ground once again in the later twenties, only to be nipped in the bud by Stalin's one-man dictatorship.

Although the author's attention is focused mainly on the various enactments pertaining to the Soviet legal institutions, he also examines their implementation in actual practice. And while he is concerned primarily with the Russian, and later All-Union, pattern, he examines also the parallel developments in the Ukrainian Republic and, to a lesser extent, the other Soviet republics then in existence.

Replete as it is with detailed accounts of Soviet legal developments, perhaps too detailed at times, Professor Hazard's well-documented volume should be of primary concern for those who specialize in the study of Soviet law. Nonetheless, in unfolding his story of legal institutions, the author sheds light on various aspects that are of interest also for students of Soviet politics in general. Thus he manages to extract valuable documentary evidence indicating that cleavages arose at times between the "supreme politicians" of the Politbureau, mistrustful of formal restrictions, and the Party members working in the legal system who, while loyal to the communist cause, sought to "humanize" the system and create limitations on arbitrary powers. He reveals how even some of the high-ranking Party members engaged in legal work were influenced by western civil-law concepts and at times freely admitted it. In delving into the proceedings of the sessions of the Central Executive Committee and the various "congresses of persons engaged in legal work," he shows how open clashes of opinion and other manifestations of genuinely free discussion used to occur in the early formative years of the Soviet system, and thereby corroborates the findings of others in this respect.

Two particularly striking instances of such free discussion are to be found in two hard-fought controversies that pitted against each other the advocates of centralization and the supporters of state and local rights: in the 1922 public debate on the Procuracy and in the 1924 session of the Central Executive Committee called to deal with the federal principles of criminal procedure. The first controversy had finally to be settled by the Party's Politbureau while the second led to a division of opinion of the two houses of the Central Executive Committee so that the text had to be referred to the committee's conciliation commission.

Professor Hazard's study is a valuable contribution to the literature on the Soviet experiment in the administration of justice, a contribution which, though concerned with events of more than three decades ago, is made all the more timely by the latest Soviet trends of the "transition-to-communism" era.—EDWARD TABORSKY, *The University of Texas.*

*The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs.* BY HUGH L. KEENLEYSIDE et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, published for the Duke University Commonwealth Center. 1960. Pp. x, 174. $5.00.)

Although all students of the Commonwealth of Nations have good reason to be grateful for Duke University having established a Commonwealth Studies Center some five years ago, Canadians are especially appreciative for the publication of three volumes which have appeared under its auspices and deal successively with the Evolution of Canadian Federalism, the American Economic Impact upon Canada, and the Growth of Canadian External Policies. The latest of these monographs resulted from the presentation in 1959 to the Commonwealth Summer Seminar and Research Group of seven papers, two of them by Americans, which were concerned with various aspects of External Policy. For this field, as Dr. Gaddis Smith of Duke University properly comments in his annotated appendix, "Selected Readings on Canadian External Policy 1909–1959" (which deals only with books) " . . . the dawn is just beginning to break." There are two reasons for this regrettable tardiness: the preoccupation of Canadian scholars with other aspects of Canadian development and the difficulty of securing access to primary sources, since the Canadian Department of External Affairs is, if anything, even more cautious than its British counterpart.

In this volume, some of the gaps in the history of Canadian external policy are wholly or partially filled. Thus, Dr. Smith, with the help of previously unused sources, has also contributed a valuable essay on "Canadian External Affairs during World War One," about which remarkably little has been written. It was gratifying to note his tribute to Loring Christie as " . . . Borden's foreign office." Professor Eayrs, a political scientist at the University of Toronto, has presented what should remain as the definitive account of the origins of the Department of External Affairs, in which he describes how the British Ambassador to Washington, the Governor-General and the Prime Minister of Canada, and a distinguished civil servant played their respective parts as founding fathers. Mr. Eayrs has also written a hard-hitting essay on "A Low Dishonest Decade" (the phrase is from W. H. Auden) which deals with some of the least commendable aspects of Canadian policy in the Timid Thirties. Further vigorous comments on this period also appear in the introductory essay by Dr. H. L. Keenleyside which are of special interest because of his long association with the Department of External Affairs before moving on to other fields of public service. A third period of Canadian policy is discussed by Professor Edgar McInnis in his paper on "A Middle Power in the Cold War," a suggestive interpretation which closes with the observation that the Berlin Crisis may herald a new phase in which " . . . consolidation and adjustment will be the dominant themes" that will offer a challenge to the flexibility displayed by Canadian policy in the past. In many respects the most interesting essay, "Le Canada français: du provincialisme à l'internationalisme," comes from Professor Gérard Bergeron of Laval University, who speculates upon the changing attitude of French Canadians towards world affairs and invites his younger colleagues to test his hypotheses. Dr. Deener of Tulane University has a clear and well-documented analysis of "The Treaty Power in Canada" and reaches the interesting conclusion that, in contrast to the experience in the United States, the last two decades of Canadian history have reflected " . . . the strong pressure in behalf of a greater treaty power, when the balance has been tipped too far in the direction of restraint." The least satisfactory essay came from Dean Bladen of the University of Toronto, who, in discussing "Economic Aspects of Foreign Policy," offered a brief exposition of "some issues of principle." It is not surprising that the title of this volume is more comprehensive than its contents. But it still remains a highly successful attempt to lighten somewhat the darkness about which Dr. Smith complained.—F. H. SOWARD, *The University of British Columbia.*

*Labor in Canadian Agriculture.* BY GEORGE V. HAYTHORNE. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1960. Pp. 122.)

This volume, the fourth of a series of Harvard Studies in Labor in Agriculture, is the work of one of Canada's senior civil servants in the field of labor. It is the product of more than a decade's work on the subject of labor in agriculture, and there is much reference to the author's earlier writings in the field.

Mr. Haythorne's purpose is to portray Canadian agriculture and its position in the Canadian economy, to analyze the role of the farm labor force in Canada, and to throw light on the problem of full employment in Canada's agriculture. He presents much developmental and statistical material on Canadian agriculture, including such matters as acreage, productivity, livestock, mechanization, and the labor force itself. Though the presentation of this material is sometimes a bit repetitive, the facts are shown fully and clearly. Of special significance is the analytical and prescriptive discussion of the problem of attaining full employment in agriculture, based in part on a thoughtful consideration of the mobility of resources.

The study is useful to the political scientist primarily in that it provides him with an organized body of economic facts. Beyond that, it should engage the interest of our profession through the suggestion of various governmental policies to attain full agricultural employment. These include organized movement of seasonal workers, settlement of immigrants, and the coverage of farm workers by social security.

Not included in the study are accounts of the political organization of Canadian agriculture, on group or party level. While these aspects of Canadian agriculture and the men engaged in it have been of particular interest to several students of sociology and politics, their exclusion does not detract from the attainment of the basic purpose of Haythorne's work.

The author is confident that the demand for Canadian agricultural products is about to increase. He is equally confident that Canada can make the arrangements necessary to provide the agricultural labor force needed to meet this demand. His analysis is presented with the cold objectivity of the dismal science; but he gives intimation of a warm feeling for the welfare of those who labor in Canadian agriculture. We can share his sympathy for this vast system of agricultural production north of our borders—a system that has met its productive goals with a high incidence of farm proprietorship, and with honest efforts to keep low the elements of drudgery which so frequently attend the raising of food.—FREDERICK C. ENGELMANN, *Alfred University*.

*British Labor and Public Ownership*. BY HERBERT E. WEINER. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1960. Pp. xii, 111. $3.25.)

The commitment of the British labor movement to nationalization now seems obsessive, anachronistic, and self-destructive. Whether this is fair criticism would, I know, be questioned by socialist ideologists. But no one is likely to dispute the view that the British labor movement is distinguished among similar movements in other western nations by the strength and durability of its commitment to nationalization. This much is true despite the British Labour party's slow backsliding and the decreasing likelihood that it will carry out any far-reaching new policies of public ownership. The fact remains that the party, influenced on this score by many important trade unions, has recently refused its leader's proposal that it undergo a constitutional purge of its long-run goal of widespread public ownership of the means of production. In fact, much of Gaitskell's trouble as leader stems from the well-founded suspicion of trade unionists as well as party militants that he lacks the true faith in nationalization.

Why this faith should so persist in the British labor movement is an important question. Herbert Weiner's study, although not directly addressed to this point, does convey some of the information necessary to an understanding of the general subject. Writing both from documentary sources and from his postwar observation as a U. S. labor attache in London, Dr. Weiner describes the early growth of nationalization ideas before World War I, the adoption of such ideas as an aspect of interwar trade union militancy, the implementation of the 1945 program, and the subsequent rethinking within the party. The author's concern in this brief study is focused on the Trades Union Congress.

Without any extensive analysis, Weiner does call attention to the way in which nationalization, originally fostered primarily by socialist intellectuals, became "symbolic of a synthesis of interest between trade unionism and political socialism, and the connection between political power and economic welfare." He performs a special service in recollecting the way in which public ownership was popular in 1945 as an aspect of the then prestigious general concept of economic planning.—LEON D. EPSTEIN, *University of Wisconsin*.

*The State and the Trade Unions*. BY D. F. MACDONALD. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960. Pp. vii, 199. $4.50.)

D. F. MacDonald, now of the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, is a man with practical experience in the Ministry of Labour and in a national employer association. He has been highly impractical, however, in attempting to write, in less than 200 pages, both a factual narrative of the relationships between labor and the British state from medieval times to the present and an essay on these relationships. Inevitably the summaries of events and trends are oversimplified and the omissions often glaring: for example, there is not even a whisper of the effect of the 1931 crisis, and while he summarizes developments during the two world wars, he never assesses their profound effects (especially those of World War Two). Nor is there much theoretical consideration of the relationships of unions to their society, to the Labour Party, and to the state.

The state, MacDonald argues, was much less hostile to unions between the eighteenth century and the beginning of this century than is generally thought, although judges and the House of Lords were, he admits, rather rough on the unions. He implies from time to time that socialism has never had much real interest for British trade unionists, and he declares that "pure socialism" [whatever that might be] "could after all mean the end of the trade unions."

MacDonald's chief contribution to current policy debates is a spirited argument for compulsory arbitration of labor disputes. To that subject, almost alone of all his themes, he gives unhurried treatment, marshalling many of the arguments *pro* and *con* and disposing of some of the latter. How a democracy can adopt his solution in peacetime when both unions and employers oppose it, he does not tell us. Here, as at many other points, prescription would have been illuminated by some reference to the experience of other countries.

Some of MacDonald's blasts will awaken sympathetic echoes on this side of the ocean: notably that against union jurisdictional strikes and strikes for the closed shop (which the British have at times, and mistakenly, treated as a peculiarly American malady). The author inveighs against the incompatibility between unrestricted sectional wage claims and the general interest of an economy dependent upon its world trading position. But here the need is less for moralizing than for the specifics of statesmanship recognizing market and political considerations.—VAL R. LORWIN, *University of Oregon.*

*Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas.* EDITED BY WILBERT E. MOORE AND ARNOLD S. FELDMAN. (New York: Social Science Research Council. 1960. Pp. xv, 378. $3.75.)

Professors Moore's and Feldman's *Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas* is a symposium of fifteen essays by various authors plus their own four introductory chapters and post-script. The introduction tries to set up a general conceptual framework for the study of the factors that encourage or discourage workers from different societies in the so-called "developing areas" to commit themselves through changes in their social and economic habits to the process of industrialization. The other essays are partly case studies and partly contributions to the general discussion.

The line of argument introducing the book emanates from a cosmic vantage point; *i.e.*, that the process of industrialization is a universal one constituting a unifying economic and social trend transcending international conflict. Since this trend is inevitable, Moore and Feldman feel that one need not be overly concerned with the social problem it creates for those who are not yet committed, and that it is just as well to make changes abruptly and dramatically. They justify their view with the observation that the workers when confronted with the economic necessity of accepting factory employment tend to adjust to their new situation relatively smoothly—an argument backed by Dr. Clark Kerr in his contributing essay on "Changing Social Structures."

According to Moore and Feldman, one of the major factors in this commitment is the spreading of the market economy throughout the underdeveloped countries. They observe that the more experience a community has with trade and a market system, the more easily will its population accept wage labor and its requirements of discipline. At the same time population pressures make reversion to the traditional agricultural and village society increasingly difficult. While the authors are not particularly concerned with the problem of easing the pains of transition by accommodating the traditional segment of society more than the standards of rational economic planning and the needs of efficiency require, they advocate the resort to techniques which would orient the factory workers positively to their work; *i.e.*, which would lead to commitment. Habits and loyalties derived from the traditional society which are likely to detract from the commitment to the industrial system are to be eliminated. Social and economic mobility, acquisition of skills, adequate wages to confer economic status as a substitute for former social status, relation to the machine, adequate communication between workers and management are key factors leading to commitment. Only through these can an efficient industrial society be established.

The other contributors to this book are divided on the issue of how to bring about this commitment. Those opposing Moore and Feldman feel that commitment can be facilitated by easing the process of transition through accommodation of the traditionally oriented segment of society. They argue that there are many valuable attitudes and institutions inherent in traditionally oriented societies which can be readily adapted to inducing workers to commit themselves to an industrial order. Morris D. Morris, Cyril S. Belshaw, Peter Gregory, Bert F. Hoselitz, and Manning Nash point not only to examples in India, Puerto Rico, and Guatemala, but even to the communal boat building industry in New

Guinea in support of their contention that integration into an industrial order can be achieved without creating too many unnecessary tensions by deliberately breaking up the old social order. To this Moore and Feldman reply that the old system is also cruel and oppressive and that this fact is not changed merely because the workers do not realize it.

In general the two authors are primarily oriented toward the need of making the transition to an industrial order not only rapid, but also as efficient as possible in order to satisfy the rising expectations of the workers by bringing increasing benefits to them. However, the process of economic development takes precedence in importance over that of creating economic welfare.

While the problem of creating an efficient industrial labor force is indeed a key one in the underdeveloped countries, the reader will find this volume not always satisfactory, even though such contributions as those of Peter B. Hammond on "Management in Transition," of Morris on "The Labor Market in India," and of Hoselitz on the "Market Matrix" are excellent. For one thing, despite the fact that two chapters are devoted to the problems of trade unionism, politics, and ideology, none of these relates satisfactorily to the process of commitment. Generally the authors and editors of this volume tend to ignore the fact that this is the age of political rather than of economic man, that the desire for industrialization is more that of the elite which is preoccupied with national prestige rather than with an economic rationale. Time and again we see in the underdeveloped countries that economic planning has to take a back seat when it interferes with the problem of establishing political control. David E. Apter in his chapter on "Political Organization and Ideology" states that modern nationalism and socialism have replaced the Protestant Ethic as the well-spring of economic development and that the economic entrepreneur is being replaced by the political entrepreneur. Although this is a clever formulation, the author fails to follow through his argument. Instead of discussing the relations between ideology and economic attitudes, he strains credulity by trying to prove the similarity of religion and nationalist ideology in promoting capitalist economic morality in Weber's sense. Since the whole idea of the Protestant Ethic as the motive force of capitalism has remained a far too readily accepted cliche, and since the ethics of some of the newly emerging nationalist elites are somewhat questionable, his thesis becomes untenable even in his own terms.

Among the more unfortunate aspects of this book are its lack of coherence and the sociological pidgin English of Professors Moore and Feldman. Is it really true, as the authors claim, that a work by many hands gains in depth and breadth?—George E. Lichtblau, *Washington, D. C.*

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Hiram M. Stout
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## INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION

*Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy.* By Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1960. Pp. x, 243. $5.00.)

A psychologist has joined a specialist in international affairs to analyze "the use of the psychological instrument in statecraft." Their purpose was the useful one of developing a more precise concept of this instrument which they argue is distinct from the traditional diplomatic, economic and military instruments, and is analytically separable though operationally inseparable from them.

The United States, say the authors, has failed to create a "total strategy" for achieving foreign policy goals. They attribute this failure in part to American organizational and constitutional "weaknesses." It is a consequence also of policy makers never having "truly understood the nature of the psychological instrument." The authors seek to dispel this ignorance. They offer a survey of the "principles" and the policy planning and intelligence requirements of "strategic psychological operations." They hope that more refined concepts will be useful to specialists in international politics and communication and to "government officials at the higher policy levels." They have also some radical organizational remedies and have included three case studies.

The precise meaning of the "psychological instrument of statecraft" remains evasive. Perhaps the clearest definition is suggested in the authors' discussion of the task of the planner of psychological operations. He initiates "action which will influence the behavior of foreign states in a preconceived manner through the manipulation of the foreign decision-makers' apparent worlds." Such action obviously demands a total strategy which in this reviewer's opinion may be beyond the capability of the American democratic system.

Behind new terminology one finds, however, a book dealing essentially, and usefully, with propaganda as an instrument for attaining foreign policy objectives. Unlike the authors, who feel a need for a different and broader concept, this reviewer uses the term propaganda here with reference to attempts, directly and indirectly, to influence purposely not only mass audiences but decision making elites. Admittedly propaganda is a term with various other meanings. Two of the case studies are concerned with United States propaganda efforts in Italy, in 1943–45 and in 1948, and the third with radio broadcast and balloon-leaflet projects of Radio Free Europe. Interestingly, in these case studies, "propaganda" rather than "psychological operations" is the authors' most significant terminological instrument.

One of the book's central and valid points is that policy makers should understand that diplomatic, economic and military actions always have propaganda, or if you will "strategic psychological," consequences. The authors offer an unnecessarily elaborate scheme for a separate, Cabinet-level "Department of Strategic Psychological Operations." The new Kennedy Administration wisely has moved in a different direction, abolishing the National Security Council's Operations Coordinating Board and implying that integrated use of all of the instruments of foreign policy must come not from bureaucratic separatism but from unified, energetic White House and State Department direction. Hopefully, neither will the propaganda instrument be neglected, nor will unsophisticated "sell America" ideas prevail.

This book will be useful to political scientists unfamiliar with research by social psychologists and other specialists in mass communication. For the book offers an elementary summary of much of the work of social scientists which is pertinent to problems in the conduct of American foreign policy. Further, the authors demonstrate an awareness of existing deficiencies in concepts, empirical research and theory in the field of international communication. The book is well footnoted, but its value to teachers would have been increased with a bibliography.—HARRY HOWE RANSOM, *Harvard University.*

*American Foreign Policy Since World War II.* BY JOHN W. SPANIER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960, Pp. ix, 234. $4.50.)

The purpose of this provocative volume is "to present an [analytical] account of American foreign policy since 1945." The author's goal is not to present a catalogue of events, but to provide "a more profound understanding of the past" and to contribute to "a greater insight into the basic problems that currently face the United States in the international area." Two of the problems that the author regards as vital are given particular emphasis. These problems concern American military strategy and our relations with underdeveloped countries.

In six fact-laden (but, unfortunately, totally undocumented) chapters Professor Spanier presents a devastating critique of postwar American foreign policy. After outlining the beginnings of the cold war, he proceeds more or less chronologically with analyses of containment in Europe, containment in the Far East, the strategy of "brinkmanship," the crisis of "massive retaliation," and policy deficiencies regarding the underdeveloped countries. The account is generally reliable, and most of the criticisms offered by Professor Spanier cover ground that specialists in the field will not find new.

The most controversial feature of this work is the author's central thesis that

> . . . as the United States moves into the 1960's, it is becoming increasingly evident that American liberalism, with its intense distaste for "power politics," has hampered—and continues to hamper—an adequate response to the ideological, social, and strategic challenges of our age. Liberalism's separation of war and peace into two mutually exclusive states of affairs, and its divorce of force and diplomacy, have made it impossible to unite power and policy; the result is that our all-or-nothing military strategy is paralyzing our diplomacy. And liberalism's failure to understand social politics—i.e., the class struggle—is a grave obstacle to our comprehension of the social changes accompanying the "revolution of rising expectations" throughout the underdeveloped areas. . . . The current crisis of American foreign policy is, in short, the crisis of American society, since liberalism is the product of our predominantly middle-class culture. It is upon the need to re-examine and adjust this value system that this book focuses.

This thesis is elaborated in an introductory chapter entitled "The Liberal Approach to Foreign Policy." In a final chapter, "The Inadequacy of American Liberalism," we are again warned that liberalism can no longer regard peace and war as two mutually exclusive states of affairs, that it must cease regarding power as evil, that it must give up the separation of force and diplomacy, and that it must cease evaluating regimes in underdeveloped areas in terms of its own values (constitutionalism, democracy, and free enterprise). What is objectionable about all this is Professor Spanier's use of the term "liberalism," not his advice to policy makers. The indictments he sets forth could as easily (and often more appropriately) have been directed at American *conservativism.* In Professor Spanier's opinion, however, it was American liberalism which led the nation back to normalcy in the 1920's, refusing "to face the responsibility that attended the possession of great power."

Since the author's central purpose is to "present an account of American foreign policy since 1945," the reader is likely to be disappointed by certain omissions. There is not a single sentence dealing with Latin American policy, and such subjects as disengagement and disarmament fare little better. The fifteen pages dealing with "The Middle East and Suez" omit many of the facts that are essential for understanding the crises of 1956 and 1958. Moreover, this particular discussion somehow fails to illustrate the folly of the strategy of "brinkmanship," in spite of the author's opportunity and intent to do precisely that.

In the field of value judgments and policy recommendations Professor Spanier has undoubtedly made an important contribution to more mature thinking about foreign policy. To make this effort, however, is to invite dissent. Many readers will argue that the world's territorial *status quo* is not as vital at every point along the line dividing East and West as he seems to think it is. Others will find sound grounds for questioning his rather dogmatic predictions of continued harmony in Sino-Soviet relations and his belief that "Communists will not cease being Communists" as that status is presently understood. Moreover some of his suggestions concerning a proposed Marshall Plan for the underdeveloped countries are likely to be attacked as naive or dangerous, particularly his tacit proposal that the United States confine its efforts to stimulate economic growth to areas that are undergoing social transformation. Many other invitations to dissent appear throughout the volume.

Despite the criticisms outlined above, Professor Spanier has produced a work that will be rewarding reading for the non-specialist as well as for students of American foreign policy. The fact that it is also available in a paper binding (at $1.75) should help to assure that it receives the wide audience it deserves.—H. PAUL CASTLEBERRY, *Washington State University.*

*The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine.* BY ROBERT W. TUCKER. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960. Pp. xi, 207. $5.00.)

Here is a penetratingly logical analysis of the American doctrine of the just war, which in its pure form holds that the right to employ force in international affairs is limited to the sole contingency of a prior armed aggression. This doctrine raises a host of questions, practical and moral. Let us call attention, in necessarily abrupt fashion, to some of those asked and dissected by Mr. Tucker.

Does not this doctrine over-simplify the differences between preventive and defensive war? May not a preventive war be defensive in every sense save for the initially "aggressive" act of resorting to armed force, and may not the state made the object of the preventive use of force wage a war that is anything but defensive except for the fact that it did not literally initiate the armed conflict? Does not the doctrine of defensive war assume that "the first blow" will not be decisive, and is that assumption warranted when the powers have nuclear weapons? Are there not aggressions as dangerous and unjust as overt armed aggression—subversion and satellitism, for instance? When a nation goes to war in response to aggression should it limit itself to repelling the immediate danger or should it go ahead and fight a war of unconditional surrender to remove the danger? It seems that the American doctrine holds that once war comes it should be expanded to the broadest of objectives.

Out of the doctrine of a defensive and just war has come the American doctrine of deterrence of aggression by the ever-present threat of massive retaliation. This doctrine presupposes for its success a united and determined national will always ready to sustain the threat of massive annihilation regardless of the intrinsic value of the place or places attacked. It is based on the sanguine expectation that it will succeed, that it will actually banish force from history.

What if this continuing threat of massive retaliation should in fact fail to deter? Then the literal annihilation of an aggressor may readily be justified as a defensive measure. "All that is necessary is that the act of annihilation be attended by a defensive purpose!" Defense for whom? For the nation with the power to inflict the massive retaliation. In the final analysis, then, the massive retaliation would be justified by the nation that employed it on the ground that national survival or even security is an absolute value transcending moral judgment; or, egoism of egoisms, that that particular nation embodies transcendent universal moral values necessary to all mankind.

But what if the policy of deterrence through the continuing threat of massive retaliation should prove to be an unqualified success? What if, by this process, force were really banned from international relations? What if even "indirect aggression" and "subversion" were prevented in this way? Would this be a desirable world order? Would it be a just peace? Would it not corrupt the purposes it allegedly was designed to serve? Would it not freeze the *status quo* and prevent even desirable change? Would it not be a peace resting on force, coercion, and in the final analysis on the unilateral fiat of the United States?

Mr. Tucker has produced a brilliant exegesis of a doctrine, but like any exegesis it ignores and minimizes some realities. Wars in the twentieth century have become total and for the unconditional surrender of the enemy not primarily because of the doctrine of the just war but for a great variety of reasons, most of them technological in origin, as Raymond Aron has demonstrated. If indeed we are moving to the banishing of force from history, it is a banishing based not on unilateral but on bilateral—and a developing multilateral—threat and coercion. What Mr. Tucker calls the American doctrine, that is the identifying of the justice or injustice of war with acts immediately attending the initiation of force, may no longer be merely an American doctrine, if indeed it ever was so restrictedly held. As Mr. Tucker himself suggests, this has increasingly become the criterion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and in all probability it would be invoked against the United States in the event the United States were to send its armored forces into East Germany to remove impediments to its legal right to remain in West Berlin. Moreover, in our complex and conflicting world with nuclear powers, it is probably a sound instinct that is leading us to assign blame on the basis of so simple a test. As for the possibility of freezing the *status quo*, this is a fear frequently expressed in all ages, notably in the Metternich era, but the persistence of dynamic forces in the various societies has always prevented a freezing, and it certainly is not likely to take place in our age of revolutionary ferment. However, the tendency for internal change and revolution to spill over into international relations is especially dangerous in our tense, nuclear age, and the arduous quest for methods to provide peaceful change, both internal and international, must become a central one in our time.—WILLIAM G. CARLETON, *The University of Florida.*

*On Thermonuclear War.* BY HERMAN KAHN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. Pp. xx, 652. $10.00.)

This is an unusual book in at least two respects. First, its contentions have produced comment ranging from the most uncritical apology to near slander of the author. Second, the present work is, regrettably, the most appalling literary effort in the whole burgeoning defense studies genre. Before he can begin to appreciate the force of the author's theses, the reader is afloat in a torrent of words and wholly preoccupied with the problem of how to extricate himself. The Center of International Studies at Princeton sought to retain the "informality," "style and organization" of the original Kahn Briefings for their publication here. (A "Kahn Briefing" may be described as a provocative, spontaneous, and extended *tour de force* by the author before a wide variety of audiences.) The Center is deserving of censure for a major abdication of editorial responsibility. The "Three Lectures" (an amazing euphemism) which comprise the substance of the book could have been presented in half the space and, perhaps, at half the price had there been any discipline at all.

The author purports to treat of the military side of what may be "the major problem that faces civilization." The problem is thermonuclear war and the treatment is undertaken from a "Systems Analysis point of view." It is clear, however, that Kahn deals only with those aspects of this problem which interest him most and, one is forced to say, those aspects which most readily lend themselves to systems analysis. Kahn relates that he was "trained" in physics and mathematics but that today he is a systems analyst; undoubtedly he is one of the foremost systems analysts in the country. Consequently, the biographical note on this book's jacket does not flatter him when it calls him a military strategist—even an exciting one. By not confusing the author with a military strategist it is easier to put his contributions in perspective.

Kahn displays a realism on a number of issues which has been much needed among deterrence theorists. Evincing a return to more classical considerations he puts aside many of the psychological aberrations which have dominated recent thought, and adopts a posture based on "objective capabilities." Where in the past deterrence theories frankly turned on the avoidance of combat, Kahn insists that it is both necessary and possible to "prevail" in a thermonuclear war. Given a carefully worked out sequence of programs through the pre-attack period into the post-attack period, he argues that the United States *could* contain a thermonuclear attack and still be in a position to "carry on" afterwards. The argument is based on a better acquaintance with the problems involved than are most that have circulation outside the government and is, I think, convincing. Yet the readers of this journal are aware that Kahn's thesis has evoked a bitter and, on the whole, a curious opposition. Some would have it that the author is a kind of pied piper who is leading us back to our ancestral caves; they charge that to the degree by which he succeeds in convincing large numbers of people that they can survive a thermonuclear war, he contributes to the likelihood of such a war. This surely is a grotesque bit of reasoning. What is really under fire is the author's rejection of the notion that war is obsolete—that it amounts to mutual annihilation and thus is no longer a practical policy alternative.

If Kahn rejects the determinism in the contention that war is simple suicide, he does not altogether escape the grip of technological determinism—conceivably an occupational hazard among systems analysts. Klaus Knorr notes in a foreword that while Kahn cannot help raising "profound moral issues," this is not a book about such issues—a distinction that will not be grasped by all readers. For example, the author, good systems analyst that he is, soberly spells out the circumstances in which "Mutual Homicide" becomes the optimal course of action. (We are also informed that a "Doomsday Machine" produces a kind of aesthetic opposition among political people but in some engineering circles it remains the preferred mode of mutual homicide.) On a broader canvas thermonuclear war—the "Central War"—is still an Air Force war from the RAND point of view. Peripheral wars—wars involving all elements of the military establishment and raising questions across the whole military spectrum, quite possibly the most likely wars—do not particularly interest Kahn. Herbert Butterfield and others have stressed the likelihood of a war initiated with conventional weapons, perhaps against a minor country, but ending in thermonuclear chaos. As against this "complex" possibility, Kahn concerns himself primarily with a "simple" situation of thermonuclear exchange at the outset. There are other emphases to be noted in this work and at RAND generally of late which can be traced both to unfolding weapons technology and prior decisions at Air Staff level. I refer to the stress on "counterforce" thinking and "active air defense," neither of which have always been among the flora and fauna at Santa Monica, although they have been perennials in some Pentagon patches. In fairness it must be said that the Navy's enchantment with "Finite Deterrence" follows embarrassingly in the wake of moral homilies on the discriminatory use of force and now the emergence of a guaranteed-response, but low-yield, strategic weapon system. In meeting the argument of "Finite Deterrence" exponents that counterforce targeting is futile where the enemy appears to have gained an initial advantage, Kahn would take the line that, first, it is of some urgency that we take steps to guard against such a contingency and that, second, active defense measures—even those under Army auspices—are now plausible. On the subject of preemption the author is noticeably skittish, due plainly to the prevailing policy position of the Air Force. This may well be the next change of course for RAND.

The glaring doctrinal void produced in military affairs by modern weapons technology has not been filled by the present work. It becomes increasingly evident that the foremost task is to distinguish various levels of analysis more sharply than heretofore. A "public philosophy of force" upon which a broad "strategic doctrine" can be formulated is the primary theoretical problem. Both of these need to be articulated in order to provide a meaningful basis for weapons-utilization doctrine. The alternative, all too evident here, is to allow technology to establish its own immanent doctrine. However, in the undertaking whereby distinct levels of analysis are brought together in a coherent pattern Kahn's work will be a valuable resource.—JAMES M. ROHERTY, *Mount Mary College.*

*The Modern Law of Land Warfare.* BY MORRIS GREENSPAN. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960. Pp. xxiv, 724. $10.00.)

This book is a comprehensive restatement of the law of war and neutrality as it relates to hostilities on land, with some incidental treatment of warfare in the air and in territorial waters. The coverage complements that of Robert W. Tucker, *The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea* (1957). However, Greenspan's focus leads to omission or scant treatment of several topics usually associated with the law of war. No attention is given to forcible measures short of war, except that reprisal is considered as a method of enforcing observance of the law of war. There is no analysis of trading with the enemy or of the effect of war upon contractual relations between nationals of enemy states. Custody of enemy property is considered only with respect to occupied areas. An introductory chapter on the present status of the law of war provides a brief theoretical frame. Appendices give some of the annexes to Geneva Conventions I, III, and IV of 1949 and the unratified Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923.

Most of Greenspan's material is a careful, lucid restatement of rules gathered by collating international conventions (those actually in force and those not in force but thought to be declaratory of customary law), principal national manuals of land warfare, and reports of cases. The comprehensive coverage of treaties is indeed a useful service. Cases are usually cited as footnote illustrations of rules drawn from conventions. Often the judgments are stated with only brief indication of the facts and little critical apparatus. Law review articles and comments are sometimes cited, but much of this literature has not been used. Thus it is surprising that in discussing the Altmark case he makes no reference to Waldock's substantial defense of the British position (24 *British Yearbook of International Law* 216 [1947]), and in supporting the Yamashita judgment he ignores the analysis, admittedly to be taken with some reservation, of one of the defense counsel, A. Frank Reel (*The Case of General Yamashita* [1949]). Although he does not avoid controversial matters, Greenspan sometimes treats them briefly without fully utilizing the critical literature. Nor does he often press theoretical implications of positions. For this the reader must still turn to such books as Julius Stone's *Legal Controls of International Conflict* (1954). Greenspan's strength lies in straightforward restatement of the law in the books.

He admits that law in the books does not always correspond with law in action, and points to obsolete provisions of treaties in force. He finds no conclusive definition of "military necessity" or "undefended places," considers warning of bombardment unnecessary in aerial warfare, the proper measure of reprisals vague, the rules of aerial warfare lacking in explicit definition.

On the other hand he is remarkably sanguine about some suggested legal standards. The looseness and want of comprehensiveness of definitions in the Genocide Convention do not disturb him. He finds life in the rule against bombardment of non-military targets, yet his justification of British "target-area bombing" on the ground that German industrial areas were heavily defended and military objectives carefully camouflaged seems to beg the whole question. In discussing the Hague prohibition of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering he suggests an obligation to reconcile military necessity, humanity, and chivalry, a proposition likely to appeal mainly to optimists. We may feel assured of outlawry of poisoned arrows, dum dum bullets, and chain shot since these are not effective weapons. But Greenspan also (quite logically) holds to be illegal anti-personnel fire weapons (flame throwers, napalm bombs), blistering and choking gases, booby-trap mines, and nuclear weapons generally. All these have actually been used, so that hope of avoiding future use seems to rest less upon humanity, chivalry, or the "law" against causing needless suffering than upon prudential considerations.

Other judgments seem not fully responsive even to the law in the books. Is it sound to suggest that during post-hostilities occupations a victor may suppress obnoxious institutions of the defeated state which led to the war because this falls within the exception in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, requiring respect for local institutions unless "absolutely prevented"? Probably the article was intended to apply only to "wake-of-the-battle" occupations. Is it clear that states which admit foreign armed forces "tacitly agree to renounce some exercise of local sovereignty over them"? Against the gratuitous dictum of Marshall in *The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon* must be put some evidence that such concessions were granted by treaty and not tacitly assumed. Greenspan here fails to notice the memorandum prepared by the Department of Justice for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations when it considered the NATO Status of Forces Agreement in 1953.

Is it proper to accept the counts of the Nuremberg indictment as a correct listing of the categories of war crimes, merely adding genocide? Even if we admit the desirability of punishing political leaders who initiate aggressive war, can we follow Greenspan and the Tribunal in saying that such conduct was considered criminal before 1939, *i.e.*, as distinct from a violation of state obligations? Certainly none of the instruments cited by the Court contained this principle. The statement that "the distinction between lawful and unlawful war has existed for centuries and only became obscured in comparatively recent times," seems to imply that the medieval-renaissance distinction was like the present one, that its disappearance for a couple of centuries had no legal consequences, and that the illegality of war is synonymous with individual criminality in instituting it. These assumptions will not bear much examination. The principle of "*nullum crimen sine lege*" is dismissed without discussion as inapplicable. Surely the curious comment made by the Nuremberg Tribunal in dismissing it deserves critical analysis. In discussing *In re Yamashita* Greenspan seems to ignore the inconsistency of this judgment with the principle of *mens rea* he has just advanced. There was persuasive evidence in that case that Yamashita's forces were so disintegrated when he assumed command that it was physically impossible for him to control them. He neither ordered, voluntarily permitted, nor condoned their conduct. Has a man an affirmative duty to prevent what it is physically impossible for him to prevent? Again, is the surrender of sovereign immunity as to state-trading operations a relevant argument for permitting neutral states as well as private persons to supply belligerents? For that matter, is the premise true? Despite the Tate letter and dicta in *The Christina*, neither the United States nor Great Britain has come firmly to the position of denying immunity as to all acts *jure gestionis*.

If Greenspan's judgments upon certain of the more controversial and theoretical points seem inadequately supported, it must nevertheless be said that his book as a whole is a readable, judiciously phrased, well documented manual which will prove most useful.—C. H. McLaughlin, *University of Minnesota*.

*Sea Power: A Naval History*. By E. B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, editors. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960. Pp. xii, 932. $11.00.)

Members of the Naval History Committee at the United States Naval Academy have revised and expanded their earlier text, *The United States and World Sea Power* (1955), to produce what the publisher proclaims as a "definitive naval history." As one plows through the 885 pages of tightly written text he becomes convinced that this indeed must be definitive. Few are the topics or incidents which have been omitted. Yet he may question the balance, the consistency, and, yes, the completeness.

While E. B. Potter and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz get equal billing on the cover as the editors of the volume, it turns out that Potter is editor, Nimitz is listed as "associate editor," J. R. Fredland and Henry H. Adams are assistant editors, and the authors number twelve members of the staff at the Naval Academy (including the editor and assistant editors). In view of the publisher's statement that this represents a joint project written and rewritten over a period of fifteen years, the statement in the Preface, "Every page of *Sea Power* reflects the influence of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, who was closely associated with the project from beginning to end," would appear to be a pardonable exaggeration. It would be interesting to know precisely the extent to which this does represent that distinguished admiral's thinking.

The book is in effect a world naval history with emphasis on the leading naval power in each given period, extending from the Greeks and Romans to the Venetians, the British, and the Americans. Some 350 of the book's 885 pages are devoted to a naval history of World War II based largely on Morison's *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* and Roskill's British account, *The War at Sea*. It is, in a sense, as the authors suggest, four books in one: a history of the world's navies, a history of the U. S. Navy and American naval power, a study of the evolution of naval warfare, and a study of the importance of sea power as an element of national power.

With suspense, attention to detail and apparent accuracy, the authors treat practically all of the major naval engagements. Whether one is looking for something on the Battle of Salamis, the Spanish Armada, the role of sea power in the American Revolution, the dramatic encounters of the War of 1812; or if one wants to read of Vera Cruz, or Mobile, or Gallipoli, or Jutland, the sinking of the Bismarck, or the Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, the Normandy landings, the Battle for Leyte Gulf, or the burning of the *Franklin*—these and scores of other episodes are to be found covered with skill and imagination, and usually illustrated with excellent charts.

When one searches for the development of thought, doctrine, and policy, these usually can be found too, but the results are less satisfactory. This is to take nothing from the brief essays which are incorporated from time to time; it is to suggest that the treatment is much less complete. The reader follows with interest the recent technological revolution in naval weapon systems, but he is at a loss to fit them into current doctrine. Logistic doctrine—particularly as it had to be improvised for World War II in the Pacific—has good brief treatment, but there is no impression of the central importance of this aspect of modern warfare The Navy's position in such matters as unification of the Armed forces is presented sympathetically, if not always convincingly. But there is little hint of the intra-Navy struggles over such things as the role of the aircraft carrier, light-than-air-aviation, the nuclear submarine program, and the *Polaris* missile. Neither is there attention to the whole complex area where are to be found some of the greatest influences on strategy in our own day—the role of vested interests—the favor of a certain type of vessel because it will be built at a certain place—the urging of a certain weapon system because certain companies and certain areas of the country will benefit, and then the shaping of strategy to fit the system rather than vice versa.

But probably we expect too much, even though the volume is offered as "definitive." As a basic text and reference book, as a starting place for those who must wrestle with the broader questions of policy to which we have alluded, as a companion for all those interested in military history and institutions, this can be highly recommended.—JAMES A. HUSTON, *Purdue University.*

*Indonesian Independence and the United Nations.* BY ALASTAIR M. TAYLOR. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1960. Pp. xxix, 503. $7.50.)

Mr. Alastair Taylor's case study of United Nations involvement in the Indonesian Revolution of 1945–1949 is excellent on several counts. Basically a chronological description of the attempts at pacific settlement of the struggle between Holland and Indonesia, it is at the same time a fair analysis of the human predicaments which complicated the conflict. Mr. Taylor's great virtue as an analyst is his ability to locate juridical positions and organizational events in a context of living politics.

The plumb line of Mr. Taylor's analysis is a statement of seven "Basic Issues" which kept Holland and Indonesia at odds and the United Nations in a quandary; these were the fundamental questions of sovereignty, power, interim government and future Dutch-Indonesian relations. The agreements of Linggadjati and Renville became possible largely because the basic issues were ignored or sidestepped; for the same reason the agreements failed. Accommodation to Indonesian views was forced on the Dutch in 1949, but mainly by the pressure of world opinion and the threat of losing Marshall Plan aid.

Through the intermittent battle, the Dutch stuck to three aims: (1) "a premeditated policy to get rid of the Republic as a constitutional entity," (2) a program to set up a network of Federal States with which the Republic "was to associate itself but which it had no part in forming," and (3) an unflagging effort to limit the significance of United Nations intervention. The author is persuasive when he argues that Holland blundered in pursuing these policies with such "rigidity" and "intransigence," though the reader has some trouble distinguishing between Mr. Taylor's irritation at the Dutch manner and his cool analysis of how and why Holland finally allowed her postwar colonial policy to be influenced by outside parties.

It is now easy to show that the main armed attacks on the Republic—the so-called Police Actions—were wrongly conceived, for they provoked the international intervention which Holland strove to avoid. Many will agree with the author's impression that "the Netherlands Government had neither the psychological preparation nor the necessary experience in world affairs to cope with the challenge of nationalism in the Indies." Yet it is difficult to imagine how better judgment and more experience could have led Holland to predict the unprecedented international pressures which were to be applied.

The most impressive section of the book contains Mr. Taylor's assessment of the United Nations role. He criticizes the United States for putting its weight behind the creation of a Good Offices Committee, which was bound to fail in its principal aim, and for advancing juridical arguments which worked to favor the Dutch position until the end of 1948. The machinery for Indonesia only became effective when the United Nations Commission for Indonesia was established in early 1949 "as the representative of the Security Council," with a sufficient mandate to allow Merle Cochran and his associates to take strong initiative towards a settlement.

Mr. Taylor gives the United Nations credit for contributing to the eventual solution at the Round Table Conference, and asks whether the Organization might not be regarded as an "isotope" which can "bombard the political nuclei of its sovereign parents until perhaps one day they may in turn be transformed from independent into interdependent elements." Fortunately, Mr. Taylor rarely allows this idealistic hope to intrude into his account of how the raw facts of world power politics enabled the United Nations to achieve its first clear success in refereeing colonial relations.—Boyd Compton, *New York City.*

*The Saar Conflict.* By Jacques Freymond. (New York: Praeger, 1960. Pp. xxviii, 395. $10.00.)

The Saar conflict began in the fifteenth century; Professor Freymond's volume recounts the developments of the second (and hopefully the last) Saar conflict of the twentieth century. For almost four hundred years this tiny but rich border area has been a source of friction between the Germans and the French. From time to time over this period the French have tried to prove to the world, and to themselves, that the Saarlanders were French. After each period of French domination the Saarlanders have been returned to the country they have traditionally regarded as their fatherland, Germany.

The Saar differs from many other border areas of Europe only in that it has provided an invasion route into France over the centuries and in that under its often dreary and forbidding exterior it bears a heart, not of gold, but of coal. French ambition has always been to unite the Saar's coal to the iron of Lorraine; but this ambition has been realized for only relatively brief periods in the past.

The story of one of these brief interludes of French control of the Saar is the subject of Professor Freymond's book. Beginning with the immediate postwar period, the French diplomatic struggle against Chancellor Adenauer's quiet determination to see the Saar returned to Germany is recounted in detail. The passive acceptance by the Saarlanders of French control at the beginning gave way slowly, but by 1955 it had been replaced by hostile skepticism of French motives. The internal political forces of the Saarland slowly began to organize to oppose any attempt by Johannes Hofmann to keep the Saar within the French orbit, or to make of the Saar the nucleus of a larger European community. The events leading up to the final return of the Saar to Germany are condensed with skill and a keen perception of the forces which were ultimately to be the deciding factors.

There is no doubt that external diplomacy and internal intrigue played significant roles in returning the Saar to Germany. But Professor Freymond probably comes close to the fundamental reason for French acceptance of the return of the Saar when he points out that there was only a "limited interest in the Saar question in Germany as well as in France. . . . In comparison with problems of domestic policy, . . . the Saar occupied only a very secondary place. At no time did the French and Germans give the impression that the absence of a satisfactory agreement could have a serious effect on relations between the two states." Unlike the period between 1920 and 1935, the Saar question no longer raised emotions on either side to fever pitch; it was too old a story. After 1945 France no longer felt the Saar was as vital to her prestige and to her economy as she had a generation before. In any case both sides were exhausted by the war. By 1955 the issue of the cold war far overshadowed the importance of the Saar; in the face of the Russian threat Europe could no longer afford to be split by a quarrel over a few square miles of territory.

Professor Freymond's book appears as one of a series illustrating the settlement of an outstanding international problem without recourse to force. But it would seem doubtful if the Saar settlement provides any very significant example of how similar conflicts could be resolved. Rather it seems to illustrate once more the self-evident point that no matter how deeply rooted in history an issue may be, when it is overshadowed by more compelling national interests on the part of the nations concerned, it no longer remains as a threat to peace.—L. Gray Cowan, *Columbia University.*

*The Nuremberg Trials in International Law.* By Robert K. Woetzel. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960. Pp. xv. 287. $9.00.)

This treatment of the Nuremberg Trials is a welcome antidote to August von Knieriem's recent volume on the same subject. Dr. Woetzel finds that the law of Nuremberg has become a part of generally accepted international law as applied to individuals as well as to states. The author concludes, " . . . it should be stated that in no area more than in that of war crimes is the responsibility of the individual under international law as indisputable and recognized."

The writer outlines the proceedings of the International Military Tribunal and treats the history of war crimes trials from Greece to modern times. The historical presentation is most informative, but by Dr. Woetzel's own admission, none of the historical precedents cited are of any great import to the Nuremberg Trials as, "They occurred under completely different circumstances than the IMT." In discussing the international legal character of the tribunal the author finds that its proceedings " . . . clearly had the sanction of the international community. . . . " Natural law is rejected as a basis for the court. The work relies rather heavily on an examination of the pertinent international agreements and general acceptance by the international community. Dr. Woetzel contends that the twenty-three nations signatories to the London Agreement represented the "quasi-totality of civilised states" at that time.

The author admits that the rules of belligerent occupation "form another powerful basis of criticism against the trials, but contends that the occupation was an *occupatio sui generis*. The endorsement of the principles applied at Nuremberg by the London Agreement and later by the United Nations are viewed as "tangible evidence that they were valid principles of international law" which will serve as a precedent for possible similar trials at some future date. Dr. Woetzel's warning that the precedent had already been "parodied" to form "victor tribunals" has been affirmed by recent events in Cuba.

The Monist doctrine that international law operates directly upon individuals is supported and the study notes that the International Military Tribunal "clearly had a legal right to apply international law to the accused individuals." Dr. Woetzel devotes several chapters to crimes against the peace, participation in criminal organizations, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The writer also discusses developments in international law subsequent to the Nuremberg Trials including the various war crimes trials held by individual European countries and the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo.

The 1950 report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly is termed "a succinct restatement of the law of Nuremberg." The writer also finds that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "enumerates many individual rights and liberties which had been violated and abrogated by some of the defendents at Nuremberg" as does the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Perhaps Dr. Woetzel over-stresses the comparison of the working of international law to the working of common law, for precedent is only a part of the former. The author also seems to confuse general, universal international law with particular international law in that he is sometimes overzealous in claiming general acceptance by the international community when such acceptance is less than universal. However, this is an extremely thoughtful, useful and provocative study. The author's historical, factual and theoretical treatment, as well as his extensive bibliography, will prove rewarding to the reader.

This reviewer agrees with Dr. Woetzel that the Nuremberg Trials mark a momentous step which will serve as a warning precedent in the development of international criminal law. The success of such warning is well illustrated by the fact that today the West German soldier is officially informed that a command need not be followed if a crime or offense might thereby be committed.—ROBERT E. CLUTE, *University of Nevada.*

*The Continental Shelf: The Practice and Policy of the Latin American States with Special Reference to Chile, Ecuador and Peru; A Study in International Relations.* BY BARRY B. L. AUGUSTE. (Genève: Librairie E. Droz, 1960. Inoctavo, pp. 412, broché. fr. S. 40.)

As nations develop the technology to exploit the resources of the sea, interest grows in the policy and practice governing the Continental Shelf. Hence any new study in this area is welcome, especially one dealing with a region in which unusual claims have been made.

Dr. Auguste, though concentrating on Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, furnishes considerable material on the other Latin American states. The general reader may leave the book unfinished, owing to the extensive geological and geographical treatment of the subject, though in closing each chapter the author gives his observations and conclusions in language suitable for the average layman. Those interested in more advanced study will find the book very useful, especially for its compilation of laws, decrees, etc., of the states treated.

In his introduction, Dr. Auguste admits that his subject is controversial and thus justifies extensive quotations from documents in order to avoid misinterpretation of official state positions. He then gives a brief survey of the development of interest in the Continental Shelf.

Since six Latin American states claim rights over waters for a distance of 200 miles, world attention has been drawn to the practical aspects of the width of the maritime zone. Dr. Auguste states: "the consensus of criticism seems to be that the Latin American Practice was not in accord with that of the International Community." He gives seven groups of criticisms against Latin American practice and twelve basic questions which his monograph examines.

He deals first with the legal history of the concept of the Continental Shelf. Two chapters are devoted to the practice and policy of the Latin American states with emphasis on the joint practice of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. The Inter-American Conferences are likewise examined. The author shows that not only do these states claim the sea bed and subsoil but also the waters above. Specific instances of the exercise of jurisdiction by Latin American states over the maritime zone are given. As Dr. Auguste points out, the importance of these incidents is the fact that the states enforced their policies, despite protests from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. The varying terminology and scope of jurisdiction are set forth. A majority of the states "reserve maritime areas to their exclusive control."

The policies were based primarily on an economic interest because these nations "depend on the natural resources of the continent for their means of survival." The C.E.P. states emphasized their unusual conditions which are not common to other coastal states, viz., narrow continental shelves, the relation of fish to the shelves, and the effects of the Humboldt Current. These states felt that foreign fishing was a menace to their fishery resources, and they believed that it was the duty of the state to protect such resources.

The chapter dealing with the Hague Conference of 1930, the Rome Conference of 1955, and the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Seas, 1958, shows the growing emphasis upon conservation of natural resources and the increasing stress on needs and vital interests of coastal states.

The last chapter surveys the reasons given by Latin American states in defense of their extraordinary claims: the nature of the American continental shelves, the oceanographical phenomena and their relation to fish, and the living and mineral resources of the Shelf. The fishing resources are discussed in relation to the economy of the nations. Dr. Auguste declares that "fisheries play an important part in the general health and economic development of these States."

The reasonableness of the Latin American claims are examined. Mr. Melo Lecaros (Chile) is quoted: "reasonableness will depend on the geographical and economic conditions proper to each country, and possibly a limit which is reasonable in America is not reasonable in other continents and vice versa." The Latin Americans feel that their claims to a wide maritime zone fulfill this test.

Dr. Auguste is sympathetic with the position and needs of the Latin American states. He concludes from his study that the term Shelf as a concept has lost its significance and that what is necessary is a "new Fishing Zone" in which states would have "exclusive or preferential rights" apart from the Shelf doctrine. He feels that while "the jurisdiction claimed . . . is unparalleled in the field of international relations," the Latin American states have contributed to the development of international law in that they have focused attention on economic and oceanographic factors relating to the maritime zone rather than on defense or security needs; that while their actions have been unlawful, the states have the weight of reasonableness on their side. Future international action will have seriously to consider the Latin American concepts on conservation of natural resources, the maritime zone, and the importance of economic and oceanographic criteria.

An extensive bibliography is provided. Many of the footnotes contain material important enough to be in the text. Seven useful appendices are included: the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria, the International Law Commissions's drafts of 1951, 1953, and 1956 on the Continental Shelf, the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958, the judgment imposing the $3,000,000 fine on the Onassis fleet, and the chart of the Humboldt Current. An index would have been useful.—JACQUELINE E. TIMM, *Bowling Green State University.*

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
## INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS
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# NEWS AND NOTES

## 1961 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1961–1962

The 1961 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 6–9, at the Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel in St. Louis, Missouri. Professor Wallace S. Sayre, of Columbia University, is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting the Nominating Committee (comprised of Hugh Elsbree, Chairman; Ethan P. Allen; Dayton D. McKean; William W. Marvel; J. Roland Pennock; and Lucian W. Pye) will propose the following officers for 1961–62: President-elect, Carl J. Friedrich (Harvard University); Vice-Presidents, Gabriel A. Almond (Yale University); C. Herman Pritchett (University of Chicago); Dwight Waldo (University of California); Secretary, Marian Irish (Florida State University); Treasurer, Max M. Kampelman (Washington, D.C.); Members of the Council for two years, Robert E. Ward (University of Michigan); Leo C. Riethmayer (University of Colorado); Lester G. Seligman (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Sigmund Neumann (Wesleyan University); John Hallowell (Duke University); Bryce Wood (Social Science Research Council); Vernon Van Dyke (State University of Iowa); Alfred deGrazia (New York University).

## PROGRAM: 1962 MEETINGS

The Program Committee for the annual meetings of the Association to be held in Washington, D. C., in September 1962 has been appointed, as follows: Byrum Carter, Indiana University, Chairman; David Smith, Swarthmore College, Political and Constitutional Theory; Vincent Ostrom, University of California (Los Angeles), Public Administration; James Prothro, Florida State University, American Political and Constitutional Theory; James Robinson, Northwestern University, Political Parties; Ethan Allen, Kansas University, State and Local Government; Vernon Van Dyke, State University of Iowa, International Politics; Lucian Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Comparative Government; Charles Clapp, Brookings Institution, National Government; Howard Penniman, Georgetown University, Special Graduate Student Seminars. Anyone having program suggestions is invited to send them to the Chairman or an appropriate member, not later than October, 1961.

## PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Fifth Annual Conference of the District of Columbia Political Science Association was held on December 3, 1960, at Catholic University of America. The principal speakers of the conference, addressing themselves to various aspects of the "National Purposes and Policies of the 1960's" were as follows: Laurin L. Henry, Brookings Institution; Leon H. Keyserling, formerly of the Council of Economic Advisers; Kenneth Mansfield, staff director of Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery; William Y. Elliot, Harvard University; Berl Bernhard, Commission on Civil Rights; Richard Scammon, Governmental Affairs Institute; and W. Howard Wriggins, Library of Congress.

New Association officers were elected at the business meeting following the conference. They are: Roger Hilsman, Department of State, president; Chester B. Earle, American University, first vice president; Vincent Rock, Office of

Civil and Defense Mobilization, second vice President; Howard Shuman, assistant to Senator Douglas, and Stephen Horn, assistant to Senator Kuchel, members of the Executive Council. H. Field Haviland, Jr., Brookings Institution continued as member of the Council. The Council appointed David W. Tarr, Library of Congress, as secretary-treasurer.

Administrators, planners, political scientists and sociologists from nine countries of South Asia met at the Indian Institute of Public Administration in New Delhi, 14 to 20 December, to discuss public administration problems of new and rapidly growing towns in the region. The seminar was sponsored by the United Nations and UNESCO which sent consultants from Poland, the United Kingdom and the U. S. A. to contribute to the debates. The Seminar was opened by Prime Minister Nehru, who recalled Henry George's "Progress and Poverty" as a useful proposal to control land speculation.

The Joint Directors of the seminar were Professor V. K. N. Menon, Director, Indian Institute of Public Administration, Indraparstha Estate, Ring Road, New Delhi, India and Mr. P. R. Nayak, then Commissioner, Delhi Municipal Corporation. Copies of the documents submitted to the seminar may be obtained from Prof. Menon. The Asian countries represented in the seminar were Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The consultants were Mrs. Elizabeth Layton, Housing Economist, U. K., Professor Julius Gorynski, Vice-Minister of Communal Affairs, Poland and Charles S. Ascher, Institute of Public Administration, U. S. A.

The International Institute of Administrative Sciences will convene a Round Table in Lisbon, Portugal, 11–16 September, 1961. Three themes will be debated: Experience with Technical Assistance (for which G. Wm. Lawson of ICA has prepared the U. S. report); Government Organization for Economic Development (for which a U. S. report has been prepared by Gerhard Colm of the National Planning Association and Harvey S. Perloff of Resources for the Future, Inc., and a report on Puerto Rico by Martin Clapp); and Official Publications as an element of Public Relations of the Administrator. Further details about participation may be obtained from Robert J. M. Matteson, American Society for Public Administration, 6042 South Kimbark Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois.

The 1st General Assembly of the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration took place in Manila 5–10 December, 1960. The Assembly attracted more than 80 delegates and observers from 12 Asian countries and international governmental and non-governmental organizations. The organizing secretary, Dr. Carlos P. Ramos, Director of the Philippines Institute of Public Administration, was able to announce on the opening day the formal entrance of Japan as the fifth State member so that under the Provisional Constitution EROPA came into being as a duly organized international body. The other State Members are Australia, Republic of China, Philippines and the Republic of Vietnam. The delegate of Thailand announced at Manila that the Council of Ministers of the Government of Thailand had decided on the adherence of Thailand as a State Member.

Group members of the EROPA include the Indian Institute of Public Administration, the Indonesian Institute of National Administration, the University of Hong Kong, the Korean Association of Public Administration, the Vietnamese Association for Administrative Research and several professional societies in the Philippines.

The theme of the 1st General Assembly was "Strengthening Local Administration for Economic and Social Development." Three working groups discussed papers submitted by *rapporteurs*: "Central Services to Local Government": Professor Prajudi Atmosudirjo, Indonesia; "Problems of Local Autonomy": Dr. Franklin Chi Ch'ing Yao, Republic of China; "Government Administration of Rural Development": Dean Dongwon Kim, Republic of Korea.

The Assembly elected an executive council of seven. Five of these represent State Members: Republic of China, Dr. Franklin Chi Ch'ing Yao; Philippines, Hon. Serafin Salvador; Republic of Vietnam, Rector Vu Quoc Thong. For Australia and Japan Council Members are to be appointed by the several governments. Group members represented on the Executive Council are the Indian Institute of Public Administration, Prof. V. K. N. Menon and Indonesian National Institute of Administration, Prof. Prajudi Atmosudirjo.

## OTHER ACTIVITIES

Paul C. Bartholomew, professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, was visiting lecturer during the winter and spring quarters, 1961, at University College, University of Chicago.

James S. Coleman, Russell Fitzgibbon, and

David A. Wilson of the UCLA department of political science, together with Wendell Bell of the department of sociology and Professor Robert Baldwin of the department of economics have received a grant from the Carnegie Corporation to support a five year study of the phenomenon of political change. The study will focus on such areas of rapid change as Africa, Latin America, the West Indies and Southeast Asia.

Geoffrey Y. Cornog, assistant professor in political science at Michigan State University has been appointed Staff Editor of the *Public Administration Review* and publications officer of the American Society for Public Administration.

Edward Dawson, formerly of the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, has accepted an appointment as executive director of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.

Lowell C. Day, formerly at the University of Pittsburgh, joined the staff of Baldwin-Wallace College as assistant professor of political science, effective September, 1960.

Rowland Egger, chairman, department of foreign affairs and political science, of the University of Virginia, has been awarded the Haldane Prize by the Royal Institute of Public Administration for 1960.

Alona E. Evans of the department of political science at Wellesley College will participate in the Fulbright Institute on Indian Civilization to be held at Osmania University in Hyderabad in July and August of 1961.

W. O. Farber, who has been on leave since August 1 to serve as minority counsel for the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, returned to his position as chairman of the department of government, State University of South Dakota, effective the second semester.

Alfred P. Fernbach, associate professor of the University of Virginia department of foreign affairs has been granted a leave of absence for the academic year 1961–1962 to accept a Fulbright grant to teach in India.

Wesley R. Fischel, professor of political science at Michigan State University has been awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship to do research on the re-emergence of Japan in Southeast Asia, during 1961–62. He has also been appointed visiting professor of government at the University of Hawaii for the summer of 1961.

J. A. C. Grant of UCLA was recently elected to the National Academy of Arbitrators.

Leslie P. Green of the University of the Witwatersrand, formerly research officer to the Johannesburg City Council and Simon Senior Research Fellow at the University of Manchester, 1957–58, is visiting professor of political science at the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

John Perry Horlacher, chairman of political science, University of Pennsylvania, will serve as chairman of an Industry Committee under the Fair Labor Standards Act to set minimum wage rates for the glove, leather, and tobacco industries in Puerto Rico during the month of April.

The Department of State lately announced that Roger Hilsman was appointed as director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Ronald F. Howell, department of political science, Emory University, has been awarded a Rockefeller Grant to pursue research in contemporary French political and legal philosophy from June 1, 1961 to January 1, 1962. Part of the time will be spent in France.

During 1960–61, Samuel P. Huntington occupied the Ford Rotating Research Professorship in the department of public law at Columbia.

Jerome G. Kerwin of the University of Chicago will retire on October 1, 1961. He will be visiting professor of political science at Stanford University in the spring and summer quarters 1961.

Robert J. Koblitz, associate professor of government at Bard College, has been granted a leave of absence from January 1961 to September 1962 to serve as associate director of the study of the Federal government and higher education. The two-year study is being conducted under the auspices of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

Gertrude Leighton, associate professor of political science at Bryn Mawr College, will take a leave of absence during 1961–62 in order to join the Institute of Legal Research at the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania where she will be associate research professor in law and psychiatry.

Under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation, the Asian Studies Committee of the University of Michigan has appointed Martin D. Lewis of Baldwin-Wallace College, Dale Riepe of the University of North Dakota, and L. C. Wright of the Women's College, University of North Carolina, as faculty interns in Asian studies for the academic year 1960–61.

Stuart A. MacCorkle, director of the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, has returned from the University of Seoul, Korea, where he was engaged in the organization of the School of Public Administration.

Charles B. McLane of the department of government at Dartmouth College held an appointment as visiting professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Geneva, in 1960–61. Professor McLane has also been awarded a SEATO Fellowship for research in South East Asia.

Joseph F. Menez, chairman of the department of political science, Loyola University, Chicago, received a Fulbright grant to lecture in Peru for

1960–61. He lectured at the National Universities of Trujillo, Cuzco, and Arequipa.

Richard E. Neustadt continued through the spring term to serve in Washington as advisor to President Kennedy on government organization.

James R. Roach of the government department at the University of Texas has been appointed Fulbright lecturer in political science at Rajasthan University, Jaipur, India, for the 1961–62 academic year.

Robert Scigliano, associate professor of political science at Michigan State University has been awarded Rockefeller and Ford grants to conduct research in political development in Vietnam.

Kurt Shell, currently assistant professor at Harpur College, has accepted an invitation from the Free University of Berlin to undertake a research project on the 1962 Berlin elections and to lecture on comparative politics.

Frank J. Sorauf, associate professor of political science, Pennsylvania State University was visiting associate professor, department of government, University of Arizona for the 1960–61 academic year, replacing Professor Bernard Hennessy who is on special leave as associate director of the Citizenship Clearing House.

Arnold S. Trebach, assistant professor of political science, University of Tennessee went on leave and joined the staff of the United States Commission on Civil Rights on July 25, 1960. He was promoted to chief of the Administration of Justice Section of the Commission on August 15, 1960, and is currently directing the study of discrimination in the operation of police agencies and of the courts in the United States.

Paul W. van der Veur, University of Hawaii, has been granted a two-year leave to serve as a senior research fellow in the New Guinea Research Unit of the Australian National University at Canberra. He will be engaged in library and field research on the political development of Australian and Netherlands New Guinea.

Manfred C. Vernon of the University of Alabama is on leave of absence during the current academic year and is serving as a Fulbright Fellow at the University of Ankara, Ankara, Turkey.

Joseph Zimmerman of Worcester Polytechnic Institute has been elected president of the Citizen's Plan E Association. He is also consultant for the Massachusetts Commission on Atomic Energy.

For inclusion in a special report to be published in *Labor History*, anyone doing research in the field of American labor history is asked to write to Professor Albert A. Blum, Labor and Industrial Relations Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, giving his name, organizational association, and tentative title of the study as well as a brief description of it.

The Institute for American Universities in Aix-en-Provence has a rotating lectureship in International Relations, to which American university faculty members are invited annually. The appointment and modest stipend may be of interest to faculty members on sabbatical leave, on research grants or in retirement. Aix-en-Provence has good research facilities and the Institute is developing an active program of Contemporary European Studies. Further information concerning the Institute and prior visiting lecturers may be found in the Institute's catalogue, which is available in most university libraries or by writing directly to the Director, at 21 rue Gaston de Saporta, Aix-en-Provence.

## APPOINTMENT AND STAFF CHANGES

Richard Bardolph has been made chairman of the political science department at the Woman's College of the University of North Carolina.

A. Doak Barnett of the Ford Foundation has accepted an appointment as associate professor of government at Columbia University and member of the staff of the East Asian Institute, with responsibility for work on the politics of contemporary China.

Willard A. Beling, formerly of Harvard University, has been appointed professor of international relations at the University of Southern California.

Eliot S. Berkley, formerly dean of administration at the Kansas City Art Institute and School of Design, has been appointed vice-president for development.

David A. Booth, has joined the department of political science at Michigan State University as an assistant professor.

P. Allan Dionisopoulos of Indiana University accepted an appointment, effective September 1, 1960, as assistant professor, department of government, University of Arizona.

JeDon Emenhiser, who has served this past year as instructor in political science at the Redlands University, has accepted an appointment for 1960–61 at Utah State University as instructor in political science.

Henry W. Ehrmann, formerly of the University of Colorado, has been appointed professor of government at Dartmouth College.

George Fischer, formerly of Brandeis University, has been appointed research associate of the center for international studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

After teaching two and a half years at Hunter College, Robert Fried was appointed assistant professor of government at Bard College. He began his new duties in February.

Robert Giles (Chicago, Ph.D. '52) last on the staff of South Texas College, was appointed lecturer in the school of government and public administration and lecturer in the department of history, College of Arts and Sciences, of American University in the fall semester, 1960.

Stewart L. Grow, formerly chairman of the department of political science, Brigham Young University, has been appointed director of the institute of government service. He is now on leave from teaching duties to work on the organization and curriculum for the new institute. Mark Cannon, formerly assistant to Congressman H. A. Dixon of Utah, has been appointed chairman of the political science department.

William J. Keefe of Chatham College has been promoted to professor of political science.

Earl O. Kline who recently received his Ph.D. from Princeton University, has been promoted to associate professor of political science at The Citadel.

Martin Lichterman has resigned from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to take up new duties on February 1 as executive secretary of the New England Board of Higher Education in Winchester, Massachusetts. Dr. Lichterman had been on leave of absence from M.I.T. since February, 1959, in order to serve as research director in the office of the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Gerard J. Mangone has been appointed executive officer of the new Maxwell Center for the Study of Overseas Operations at Syracuse University. He recently completed a trip to Nigeria, India, Pakistan, Hong Kong, and Japan where the Maxwell School either has or contemplates overseas programs.

Harry A. Marlow has been appointed assistant professor at the graduate school of public and international affairs.

Alfred G. Meyer was promoted to professor of political science at Michigan State University last summer. He was one of two American professors participating at the centennial celebration of the A. I. Cuza University in IASI, Rumania in October–November.

Daniel P. Moynihan, formerly director of the New York State Government Research Project at Syracuse University has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Maxwell School.

Lowell G. Noonan has resigned as associate professor of political science at the University of Southern California to become associate professor of political science at San Fernando Valley State College in Northridge, California.

Joseph L. Nyomarkay, formerly of the University of Minnesota, has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science at the University of Southern California.

Arthur L. Peterson has joined the faculty at Ohio Wesleyan University as director of the Arneson Institute of Practical Politics and lecturer in political science. Mr. Peterson was most recently attached to the Republican National Committee as a fellow under the Citizenship Clearing House Program.

Claude S. Phillips, Jr., associate professor of political science, has been named director of the newly created institute of regional studies at Western Michigan University. The institute has been set up to improve teaching and offerings on the Non-Western World under a Carnegie grant.

Sam Pearce Pinkerton has been appointed professor of political and social science in the military, United States and world affairs department of the U. S. Army Information School.

Joseph Pois, financial vice president and director of the Signode Steel Strapping Company has been named professor of public administration and director of the public administration program of the graduate school of public and international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh.

Wendell G. Schaeffer, associate professor of public affairs has been named assistant dean of the graduate school of public and international affairs, University of Pittsburgh.

Malcolm Smith, who has been a consultant for the U. S. Civil Rights Commission, has been appointed professor of government and acting assistant director of the governmental research bureau at the State University of South Dakota.

Helen Shirley Thomas has been promoted to assistant professor in political science at Goucher College.

Eric Voegelin of the Institut Für Politische Wissenschaften, University of Munich, has also accepted appointment to the permanent faculty of the University of Notre Dame.

Warren Weston, formerly at New Mexico Highlands University has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Denver.

## IN MEMORIAM

Luther J. Lee, Jr., former dean of the Claremont Graduate School and for fifteen years a valued member of the department of government at Pomona College, died March 31 at his home in Claremont after a year's illness with lateral sclerosis. He was 49.

Dean Lee won his baccalaureate at Pomona College, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, and subsequently earned both an M.A. and a Ph.D. at the University of California in Berkeley. His doctoral dissertation, devoted to an analysis of the development of federalism, reflected both of his main fields of interest as a teacher, namely American government and political theory.

In the year following his appointment to the Pomona faculty in 1941, his senior colleague, Edward McChesney Sait, died and it fell to Dr. Lee to guide the department through the period of the war. Blessed with administrative talent as well as being a competent classroom teacher, he served during the year 1949–50 as assistant field director for the Committee for Economic Development and from 1950 to 1960 as Director of the Claremont Summer Session. Success in these assignments led to his appointment in 1953 as Dean of the Claremont Graduate School, which post he held until his resignation last July because of illness. He was a co-author, with several colleagues at Pomona, of the volume *Our Needy Aged: A California Study of a National Problem* (Henry Holt, 1954)—JOHN A. VIEG.

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

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

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

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